FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES

Vol I: Theoretical Aspects

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PREFACE

At the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 1992, foresters from all over the world agreed to a new understanding of sustainable forest management (SFM). SFM is not just restricted to sustained yields of timber anymore, but also comprises the provision of all economic, ecological, social, cultural and spiritual needs of present and future generations. This widened objective is called "sustainable management, conservation, and sustainable development of all types of forests" in the Rio documents on forests.

Since the Rio Summit and the ongoing international deliberations on forests, national forest programmes (NFPs) are one of the most endorsed policy means for ensuring SFM. This can be explained by the long-term orientation and the large number of political actors interested in forests, and their partly competitive relationships which involves policy planning. However, the astonishing agreement on NFPs could also be explained by the positive symbol of planning recognising the difficulties of its implementation. In the latter case, NFPs would just be a policy capsule without much of a chance to substantially change the status quo in the desired direction.

According to its aim, the main objective of NFPs is to improve the present situation of forests. In developing countries, the donor community expects NFPs to stop deforestation and to maintain the forest resources for the livelihood of the people. However, what are the forest problems that European countries are faced with? They certainly vary from country to country. In the past, the forest area has drastically been reduced in some countries and will be reconstituted. In other countries, one-sided uses of forests for high yield timber production, hunting, grazing, etc., have degraded their production capacity and, in most countries, the health and vitality of the forests are endangered by various types of pollution. The degradation of European forests is even more severe because they are the backbone of the economy in rural areas which suffer from depopulation and economic decline. Thus, the development of NFPs could help increase the value added of forests in rural areas.

There are only a few European countries which have experiences with national forest development plans, forest strategies, forest concepts or however national forest programmes are called. Nevertheless, an NFP is a new policy tool for most European countries, of which the content and purpose is not yet clear. Thus, the University of Freiburg in concurrence with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GTZ) and the European Forest Institute (EFI) organised an international, three-day scientific seminar on the formulation and implementation of national forest programmes. The overall aim of the seminar was to gain a common understanding of the potential and the limits of national policy plans related to forestry and forest industries within the scientific community. A secondary objective was to point out promising research needs in the context of national policy planning and co-ordination related to forests and forestry, for example, within the framework of a new COST-Action on NFPs in a European context to be launched at the end of 1998.

The seminar was in many respects a challenging project. Not only was the topic dealt with highly political and still subject to international negotiations, but, above all, the organisational and structural aspects before and during the seminar gave it certain special features:

- Foremost was the wide variety of international participants. Before the start of the seminar, forest policy scientists from all over Europe were asked to prepare a report on the state of national forest policy planning in their respective countries. More than 15 country reports representing the various European regions was the result, which formed an excellent basis for the seminar and the projects involved. In addition, the composition of these country reports provided a unique comparative insight into the formulation and implementation of forest policies in different European countries.
- A further special aspect was related to the fact that the seminar's topic was very new to most of the European countries. As opposed to the given modest experience in national policy planning and national forest programmes (NFP) in the European countries, the countries of the South possess a long tradition and solid experience in this field. For exactly this reason, experts from the South were invited to share their experience with the European scientists and to incorporate this international experience into the seminar discussions. The South consulting the North – a conscious switch to the predominant flow of technical consultation – was an explicit aim of the seminar.
- Additionally, the circle of participants was deliberately not limited to those solely specialising in forest policy science. It was an explicit aim of the seminar to include scientists from other scientific areas in order to introduce the participants to current thought processes in the social sciences and in relation to the seminar's topic. These reflections, in addition to voluntary papers contributed on different aspects of NFPs, provided a valuable impetus for the seminar's discussions.
- Certainly a very challenging aspect of the seminar was the concept of structuring the entire seminar around three workshop sessions, whereby the seminar's topic was to be discussed intensively in small workgroups. In order to create the stimulating and productive atmosphere necessary for a thorough discussion of the seminar's topic, the participants were split into four workgroups during all workshop sessions and were each given the same assignments. The workgroups' results were then discussed in collective sessions at the end of each day. In order to achieve the ambitious goals set during the workgroup sessions, the workgroups were facilitated by young scientists. As facilitation in such a context is very challenging, they were specially trained in a three-day meeting guided by a professional facilitator before the seminar began.

The seminar followed the same procedure on all three days: in the morning sessions, introductory and impetus presentations developed the topic for the workshops in the afternoon. The workshop of the following day was based on that of the preceeding day. The structure was determined by the principal aims of the seminar:

- The first day of the seminar was devoted to the orientation and theoretical foundation of national forest programmes, thereby drawing on experiences with national environmental policy planning. On the basis of invited and voluntary papers, the first workshop dealt with the key elements building the "should be situation" of national policy planning in the European forestry sector.
- The second day elucidated the "current situation" of the development and experiences to date of national policy planning in forestry in different European countries, based on analysis of the political structure and processes in these countries. In addition, the European country reports were confronted with the long-standing and manifold experiences with forest policy planning in countries of the South. The subsequent workshop aimed at revealing the strengths, weaknesses and deficiencies of the existing NFPs and the reasons for these in Europe and in the South.
- Finally, the third day focused on the further development and research needs of national forest programmes considering the state-of-the-art in economic, legal and social sciences. The presented papers stimulated workshop 3 on further development and research needs concerning NFPs.

All of the different aspects of the seminar are very distinctly reflected in these proceedings. These proceedings consist of two Volumes:

- Volume 1 focuses on theoretical considerations in connection with the formulation and implementation of NFPs. It contains all background papers, keynote presentations, and supplementary papers delivered to the seminar. Furthermore, it summarises the main arguments and the results of several workshops.
- Volume 2 reflects on the state of formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe. It consists of the country reports representing the different regions in Europe: from Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden, Denmark), Western Europe (France, Great Britain, The Netherlands), Central Europe (Austria, Germany, Switzerland), Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) and Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal).

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I

BACKGROUND PAPERS AND OPENING PRESENTATIONS

NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES IN CLEAR TERMS

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ABSTRACT

This article reflects on the concept *National forest programme* as presented by the International Panel on Forests in the follow-up process of the UNCED. After a brief introduction presenting the history of the concept, its meaning is located relative to those of planning and policy on a conceptual map. Subsequently, the purpose of introducing the concept, the definition of the concept, and, finally, the content of the concept are presented and discussed.

Keywords: National Forest Programme, Planning, Policy Framework, Sustainable Forest Management, International Panel of Forests.

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to provide a clear understanding of the concept *National Forest Programme* (NFP) as it is presented in the follow-up process of the UNCED. An understanding, such as this, is an important basis for an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of this concept. Following the introduction, *National Forest Programme* is placed in a relative position to other planning concepts. Subsequently, the purpose of introducing the concept, its definition and, finally, its content will be discussed. A concluding paragraph in bold can be found at the end of each section.

Since the 1992 UNCED summit, global efforts have been made to implement and operationalise the intent of this meeting. Agenda 21 states that national states should work:

> *To prepare and implement, as appropriate, national forestry action programmes and/or plans for the management, conservation and sustainable development of forests. These programmes and/or plans should be integrated with other land uses. In this context, country-driven national forestry action programmes and/or*

plans under the Tropical Forestry Action Programme are currently being implemented in more than 80 countries, with the support of the international community; (UNCED 1992a, Agenda 21, Chapter 11)

Under the management paradigm of *Sustainable forest management*[1] it is considered insufficient that national states prepare isolated forest management plans. International co-ordination and coherence is necessary to meet and reflect on the global dimensions implicit in sustainable forest management.

More recently, the concept of *National Forest Programmes* (NFPs) was introduced to the working process of the International Panel of Forests (IPF) as a conceptual attempt to guide forestry in the UNCED signatory states towards sustainable forest management. The present paper departs from the meaning and content ascribed to NFP according to this process. That of course, does not preclude that the concept of NFP is used differently elsewhere.

The IPF was founded in 1995 by the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). The panel was called in to pursue a consensus and formulate proposals for the national and international implementation of the United Nations Conference goals with regard to forests (programme element I), as well as progress made on national forest- and land-use plans (programme element I.1):

The Commission defined programme element I.1 as a need to consider actions to promote progress through national forests and land-use plans and programmes in implementing the Forest Principles, and chapter 11 and other chapters related to forests in Agenda 21, through an open, transparent and participatory process involving Governments and all interested parties, including major groups, particularly indigenous people and local communities (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, §3).

In its second session, the IPF decided to use *National Forest Programmes* as the conceptual tool to implement the intentions of the relevant UNCED documents. The term *National Forest Programmes* was preferred by the IPF to national forest and land-use plans:

The generic expression "national forest programmes" includes reference to land-use planning and integrated land management. Therefore, it is suggested that the Panel [Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF)] use "national forest programmes" instead of "national forest and land-use plans" (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, §31).

2. NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMME IN THE UNCED FOLLOW-UP PROCESS

First, the relation between NFP and the concepts planning, policy, strategy and goal shall be explained. Subsequently, the concept of NFP will be examined with regard to its *purpose*, its *definition* and its *content*.

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[1] The IPF-process seems to use the concept *Sustainable forest management* synonymous with *Conservation, management and sustainable development of forests*

Locating NFPs on the conceptual map

Programmes, policies, plans, and strategies date back a long time in the field of forestry. Such documents and the processes of preparing them vary widely in form and content according to factors such as level of focus, geographical setting, purpose, context and school of thought (e.g. Mintzberg 1994, ch.1). More precise definitions of these concepts are therefore often necessary.

In the IPF report of its third session (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, §§ 15-32), a set of working definitions were set to explain what this process means in terms of the concepts of planning, policy, strategy and action. These definitions and their inter-relations are presented schematically in Figure 1.

From this set of definitions it appears that the concept NFP has a superior standing to the concepts of planning, policy, strategy, and goal. NFP is described as "a generic expression for a wide range of approaches to the process of planning, programming, and implementing forest activities in countries." (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, § 25)

Planning is the systematic process of examining the future and defining policies, strategies and actions to achieve goals. As a general concept it, thus, has a superior position to the concepts of *strategy* and *policy* and *action*.

A *strategy* is a broad course of action, chosen from various alternatives in an attempt to achieve clearly defined goals. *Policy* is a course of action adopted and pursued by a government, political party, community or the private sector, according to desired social and economic objectives. Both *planning*, *strategy* and *policy* refer to long-term processes.

Plans, strategies and policies should lead toward goals; strategies towards even clearly defined goals (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, § 19). *Goal-setting,* therefore, becomes an important element of planning, and goals are central elements of plans, policies, strategies and actions. Setting clear goals implies that the agents of the planning process share a clear picture of what state or situation the plans should lead us to. As such a matching perception of goals often requires shared norms and world views, goal-setting is a complex and difficult element of planning.

A plan can, as it appears from Figure 1, exist at three different levels: the normative, the strategic, and the operational level. A plan at the normative level is also referred to as a policy (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, § 21). A strategic level plan is referred to as a strategy and an operational level plan is referred to as a plan of action or programme of action. Programme, in this context, refers to the operational level and should not be confused with programme as part of the concept *National Forest Programme.*

Four sub-concepts of planning are more specifically defined by the IPF-process. These are *strategic forest, or forest sector planning*, *operational planning*, *decentralised planning* and *participatory planning*.

Strategic forest-sector planning is a continuous process of taking decisions and actions on alternative ways of conserving and using trees and forests with the intent of achieving specific goals in the mid and long term. It should be emphasised that there is no difference between a forest plan and a forest-sector plan at the strategic level. A strategic-level plan requires planning for the entire forest-sector, not solely for the forests (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, § 20). A forest-sector plan is usually prepared at country level and is therefore frequently referred to as a N*ational Forest Plan.*

Form

Decentralized planning
process of empowering sub-national levels in desicion and implementation processes

Participatory planning
planning where all concerned actors participate in the desicion process

NFP

Planning
a systematic process of examining and defining policies, strategies and actions to achieve goals

Level

Normative level planning
Process that results in a normative level plan. Also called a **policy**. This is a course of action adopted and pursued by a Government, political party, community or the private sector, according to desired social and economic objectives.

Strategic forest-sector planning
A continuous process of desicion-making with a medium to long term focus. Results in a strategic level plan. Also called a **strategy**. This is a broad course of action.

Operational planning
A process of desicion-making concerned mailnly with detail of implementation. Results in an operational level plan. Also called an **action plan**.

Figure 1. The concepts NFP, planning, strategy, policy and goals relative to each other. Definitions from UN-IFP, 1996.

Operational planning is the second specific planning definition given. Operational planning deals with the details of implementation. It has a shorter time frame than strategic planning and is intended for operational-level use.

The third and fourth planning sub-concepts, *decentralised planning* and *participatory planning,* differ from the two, mainly due to the fact they do not directly relate to a planning level (normative, strategic or operational level). *Decentralised planning* is defined as a process of empowering sub-national and local-level authorities in the decision-making and implementation processes, *whereas participatory planning* characterises a planning process, and all concerned actors are invited to participate in decision-making.

This means that operational and strategic planning refer to time frames and planning levels (normative, strategic, operational) and that decentralised and participatory planning refer to a certain form of the planning process – a process where decisions are taken through empowerment of the local level in a participatory manner.

A planning process marked by participatory and local planning represents a distancing from centralised government planning carried out by resource professionals or officials as has often been observed in recent decades. A participatory and local-level planning process possibly expresses a wish by the IPF to secure democracy in planning.

Thus, the concept NFP should initially be understood as an overall concept comprising the processes of normative-, strategic- and operational planning. Implicit in the concept is, in addition, a decentralised and participatory planning approach.

Purpose of NFPs

Why has the IPF-process chosen to introduce the concept of NFPs? What is the purpose of introducing this concept? A number of quotations from the CSD-process publications, each stating a purpose of NFPs, are presented below. The purposes are presented chronologically with the "oldest" definitions first, and the most recent definitions last. This intends to illustrate how definitions have changed through the IPF-process.

1. The goal of National Forestry Programme[[s]] is to promote the conservation and sustainable use of forest resources to meet local, national and global needs, through fostering national and international partnerships to manage, protect and restore forest resources and land, for the benefit of present and future generations (UN-FAO 1996:14).

2. The essence and main purpose of the National Forestry Programme are to ensure the conservation and sustainable development of forest resources (UN-FAO 1996:22).

3. During deliberations at its second session, the Panel considered national forest programmes as the main tool for planning and implementing forest-related activities and noted that considerable efforts had been directed towards planning and policy reforms in all regions, particularly in developing countries (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, § 8).

4. The purpose of national forest programmes is to establish a workable social and political framework for forest conservation, management and sustainable development. National forest programmes are part of a political process... (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, § 27)

5. The goal of a national forest programme is to ensure the conservation, management and sustainable development of forests to meet local, national, regional and global needs and requirements, by fostering national and international partnerships for the benefit of present and future generations (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, § 53).

6. The purpose of the national forest programmes is to establish a workable social and political framework for the conservation, management and sustainable development of all types of forests. Nations forest programmes represent processes by which policy and action-oriented decisions are taken following debate, negotiations, and commitments involving all interested parties (UN-FAO 1997).

7. The panel recognized the importance of comprehensive forest policy frameworks or "national forest programmes" for the achievement of sustainable forest management...it noted that national forest programmes can provide an effective link between strategic and operational planning (UN-CSD-IPF 1997B, §§ 8+11).

The quotations show that a national forest programme is meant to act as a *framework* or *tool* to ensure the conservation and sustainable development of forest resources. The goal is *sustainable forest management* and NFPs as tools, frameworks or guidelines shall help us reach that goal. This means that NFPs shall not ascribe a content to *sus-*

tainable forest management in the respective countries, but provide a framework that can help guide the process towards this goal. The IPF process hereby acknowledges, on the one hand, that the content of a national forest plan can vary greatly, yet it suggests that certain process requirements in planning are necessary to meet the intentions of sustainable forest management. An implicit assumption here is that sustainable forest management cannot come into existence unless certain process requirements are met. The right process framework is required to achieve the desired goals.

Purpose 4 states that NFPs are part of a political process. This indicates that a required part of a national forest programme is to involve all interested parties in the formulation of forest plans, policies and strategies. A corollary of the concept is, therefore, to organise society in a way that makes it possible for all interested parties to be heard. The conceptual ideal of democracy thus becomes a central part of the concept.

Purpose 1 and 5 emphasise the need for national and international partnerships while alluding to the global dimension of sustainable forest management. Coordination of forest management at a global level is a necessary condition for sustainable forest management. Sustainable forest management can solely occur at a global level when management of the parts is coordinated.

According to purpose 4 and 6, NFPs should contribute a *workable* social and political framework. This perception of planning processes as being functionable forms an interesting contrast to the planning processes of the 1970s and 1980s which were mainly oriented to creating optimal solutions.

In purpose 7 it is stated that National Forest Programmes can provide an effective link between strategic and operational planning. This statement seems to contradict the terminology presented in the previous section. There it was stated that NFP encompasses both strategic-level and operational-level planning. Encompassing both of these planning concepts can hardly provide an effective link between them.

Purpose 3 states that NFPs shall introduce policy reforms in all regions, in particular in the developing countries. This implies that a viable policy system, according to the IPF, is a prerequisite for sustainable forest management, and that NFPs should contribute towards such a system. A democratic governing system seems to form the IPF template for a viable policy system.

Within the IPF process, the terminology shifts from National *Forestry* Programme to National *Forest* Programme between the second and third session. The later IPF reports use the term National *Forest* Programmes (e.g. UN-CSD-IPF 1996b), whereas National *Forestry* Programme is used by the FAO and in the earlier IPF reports (e.g. UN-FAO 1996 and UN-CSD-IPF 1996a). As *forest* often refers to the biological system, and *forestry* to the management of this system as part of a society, the use of National *Forest* Programme could imply a narrowing of the concept.

In all of the official papers, however, by using National *Forest* Programme, it is underlined that a holistic and inter-sectoral approach comprising all forest sector activities is needed (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, §25). In addition, the third session report of the IPF stresses that *National Forest Programme* should be read as one concept and not as a combination of three separate concepts, meaning that there is no difference between the purpose and content of the concepts National *Forestry* Programme and National *Forest* Programme. NFPs encompass the entire forestry sector and require that this sector be coordinated with other sectors.

It can be concluded that all the purposes share the goal of s*ustainable forest management*. Whether NFP is to be seen as a main tool, a *functionable* policy framework, or a link is not clear from the above. The most recent quote (7) from the last IPF session states that the purpose of an NFP is to provide a policy framework.

Definition of NFPs

The purpose of introducing NFP has been outlined above. The attention is now focused on a definition of the concept. The quotations below, excerpted from CSD-process material, are definitions of the concept. As above, the definitions are presented chronologically with the first definitions placed first and the most recent definitions last.

1. The term national forest programme is understood to be a generic expression for a wide range of approaches to the process of planning, programming and implementing forest activities in countries. National forest programmes comprise both the planning of forest-sector activities, including the formulation of policies, strategies and action plans, and their implementation, including monitoring and evaluation (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, §25).
2. In many countries, the words "programme" and "plan" are used interchangeably, and "strategy", "forest strategy" or "national strategy" may be used to designate a process similar to that of national forest programmes. In the present report, the expression "national forest programme" is used to designate the process used by a country to deal with forest issues, including the planning and implementation of forest and forest-related activities. The expression "national forest plan" refers to the results of the planning process (UN-CSD-IPF 1996b, §26).
3. Therefore at the local level, a national forest programme must be considered a component of an integrated development programme; at the national level, a national forest programme must be considered an integral component of the national sustainable development strategy/plan (UN-CSD-IPF 1996B, §32).
4. The term "national forest programme" is a generic expression for a wide range of approaches to processes of planning, programming and implementing forest activities at the national and subnational levels (UN-CSD-IPF 1996B, §52).
5. Regardless of the approach adopted by individual countries, national forest programmes, as long-term iterative processes, ... (UN-CSD-IPF 1997B, §10)
6. The panel recognized the importance of comprehensive forest policy frameworks or "national forest programmes" for the achievement of sustainable forest management. It agreed that the term "national forest programme" is a generic term for a wide range of approaches to sustainable forest management within different countries, to be applied at national and subnational levels based on the basic principles... (UN-CSD-IPF 1997B, §8)

An initial reaction to these definitions is that NFP is still defined in a very broad manner bearing in mind that it is a tool for the implementation of sustainable forest management. The definitions vary over time, the most recent agreed upon at the fourth and last session of the IPF being numbers 5 and 6.

This means that at the present stage of the CSD-process, a NFP is a comprehensive forest policy framework used in order to guide the policy process of the respective countries towards sustainable forest management. The term *comprehensive* underlines the meta-position of the concept compared to planning.

As forest policy guidelines have been present in different forms in many countries, the introduction of the concept NFPs underlines the need for a common global framework or common process guidelines and a need for these overall forest policy guidelines to meet the paradigm of sustainable forest management. As mentioned above, this seems to imply that forest policy frameworks are securing democratic participatory approaches to policy-making.

Definition 5 indicates that an NFP as a policy framework should not be seen as a linear process, rather as a process that is continuously iterative. This stresses the need for a constant adaptation to changing or new conditions. The intention seems to reflect the imperative requirement of adaptable behaviour in a rapidly changing environment.

Definition 3 underlines the previously mentioned call for coherence between plans at the local level and those at the national level. In that sense, an NFP sets guidelines for local, as well as national plans. Local and regional plans should form a coherent whole with the national strategy for sustainable forest management, if one exists. The IPF-process thereby accents a desire for integrated management throughout all geographical levels.

From the above it can be concluded that an NFP is defined as a comprehensive policy framework. The IPF papers convey the impression that planning processes in signatory countries should be holistic, flexible, adaptive and integrated at all levels. As the material does not elaborate on why it should be characterised by these concepts, the definition should be considered normative.

Content of NFPs

What characterises a comprehensive forest policy framework according to the IPF-process?

> *The preparation and implementation of the National Forestry Programme is guided by a series of basic principles... The application of these basic principles should enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of national planning and implementation of forestry activities and contribute significantly to the achievement of sustainable forestry development (UN-FAO 1996:15).*

A publication by the FAO[2] and publications from the IPF's third session (e.g. UN-CSD-IPF 1996B) present a set of eleven *basic principles* that were considered during the process. It is stressed that "the application of these basic principles will, of course, need to be adapted to the specific national context (political, social, economical, environmental) of the country concerned" (UN-FAO 1996:15). The eleven principles are:

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[2] UN-FAO 1996. In the FAO publication *Basic principles and operational guidelines* the purpose of NFP is added as the first principle, which is why this set of principles consists of 12 rather than 11 principles. Otherwise the principles are identical.

1. National sovereignty and country leadership:
   National forest programmes are nationally led initiatives, for which the country should assume full leadership and responsibility.

2. Partnership:
   National forest programmes strive to bring together all interested parties in a process for which they will feel concerned and committed. The strength of the partnership will depend on its ability to draw upon the specific capacities of individual partners.

3. Participation:
   In a national forest programme, issues, options and the resulting policies, strategies and programmes are agreed upon through participatory decision-making and consensus-building among all interested partners. Transparency and sharing of information are essential for consensus- building.

4. Holistic and intersectoral approach:
   In national forest programmes, forests should be treated as diverse ecosystems comprising many interdependent elements in dynamic equilibrium, producing a variety of goods and services. Forest dwellers are also a part of the ecosystem. Forestry, including tree-growing in rural areas, is practised within the context of sustainable land management, environmental stability and social and economic development.

5. Long-term iterative processes:
   A national forest programme is a cyclic process comprising planning, implementation, periodic assessment and evaluation. It is also an ongoing process which continuously reflects changes in the planning environment and the acquisition of new knowledge during the course of implementation. Concrete targets and timetables and periodic independent review and reporting are required.

6. Capacity-building:
   Capacity-building is a fundamental element of a national forest programme. Throughout the process, actions are taken to develop the planning and implementation capacity of the national institutions and other key actors, with a view to decreasing dependence on external assistance.

7. Policy and institutional reforms:
   A national forest programme ensures that the policy and institutional framework is conducive to sustainable forest development. Programmes must address policy and institutional issues in a comprehensive manner which recognizes the interdependencies and interlinkages among sectors.

8. Consistency with the national policy framework and global initiatives:
   A national forest programme must be integrated with national sustainable devel-

opment plans and with regional and local strategies. They should all be integrated in land-use planning at the national and local levels and in programmes that are broader in scope, such as environmental action plans and actions to implement Agenda 21 and related conventions and associated initiatives.

9. Raising awareness:
    A national forest programme must raise the visibility of the forest sector and its priority in national agendas. The full value of forests, wooded lands and trees and their contribution to social, economic and environmental well-being at the local, national, regional and global levels must be recognized.

10. National commitment:
    A national forest programme must be backed by a long-term commitment on the part of all national actors (governmental and non-governmental, including community-based institutions and/or organizations within the forest sector and other relevant sectors), particularly at the high political and decision-making levels.

11. International commitment:
    A national forest programme will prove to be counter-productive if expectations raised during the planning process are not addressed. Long-term commitments from the international community and its institutions, from the planning to the implementation phase, respecting the policies, strategies and programmes approved by countries should be ensured.

Apparently, these principles were not adopted by the IPF. In the IPF report to the CSD of its final fourth session, the presented initial eleven principles are no longer in effect. Instead, they are replaced by another set of basic principles presented in two smaller paragraphs.

The first paragraph contains a set of *specific elements* that need to be considered during the development and implementation of national forest programmes (comprehensive policy frameworks). These elements are:

1. Appropriate participatory mechanisms which should involve all interested parties;
2. decentralization, where applicable, and
3. empowerment of regional and local governments structures consistent with the constitutional and legal frameworks of each country;
4. recognition and respect for customary and traditional rights of, inter alia, indigenous people, local communities, forest dwellers and forest owners;
5. secure land tenure arrangements, and
6. the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms and conflict-resolution schemes (UN-CSD-IPF 1997B, §3).

The second paragraph contains *principles* or *key elements* that should be recognised by National forest programmes, as long-term iterative processes, regardless of the approach adopted by the country. The principles to be recognised are:

1. National sovereignty and country leadership;
2. consistency with national policies and international commitments;
3. integration with the country's sustainable development strategies;
4. partnership and participation, and
5. holistic and intersectoral approaches (UN-CSD-IPF 1997B, §10).

The IPF process hereby recommends that these two sets of principles be incorporated in the overall planning process in order to attain the goal of sustainable forest management. These principles are, in other words, the recommended overall policy guidelines suggested by the IPF. It is not clear from the process documents whether the present stage principles are sufficient to attain the goal of sustainable forest management.

Although the first presented eleven principles stated and the last two sets of elements presented above do not contain identical formulations, they both contain roughly the same intentions, whereby the latter set of principles possesses a more open formulation than the former.

The NFP principles prescribe that national states must approach policy-making holistically, operate with long-term time frames, seek to attain coherence across sectors, levels and settings, meet and respect national and international obligations, and create commitment, participation, partnerships, respect laws, minorities, as well as providing decentralised decision making and effective conflict-resolution schemes. These general characteristics all imply a democratic approach to policy-making. The material does not mention, however, how these guidelines must be met and how they will result in sustainable forest management.

3. CONCLUSION

In the process of implementing Agenda 21, the IPF-process, mandated by the Commission on Sustainable Development, has put forward the concept *National Forest Programmes*. A National forest programme is a *comprehensive forest policy framework,* meant to be a generic term for a wide range of approaches to sustainable forest management within different countries and to be applied at national and subnational levels, based on a set of *basic principles*. These principles are divided into two sets. The first set consists of six principles that *can be considered* by national states in national forest planning and policy making. These principles are as follows:

1. Appropriate participatory mechanisms to involve all interested parties;
2. decentralization, where applicable, and
3. empowerment of regional and local governments structures consistent with the constitutional and legal frameworks of each country;
4. recognition and respect for customary and traditional rights of, inter alia, indigenous people, local communities, forest dwellers and forest owners;
5. secure land tenure arrangements, and

6. the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms and conflict-resolution schemes.

The second set consists of five principles that *should be recognised* regardless of the approach adopted by individual countries to its sustainable forest management policy process. These are:

1. National sovereignty and country leadership;
2. consistency with national policies and international commitments;
3. integration with the country's sustainable development strategies;
4. partnership and participation, and
5. holistic and intersectoral approaches.

Elaborated arguments for propounding the above principles are not provided by the process documents. NFP should, therefore, be considered a normative and politically defined concept at present. The concept prescribes an adaptive, holistic and integrated policy approach and propagates an ideal democratic approach to planning processes, thereby emphasising participative, decentralised and respectful processes which are acceptable to all parties involved.

List of abbreviations

CSD	United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
IPF	United Nations Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Panel on Forests
NFP	National Forest Programme
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

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THE ROLE OF THE TROPICAL FORESTS ACTION PROGRAMME AND NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES IN SUSTAINABLE FOREST DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims at summarising the discussion from the beginning of the TFAP process until the achievement of a consensus on the concept of National Forest Programmes (NFP) as the current framework for forest-related measures in the context of sustainable development. The objective of this paper is, thus, a better understanding of the process that led to the development of the NFP concept, and to outline the major trends and developments in the international discussion on forest-related issues carried out in recent years.

Keywords: Tropical Forests Action Programme, National Forest Programmes, International Initiatives, History.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the deliberations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), the concept of National Forest Programmes (NFP) was accepted as the reference framework for sustainable forest management, conservation and development of all types of forests at the national level. This consensus was reached after more than a decade of international debate on the most feasible achievement of the objectives of conservation and sustainable management of forest resources while satisfying the increasing demand for forest goods and services of a growing population world-wide.

As forests have always been subject to economic activities, interest at the international level focused on the goods and services the forests can provide on a global scale. In particular, the destruction of the tropical rainforests woke public attention at the beginning of the 1980s, threatening the existence of the global biodiversity and climate. Since the launching of the Tropical Forestry Action Plan in 1985, the global attention on forest-related issues has not only stimulated international discussion, but

has also attracted a substantial increase in public funding for forest-related projects and programmes within the framework of international development cooperation. In this context, the discussion on the formulation and implementation of forest-related initiatives was influenced by a conflict of interests among conservation issues, widely issued by conservation activists and non-governmental groups, and effective forest utilisation advocated by forest-dependant industries and recipient countries.

It was recognised early that the destruction and degradation of forests could not only be stopped by action within the forestry sector, but that it had large-scale implications on other sectoral and overall development policies and strategies at the national level. It also became evident that less attention had to be focused on trees, and more on the societies and the role they play in forestry. Based on the new focus, fundamental changes in the attitude of decision-makers in national and international institutions towards those participating in planning and decision-making processes were required. Some donors increased their understanding development co-operation in the forestry sector as an instrument for changes in the political and institutional framework of recipient countries. Conditions for their support, including the acceptance of specific forestry planning frameworks were set.

With the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janiero 1992, the controversial discussion on how to harmonize the various interests towards forests was incorporated into a wider discussion on how environmental issues could be taken into account within a general concept of sustainable development, recognising the sovereignty of all countries concerning the use of their natural resources, including forests. The formulation of Agenda 21 and the Forest Principles broadened the scope for a new quality of discussion on all types of forests world-wide.

The discussion was carried out during the UNCED follow-up processes, particularly in the framework of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), a UN work group of the UN Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD). During the deliberations of the IPF, consensus on the concept of National Forest Programmes (NFP) as the overall framework for forest-related development was reached. This consensus is laid down in the IPF Report to the CSD and the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) in June 1997, elaborating the conclusions and actions to be taken world wide to achieve sustainable forest management. The international forestry community is now faced with the challenge of finding feasible ways to effectively implement the IPF proposals for action at the national level. Presently, the follow-up process to the IPF, the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF), supports initiatives in this regard as part of its programme.

2. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TROPICAL FORESTS ACTION PROGRAMME

2.1 Background of the TFAP

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the awareness of the international community on world wide forest destruction and the increasing need for rehabilitation and sustainable

management of tropical forest resources and lands has been increased. As a result, the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP, later renamed into Tropical Forests Action Programme) was adopted by the World Forestry Congress in Mexico in June 1985 as an international framework for forest-related action.

The TFAP was based on two independent initiatives. In 1983, the FAO, on request of its Committee on Forest Development in the Tropics (CFDT), prepared five priority action programmes relating to forests at the international, regional and national level. These programmes included a global inventory of tropical forests, training and firewood demonstration projects and, above all, pilot and demonstration projects at the national level, based on individual country studies and an investment programme over a period of 10 years. The World Resources Institute (WRI), supported by World Bank and UNDP, had also prepared investment programmes for 56 countries, based on similar priority areas as the FAO proposal. As opposed to the FAO proposal, however, a significant part of the identified investment requirements in fact corresponded to the agricultural sector, based on the fact that many forests can only be stabilised by sustainable agricultural development in the adjacent areas.

Both proposals were then amalgamated in the TFAP at the World Forestry Congress as the global framework for forest conservation and development, aiming at the integration of the proposed five priority action programmes in the preparation of national forest plans. In November 1985, representatives of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, supported by representatives of developing countries and international NGOs, accepted the TFAP as a framework for their bilateral and multilateral cooperation concerning tropical forests. Furthermore, they accepted the need for translating the global TFAP into national programmes consistent with national priorities and development plans.

A Multi-Donor Trust Fund was set up to be managed by FAO for the coordination of TFAP activities world-wide, The Forestry Advisers Group (FAG), an international advisory body, composed of experts and representatives of international donor agencies, research institutions and NGOs, as well as national experts, was established to supervise the process of TFAP implementation. At the beginning of the global TFAP process, most of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, including the World Bank participated in the process promoting the expectation that, with the launching of the TFAP, major changes could be achieved in forestry development in the tropics.

2.2 Objectives, Strategies and Elements of the TFAP

The TFAP came to being with the following objectives:

- to increase awareness of the problems of deforestation and to appeal to all levels of society to address them;
- to introduce inter-sectoral planning approaches, involving all relevant partners to allow the generation of more effective polices and programmes; and
- to draw on national and international resources to assist the preparation and implementation of National Forestry Action Programmes (NFAP) following a coordinated plan.

Based on request of and in cooperation with the recipient governments, joint missions of national and international experts were established to review the forestry sector of a given country and to elaborate National Forestry Action Plans. During these country missions, existing sector policies and strategies were analysed, priority fields of action identified and an action programme defined involving the identification of inter-sectoral linkages. As a result of country missions, a series of project profiles were elaborated corresponding to the following five priority fields of action:

- Forestry in land use
- Forestry-based industrial development
- Firewood and energy
- Conservation of tropical forest ecosystems
- Institutions

The purpose of country missions was, first of all, to create awareness for forestry issues and to initiate the momentum for a joint effort for the conservation and development of forests. The process aimed at increased support from the donor community invited to the Round Table Meetings after completion of the national practices to pledge for individual projects according to a list of project profiles presented to them.

The national TFAP processes took up to 3 years, in certain cases even longer. In many countries, excellent information on the respective forestry sector was made available to the interested parties and often a rather broad participation of major stakeholders was achieved. Viewing the TFAP references in literature in terms of general concepts and strategy papers, the global forestry dialogue has never received such professional attention from sectoral experts, diplomats and politicians. In addition to the work on concepts and strategies, the FAO, in cooperation with other agencies, was supporting the process in view of capacity building and offered training courses for the effective application of the TFAP Basic Principles and Technical Guidelines.

Failure to keep the initial momentum and the "TFAP spirit" alive were inter alia due to the lack of the will of certain governments to endorse major policy changes. However, more than one hundred countries embarked on the TFAP processes which – in the majority of cases – had collapsed by 1995 at different stages of implementation.

2.3 Constraints on TFAP Implementation

Observing the TFAP processes in various countries throughout the world over a longer period of time led to the conclusion that a mutual understanding of the basic principles, the role and mandate of TFAP in the national context of the recipient countries was lacking amongst the international and national actors. Despite great efforts of the FAO and supportive organisations to clarify the role TFAP was to playhold in forestry development, the initiative of TFAP was too ambitious concerning the streamlining the TFAP process at a global scale and the fully involvement of all relevant actors and their institutions in the dialogue international and national levels.

In retrospect, it is understood that regional desks of the development agencies viewed the TFAP processes as a vehicle to coordinate donor investments more effectively at the

national level, giving TFAP a somewhat political dimension, whereas technical departments of the same organisations attached greater importance to forestry sector reviews and emerging project profiles. In general, donor agencies tended to place part of their development contributions in the framework of the TFAP for political reasons, making their organisation participate in the national TFAP. Projects which were not regarded to be traditional "forestry projects" – though possibly possessing a greater forestry component – were, however, often implemented without any interlinkage with the TFAP. In other words, after a few years of TFAP support, it was not clear to the participants in the respective national processes which project was meant to be "TFAPable".

Inter-sectoral approaches of the TFAP met with a broad consensus amongst those who considered placing forestry development into a wider social context. The TFAP processes were, however, meant to give the forestry sector per se more weight in the debate concerning scarce resources in terms of finances, human capacity, as well as land allocations for agricultural purposes. Forestry was seen to be at the losing end of development strategies at the national level, a trend, which was also reflected in the budgetary discussions in the FAO. Other sectors, in particular agriculture, normally won the race. The TFAP always suffered from this misunderstanding of its role. Views started to change gradually, however, after the UNCED in 1992, putting the sectors into the context of sustainable development and looking at the respective contributions of the different sectors to this global and national goal.

A view of the lists for each country prepared by the FAO, every year up to 1993 reporting the degree of funding, the TFAP project profiles conclude that few priority fields were taken up by donor agencies, while others remained without funding. In particular, donor agencies tended to follow their own national priorities such as nature conservation and the re-organisation of institutions at the national level, while the establishment of plantations, the elaboration of management plans for large private concessions or the support to forestry-based industrial development were not touched on. As a consequence, the imbalance of the sectoral development could be compensated neither by national public funding nor by investments from the private sector. This led to donor-oriented priorities of the countries to secure external contributions, which often did not meet social requirements. The public interest in the TFAP process was therefore quite limited to those who benefited from the process directly. In recipient countries, the TFAP was considered as well, primarily to be a donor investment programme increasing the current funds and investments in forestry. Some countries expressed very clearly that TFAP was seen considered a parallel process to their national planning and implementation of their own development programme.

This attitude followed the conventional approach of donor involvement, whereby externally funded projects were implemented by external personnel supported by seconded national staff. Planning and supervision was done in cooperation with the so-called executing agency, usually a line ministry. National responsibilities concerning the accountability and delivery of the donor projects and programmes were rather marginal. As a result, TFAP Round Tables organised by recipient countries turned out to be simple pledging conferences for development agencies rather than consultative groups on the respective national forestry development led by national institutions. The "shopping list" of project profiles, which was normally established in the TFAP process was taken

as "investment opportunities" for external sources only. None of the country project profiles was financed by means of a national development budget.

Moreover, only few TFAP documents were discussed and decided on beyond the scope of the line ministries involved and public dialogues organised by the responsible national institutions and the donor "lead" agency. Political institutions such as parliaments, district councils and others were normally not involved to the extent they are in national development planning. The lack of national, political and institutional ownership became more paramount with the years. Donor agencies, development banks and international NGOs were not willing to integrate their contribution to the forestry sector into a truly country-run forestry programme. It took more than ten years to arrive at an international level consensus that the respective national TFAP had not managed to become the only national forest programme integrating all activities and measures of the sector into one politically and institutionally-led process by national institutions and the public in an appropriate fashion.

With the rising criticism from NGOs, several bilateral donor agencies and, in particular, the World Bank concerning the TFAP processes, their technical quality and social impact, the forestry community stressed the outlining of additional processes, initiatives and programmes. Figure 1 shows the "programme landscape" which brought about confusion among the actors involved.

During the last few days of the TFAP, competing initiatives were established by donor agencies, development banks and international NGOs at the national level. These aimed at slightly different objectives, repeating on-going processes and involving various national institutions. Furthermore, recipient countries were obliged to establish national positions vis-à-vis emerging international dialogues, fora and institutions such as UNCED, CSD, IPF and the increasing number of party convention conferences and their financial mechanism GEF. It is therefore of utmost urgent to appropriately link all initiatives, programmes and mechanisms. Considering an increased involvement of the private sector in forestry, countries will need to establish effective steering mechanisms to keep the overview and to safeguard the public interest in sustainable forest management.

What remains from the TFAP is the basic idea of supporting recipient countries in their efforts (i) to hold a continuous debate on the forestry sector with regard to sustainable development and achieve more public participation by means of appropriate mechanisms such as consultative groups, (ii) establish national priorities by means of public involvement and (iii) establish a country-specific process on the formulation and implementation of a national forest programme which serves the public interest in sustainable management of the remaining forests.

3. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES

3.1 NFP – a New Approach to Sustainable Forest Management

At the 20th Meeting of the Forestry Advisers Group in June 1995, the Head of the FAO TFAP Support Unit informally announced that TFAP no longer existed as an international framework. This had already been the latest fact since the end of 1994.

Figure 1. Support of National Forest Programmes in the Global Context (GTZ 1997, see abbreviations at the end).

However, no formal decision on the termination of the programme has been taken. In order to continue the momentum of international support of forest-related initiatives, FAO decided to concentrate on supporting individual National Forestry Action Programmes (NFAP).

Although TFAP was no longer functioning as an international initiative, the principles of a programmatic approach achieving a country-led forest programme were still maintained. This led to a new focus on a more generic concept of a national forest programme capturing the various national approaches to forestry development. In support to this idea, the FAO subsequently prepared a guideline for the process of formulation, implementation and monitoring of National Forest Programmes (NFP). This guideline was elaborated in an iterative process, taking into account the international discussion on forests, and in interaction with experts at the international level, including the Forestry Advisers Group. A series of documents followed leading to a final paper entitled "Basic Principles and Operational Guidelines for the Formulation, Implementation and Revision of National Forestry Programmes", which widely integrated the content of the FAG's paper "Common Principles for National Forestry Planning and Programme Implementation". It broadened the scope of the NFP concept

to make it applicable to all kinds of forests, non-tropical and tropical forests, and to all countries that may be interested. No single format for NFPs was suggested as earlier under TFAP, but all approaches towards sustainable forest management were to be included in the process of NFP formulation and implementation.

The "Basic Principles and Operational Guidelines" recommends following a participatory planning and implementation approach that encourages the involvement of all forest-dependent actors at local, national and global levels and the development of a partnership between them, emphasising national sovereignty regarding the management of forest resources and the need for country leadership and responsibility. Planning was explained as an iterative process which involves all stakeholders, and takes the relation of forestry to other sectors into account as well.

The International Expert Penal on "Implementing the Forest Principles – Promotion of National Forest and Land-Use Programmes" held in Feldafing, Germany, in June 1996 under the IPF mandate as an inter-sectoral event discussed the terminology of "National Forest and Land Use Programmes" as a part of the IPF programme. The experts agreed that the aspect of land use was not adequately included in the discussion on forests held so far, but subsequently used the term "National Forest Programmes" (NFPs), bearing in mind that it also included inter-sectoral linkages in the wider sense of land use. The term *forest* used instead of *forestry* also reflected the new spirit and wider approach of NFPs aiming at any activity related to forests and not only to the forestry sector in a narrow sense. The meeting further elaborated on the concept of the NFP and introduced its recommendations to the IPF later that year.

During the subsequent IPF meetings, a consensus was reached on the NFP concept discussed below. The concept of NFP now provides a global framework to address forest issues within the context of sustainable development at the country level. Additional elements for NFPs are presently debated such as the Forest Partnership Agreement (FPA) and mixed public and private financing of sustainable forest management. In all, the IPF provided a sound political basis for the further development of the concept of NFP.

3.2 NFP Definition, Generic Elements and Instruments

According to the IPF, NFPs are defined as comprehensive forest policy frameworks for the achievement of sustainable forest management. The term "National Forest Programme" is explained as a generic expression for a wide range of approaches to sustainable forest management within different countries, to be applied at national and sub-national levels based on the basic principles outlined below. NFPs demand a broad inter-sectoral approach at all stages, including the formulation of policies, strategies and plans of action, as well as their implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

National forest programmes should be implemented in the context of each country's socio-economic, cultural, political and environmental conditions, and should be integrated into wider programmes for sustainable land use, according to chapters 10 to 15 of Agenda 21. The activities of other sectors, such as agriculture, energy and industrial development, should be taken into account. It is of crucial importance that the NFP be regarded by all actors as the only forest programme, which is to include all

forest-related activities at the international level, following the planning cycles and procedures of the respective national development programme. Generic NFP elements are as follows:

   i) Sector review, policy and institutional reform process,
  ii) Investment programme,
 iii) Capacity building programme,
 iv) Coordination.

As long-term iterative processes, NFPs should recognise the following key elements:

- national sovereignty and country leadership,
- consistency with national policies and international commitments,
- integration with the country's sustainable development strategies,
- partnership and participation, and
- holistic and inter-sectoral approaches.

Specific elements to be considered during the development and implementation of NFPs are:

- the need for appropriate participatory mechanisms to involve all interested parties,
- decentralisation, empowerment of regional and local government structures; consistent with the constitutional and legal frameworks of each country,
- recognition and respect for customary and traditional rights of, inter alia, indigenous peoples, local communities, forest dwellers and forest owners,
- secure land tenure arrangements, and
- the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms and conflict resolution schemes.

The following instruments are related to NFPs:

- National Forest Statement
- Forest Sector Review
- Identification of key issues and priorities (based on sector review)
- Forest Policy Formulation
- Strategy Development
- Action Plan for a planning cycle
- Investment programme for the public sector
- National and International Forest Partnership Agreements (still to be developed as a mandatory instrument to support the formulation and implementation of the NFP on a participatory basis).

With these features, national forest programmes and similar policy instruments can be important policy tools, and can serve as means of promoting, prioritising and coordinating both public and private investments.

3.3 Integration into National Planning Frameworks

Most bilateral donors have not followed a TFAP plan since the beginning of the nineties, but have increasingly integrated their activities into national planning frameworks and planning cycles. Whereas the focus was on forestry without much linkage to other sectoral and national development plans at the beginning of TFAP, the integration of activities of the forest sector into national development planning has received more attention since 1989. With the review of the TFAP in 1989/1990, the need to harmonise projects and programmes with existing planning frameworks, planning cycles and national development programmes became evident. The quality of national practices, planning tools and their application improved and forestry planning was increasingly integrated into national economic development plans and strategies. In this context, the idea of the NFP as a process for all forest-related activities at the national level has already been accepted, but not well formulated, and it is based on an international consensus. The process of integration of all forest-related activities in a given country will be continued, particularly through the application of the Forest Partnership Agreement (FPA).

3.4 NFP and Coordination

With the decreasing importance of TFAP and the proliferation of other international initiatives and planning frameworks related to forests, environment, natural resources management and conservation based on the results of the UNCED, the competition between the various frameworks at the country level has increased. The World Bank and other bi- and multilateral donors have developed their own approaches to forestry sector planning and donors generally follow a more bilateral approach. With an increasing number of donors involved in supporting NFPs, the question of coordination became increasingly important. As the TFAP failed to coordinate international support to forest-related programmes at the national level, a new approach has to be sought.

Coordination needs in the framework of forest-related initiatives were identified at three levels: the national, regional and international level. Each country with its own specific planning mechanisms must identify the requirements for harmonisation of planning frameworks, forest-related policies and measures which affect forests in one way or the other. This includes sectoral concepts, the fiscal system, administrative procedures, public investment and incentives or disincentives for forest-related private sector activities.

Parallel planning becomes a problem concerning the most effective channelling and use of resources. The concept of NFPs should, thus, attempt to overcome national constraints in policy-making, programming and planning in view of the impact on forests. In a global context, it is evident that international initiatives and financial mechanisms are not always in unison with country-specific needs, but are more related to public perceptions in donating countries. Therefore, a balanced approach to forests in the framework of sustainable development is required, taking into account the existence of forest industries with a justified interest in the utilisation of forest resources versus the requirements for conservation of the natural environment, and the necessity of private sector investment in sustainable forest management.

    As planning constraints partly result from competition among donors, the NFP as a concept incorporating all national and international approaches towards forest sector planning emphasises coordination at the national level. First structured attempts for harmonisation and coordination in the framework of the NFP have been made in various countries, two examples being Indonesia and Vietnam, where related processes have been established with support of the German Government since 1994/95. The three cornerstones of this approach are policy development, institutional arrangements, and harmonisation of international initiatives. Practical steps included the establishment of consultative mechanisms at the national level as a platform for a constructive dialogue between all stakeholders, for policy development and co-ordination of projects, and related information management.

4. CONCLUSION

The IPF Report and its conclusions and proposals for action is regarded to be a more practical elaboration of the Agenda 21, Chapter 11 and the Forest Principles agreed upon during UNCED in 1992. The report being negotiated at the international level under the auspices and the political mandate of the UN is considered to be a political obligation of the governments to foster sustainable forest management along the lines of the negotiated text of the IPF Report. It becomes quite obvious from the report that the international forestry community wishes to consolidate the discussion on the NFP concept and its elements by asking the countries to find consensus on the overall national process and the country-specific elements and mechanisms, procedure and institutional arrangements for every country wishing to formulate and implement a national forest programme.

    At this stage of the international discussion under the IPF follow-up process, the UN Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF), as well as other processes such as the Conferences of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, experiences with the new concept of the formulation and implementation of national forest programmes need to be drawn up in partnership with all actors involved. It remains to be seen if the forestry community will learn from the rise and fall of the TFAP and come to an agreement on cooperation and communication procedures at both the international and the national levels.

List of Abbreviations

EAP	Environmental Action Plan
CCD	Convention to Combat Desertification
FMP	Forestry Master Plan
FSR	Forestry Sector Review
BS	Biodiversity Strategy
CS	Conservation Strategy
NEP	National Education Programme

List of Abbreviations (continued)

NAP	National Agricultural Programme
NFP	National Forest Programme
Dec. P.	Decentralised Programmes (District, Province etc.)
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
ITTA	International Tropical Timber Aggreement
FCCC	Framework Convention on Climate Change
Kyoto Prot.	Kyoto Protocol of the Framework Convention on Climate Change

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NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMS – SIGNIFICANCE OF A FOREST POLICY FRAMEWORK

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ABSTRACT

Since UNCED, the international deliberations on forests have concluded that national states throughout the world should work on preparing and implementing national forest programs (NFPs) for the sustainable management, conservation and sustainable development of forests (SFM). While this policy tool has already been introduced in the South, it is fairly new for many countries in the North. The novelty of NFPs consists of the focus on SFM and the new paradigm of policy planning based on a series of ambitious principles such as participation, decentralisation or holistic and intersectoral orientation. The chances of NFPs to make substantial contributions to the enhancement of SFM are discussed here. Significant influential factors seem to be: the capability of countries to agree on an operational definition of SFM, the existence of an international legally binding instrument on forests, pressure from outside, financial incentives, and the structure of decision-making.

Keywords: Forest Policy, Policy Planning, Policy Change, Policy-oriented Learning, National Forest Programs.

1. INTRODUCTION

For almost six years, the discussion concerning the establishment of national forest programs (NFP) has been on-going in international negotiations for sustainable management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests. In Chapter 11 on "Combating Deforestation" of Agenda 21 it is stated that national states should work

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"… b) to prepare and implement, as appropriate, national forestry action programmes and/or plans for the management, conservation and sustainable development of forests. These programmes and/or plans should be integrated with other land uses. In this context, country-driven national forestry action programmes and/or plans under the Tropical Forestry Action Programme are currently being implemented in more than 80 countries, with the support of the international community;" *(UNCED 1992)*

The formulation and implementation of NFPs also became a main topic of the sessions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF). It has been on the agenda since its second session and remained there until the final report of IPF to the UN Commission of Sustainable Development (CSD) which states:

"The Panel: (a) Encouraged countries, in accordance with their national sovereignty, specific country conditions and national legislation, to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate national forest programmes, which include a wide range of approaches for sustainable forest management, taking into consideration the following: consistency with appropriate international agreements; partnership and participatory mechanisms to involve interested parties; recognition and respect for customary and traditional rights of, inter alia, indigenous people and local communities; secure land tenure arrangements; holistic, intersectoral and iterative approaches; ecosystem approaches that integrate the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of biological resources; and adequate provision and valuation of forest goods and services;" *(UN-CSD-IPF 1997, § 17)*

From the great many proposals for action of the IPF process only a few were agreed on by the CSD in its fifth session in April 1997. The CSD concluded in its report to the UN Special General Assembly in June 1997 the following:

"To maintain the momentum generated by the IPF process and to facilitate and encourage the holistic, integrated and balanced intergovernmental policy dialogue on all types of forests in the future, which continues to be an open, transparent and participatory process, requires a long-term political commitment to sustainable forest management world-wide. Against this background, there is an urgent need for: ... (b) countries to develop national forest programmes in accordance with their respective national conditions, objectives and priorities; ..." *(UN 1997, § 39)*

According to its mandate, the formulation and implementation of NFPs will also be one of the focal points of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF). The IFF was established to continue the intergovernmental policy dialogue on forests and to consider and advise on the need for legal and other arrangements covering all types of forests.

2. NFPS – A NEW POLICY TOOL?

The term "National Forest Program" is used in the IPF process as self-explanatory, therefore, has not been defined. Perhaps the term is clear for foresters working in and with developing countries from their experience with Tropical Forest Action Plans, National Forestry Action Programmes, Forestry Master Plans, Forestry Sector Reviews, etc. If these people, along with a donor agency, wish to enhance forest management in a certain country in a rational way, they need a mechanism for setting goals and giving them priority, specifying appropriate means and actors, implementing them and evaluating the impacts and outcome with regard to the goals set. In this sense, NFPs can be described as "a generic expression for a wide range of approaches to the process of planning, programming, and implementing forest activities in countries." (UN-CSD-IPF 1996, § 25). It explicitly refers to land-use planning and integrated land management (UN-CSD-IPF 1996, § 31).

In seeking to operationalize their programming work, the experts engaged in forest development aid and represented in the Forestry Advisory Group, put their efforts into elaborating guiding principles and mechanisms of how to proceed; they were finally published by FAO (1996) under the title "Basic Principles and Operational Guidelines. Formulation, Execution, and Revision of Forestry Programmes". The spirit of these principles was incorporated in the final document of the IPF process. The principle elements are the following (UN-CSD-IPF 1997, §§ 9 and 10):

1. national sovereignty and country leadership;
2. partnership and appropriate participatory mechanisms to involve all interested parties;
3. decentralisation, where applicable;
4. empowerment of regional and local governments;
5. recognition and respect for customary and traditional rights of, inter alia, indigenous people, local communities, forest dwellers and forest owners;
6. secure land tenure arrangements;
7. long-term iterative process;
8. consistency with national policies and international commitments;
9. integration with the country's sustainable development strategies;
10. holistic and intersectoral.

NFPs are comprehensive forest policy frameworks (UN-CSD-IPF 1997, § 8) at the national and sub-national levels (UN-CSD-IPF 1996, §§ 32, 52) for achieving sustainable management, conservation and sustainable development of forests (SFM). As Egestad (1999) summarises, the concept prescribes a holistic, integrated policy approach adaptive to changing or new conditions and "propagates an ideal democratic approach to planning processes, thereby emphasising participative, decentralised and respectful processes which are acceptable to all parties involved." Whether NFPs are legally binding or embedded in a legally binding instrument was not touched in the IPF process.

3. NFPS FOR ENHANCED POLICY PLANNING

One could assume that NFPs are a new concept in forest policy making considering its holistic, integrative, democratic and adaptive promises to achieve a certain goal, i.e. SFM. In fact, these promises are similar to those of the Sixties when policy planning was regarded as the key tool for making political decisions more rational. At that time, policy planning strove to accomplish at least the following three objectives:

1. to enhance the rationality of policies;
2. to ensure long-term orientation of policies; and
3. to better coordinate the decisions of various political actors.

The concept of policy planning employed at that time was technocratic-oriented and was bound to fail, partly as a result of negligence of systemic restrictions (Jänicke and Jörgens 1997:22). Today we know more about the policy making process, which enables us to better meet the demands of policy planning. In Table 1, the new general paradigm of policy planning (Glück 1997) is compared with the principle elements of NFPs described above allocated to one of the three objectives of policy planning. The first element refers to national responsibility. Elements 2-6 contribute to the rationality of policies; element 7 ensures long-term orientation of policies; and elements 8-10 refer to the coordination of political actors (Table 1).

Table 1. Policy planning.

Objectives	General paradigm	National Forest Program
Enhancing the rationality of policies	• governance processes in policy networks and bargaining systems • participation of all relevant actors	• participatory mechanisms • decentralisation • empowerment of regional and local governments • respect for local communities • secure land tenure arrangements
Ensuring long-term orientation	• fragmentation of the long-term strategy into an iterative planning process • review and assessment of the goals achieved	• long-term iterative process
Improving coordination of political actors	• consensus building processes via information and persuasion strategies • inner-bureaucratic intermediation processes and capacity building	• consistency with national policies and international commitments • integration with the country's sustainable development strategies • holistic and intersectoral

Source: Glück 1997

Enhancing the rationality of policies

Contrary to the old paradigm of policy planning which assumes hierarchical relationship between state and society, the new paradigm focuses on governance processes taking place in policy networks or bargaining systems. These are informal groups of political actors of the policy making process. The participatory principle makes sure that all relevant actors are involved in the planning process.

The IPF proposals for the development of NFPs are also based on the principle of developing a new and equitable partnership. Thus, an NFP will strive to bring together all relevant stakeholders at local, regional, national, and international levels. Appropriate participatory mechanisms should ensure that all stakeholders participate in the planning process. Secure land tenure arrangements ensure that natural resources are not exploited.

Ensuring long-term orientation

As prognosed of future developments and goals fail due to the lack of hypotheses and knowledge about values and inventions affecting economic and societal developments, the long-term vision of a strategy is fragmented into medium-term action plans and short-term programs. The development of the strategy is reviewed and assessed several times within the long planning horizon.

Accordingly, the IPF regards national forest planning as a long-term iterative process. The chance to learn from the policy making process and to reset goals and preferences enables the political actors to respond adoptively to the changing environment. This is the basis for policy learning and policy change (Bennett and Howlett 1992).

Improving coordination of political actors

Policy planning depends on political consensus; it cannot technocratically replace a lack of political consensus. However, political consensus is not natural law. Consensus forms up and decays; it can be manipulated; and it can be built up and destroyed by means of information and persuasion strategies. In some cases such as the dissemination of the notion of SFM these strategies may fail due to the difficulty to making the topic visible. In that case, innerbureaucratic intermediation processes through education, training, research, development of reliable data, etc. have to be strengthened.

Coordination of political actors in developing NFPs should ensure that they are comprehensive, holistic and intersectoral, comprising all sectors affecting forestry and affected by forestry, including land-use planning. Furthermore, NFPs have to be consistent with national policies and international commitments and integrated with the country's sustainable development strategies.

4. NFPS' CHANCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

In the past, the promise of policy planning to make policy making more rational also penetrated forest communities. Apart from developing countries, several European countries (e.g. Finland, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia) have already had some experience with this policy tool. Unfortunately there are almost no evaluation studies available which assess their results. Even if they were available, it would be difficult to draw conclusions to the proposed NFP, as they differ in terms of approach (new paradigm) and objective (sustainable forest management).

Once again, the objective of NFPs is to ensure SFM at the national level in accordance with international commitments. But what does SFM consist of? Although there is a world-wide deliberation process on finding an operational definition of SFM by means of principles, criteria and indicators such an agreement does not yet exist. Success and failure of NFPs will greatly depend on the national agreement on an operational definition of SFM or any other objective comprising SFM. Other success factors are the existence of an international legally binding instrument on forests, pressure from outside (compare the establishment of the Dutch National Environment Plan), new financial incentives (e.g. provided by the European Union) to achieve certain policy goals, and the structure of decision-making. If, however, these or similar circumstances are not given, the notion of NFP may remain a panacea due to unbridgeable frontiers between the conflicting actors in the forest arena.

International legally binding instrument on forests

During the two-year deliberations of the IPF five main elements or policy areas were discussed, one of which were NFPs, another being an international legally binding instrument on forests. Both topics cannot be separated as they are mutually dependent. NFPs could receive a definition of SFM from an international legally binding instrument (e.g. a European Forest Protocol) developed by its Conference of Parties. Good groundwork in that direction has been already done by the elaboration of "Pan-European Operational Level Guidelines for Sustainable Forest Management" within the Pan-European Process on the Protection of Forests; they are scheduled to be presented to the Third Pan-European Ministerial Conference for decision in June 1998 in Lisbon. NFPs are however the core piece of any global forest convention for implementing SFM at the national level (Figure 1).

The mutual dependency of both NFPs and a global forest convention was expressed in several statements of European Union representatives in the last phase of the IPF process before the UN Special General Assembly session in June 1997. The representatives of the Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union, enumerated a number of merits of a global forest convention, one being

> "c. promoting development and implementation of national forest programs, developed in a participatory and transparent manner, and national reporting on the progress in achieving sustainable forest management" (European Union 1997:2).

Figure 1. Elements of a global forest convention for sustainable management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests (Source: Glück et al. 1996).

Accordingly, the Dutch Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment repeats on behalf of the European Union in her report of the fourth IPF session to the fifth CSD session that a global forest convention is needed:

> *"a convention would promote development and implementation of national forest programs and can ensure that both are developed in a participatory and transparent manner" (de Boer 1997).*

Pressure from outside

Planning is a usually non-binding policy tool which attemps to avoid future conflicts of interest by means of anticipative measures. This always means restrictions to powerful stakeholders whose plans of action have to be coordinated with those of others. As long as the powerful take advantage of the present situation, which is not at all satisfactory for the public, they will not be prepared to change their policies voluntarily. However, lessons can be learned from environmental politics as to the circumstances under which the problem makers are prepared to integrate their actions into an overall policy concept. In Japan, where the environmental disasters peaked in the 1960s, industry was prepared to make far-reaching concessions. This was the start for the development of a number of policy tools anchored in a national environment plan (Weidner 1989). A similar situation occurred in the Netherlands in the 1970s. Pollution problems caused by agriculture and industry created such an uproar among the population that industry became the leading promoting force behind the development of the Dutch National Environment Plan (Jänicke et al. 1997).

Financial incentives

Financial incentives are given by the state for stimulating the provision of specific products and services when there is no market. In forestry, they are applied at both the national and supra-national level of the European Union. The mechanism is always the same: the donor agency specifies a certain goal and specific measures for 1st achievement, the recipient declares to follow this goal and to take the measures for a certain amount of money. Usually the agreement is formally expressed by a contract. What regards ensuring SFM at the national level it is quite usual to provide financial incentives to the forest owners so that they provide for biological diversity, etc. in their forest management activities. In a similar way, it is conceivable that the European Union applies financial incentives to national governments if they follow a specific course of action. In the ongoing process of developing a European forest strategy NFPs could be a very promising instrument for ensuring SFM, strengthening rural areas, etc. The concession of the member states could be eased by subsidies available for those forest owners prepared to take the specific measures presented in the NFP.

Multi-level governance

In forestry, affairs the Treaty of Rome does not deliver a legal basis for a common European Forest Policy. Despite this fact, the EU bureaucracy has a strong interest in extending its competence by establishing new networks by means of financial incentives programs borrowed from other policy areas, such as agriculture, energy, environment, research (Kohler-Koch 1996). The development of NFPs under the umbrella organization of the EU would further these intentions. In fact, in 1997 the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Council and the Committee of the Regions expressed their positions in European forest politics. The potential of such newly established networks to become part of European governance structures depends on the following two conditions: first, the readiness of participating stakeholders to cooperate, and second, the competition with organisations fulfilling an important governance function at the national level. The stronger the neo-corporatistic cooperation between government and interest groups at the national level, the lower the chances of the Commission to establish a clientele through self-created networks taking action in the proceeding communication process of this policy area as a successful lobbyist (Kohler-Koch 1996: 214).

   In policy areas such as forest policy which are characterised by clientilistic relationships between state administration and interest groups at the national level, national strategies prevail. The national forest interest groups endorse national governments to determine forest policy. This is expressed by the permanent emphasis on the subsidiarity principle in matters concerning forestry. Solely, if the chances of influencing the own national government are small or if there are doubts about its ability to enforce national interests at the supra-national level, the supra-national level is preferred (Kohler-Koch 1992: 99). If however, power accrues to the supra-national level due to the provision of financial resources, the resolution of guidelines and directives of SFM etc., the national actors are challenged to engage themselves there.

The national positions of those actors involved in supra-national networks are strengthened (Grant and Schubert 1992).

In spite of the dominance of national actors in forest policy matters, the EU is gaining responsibilities in international forest policy areas, such as the definition of SFM applicable to all European countries, forestry's contribution to rural development, the fight against pollution, etc. NFPs could help implement the EU agreements at the national level, particularly if they are accompanied by financial incentives.

5. NFP – A SYMBOLIC POLICY CAPSULE?

For most European countries, an NFP is a new policy tool. Its development by national government requires policy change. According to the book, political science policy change occurs if evaluation proves that a program has failed, in which case the political-administrative system will reformulate the program to yield better results. The rational choice approach presumes that the political actors recognise the difference between goal and outcome and react correspondingly. Another promising theoretical approach is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) proposed by Paul A. Sabatier (1993). As it is based on hypotheses, prognoses can be made on the acceptance of the new policy tool NFP.

The ACF precedes from a policy sub-system which is defined as the interaction of actors seeking to influence governmental decisions in a given policy area, e.g. SFM. Within the sub-system, the ACF assumes that actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from public and private organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often cooperate for more than a decade. In the case of the SFM issue in Austria, one can differentiate between two advocacy coalitions which we call "timber production coalition" and "forest conservation coalition" (compare Hogl 1999). The actors of the timber production coalition are assembled under the umbrella organization of the Board of the Austrian Forest Association including the editor of the leading Austrian forestry magazines; the actors of the forest conservation coalition are representatives of the Ministry of Environment, Bureau of Environment, environmental NGOs, professors and journalists of environmental magazines. The actors of advocacy coalitions share specific "belief systems" which determine their actions.

Sabatier differentiates between three categories of beliefs which are organised into a hierarchical structure. He calls the highest level "deep core" of the belief system which includes basic ontological and normative beliefs. On the next level are "policy core" beliefs which represent a coalition's normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or a sub-system. The third level consists of "secondary aspects" of a coalition's belief system. They comprise policy preferences regarding desirable policy regulations, the design of specific institutions, etc. for pursuing the policy core.

In general, deep core beliefs are very resistant to change; they function as does a religion. The ontological-normative axioms of the timber production coalition are enshrined in the forest tenets of primacy of timber production and the economically

efficient use of forest resources with the underlying ideologies (Glück 1987). Some of these values are hardly compatible with the core beliefs of the forest conservation coalition which are the principles of forest conservation and the ecologically oriented use of forest ecosystems.

A coalition's core beliefs are somewhat less rigid. They are almost exclusively normative, yet involve empirical accumulation of evidence. If empirical evidence shows severe anomalies, changes are possible. The timber production coalition, for example, retreated from the wake-theory (Glück 1982) which was preached by foresters for decades; the forest conservation coalition has reduced its reservation claims of untouched forest areas.

Beliefs in secondary aspects are assumed to be more readily adjusted in the light of new data, experience, or strategic considerations. Examples are the positions of both coalitions with regard to the forest certification system approach (FSC or ISO 14000 series), the administrative jurisdiction in forest matters (Ministry of Agriculture or Environment), etc.

The assessment of both the coalitions' readiness to get involved in the development of NFPs will very much depend on the assessment of whether or not NFPs interfere with the coalitions' belief system. Doubtless, the operational definition of SFM is a pivotal aspect. It unavoidably affects the existing property rights of private forest owners and the intended user rights of conservationists, and therefore the deep core beliefs of both coalitions. The decisive resistance against any definition neglecting each coalition's deep core beliefs must be the predictable reaction. The logical outcome is a definition lacking content as it is being negotiated by the Pan-European Process. An NFP based on an empty definition of SFM would be a solely symbolic endeavour.

Principally, the ACF assumes that each coalition endorses such strategies which are consistent with its own policy objectives. The individual members of each coalition seek to resist information suggesting that their core or policy core beliefs may be invalid or unattainable, and they will use formal policy analyses primarily to support their own beliefs or attack those of their opponents. If these assumptions held forever, policies would never change. By experience, this is not the case, as the political actors are prepared to learn. Sabatier calls this process "policy-oriented learning" and understands "relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions which result from experience and are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives" (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994:182). Policy-oriented learning can often alter secondary aspects of a coalition's belief system. Changes of the policy core aspects of a governmental program are usually the results of perturbations external to the subsystem, such as macro-economic conditions or the rise of a new governing coalition which alters the distribution of political resources.

Apart from an external shock, policy-oriented learning can also take place across belief systems, i.e. between coalitions. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier propose four hypotheses which are based on the premises that policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994:184):

1. in problems dealing with natural systems such as SFM, as controlled experimentation is more feasible;
2. in fields where accepted data and consensual theories are available;

3. in situations involving an intermediate level of conflict, i.e. high-level enough to be worth expending analytical resources but not involving deep core beliefs; and

4. when a prestigious professional forum requiring the participation of experts from various coalitions exists.

The four hypotheses permit rather specific prognoses about the significance of NFPs. In fact, an NFP is just the political framework for accomplishing SFM, and the core of an NFP is the definition of SFM. As we have learned from the definition of SFM, there is an intermediate level of conflict. The conflict is between core elements of the timber production coalition (e.g. making profits from forest management) and secondary aspects of the forest conservation coalition (e.g. environmentally appropriate forest management). Thus, political learning between the two coalitions is likely. This holds true particularly when a prestigious forum to force professionals from the two coalitions to participate exists, and, when empirically based data and theories on the impacts of SFM and its absence – deforestation and forest degradation – are available. The first condition is met, as the Pan-European Ministerial Conference is exactly this prestigious forum. The latter condition is partly met, yet there is still a great lack of information that could be provided by the establishment of a scientific advisory group supplementary to the Pan-European Conference (Glück and Byron 1998).

The high-level forest discussion forum in combination with the scientific advisory group, provides a platform for deliberations between the two coalitions on a European level. As the ACF suggests, there is normally a third group of actors, termed "policy brokers", whose main concern is to find some reasonable compromise which will reduce intense conflict. Several EU institutions have taken this part in the past on a European level. The European Union is highly motivated to expand its responsibility in forest matters and has policy tools (e.g. guidelines, directives, and financial incentives) at its disposal. It can use these for relieving compromises. The bargaining process on SFM would then shift from conflicts in core beliefs to different positions on secondary aspects and eventually to compromises on secondary aspects.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Although the formulation of NFPs is a paramount topic of the UNCED follow-up and the EU's position on the international deliberations on forests, the idea is far from rooted in national forest policies of all European countries. The wide support that NFPs received during the IPF process underpins the supposition that NFPs are simply regarded as symbolic tools lacking content. The analysis yields the conclusion that the developing of substantial NFPs increases by means of the agreement on an international or European legally binding instrument on forestry, external perturbations to the forestry sector, the provision of financial incentives, and a strong supra-national governance level. As the pivotal element of any NFP is the definition of SFM which affects core beliefs of foresters and conservationists. The symbolic or substantial significance of NFPs will highly depend on the establishment of an appropriate discussion forum and the availability of scientific advice which together may resolve the definition problem.

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NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

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ABSTRACT

The paper reviews some of the key international and intergovernmental processes on forest conservation and related issues since the 1970s. Consideration is given to the main actors involved in such processes, including their ideological positions. Three inter-related notions of justice are examined. Attention is given to the International Tropical Timber Organisation, including its relationship with the CITES, and the Forest Stewardship Council. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests are briefly examined, including the debate under programme area V on the question of a global forests convention.

Keywords: Global Forests Convention, Ideology, Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, Justice.

1. INTRODUCTION

The global context within which National Forest Programmes (NFPs) are planned and implemented is shaped by the evolving structures and institutions of global governance. These structures include those fora that seek to promote neoliberal norms through the free trade of capital, goods and services, such as the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the OECD (which is currently hosting negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. as well as those intergovernmental fora that seek to promote conservationist norms. In many respects a tension exists between those fora promoting global neoliberalism and those promoting environmental conservation. The latter includes a range of forest-related intergovernmental conventions and instruments.

This paper will briefly examine some of the forest related processes that shape global governance. Three such processes may be discerned. First, there is the development of

existing forest-related intergovernmental instruments and fora. Second, there are the on-going discussions and negotiations on the desirability of a global forests convention. Third, there are initiatives by actors outside the international state system, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The paper will also consider the ideological tensions that inform forest policymaking and the question of justice in forest policymaking.

2. EXISTING FOREST-RELATED INSTRUMENTS AND FORA

A range of intergovernmental instruments exist with a forest-related mandate. This section will briefly consider two of these, namely the International Tropical Timber Agreements of 1983 and 1994 and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora of 1973 (CITES). Attention will also be given to the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and its successor mechanism, the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests. Other instruments, listed in chronological order, with a forest-related mandate include the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere:

- 1940 African Convention for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
- 1968 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
- 1971 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World's Cultural and Natural Heritage
- 1972 Convention on the Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific
- 1976 Amazonian Cooperation Treaty
- 1978 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Resources
- 1979 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
- 1985 Convention on Biological Diversity
- 1992 Convention on Climate Change
- 1992 Central American Forests Convention
- 1993 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
- 1993 Convention to Combat Desertification (1994)
- 1995 The protocol on the Sustainable Management of Forest Resources to the Lomé IV Convention

One option for improving the global governance of forest conservation is to work within the status quo and to strengthen these existing mechanisms (Tarasofsky 1995; Glück et al. 1997). However there are two criticism of such an option. First it would result in an essentially piecemeal approach to global forest policymaking, with no single institution having the mandate to take all forest-related decisions. Second, and as a consequence, disputes would inevitably arise between governments as to which fora had which mandates. Indeed such disagreements have already occurred. For example, at the 1992 meeting of the conference of parties to the CITES, disagreement arose as to whether the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) or the CITES was the appropriate

forum for restricting the trade in international tropical tree species (Humphreys 1996). Attention will now turn first to the ITTO and then to the CITES.

International Tropical Timber Organisation

The ITTO was created by the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) 1983. The ITTA 1983 was replaced by a successor agreement, the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994, which finally entered into legal effect on 1 January 1997, nearly three years after its negotiation. Disagreement on scope was one of the most contentious issues in the negotiation of the ITTA 1994. The producer countries argued that the agreement should be expanded to include all timbers. Meanwhile delegates from the consumer countries argued that a convention should deal with all non-tropical forest related issues and that the agreement should retain a tropical only focus. The scope of the ITTA 1994 will be reviewed four years after its entry into force. Indonesia, supported by most of the Group of 77 Developing Countries (G77. subsequently protested to the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests that the agreement effectively discriminates against tropical timbers (Indonesia to CSD 1997).

The ITTA 1983 was the first UNCTAD commodity agreement to contain a clause providing for the conservation of the resource. It also contains an objective on the expansion and diversification of the tropical timber trade. Both these objectives are contained in the ITTA 1994. Governmental actors at the ITTO are divided into a producer and a consumer caucus. In addition, two sets of non-governmental actors may be granted observer status, namely environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and timber trade organisations. Timber industrialists and, to a much lesser degree, NGO campaigners have also gained entry to national delegations.

An analysis of the history of the ITTO reveals a tri-polar ideological tension, a tension that has informed global forest politics since the early 1980s. Three competing ideologies are involved, namely the currently hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism, and two counter-hegemonic ideologies; the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and ecologism. The NIEO was first articulated in the 1970s by the G77, which argued that the neoliberal global economic order is an unjust one that privileges the developed countries of the North at the expense of the South. The developed countries advocated a 'global Keynesianism', arguing that the rich North should help the poorer South through financial transfers, technology transfers, debt relief and the reversal of declining terms of trade. While the G77 has conceded a degree of qualified acceptance of neoliberalism by accepting the norm of free trade, it has also simultaneously sought to overturn this norm in certain respects. Hence the G77 argue that trade should be free and open, but the market should be usurped with respect to, for example, the transfer of Northern technology on preferential and concessional terms and increased North to South financial transfers.

The ideology of ecologism should be differentiated from environmentalism, which seeks merely to green the industrial system. Whereas proponents of environmentalism advocate controlling industrialism and development so as to eliminate its worst environmental effects, ecologism critiques existing patterns of production and consumption and sees development, free trade and globalisation as part of the problem

of environmental degradation. Proponents of ecologism also seek a shift in power relations from the state to the local level, the commensurate empowerment of local communities, a recognition of the role that the knowledge of indigenous peoples can play in forest conservation and the abolition of top-down centralised modes of development planning (Banuri and Marglin 1993). Unlike environmentalism, ecologism is not 'simply embedded in other political ideologies – it is an ideology in its own right' (Dobson 1990).

At the ITTO, the consumers and timber trade organisations have promoted international free trade, thus adhering to the ideology of neoliberalism. The producers have adhered in part to the ideology of neoliberalism in arguing that there should be no restrictions to the international trade of tropical timber. This has enabled the emergence in some countries of a strong producer-timber trade alliance. The close relationship between governments and timber trade organisations, especially in Southeast Asia, is especially visible at the ITTO. For example, the delegations to the ITTO of two leading tropical timber producing countries (Philippines and Indonesia) have been led not by government ministers or civil servants, but by timber industrialists (Ernesto Sanvictores and Mohamad Hasan respectively). Timber industrialists have also funded many ITTO forest development projects and in some cases have been elected to chairs of ITTO committees. The influence of the timber trade at the ITTO is far thus greater than the influence of the conservation NGOs. Nominally therefore the ITTO is an intergovernmental forum, although the structure of interests represented is far wider than purely governments, with the organisation bestowing a legitimacy upon timber trade interests (Lee et al. 1997). However it is important to note that the producers have not adhered to a pure neoliberal position. They have also pursued the objectives of the NIEO by arguing that effective tropical forest conservation requires financial and technology transfers from North to South. Meanwhile, the environmental NGOs have pursued conservationist norms and have argued for trade restrictions such as timber labelling and the effective participation of local communities and indigenous peoples in forest policymaking, positions that may be said to correspond to the ideology of ecologism.

The ITTO operates a consensual decision making mechanism, and the agreement of all members is needed before a decision can be taken. This mechanism has effectively served more or less to reinforce the status quo. Some Northern aid has been channelled through the ITTO, thus meeting in part the claims by the South for additional financial resources. Lobbying by NGOs has also had some effect; unlike the ITTA 1983, the ITTA 1994 contains a reference to the need to give due regard to 'the interests of local communities dependent on forest resources' (ITTA 1994). However with the exception of a decision in 1990 that members should work towards the objective of ensuring that the international trade in tropical timber should be from sustainable sources by the year 2000, the ITTO has taken no substantive decision on forest conservation. It is best viewed as a mechanism for monitoring the international trade in tropical timber, rather than ensuring the conservation of tropical forests. No policy that could be construed as a market intervention has been adopted by the ITTO. Disillusioned with the ITTO's poor conservation track record, most of the larger NGOs have ceased attending the ITTO's twice yearly meetings.

Convention in International Trade in Endangered Species

In 1992 the eighth conference of parties to the CITES listed for the first time commercially traded timbers. Following disagreement as to whether the CITES or the ITTO was the most appropriate forum for timber listing, the CITES took steps to improve the horizontal relationship between the two organisations in 1994 when it established a Timber Working Group. The ITTO is represented on this group, which is composed principally of government nominated experts, although IUCN and TRAFFIC have also been invited. The Timber Working Group is tasked with drafting listing proposals for the CITES conference of parties. By the end of the tenth conference of parties in 1997, six species were listed in Appendix I, which prohibits international trade except for non-commercial reasons, and nine species were listed in Appendix II, which monitors the trade through the issue of certificates by the host country. These are listed in Table 1.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Forests

In 1994 the Canadian and Malaysian governments co-sponsored an Intergovernmental Working Group on Forests which met twice. The Group facilitated dialogue on a range of issues and enabled the subsequent creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) by the third session of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) in April 1995. The Panel met on four occasions: September 1995 (New York); March 1996

Table 1. Timber species listed in Appendices I and II of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) at June 1997.

Appendix I	
Abies guatemalensis	Guatemalan fir
Araucaria araucana	Monkey puzzle (Chilean population)
Dalbergia nigra	Brazilian rosewood
Fitzroya cupressoides	Chilean false larch
Pilgerodendron uviferum	
Podocarpus parlatorei	Parlatore's podocarp

Appendix II	
Araucaria araucana	Monkey puzzle (Non-Chilean population)
Caryocar costaricense	
Guaiacum officinale	Lignum vitae
Guaicum sanctum	Lignum vitae
	Oreomunnea pterocarpa
Pericopsis elata	Afrormosia
Platymiscium pleiostachyum	Quira macawood
Swietenia humilis	Mexican mahogany
Swietenia mahagoni	Cuban mahogany

Source: A.J. Grayson and W.B. Maynard (eds.) The World's Forests- Rio + 5: International Initiatives Towards Sustainable Management, (Oxford: Commonwealth Forestry Association, 1997. p.19.

(Geneva); September 1996 (Geneva); and February 1997 (New York). Its report was considered by the fifth session of the CSD (7-25 April 1997, New York) and the United Nations General Assembly 19th Special Session held to review the implementation of Agenda 21 (UNGASS or 'Earth Summit II', 23-27 June 1997, New York). The Panel's agenda consisted of five programme areas:

   I Implementation of forest-related decisions of the UNCED
  II International cooperation in financial assistance and technology transfer
 III Scientific research, forest assessment and criteria and indicators for
      sustainable forest management
 IV Trade and environment in relation to forest products and services
  V International organisations and multilateral institutions and instruments

The main debates and recommended proposals from programme areas I to IV will be considered below. In the next section attention turns to the most contentious area of the Panel's deliberations namely programme area V which, like the UNCED forest negotiations, saw a protracted debate on the pros and cons of a global forests convention.

Programme area I related to the implementation of the UNCED's non-legally binding statement of forest principles and Chapter 11, 'Combating Deforestation', of Agenda 21. Parts of the Panel's report repeat language contained in previous intergovernmental statements on forests, including the need for 'a broad intersectoral approach' to forest management that is 'integrated into wider programmes for sustainable land use' (United Nations 1997). However one new development was the attention given to 'traditional forest related knowledge' (TFRK). One of the most significant agenda-setting achievements of environmental NGOs with respect to global forest politics is their lobbying for the knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities to be recognised by governments. The Panel was the first intergovernmental forum to consider this issue. It defined TFRK broadly to include local knowledge not only of forest resources, but also of other issues relevant to forest use. Much discussion centred on who should benefit from TFRK. The three main stakeholders are: local peoples who may have first developed the knowledge; host governments; and the corporations that commercially develop TFRK. The agreed compromise formula was that the 'effective protection of TFRK requires the fair and equitable sharing of benefits among all interested parties' (United Nations 1997).

The Panel also discussed the underlying causes of deforestation under programme area I and recommended the adoption of a 'diagnostic framework' as a conceptual tool to enable actors to identify the relationship between the direct and the underlying causes of deforestation (Table 2). It was recommended that the framework should be developed voluntarily and that its use should not be a basis for aid conditionality. The Panel also noted that airborne pollution affects forest health in many parts of the world and recommended that preventative, as opposed to adaptive, policies should be adopted to tackle this problem (United Nations 1996a).

The Panel made little progress on programme area II, the twin issues of financial aid and technology transfer. One difference between the Panel's negotiations and the UNCED forest negotiations was the emphasis on financial and technological aid from

Table 2. Diagnostic framework: illustration of the relation between selected direct and underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation.

Direct causes	Underlying causes							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Replacement								
· By commercial plantations	×					×	×	
· Planned agricultural expansion	×	×				×	×	
· Pasture expansion	×	×				×		
· Spontaneous colonisation		×	×	×		×	×	×
· New infrastructure						×		
Shifting agriculture			×	×				×
Modification								
· Timber harvesting damage	×		×		×		×	
· Overgrazing			×		×			
· Overcutting for fuel			×		×			
· Excessive burning				×	×			
· Pests or diseases					×			
· Industrial pollution					×		×	

Key

1 Economic and market distortions
2 Policy distortions, particularly inducements for unsustainable exploitation and land speculation
3 Insecurity of tenure or lack of clear property rights
4 Lack of livelihood opportunities
5 Government failures or deficiencies in intervention or enforcement
6 Infrastructural, industrial or communications developments
7 New technologies
8 Population pressures causing land hunger

Source: UN document E/CN.17/IPF/1996/2, ‚Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, Programme Element I.2, Underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation‘, 13 February 1996, Table 4.

sources other than overseas development assistance, in particular from the private sector. It was noted that private capital flows are increasing at a faster rate than public funding. Japan emphasised the importance of a predictable political climate and investor-friendly markets for private sector investment. The G77 and China noted that private sector investment is not always motivated by environmental considerations and there remains an important role for international public finance. The Panel discussed various options for an international forest management fund, but without reaching agreement. As in the UNCED negotiations, Northern delegations appended 'as mutually agreed' to claims from the G77 and China for technology transfer 'on concessional and preferential terms', thus ruling out mandatory transfers outside the market (United Nations 1996b).

Agreement was reached in the programme area III discussions that the next assessment of global forest cover should take place in the year 2000, ten years after the

1990 survey by the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation revealed increasing rates of deforestation in many countries. The Panel urged that the 2000 survey should provide for an assessment of all forest values (United Nations 1996c). The theme of forest values recurred in discussions on criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management which aim to ensure that all values, including non-commercial values, provided by forests are considered when evaluating forest policy. Various regional criteria and indicators process have been developed for assessing policy at the national level. It was agreed that criteria and indicators should reflect ecological and geographical differences, yet also enable the full participation of all interested parties. The Panel stressed the need for a common international understanding on the subject (United Nations 1996d).

Programme area IV on trade and environment in relation to forest products and services was one of the areas where the Panel made least progress. Lack of information on the international and domestic trade in timber and non-timber forest products hampered deliberations. It was agreed that full cost internalisation of social and environmental externalities could contribute to sustainable forest management, and the Panel recommended that governments and intergovernmental fora explore methodologies for internalisation (United Nations 1996e).

3. THE QUESTION OF A GLOBAL FOREST CONVENTION

Two rounds of negotiations on the desirability of a global forests convention have taken place in the 1990s. The first round was the preparatory discussions prior to the UNCED (1990-92). The second round of negotiations took place under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (1995-97).

The UNCED discussions were acrimonious and were essentially polarised along North-South lines. The North, represented by the then European Community, Canada, the United States and Japan, noted the global importance of forests and argued for a convention while the South, represented by the G77, argued against. Different views on forest proprietorship help explain the disagreement on the forests issue prior to the UNCED. Some Northern delegations referred to forests as a global common, a term dismissed by the Malaysian delegation as 'an assumption of supranational rights by the North' (Nelson 1991). The G77 argued that forests were a sovereign natural resource to be used in line with national development policy. The Canadian-Malaysian initiative (see above) served as a confidence-building process following the divisive UNCED forest negotiations and enabled the subsequent establishment of the Panel. Discussions on whether or not the Panel should recommend the establishment of an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Forests (INCF) dominated deliberations under programme area V.

Since the UNCED there have been some changes in the positions adopted by governments regarding a convention (Table 3). The North-South polarisation of the issue has blurred, although it remains discernible. As the negotiations progressed the debate shifted within the G77. Malaysia changed position to advocate a convention which recognised a relationship between forest conservation and financial and

technological transfers. The position was summarised by the Malaysian delegate at the fifth session of the CSD; 'Malaysia is amenable to an equitable and comprehensive Convention provided that it covers all forests and has adequate economic, technological and environmental provisions...' (Malaysia to CSD 1997). Indonesia supported this position and argued that an INCF should be established (Indonesia to CSD 1997). Most, although not all, African countries also favoured a convention. Other developing countries to support a convention were Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica. Meanwhile, most Latin American countries, especially Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia and Peru, argued against a convention. From these positions the G77 and China, which sought to speak with one voice, synthesised the common line that it was too early to establish an INCF, although the desirability of a convention would be reassessed after the UNGASS.

With respect to the North, both the European Union and Canada argued for an INCF. In so doing they adhered to the pro-convention line announced at the 1990 G7 summit at Houston. However the USA, which had supported a convention during the UNCED negotiations, shifted policy and argued against. The influence of the corporate sector in the United States helps explains this change. Whereas the first term of the Clinton administration saw a policy shift in favour of environmental protection, with the administration signing the Convention on Biological Diversity, the second term has seen American corporations reassert the values of neoliberalism, protesting against any form of trade intervention and global regulation on environmental grounds. The administration has been criticised by the American pharmaceutical industry for signing the Convention on Biological Diversity (which at the time of writing has not been ratified by Congress). Meanwhile the United States energy sector has failed to make progress towards the stabilisation of carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 as called for under the Convention on Climate Change. This has attracted criticism from NGOs and from some governments, including the British Labour government. In short, the domestic political climate in the US has moved against the administration joining additional international environmental regimes. Japan, which formally endorsed the 1990 G7 position without actively supporting it, also announced its opposition to a convention during the Panel's negotiations, as did Australia and New Zealand. Meanwhile Russia, which at the time of the UNCED was preoccupied with internal matters and did not offer a view on the issue at Rio, declared its support for a convention at the IPF. The positions of actors that have played a central role in the forests convention debates of the 1990s is shown in Table 3.

The Environmental Investigation Agency was one of the few environmental NGOs to support a convention at the Panel, in part to regulate the global timber industry (Environmental Investigation Agency 1996). Most of the bigger NGOs, which at Rio had favoured a convention that contained strong conservation commitments and clauses that respected the rights of indigenous peoples, are now against a convention. The shift by the NGO community can be explained in part by disillusionment with intergovernmental initiatives, and in part by fears that a convention would hinder the empowerment of international civil society. The main thrust of the NGOs' arguments is that a convention would reinforce a global governance structure that gave authority to states to the exclusion of local communities. NGOs that adhered to this position included the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Greenpeace International, Friends of the Earth, World Rainforest Movement and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

Table 3. Positions of major actors on the desirability of a global forest convention at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and at the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests.

	1990-92 UNCED	1995-97 IPF
European Union	●	●
Canada	●	●
Malaysia	✕	●
Indonesia	✕	●
Russia	?	●
Africa	✕	●
Latin America	✕	✕
USA	●	✕
Japan	●	✕
NGOs	●	✕

Key

✕ Against a global forests convention
● In favour of a global forests convention
? Position undecided

Some of these international NGOs saw the Panel's negotiations on the merits of a convention as a diversion from the need to ensure a greater role for civil society in forest policy making at all levels.

The Intergovernmental Forum on Forests

The fourth and final session of the Panel agreed on the need to continue international dialogue on forests and generated three possible options: first, to continue intergovernmental dialogue within existing fora (effectively the status quo ante the Panel); second, to establish an Intergovernmental Forum on Forests that, like the Panel, would report to the CSD (effectively the status quo); and, third, to launch negotiations for a legally binding instrument on forests. The pro-and anti-convention delegations were unable to reach agreement on this matter and passed it to the CSD, which declined to take a decision and passed it to the UNGASS where finally it was agreed to establish an Intergovernmental Forum on Forests. The Forum will report to the CSD which will take a decision on the Forum's findings after three years, that is at its 8th session in the year 2000. The Intergovernmental Forum on Forests has been charged by the UNGASS with inter alia:

a. promoting and facilitating the implementation of the Panel's proposals for action;
b. reviewing, monitoring and reporting on progress in the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests; and
c. considering matters left pending by the Panel, in particular trade and environment in relation to forests, transfer of technology and the need for financial resources.

The Intergovernmental Forum on Forests, like its predecessor the Panel, is another example of bridging institutional machinery. The question of a convention is certain to dominate much of the Forum's time in the same way that it dominated the UNCED forest negotiations of 1990-2 and the IPF/UNGASS deliberations of 1995-7. The year 2000 is now the earliest opportunity for an INCF to be established, assuming that a consensus for a convention emerges from the Forum.

4. INITIATIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY

As noted above, some of the bigger international NGOs saw the Panel's negotiations on a convention as a diversion from other issues. A forest convention, it was suggested by some NGOs, would reinforce the statecentric intergovernmental system and marginalise the role of international civil society in global forest politics. Partnership outside the formal framework of a convention is now seen by most NGOs as the most viable route to effective forest conservation. Two examples involving the WWF are given below. Insufficient space exists to illustrate the full range of activities in which NGOs are engaged.

First, the WWF is currently working with a range of actors towards the target of ensuring that an ecologically representative network of protected areas covering at least 10 per cent of the world's forest cover is achieved by the year 2000. Currently about 94 per cent of the world's forests are outside protected areas. According to WWF's figures, the per centage area of forests outside protected areas are 91% for Latin America and the Caribbean, 95% for Asia and Pacific, 95% for Africa and Madagascar, 95% for North America, 98% for Russia and 98% for Europe (World Wide Fund for Nature 1998). WWF's protected areas target was given a boost at the fifth session of the CSD when Australia announced its commitment to establish reserves for 15% of its forest area prior to European colonisation. At the UNGASS China announced its support for WWF's 10-percent target. In December 1997, Brazil, which currently has 3.8% of its forests in protected areas, became the twenty-first country to announce its support for the WWF target. The other countries committed to the ten per cent target are Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Lithuania, Malawi, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Romania, Russian Republic of Sakah, Slovakia, Tunisia and Uzbekistan. At the UNGASS the World Bank announced its support for the WWF target, and also stated its intention to establish 50 million hectares of new protected areas by 2005 (World Wide Fund for Nature 1997). One criticism of the protected areas approach is that it excludes local people, both from land and from policy making.

The WWF has also been centrally involved in the establishment of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The origins of the FSC can be traced directly to the failure of intergovernmental to support or enable a labelling scheme for sustainably managed timber. In 1989 the ITTO rejected a labelling proposal drafted by Friends of the Earth and introduced by the British delegation. In 1990 the ITTO refused to follow up a recommendation by the WWF that the ITTO seek a waiver from Article XX(g) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which prohibits discrimination

between like products on the basis of their manufacture. This article prohibits states from discriminating between sustainably managed and unsustainably managed timber in the international market place.

Following the failures of the ITTO to take action on labelling, the WWF shifted its support from an intergovernmental global labelling scheme regulated by governments to a voluntary private sector scheme. The FSC was established in October 1993 following a series of consultations between the WWF, other conservation NGOs, social groups and timber trade organisations. The FSC authorises national certifying bodies to award the FSC label to timber from forest concessions that adhere to the FSC's principles for well-managed forests. It aims to end the proliferation of timber labels by working towards a globally harmonised scheme. The rationale behind the FSC is that while it is voluntary, it will attract sufficient support over time to become the sole recognised label. In order for the FSC label to achieve global legitimacy, it is necessary that the scheme attracts over time support from a majority of the world's forest concessions and timber traders, as well as the support of a majority of the world's consumers. It is significant that while North-South governmental divisions have precluded agreement on an intergovernmental timber labelling scheme, a global non-governmental/private sector scheme is now in the process of operationalisation. The FSC represents a qualitatively new form of global governance that has been created in response to the perceived failure of intergovernmental fora. While discrimination by states between sustainably managed and unsustainably managed timber is GATT illegal, private companies are, of course, not members of the GATT, hence they can make such discriminations without running foul of the GATT. By January 1998, 6.3 million hectares of forest were independently certified under the FSC's labelling scheme. The target is for ten million hectares of forests to be certified by the end of 1998. By March 1998 twenty countries had certified forests, namely Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Honduras, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, Poland, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, UK, USA and Zimbabwe (FSC 1998).

5. FOREST POLICYMAKING AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE

One of the objectives of the FSC is to ensure that forest management is socially as well as environmentally responsible. Here it is instructive briefly to consider the question of justice. If NFPs are to attract support from all areas of society, and if forest policy is successfully to be legitimated and justified before all stakeholders, then the question of justice will inevitably be a central one for those involved in the conception, planning and execution of NFPs. Three dimensions to justice may be discerned: justice between countries; justice within countries; and justice between generations.

With respect to justice within countries, it is clear from the discussions above on the ITTO and the question of a global forests convention that different views prevail in North and South with respect to the rights and duties of states. In the UNCED negotiations certain governments from the North sought to frame forest conservation as an issue whereby the South has a moral duty to conserve the world's tropical forests for

the good of all humanity. The South responded that it has the right, enshrined in international law, to use its forests in line with national development policies. One of the arguments made by the South is that the North, which has chopped down most of its forests and is consuming most timber felled in the South, bears an additional responsibility for global forest destruction. It is therefore, argue the South, not only unjust but a supranational presumption for the North to attempt to stipulate that the South should conserve its forests. In response to the view of some Northern countries that forests should be seen as a 'global common' in which all humanity has a stake, Southern countries have asserted that the North has a moral duty to provide compensation to the South for the opportunity cost foregone if the South is to desist from exploiting its forest resources, as if the South were to agree to conserve its forests, it would lose the foreign exchange that would accrue from forest development. As we have seen, claims for compensation have taken the form of demands by the South for external debt relief, technology transfers from North to South and increased aid flows. One reason why, after two rounds of negotiations in the 1990s, negotiations have not been launched for a forest convention is that North has not been prepared to meet the forest-related demands of the South.

Forest policymaking also raises the question of justice within countries. Intergovernmental negotiations involve only governments, and the underlying assumption of such negotiations is that a government may speak for all its citizens. However, and as we have seen in the case of the ITTO, governments may align themselves with some interest groups at the expense of others. In many cases indigenous forest peoples have suffered loss of land at the hands of powerful political and economic interests from outside the forests. In Brazil and Kalimantan, to name just two examples, forest burning and logging has robbed indigenous peoples of their tribal homelands. While this policy may benefit the national economy and may help to promote national development, the cost in terms of cultural destruction and the loss of habitat for humans and other species has been huge.

Indigenous forest peoples are gradually becoming better organised in response to the threats to their way of life posed by outside interests. In 1992 indigenous peoples from all the world's main tropical forested regions formulated a joint declaration in Penang which asserted '[r]espect for our autonomous forms of self-government, as differentiated political systems at the community, regional and other levels' (World Rainforest Movement 1992). In response to claims that forests should be seen as a 'global common' as some Northern governments have asserted, or that they are a 'national resource' as the G77 claim, indigenous forests peoples and other forest communities have asserted a third proprietorial claim, namely that forests should be seen as a 'local common'. In the words of the 1992 Penang declaration, 'we declare that we are the original peoples, the rightful owners and the cultures that defend the tropical forests of the world' (World Rainforest Movement 1992). Most indigenous peoples wish to be left alone to practice their traditional lifestyles. Even the possibility of their receiving financial compensation for the destruction of their forests is an unattractive proposition, as money is seen to be as destructive of traditional lifestyles every bit as much as deforestation.

Finally there is the question of justice between generations. As with other environmental issues, long term beneficiaries are rarely present when decisions are

made on forest use, and future generations are never present. Forests fill a diverse range of social and economic functions. If there is to be justice between generations, all forest values must be passed on to future generations more or less intact. However, the policy of some actors has been to conserve some forest values while destroying others. Let us consider the question of plantations. Some timber industrialists may clear an area of forest and replace it with a plantation of, in economic terms, high value timber species. Plantations may successfully pass onto to future generations certain forest values; future generations may receive the same carbon dioxide sink capacity and stock of timber as their predecessors inherited. However, many plantations are monocultures of just one timber species and are therefore not ecologically representative of natural forest cover: they will be unable to support the same level of biodiversity as natural forests; they will be unable to provide the same returns of non-timber products such as fruits and nuts; and they will not serve the same cultural and spiritual functions as natural forests. Hence while plantations may be a satisfactory policy response with respect to some aspects of intergenerational equity, they are incapable of satisfying a broad notion of intergenerational equity that passes onto the next generation all values of a given area of forest.

In effect therefore a plantation policy best serves the interests of timber industrialists at the expense of future generations. The immediate successors of today's plantation owners will *ceteris paribus* inherit a financially healthy company. They thus effectively benefit from the policy of their predecessors by which the ecological capital of future generations was converted into the private capital of a business concern. However the immediate successors of the present generation (and this includes those with a stake in the plantation company in question) will inherit an area of degraded forest land that is devoid of those other values which have been lost by the destruction of natural forest.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Forest policy, both within and outside the framework of NFPs, is in large measure a product of power configurations and of conflicts of interests. It is also a product of the ideological positions of the actors involved. While the agents of the hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism have so far thwarted the ideological challenge of the NIEO and of ecologism, the latter two may gain force. First, as intergovernmental forest negotiations in the 1990s have shown, the G77 is prepared to use forest conservation as a bargaining chip to argue for a greater share in the financial and technological resources of the North. Second, the increasing environmental concerns of many actors may result in the questioning of the free trade ethos of neoliberalism so that ecologism gains strength as a political doctrine.

Two series of intergovernmental negotiations – the UNCED process and the IPF/UNGASS process – have now decided against a global forests convention, but whereas the former process led to bitter divisions between North and South, the cooperative spirit generated in 1994 as the result of the Canadian-Malaysian initiative held good during the latter negotiations. In both processes the G77 and China sought to link progress on forest conservation to the issues of financial and technological transfers,

and in each case the developed world was reluctant to make potentially costly new pledges. While at UNCED the pro- and anti-convention camps were polarised along North-South lines, in the five years since Rio some governments from the South have moved in favour of a convention. One reason for this is that some G77 countries perceive that there is a greater chance of extracting from the North forest-related transfers of finance and technology within a convention framework, a point reinforced by the fact that calls over the last five years from the G77 and China for tropical forest conservation to be financed in part from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) have been rejected by Northern governments on the grounds that the GEF is available only for supporting legally-binding conventions. It is unlikely that the G77 and China will agree to a convention that does not relate forest conservation to financial and technological assistance. Nonetheless, for the first time since a convention was proposed in 1990 there is now scope for possible agreement on the issue between the G77, Russia, the EU and Canada. However this change in the political climate has occurred at the same time as the United States has moved to oppose a convention.

The question of justice is central to National Forest Programmes. Those with the greatest impacts upon the forests invariably tend to be powerful outside interests, such as industrial companies backed by economic and political power who displace the traditional forms of land control of local communities. Migrating landless farmers may also enter the forest in search of land for subsistence agriculture if they have lost, or been evicted from, land elsewhere. Deforestation is therefore the result of incursions into the forest by both the powerful who displace, and the powerless who are displaced. As such, a recognition of the rights and concerns of disempowered local communities is not only an environmental imperative, it is also one of social justice within the present generation. Only when the question of injustice within generations has been addressed, so that those with a stake in forest conservation or in sustainable forest use have a greater influence in the policy making process than actors with a stake in short sighted and ecologically unsustainable economic exploitation, will the present generation be able to bequeath to its successors all the forests values it inherited, thus satisfying the imperative of intergenerational justice.

List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CITES	Convention in International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
EU	European Union
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
G7	Group of 7 Developed Countries
G77	Group of 77 Developing Countries
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEF	Global Environment Facility
INCF	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Forests
ITTA	International Tropical Timber Agreement
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organisation

List of Abbreviations (continued)

IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (World Conservation Union)
NFP	National Forest Programme
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
TFRK	Traditional Forest Related Knowledge
TRAFFIC	Trades Record Analysis of Fauna and Flora in Commerce
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNGASS	United Nations General Assembly 19th Special Session (to review five years implementation of Agenda 21)
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

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II

IMPETUS PRESENTATIONS

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

The article provides an overview on problems of multi-level governance and summarizes, based on recent findings in political science, some hypotheses on how these problems can be solved. It is argued that in complex policies like the formulation and implementation of forest programs, simple structures of centralization or decentralization provide no alternative to multi-level governance. Moreover, existing analyses show that simple structures of joint policy-making between two levels of government are problematic as they cause stalemates in decision-making. Contrary to common assumptions, policy-making in complex multi-level governance, which includes more levels and requires coordination between policy sectors and public-private cooperation, does not necessarily end in a deadlock. This argument is illustrated by the example of regional policy in the German federal system and in the EU, from which some ideas are derived on how multi-level governance functions.

Keywords: Centralization, Coordination, Decentralization, Multi-level Governance, Negotiation

'Multi-level governance' is a concept which political scientists use to describe and analyze structures of power-sharing between levels of government and intergovernmental or interorganizational policy-making, with "(...) no center of accumulated authority. Instead, variable combinations of governments on multiple levels of authority – European (or international, A.B.), national, and subnational – form policy networks for collaboration. The relations are characterized by interdependence on eachothers' resources, not by competition for scarce resources" (Hooghe 1996:18).

The article summarizes some ideas on problems of governance in multi-leveled structures and comments on how these problems can be solved. As I cannot refer to experiences or empirical studies on forest policies, I base my argumentation on

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theoretical studies and on empirical research on territorial planning and regional policy. According to my own assessment, these policy fields do not differ greatly from forest policy, if we ignore specific institutional structures and procedures. These policies all concern the development of territories, their economy, their social structure and their environment. They require coordination between different levels of government, an integrative planning approach including economic and environmental aspects, and cooperation with private parties. These three dimensions of coordination and cooperation pose specific challenges for multi-leveled governance.

The following outline summarizes some findings in political science on the characteristics and difficulties posed by policy-making in structures of multi-level governance. First, I argue that in complex policies concerning the development of territories and different functions simple structures of centralization or decentralization provide no alternative to multi-level governance. Secondly, I examine simple structures of joint policy-making between two levels of government. In the third part, I analyze complex multi-level governance, which includes more levels and coordination between policy sectors and public-private cooperation. I argue that increasing complexity should not force policy-making to end in a deadlock. Based on experiences from regional policy in the German federal system and in the EU, I outline some ideas on how multi-level governance functions.

1. REASONS FOR MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: WHY A SEPARATION OF LEVELS IS NOT APPROPRIATE

Multi-level governance means that processes of policy-making of central and decentralized governments are inter-dependent, that there is a necessity of coordination between levels and that the latter must be achieved in processes of negotiations and cooperation, as there is no distinct hierarchical order between levels. Governance refers to interorganizational patterns of interaction, which are characterized by an exchange of information and resources, and in which no single center has authoritative power to resolve conflicts (Rhodes 1997:46-60; Kenis and Schneider 1996; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). A pattern such as this is characteristic of policies which concern territorial developments. Here, decisions at local or regional levels usually have consequences which go beyond the regional context and touch on national or international problems. Multi-level governance may also develop when policies of national or international institutions have various repercussions on regions or localities to be considered in the formulation of programs on a central level. Such interdependencies between levels must be dealt with in forest planning as they are in territorial planning or regional development policy.

In these cases, both decentralized and centralized policy-making face limiting factors. The reasons can be derived from the economic theory of federalism (e.g. Oates 1972; Thoeni 1986), which provides a well elaborated analytical toolbox for an evaluation of centralization and decentralization. The limits of decentralization are primarily caused by:

- external effects, which extend to the territory of a responsible government: forests provide resources for a regional economy, but exploitation of these resources may have national or global consequences;
- the existence of common resources, which are controlled by different governments: large forests influence the climate of wider territories, therefore their preservation is in the interest of affected regions and states;
- the allocation of resources or costs and benefits of developments, which leads to unjustified inequalities between territories: problems of sustainable development of forests are caused to a considerable degree by economic inequalities among regions and nations and unfair terms of trade between suppliers and demanders of timber.

Centralization of policy-making may solve these problems, but it has disadvantages due to:

- the lack of information of central governments on specific situations in regions and localities,
- the disposition of central governments to implement sector-specific solutions,
- the decline of citizen's influence and difficulties to find acceptance for central decisions.

Policy-making thus requires a "federal", vertically differentiated structure, in which central planning is based on agendas, interests, ideas and solutions defined at regional or local levels and in which decentralized implementation has to be coordinated and controlled by central institutions. A clear separation of functions and powers with central governments being responsible for regulation and strategic planning and decentralized institutions implementing policies (a layer-cake model of a polity) is hardly realistic. On the one hand, central regulation and strategic planning need information from local actors, and central institutions have to consider interests of regional and local actors and have to gain acceptance. On the other hand, implementing institutions have to be motivated and supported by central policies in order to be able to effectively fulfill their functions; the central control of policies, which vary according to different territories, has to be based on continuous communication. Therefore, centralized and decentralized planning and policies cannot be made without coordination; they are interdependent.

In policies which concern territorial or environmental development, coordination between levels of policy-making has to be completed by coordination between specific sectoral policies and by cooperation between actors of the public and the private sector. It is not possible to manage and control these "horizontal" processes of coordination and cooperation in a hierarchical structure. Under these conditions, multi-level governance develops in complicated non-hierarchical structures, combining different arenas at different levels with often different rules of interaction and decision-making. "La gouvernance est donc définie comme un processus de coordination d´acteurs publics et privés, de groupes sociaux, d´institutions pour atteindre des buts propres discutés et définis collectivement dans des environnements fragmentés, incertains" (Le Galès 1997: 241; furthermore Le Galès 1995: 59). It goes without saying that in such an

institutional context, it is quite difficult to achieve a consistent policy, not to mention a rational approach of an integrative planning.

2. PROBLEMS OF JOINT DECISION-MAKING

Political scientists have argued that even simple forms of multi-level governance possessing only two levels of government (Figure 1), may lead to severe problems. An elaborate theory of such a pattern of joint decision-making was presented by Fritz W. Scharpf (Scharpf 1988; 1994; 1997; Scharpf et al. 1976). Case studies in territorial planning and regional development policies, but also in other policy fields, show that joint decision systems are bound to end in stalemate if interests of governments diverge at important aspects (Benz 1982; Garlichs 1980; Scharpf et al. 1976). This is the case if policies have redistributive consequences or if regulations are blamed by affected governments to constrain their autonomy.

In order to avoid stalemates, actors in intergovernmental relations refer to conflict avoiding strategies. Regulations and goals of programs are formulated as "soft" norms, catching all relevant interests; financial resources are allocated according to the principle of equality or in such a way that all governments profit from it. Compromises are found by solutions which only marginally alter the status quo, which conserve existing structures and do not harm vested interests of powerful organizations. As a consequence, the quality of policy-making and of governance is reduced, innovative and efficient solutions are hardly feasible.

These conflict-avoiding solutions are implemented in order to evade deadlock situations, as governments at both the central and the regional or local level have to comply with two basic considerations: on the one hand, they have to co-operate with other governments in order to achieve solutions of social problems and advance the public interest. In addition, they have to pursue specific interests, which are defined by

Figure 1. System of joint decision-making.

their responsibilities or their constituency. The behavior of actors in such "mixed-motive situations" depends, other things being equal, on the weighing of joint interests and individual interests of governments.

The evaluation of joint and individual interests is not only influenced by the definition of problems, i.e. whether they are assessed as problems of joint production or problems of redistribution. It is dependent, to a considerable degree, on institutional structures or patterns of networks developing in multi-level structures (Benz 1992).

Cooperation is the most probable result in established interorganizational relations including only civil servants and specialists of a single policy area. If experts in autonomous administrations are mainly responsible for intergovernmental coordination, it is probable that they will find common orientations, cooperate on the basis of mutual trust and form stable networks. In many countries, forest policy is among those policies (e.g. territorial planning, road planning and construction, transport policy, water policy), which are often the work of independent organizations in the public sector and are predominated by a community of experts with specific professional norms and knowledge.

Such policy communities (Atkinson and Coleman 1992; March and Rhodes 1992; Wilks and Wright 1987) face limiting factors when decisions need the support of governments and parliaments. Joint policy-making which concerns fundamental decisions is influenced by the rules of the democratic system. In systems predominated by the competition of political parties, intergovernmental cooperation becomes difficult. A government, which has to justify the outcomes of negotiations in parliament is more inclined to follow the genuine interests of its constituency than to seek solutions conforming to the "common good". Parliaments often formulate policy goals in redistributive terms and stress competition with other regions or states. Governments, forced to find approval of a majority in the parliament have to realize that any compromise with other governments is exposed to critical scrutiny in debates among parties regarding gains and losses. As a consequence, confrontation among parties induces them to pursue a strict distributive bargaining strategy which is determined to achieve acceptance for fixed propositions but not to search for optimal solutions. Such strategies very likely lead negotiations and intergovernmental coordination to fail (Benz 1998; Lehmbruch 1976).

Both institutional settings of joint decision-making are relevant in practical policy-making. They have consequences which are both problematic: cooperation among independent administration obstructs coordination between different policies and ends in sectoral fragmentation or policy-making. Binding decisions and control of parliaments make non-decision-making more likely and lead to the dilemma of democracy in multi-level governance (Benz 1998).

3. POLICY-MAKING IN MORE COMPLEX STRUCTURES OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

The result of this theoretical analysis may not totally conform with our knowledge of real policy-making. There are two reasons for this: first, no democratic government can

live with such outcomes. Therefore, governments and administrations develop pragmatic strategies to cope with problems of intergovernmental coordination and cooperation. Secondly, real structures are more complicated than simple systems of joint-decision-making. Policies such as forest planning often include more levels, particularly with the globalization of economic and environmental problems, international organizations enter the arena. Moreover, we have to take into consideration that private actors and non-governmental organizations play an increasing role in public policy-making (Figure 2).

At a first glance, the evolution of systems of joint decision-making into multi-level governance seems to increase problems of coordination and policy-making. There are indeed reasons for this (Benz 1998). Firstly, inter-governmental negotiations in a multi-level setting are burdened by the increasing number of actors and the variedness of interests involved. This has two consequences: on the one hand, immediate communication among relevant actors is no longer feasible, official processes must be formalized, while informal "behind the scene" communication gains importance with regard to intermediating interests and elaborating agreements. On the other hand, the "zone of overlapping interests", which makes compromises possible, declines in proportion to the number of actors. Even when there are overlapping interests, it is more difficult to find appropriate "package deals" due to the amount of information to be considered. The "costs" of multi-level negotiations increase both in terms of complexity of decision and in terms of time required for exchanging propositions and arguments.

Figure 2. Multi-level governance.

Secondly, more serious than the costs of decision-making are the ramifications of interdependent decisions. They can significantly reduce the effectiveness of policy-making and – if worse comes to worst – lead to a deadlock. Two types of interlocking politics are of particular relevance:

- Multi-level structures are composed of at least two arenas of negotiation, in which actors have to find agreements. The problem is that agreements in one arena reduce the chances for consent in another arena, because actors are committed to previous deals. It is often very difficult to coordinate interdependent negotiations at different levels so that actors are not caught in double-binds. A sequential or hierarchical ordering of negotiation processes might offer a solution to this problem, but it leads to centralization of policy-making with all the negative consequences mentioned in the first chapter.
- In multi-level governance, intergovernmental negotiation is mostly linked to forms of intra-governmental cooperation. Regional or local programs, which have to be coordinated with central policies, are to be coordinated between different functional organizations in public administration and have to be elaborated in public-private partnerships in the regions. Again it is likely that effective negotiation in one arena might reduce space for maneuvering in the other arena, because participants are bound to agreements. If lower-level governments take up proposals emerging from regional partnerships, they may fail to find approval of central governments and lose financial support. If this is the case, participants in regional cooperation may be frustrated and reduce their engagement in regional politics. This development can be observed in the current regionalization process in Germany (Hesse et al. 1991; Kilper 1998: 118-124).

4. HOW MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE FUNCTIONS

These theoretical reflections can explain the problems of multi-level governance. If they represented the whole story, it is doubtful whether such a system would work at all. Indeed, empirical studies, e.g. studies on European regional policy, have shown that multi-level governance is no less effective than systems of joint decision-making. This is astonishing, given the increasing number of actors and interests, the variety of institutions, and the links between arenas and levels of government. Empirical findings on European multi-level governance invite us to join Morton Grodzin, who in the face of the highly complex intergovernmental relations in the federal system of the U. S. wrote: "...it works – and sometimes with beauty" (Grodzins 1966: 8).

Whether with beauty or not, in order to be able to manage complex processes of multi-level planning and implementation, we have to explain why and how multi-level governance works. Given the state of research, I can merely provide preliminary findings and hypotheses. The following explanations are influenced by theories of interorganizational negotiations (Benz 1994; Benz et al. 1992; Lax and Sebenius 1986; Walton and McKersie 1965) and international politics which consider the interplay of international and national politics in the analytical framework of a dynamic "two-level

game" (Evans et al. 1993; Putnam 1988; Scharpf 1994a). Moreover, my hypotheses are based on my experience of EU regional policy (Benz 1998a). This case can serve as a good example for our discussion, as in 1988, a reform introduced new implementation procedures for the structural funds. This reform introduced a complicated multi-level policy-making characterized by following attributes (Hooghe 1996, Marks 1993, Staeck 1997; Smith 1997):

- The first improvement concerns the coordination of various structural funds and aims at implementing an *integrative approach* to policy-making. Different sectoral grants are now allocated on the basis of a single scheme.
- A second development should improve *vertical intergovernmental coordination*: The reform introduced the partnership principle which attributes the regional actors an effective role in decision-making with the use of available regional policy grants. Subsidies to selected regions are granted on the basis of development plans and operational programs to be elaborated at the national and regional level. They have to be approved by the Commission, which integrates them into the Community Support Framework.
- In addition, all projects supported by the EU have to be "co-financed" by national or regional governments. EU regional policy can be characterized as a system of *joint finance,* linking budgetary policies of different levels of government.
- Finally, rules of the structural funds require that regional administrations should involve *public and private actors* into the decision-making process in order to achieve broad support for policy goals and to gain comprehensive information on development potentials. Thus, the EU promotes the emergence of *policy networks* in regions.

Evaluations of the new regional policy have revealed that the reform did not fulfill all intentions. It however, is interesting to analyze how coordination processes in such multi-level structures could work at all and how the system has reacted to looming deadlocks. The following aspects seem to play an important role (Benz 1998a):

Firstly, EU regional policy is characterized by a specific organization of functions: the EU has decided *on the concept*, i.e. on very general policy goals and on principles for the allocation of grants to regions. The main goals for regional policy are formulated in programs *for each individual region*, which are elaborated in cooperation between the Commission and the responsible institutions of member state governments and the regions concerned. National or regional governments define their own goals and strategies of regional development. Thus, there is a relatively clear separation of decisions of policy principles and the implementation of these principles with a considerable degree of discretion for decentralized institutions.

Secondly, the complexity of processes is simplified, to a certain degree, by a territorial differentiation of intergovernmental relations. In contrast to systems of joint decision-making, which include all decentralized governments, intergovernmental relations between the EU, the national and regional governments are related to individual nations or regions. The dominant mode of intergovernmental coordination is not multi-lateral, but bi- and/or trilateral. In this way, multi-level coordination can be

adjusted to different institutional settings of lower level governments, conflicts can be reduced by dividing them into smaller parts. These procedures are often further simplified by a pragmatic by-passing of levels of government: in Germany, the national government leaves the formulation of development programs to Länder governments, which have immediate relations to the Commission. By lowering the number of participants in the negotiation process, the potential for conflict is reduced.

Thirdly, different arenas of the multi-level system are loosely coupled. The term "loose coupling" means that decisions in one arena do not completely determine decisions in other arenas, but only influence parts of the decision premises (Weick 1985: 163-165). This means that politics are linked not by binding decisions but by transferring information, not by delegates with clearly defined mandates but by representatives who pursue goals but not fixed strategies. The political process is structured not as "connected games", in which strategies of the actors are dependent on outcomes of other games, but as "embedded games", in which policy-making in one arena sets the context for negotiations in other arenas. Parliaments, for instance, react to developments in intergovernmental relations; not with strict controls but with resolutions, which express the opinions and recommendations of the majority of elected representatives of the people. Public-private partnerships are mobilized on a more informal basis They do not form institutionalized councils but flexible networks which are adjusted to specific requirements of planning and implementing individual projects. Governments consider proposals from regional cooperation as ideas on how a region should be developed. In a nutshell: actors in multi-level structures shift the logic and language of interaction from control or decision-making to information exchange and persuasion. This style of policy makes it easier to evade interest-based deadlock.

Fourthly, cooperation among governments and public-private cooperation is not only embedded in the context of politics in other arenas. These arenas may also constitute structures of guidance and control. In the EU system two types influence negotiation and cooperation:

- Agendas and potential solutions of intergovernmental or public-private negotiations are influenced by "mediators" or "promoters". These functions are fulfilled by actors occupying boundary-spanning roles: many of the members of the EU-Commission, of national and of regional executives are in such positions, but we also find that representatives of Chambers of Industry and Commerce act as regional mediators.
- The quality of policy-making in the EU is stimulated by competition between governments and regions. In regional politics, the rules of the EU funds merely determine whether a region is eligible. The amount of grants to individual regions depends on the quality of programs and the effectiveness of coordination. In addition, a certain degree of competition exists between regional public-private partnerships trying to present themselves as being innovative and effective.

All this does not mean that European governance is totally unproblematic. I merely argue that it does not end in stalemate and may produce solutions of a satisfying quality.

5. CONCLUSIONS

To summarize: the difficulties of multi-level governance can be managed,

- if central-level institutions provide policy principles and ideas, if they are guided by incentives, if they promote and mediate cooperation, and if they evaluate planning and implementation of lower level governments,
- if coordination is based on competition among lower-level governments and bilateral negotiation between central, regional and local policies in the shadow of central control and decentralized competition, and
- if parliaments and organized interests are integrated as forums of public discussion, which influence not only definition of interests but also standards of solid governance.

Therefore, planning at central (national and international) levels should be limited to formulating and controlling principles and quality standards, which provide a convincing and applicable conceptual framework for regional and local planning. Grants from central governments are often necessary to stimulate strategies of sustainable development, but they should also induce competition of regional governments to formulate and implement the best possible planning practices. Competition should be further supported by appropriate evaluation of action programs and their implementation. Regional and local actions should refer to global principles, standards and guidelines, which are implemented not only in decentralized processes, but also in negotiations and communication among central, regional and local governments and between public and private actors. By making evaluations public, thus causing positive or negative publicity for decentralized planning and implementation, the central institutions, without regulation and direct interference, may effectively sanction deficient outcomes and create the "shadow of hierarchy" (Scharpf 1993), in which effective cooperation at the regional and local levels becomes more probable. In order to achieve effective decisions and to avoid confrontations and stalemates, political entrepreneurs (mediators) are of vital importance. They have to promote ideas, principles and alternative solutions, to mediate conflicts and to bridge institutional boundaries between levels of government and arenas of policy-making. Parliaments and social groups should be included in processes of decision-making in order to gain widespread approval and to avoid resistance to the implementation of planning. Their function is to influence principles and standards, to make processes and decisions public, and to stimulate open discussions.

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POLICY LEARNING AND POLICY CHANGE: RECONCILING KNOWLEDGE AND INTERESTS IN THE POLICY PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

Several different explanations of policy change based on notions of learning have emerged in the policy literature to challenge conventional conflict-oriented theories of public policy-making. These include notions of "policy-oriented learning" developed by Sabatier, "policy transfer" analyzed by Rose, "social learning" discussed by Hall and "government learning" identified by Etheredge. These different concepts identify different sets of policy actors and different policy effects with each mode of learning. This paper examines each approach and categorizes each type of learning in terms of its effects on policy change. Finally, the implications of learning theory for policy-makers and policy actors are discussed.

Keywords: Policy Learning, Policy Design, Policy Change, Social Learning,

1. INTRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLICY LEARNING

Policy learning is a policy-related activity undertaken by both state and societal actors which can affect both the goals and means of policy. It is an important aspect of public policy-making because it is a factor involved in both major and relatively minor instances of policy change. Its importance is equally significant to those trying to understand policy processes and to those actively engaged in policy-making. For the former, it serves as a needed corrective to traditional "interest-driven" conceptions of the policy process and provides new insights into the forces and factors leading to policy change (Richardson et al. 1992; Hall 1993; Hayward 1991; Schulman 1988; Holzner and Marx 1979; for an applied discussion see Lertzman et al. 1996 and Hoberg 1996). For the latter, it provides insights into the means and methods of modern-day planning, an activity now often undertaken in a much more indirect fashion than was the case in the recent past (Klijn 1996; Howlett 1998a).

This is not a new insight. Twenty-five years ago, Hugh Heclo argued that an approach to policy studies which focused on knowledge acquisition and utilization could yield better explanations and understanding about policy-making than could existing interest or conflict-based theories. As he argued in his 1974 study of British and Swedish social policy:

Tradition teaches that politics is about conflict and power... This is a blinkered view of politics and particularly blinding when applied to social policy. Politics finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty – men collectively wondering what to do... Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society's behalf (Heclo 1974: 305).

What is new, however, is the linking of policy learning to policy change and, especially, the ability of governments to facilitate learning and therefore indirectly influence the direction and nature of policy change. Based on much better understandings of the types and consequences of policy learning developed in the policy sciences since 1974, the learning effects of government actions aimed at manipulating the range of actors and ideas involved in the policy process can now be reasonably well predicted. That is, policy effects can now be designed into policy processes by contemporary governments (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1995).

This paper examines current research into the linkages of policy change with the several different types of learning that have been identified in the policy literature. These include notions of "policy-oriented learning" (Sabatier 1988), "policy transfer" (Rose 1993), "social learning (Hall 1993), and "government learning" (Etheredge 1981). These different concepts associate different sets of policy actors with different policy effects. Some elements of these theories are compatible, while others are not. This paper examines each approach and categorizes each type of learning in terms of its effects on policy change. Finally, the implications of learning theory for policy-makers and policy actors are discussed.

2. POLICY CHANGE: TYPES AND CAUSES

There are several patterns of policy development and change which are typical of liberal democratic states (Weir 1992; Stewart 1992). A useful way to look at these has been set out by Durrant and Diehl (1989). Analogizing from work in paleobiology, they have argued that policy change has two components. Policies can vary not only in terms of the mode of change – between the normal pattern of piecemeal incremental change and the pattern of paradigmatic chance mentioned above – but also in terms of the tempo or speed of change (see Table 1).

As this model demonstrates, paradigmatic change (although always expected to be infrequent) can be either rapid (Hall 1993) or slow (Howlett 1994; Coleman et al. 1996). The same is true for the normal pattern of incremental change which can occur at either tempo (Lindblom 1979; Hayes 1992).

Table 1. A Taxonomy of Policy Change. Adapted from Durrant and Diehl (1989).

Mode of Change	Speed of Change	
	Fast	Slow
Paradigmatic	Rapid Paradigmatic	Gradual Paradigmatic
Normal	Rapid Incremental	Gradual Incremental

Table 2. The Effects of Changes in Ideas and Interests on Policy Change. Adapted from Howlett and M. Ramesh (1998).

Changes in ideas	Changes in actors / interests	
	Yes	No
Yes	Rapid Paradigmatic	Slow Paradigmatic
No	Rapid Incremental	Slow Incremental

This model, of course, does not delve into the question of what causes policies to change in these fashions. However, other work in the policy sciences has linked policy change to changes in the composition and behaviour of policy subsystems (Howlett and Ramesh 1995 and 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993a+b; Baumgartner and Jones 1993); that is, to the actions, perceptions and behaviour of groups of knowledgeable actors intimately involved in the policy process. As such, the causes of policy change can be viewed as being very closely related to the variables which have been identified as significant factors affecting subsystem behaviour. These factors generally fall into two types and are related to conditions which affect the number and type of ideas and actors involved in a subsystem (Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Hessing and Howlett 1997). Table 2 provides a taxonomy of policy change related to the effects of changes in interests and policy ideas on existing policy subsystems (Balbus 1971).

As Table 2 shows, the mode of policy change will take paradigmatic form only if changes have occurred in dominant sets of ideas. When ideas remain unchanged the resulting pattern of policy change is likely to be incremental. The speed or tempo of change, on the other hand, is affected by changes in actors. When actors change, rapid policy change is possible. When the same set of actors is involved, change is likely to be more gradual. Combining these two variables generates the four types of policy change set out in Table 1 (for empirical examples of these propositions see Howlett and Rayner 1995; Kawasaki 1993; Nelson, 1989).

Contemporary research in the policy sciences has identified four major factors which affect the kinds of ideas prevalent in, and the membership of, policy subsystems, and hence underlie the processes of policy change set out above. These are: *policy learning*; *venue change*; *systemic perturbations*; and *subsystem spill-overs*. The first two factors are endogenous to the subsystem and reflect the manner in which the behaviour of

subsystem members themselves can alter ideas and interests in established policy-making routines. The latter two are examples of exogenous variables in which actions taken outside of, and often independent of, an existing sub-system can alter its characteristics and configuration.

Policy learning refers to the manner in which, as Hugh Heclo has noted, a relatively enduring alteration in subsystem behaviour results from experience (Heclo 1974: 306). What is learned is often the experiences of other jurisdictions, but can also involve reflection from experiences within the confines of the subsystems existing boundaries (Rose 1993). This behaviour can result in a variety of feedback-like policy learning processes which will be discussed in more detail below (Pierson 1993; Rist 1994).

Venue change refers to a second type of endogenous subsystem behaviour which can result in policy change, but related not so much to changes in ideas as to changes in actors. In venue change, a redefinition of a policy issue occurs in order to alter the location in which policy deliberations take place and add more actors into an existing policy subsystem. As Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have noted, manipulations of policy images and policy venues are intricately linked together, again resulting in a feedback process in which policy change is the ultimate result. Although not all policy issues are susceptible to manipulation, and not all political systems contain any, or as many, possible alternate policy venues, actors outside of formal and informal policy processes have an incentive to attempt to alter an image and venue in such a way as to alter the nature of an existing policy monopoly or subsystem (Howlett 1998b).

Systemic perturbations refer to a variety of occurrences in the subsystem environment which can exogenously affect subsystem composition and membership. Sabatier (1988) argued that "changes in the core aspects of a policy are usually the results of perturbations in non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem such as macro-economic conditions or the rise of a new systemic governing coalition". This was because he felt that beliefs were influenced by a set of relatively stable parameters such as the basic attributes of the problem area, the basic distribution of natural resources, the fundamental cultural values and social structure of the society in question, and the basic legal structure of the jurisdiction involved. These relatively stable parameters act to establish and constrain fundamental beliefs which could be placed under tension by a set of dynamic variables including changes in socioeconomic conditions and technology, changes in governing coalitions, and the impact of policy decisions in other political systems and sub-systems (Sabatier 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993a, 1993b; Jenkins-Smith et al. 1991).

Finally, *subsystem spill-overs* refer to situations in which activities in subsystems transcend sectoral boundaries and affect other subsystems. Although this particular avenue of policy change has just begun to be examined, it would appear that spill-overs can occur on specific issues without any permanent change in subsystem membership – subsystem intersection (Hoberg and Morawski 1997; Howlett 1994) – or they can be more long-term in nature – subsystem convergence (Grant and MacNamara 1995; Coleman 1994).

3. TYPES OF LEARNING

Policy learning, then, is one of the major sources of policy change. It is not the only source of such change, and any analysis of change in a specific sector or jurisdiction must deal with the possibility that change might result from some other, or some combination of other factors than learning; including venue change, systemic perturbations or subsystem spill-over (Heclo 1974). Nevertheless, when examining learning as a potential source of change, it should also be noted that different types of learning exist. Learning does not always result in paradigmatic policy change, or in incremental change. Rather, different types of learning are associated with propensities for different types of change.

Four types of learning have been identified in the policy literature. These include *social learning*, *policy-oriented learning*, *policy transfer* and *government learning*. These types differ in terms of what is learned, where the lessons arise and what effect each type of learning has on overall policy change (Bennett and Howlett 1992).

Social learning is the most general and significant type of learning.[1] It involves many different types of actors, both inside and outside of governments and existing sectoral subsystems. As a result, it can involve both new ideas and new actors in policy processes, and hence can result in rapid paradigmatic policy change. The transition to Monetarism which occurred in many developed states during the 1980s, as was the adoption of Keynesianism before it, is an oft-cited example of this kind of social learning. That is, new actors entered into policy subsystems through the electoral process and brought with them new ideas about how the economy should be organized and operated (Hall 1992, 1989).

Policy transfer is a more limited, means-oriented, type of learning (Bennett 1997; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).[2] It involves a variety of actors inside of existing subsystems, who draw lessons from their own experiences and the experiences of others in designing and implementing existing policies. It involves new ideas but is usually carried out by existing actors and, therefore, tends to promote a process of gradual paradigmatic change. The gradual reform of the institutions of democratic governance through the adoption of laws and regulations for access to government information and the protection of privacy rights, and the attainment of new methods of citizen accountability in many countries – such as the creation of offices of the ombudsmen – based on models developed in Scandinavia and the U.S. are examples of this type of learning process (Bennett 1988, 1990, 1992).

Policy-oriented learning is a third type of learning that occurs as new actors join existing subsystems and attempt to clarify or better attain existing goals and policy beliefs (Sabatier 1988).[3] It tends only to involve new actors in the policy process and

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[1] Hall has noted that learning can affect both means and ends. In his scheme, learning involves three different types or "orders". In "first-order learning", lessons regarding the "setting" of existing instruments are derived from past experiences. In "second-order learning", the use of various instruments themselves is considered. In the rarest form of learning or "third-order" or "social learning", changes involved the hierarchy of goals behind the policy itself. See Hall 1993; Herson 1984 and Deutsch 1963.

[2] In his work on lesson-drawing Rose points out that in any effort to reduce dissatisfaction with existing policies, policymakers have three alternatives: to turn to their national past; to speculate about the future; or to seek lessons from current experience in other places. He argues that evaluation and lesson-drawing are inextricably linked since a lesson includes a judgment about a programme in effect elsewhere and the position of a potential user. Learning involves scanning programs existing elsewhere, producing a conceptual model of a program of interest, and comparing the exemplar with the problems of the existing program which have occasioned dissatisfaction (Rose 1991).

not new ideas, and hence is consistent with the requisites of rapid incremental change. The adoption and transfer to Eastern European economies of the institutions of West European style "state-aided market economies" it has been argued, represents an example of this type of learning in which state goals changed very little despite the addition of new actors (Deeg 1995).

Government learning is the most restricted type of learning (Etheredge 1981). It involves reviews of subsystem behaviour by existing actors and tends to be means-oriented at best. With no new ideas and no new actors present, this form of learning usually involves only a review of existing policy means by existing actors and, as such, tends to promote only slow, incremental, change. Various efforts at internal reform of existing administrative agencies – such as the PS2000 exercize in Canada – are good examples of this very limited type of learning (Aucoin 1997 and 1995).

These different conceptions of learning and its role in public policy formation – government learning, policy-oriented learning, policy transfer and social learning – are used by many analysts to describe a commonly described tendency for some policy decisions to be made on the basis of knowledge of past experiences and knowledge-based judgments as to future expectations. However, these concepts are not interchangeable. They describe different aspects of the learning process and it is important to note the areas to which they apply and those to which they do not if a usable set of concepts for theory construction and policy practice is to be developed (Sartori 1968).

Table 3 illustrates the different elements of the four types of learning and their relationship to the types of policy change identified above.

5. MANIPULATING LEARNING

This discussion has shown that different types of learning exist and can result in different types of policy change. Each process involves different objects, different subjects and different results. A critical question for anyone concerned with policy-learning is whether and how these processes can be manipulated. That is, can the learning process – and the general nature of resulting policy changes – be engineered, or are these quasi-naturalistic processes which work themselves out in an autonomous or quasi-autonomous fashion?

For most students of learning, in whatever, form, the answer is resolutely the former.[4] In Etheredge's (1981) view, for example, government learning is determined by the

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[3] In his work on advocacy coalitions, Paul Sabatier stressed the manner in which factors such as economic crises, war, social conflict or political realignments can affect subsystem behaviour. In Sabatier's view, the glue that holds advocacy coalitions together is the "Deep Core" beliefs held by their members. These extend to the fundamental normative and ontological axioms which define each individual's underlying personal philosophy. Sabatier argues that these deep core beliefs are relatively impermeable to change, meaning that coalitions are not usually involved in their alteration. Instead, what subsystem members are engaged in is the alteration of two other aspects of coalition belief systems, those related to the "Near Core" and other "Secondary" aspects. The near core positions are those related to the types of strategies required to achieve the deep core beliefs, while the "secondary" aspects relate to decisions on instruments and research required to implement the near core strategies (Sabatier 1988).

[4] Most would agree with Halls' statement that "learning is a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in the light of the consequences of past policy and new information so as to better attain the ultimate objects of governance" (Hall 1993, 278). Heclo is very much in the minority in arguing that learning is a less conscious activity, often occurring as a sort of conditioned government response to some kind of societal or environmental stimulus (Heclo 1974: 306).

Table 3. Four Types of Learning and Their Relationship to Policy Change. Adapted from Bennett and Howlett (1992).

Learning Type	Subject of Learning	Results of Learning	Change Propensity
Social Learning	Policy Subsystems State and Social Actors	Integration of New Ideas (goals)	Rapid Paradigm and New Actors Shift
Policy Transfer	Policy Subsystems State Actors	Integration of New Ideas (means)	Gradual Paradigm Shift
Policy-Oriented Learning	Policy Subsystems State and Social Actors	Integration of New Actors (clarification of goals)	Rapid Incremental Change
Government Learning	Policy Subsystem State Actors	Review of Existing Means	Gradual Incremental Change

growth of organizational intelligence, a subject which can be subjected to manipulation. That is, drawing from cognitive development psychology, Etheredge and Short (1983) argue that there are three principle facets of learning: (a) increased capacity for differentiation; (b) increased capacity for organization and hierarchical integration, and (c) increased capacity for reflective thought, perspective on the form and nature of the contents of thought, and on the choice of structuring principles.

Each of these is related to the way that government bureaucracies are staffed and operated. Hence Etheredge (1981) argues that government learning is a process that is influenced by a number of political and sociological variables; many of which can be the subject of manipulation by government. As he put it:

> One hypothesis I want to emphasize again is that government learning is often the dependent variable. It is dependent on what universities teach, on what the voters want or can be sold, on what lobbying groups say, on the agendas the news media set, on the standards and quality of critics, on the action mood of the times, on conceptual and methodological innovations from university research, on whether people have enough genuine trust to tell the truth, and on much else. It is probably also true that learning by government is often a function of current active political conflict and the public adversary processes by which opponents of established policy do the research that ultimately makes government more intelligent (Etheredge 1981: 135).

Similarly, for Sabatier (1988), policy-oriented learning is a conscious activity undertaken on a regular basis by actors at various levels of government active in policy formulation and implementation, as well as journalists, researchers, and policy analysts who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas. In Sabatier's view, policy-oriented learning generally involves: (1) improving one's understanding of the state of variables defined as important by one's belief system

(or, secondarily, by competing belief systems); (2) refining one's understanding of logical and causal relationships internal to a belief system; and (3) identifying and responding to challenges to one's belief system. Thus, as Sabatier puts it: "policy-oriented learning (...) is an ongoing process of search and adaptation motivated by the desire to realize core policy beliefs" (151).

With respect to policy transfer Rose (1991) argues that this is also a conscious activity in which a programme from one jurisdiction may simply be *copied* by another or a program in effect in another jurisdiction can be used as a model – *emulated* – but is tailored to meet the requirements of the enacting jurisdiction. Lesson-drawing can also involve *hybridization*, where elements of two exemplar programs are combined into a new program. A fourth type of lesson-drawing is *synthesis* in which elements from a variety of programs are combined together into a new one. The final type of lesson which is drawn is *inspiration* in which programs in other jurisdictions are used to stimulate greater efforts to develop domestic ones. Each type, of course, requires conscious learning on the part of governments and non-government actors.

Social learning is also a conscious activity. Hall, for example, has argued that state autonomy from societal forces is the condition which allows policy formation to be characterized by learning rather than by conflict. The principal agents of learning, in his view are, "the officially-sanctioned experts operating in a given field of policy. The most important of them work for the state itself or advise it from privileged positions at the interface between the bureaucracy and the intellectual enclaves of society" (Hall 1988: 5).

In all four cases, then, policy learning is viewed as a conscious activity undertaken by organizational actors drawing on examples available in their own and other subsystems, be they domestic, international, or trans-national in origin.[5] Since the principle actors are organizational in nature, whether or not any lessons will be learned by policy-makers depends on such basic characteristics as the capacity of the organization to absorb new information. Huber, for example, lists the essential "constructs and processes" of learning as related to (1) knowledge acquisition; (2) information distribution; (3) information interpretation; and (4) organizational memory (Huber 1991). As Cohen and Levinthal (1990) have argued in the case of the private firm, augmenting or diminishing this capacity is a largely a matter of adequately structuring and resourcing governmental and societal organizations:

the ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge is largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge. At the most elemental level, this prior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared language but may also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments in a given field. Thus, prior related knowledge confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. These abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm's 'absorptive capacity' (150)

In a complex organization such as a firm or government, this implies that learning is a cumulative process and that the existing store of knowledge largely determines what

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[5] Otherwise, what would exist is non-learning. See Lebovic 1995.

will be done with any new information that flows into the organization. They also note that critical in this regard is the existence of 'boundary-spanning' links between the organization and its environment, links receptive to new information and capable of disseminating it within the organization (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Richards 1994/95; Olsen 1993).

In the case of policy-making, this implies that the two relevant variables affecting the potential for learning are: (1) the organizational capacity of the state and societal members of policy subsystems, including especially their expertise in the subject area, and (2) the linkages which exist between the subsystem and its environment, and between actors in the subsystem itself (Hood 1993).

Both of these variables are subject to manipulation by state actors. State bureaucracies, in particular, can be structured and resourced in such a way as to promote "larger" learning processes by, for example, developing informational resources and boundary-spanning networking activities. States can also affect social actors' organizational capacities through information provision, funding, and other techniques (Leik 1992; Grin and Van de Graaf 1996).

Although a complete discussion of the possible means for enhancing learning is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that Bressers and Klok (1988), Schneider and Ingram (1990), and others (Weiss and Tschirhart 1994; Bellehumeur 1997; Saward 1992; Howlett 1998a), have identified a number of policy instruments which can be used to alter the ideas and actors involved in policy subsystems. These include education, training, institution creation, the provision of information, "labeling", propaganda, exhortation, formal evaluations, hearings and institutional reform. Research into the tools and mechanisms used in intergovernmental regulatory design has also identified several others instruments such as "treaties" and a variety of "political agreements" which can affect target group recognition of government intentions and vice versa (Bulmer 1993). Other research into interest group behaviour and activities have highlighted the existence of tools related to group creation and manipulation, including the role played by private or public sector patrons in aiding the formation and activities of such groups (Nownes and Neeley 1996; Pal 1993; Burt 1990). Still other research into contemporary policy-making has highlighted the use of techniques such as focus groups (Furlong 1995); research funding for, and access to, investigative hearings and tribunals (Jenson 1994; Cairns 1990); and the various powers awarded to such inquiries and hearings such as the ability to subpoena witnesses or enforce orders (Salter and Slaco 1981; Schwartz 1997). Finally, some researchers have also emphasized the manner in which tools can be used to negatively affect interest groups and other actors' behaviour. Such "negative" procedural instruments include suppression of information, misleading the public, withholding information, or deception, obfuscation, and other forms of administrative delay (Mueller 1973; Kickert et al. 1997).

All of these tools, and others, can be used by governments to promote, or prevent, specific types of learning by altering the distribution of new ideas and actors involved in the policy process and hence alter the propensity for learning to lead to specific types of policy change.

6. CONCLUSION: KNOWLEDGE AND INTERESTS IN PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING

One of the most contentious issues in the study of public policy-making concerns the roles played by knowledge and interests in this process (Torgerson 1986). While traditional policy studies tended to concentrate almost exclusively on interest-driven explanations of the behaviour of policy actors (Self 1985; McLennan 1989; Therborn 1986; Dryzek 1992; Cammack 1989) more recent work has emphasized the role played by ideas in the policy process (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Schulman 1988; Lee 1996).

This latter development has opened up another way of looking at the policy process. While it has not reconciled the question of the exact manner in which knowledge and interests combine to make policy, it has created a conceptual space in which analysts can examine the variety of hitherto ignored or downplayed factors affecting policy-making. One element of this new "space" is policy learning, or the way in which ideas are created and disseminated across space and time (May 1992).

It is important to incorporate both ideas and interests, or knowledge and power, into analyses of policy learning. The role played by entrenched actors or "interests" play in resisting change, for example, is of critical import in many mechanisms of policy change (Weir 1992). But ideas are also a significant factor affecting policy change and analyses of change must reconcile both knowledge and interests, or ideas and actors, in the attempt to clarify and understand this phenomenon. As the analysis of policy learning presented here has shown, for example, what is "learned" and what is "remembered" in policy learning must always be seen in the context of the interplay of both new and existing political interests and political ideas (Blyth 1997; Jacobsen 1995; Hoberg 1996).

Policy learning is one of several methods by which policies change. In its various guises – social learning, policy-oriented learning, policy transfer, and government learning – it can have a variety of effects on policy outcomes. However, unlike many of the other processes of policy change, – venue change, systemic pertubations, and subsystem spill-over – policy learning can be manipulated by governments. A variety of policy tools can be used by governments to alter the configuration of actors and ideas in policy subsystems and hence affect the nature policy change. Although research into this kind of policy design has only begun, it holds out some promise for the resolution of some of the problems of modern governance and planning.

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GREEN PLANNING IN OECD COUNTRIES – A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PLANS

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ABSTRACT

This article looks at existing national planning approaches in OECD countries, underlining important differences and similarities, and trying a preliminary evaluation of three national environmental policy plans. On this empirical basis the paper represents an attempt to systematise existing approaches and to draft model stages in environmental planning.

Keywords: Environmental Policy, Environmental Planning, Green Plans, Sustainable Development, Strategic Planning.

1. INTRODUCTION

Following the 1992 Rio Conference and the general shift towards sustainable development in environmental policy, a new and more comprehensive approach has gained importance in most industrialised countries. The policy innovation resulting from the sustainability debate lies in the emphasis placed on setting long-term goals on a broad political and societal basis, the integration of environmental policy objectives into other policy areas (intersectoral integration), a cooperative target group policy and the mobilisation of additional decentralised societal capacities. The most visible expression of this new approach is the broad diffusion and adoption of strategic and integrative environmental planning at national level.

Environmental planning of the new "Agenda 21" type is not simply another "instrument" of environmental policy, but a comprehensive strategy; a permanent process of learning, setting goals, formulating and implementing measures. A large number of industrialised countries have already introduced some kind of national environmental policy planning, among them about two thirds of the OECD countries (OECD 1995; REC 1995; Jörgens 1996; Dalal-Clayton 1996a, 1996b; Jänicke et al.

Figure 1. Diffusion of national environmental policy plans in 39 industrial countries.

1997; Jänicke and Weidner 1997a; Johnson 1997). The same is true of many Central and Eastern European (CEE) as well as developing countries (REC 1995; OECD 1998; Lampietti and Subramanian 1995). Moreover, this diffusion shows some parallels to the rapid spread of general concepts of strategic planning and new public management (OECD 1993; Berry 1994; Damkowski and Precht 1995). Figure 1 shows the rapid diffusion of green planning in OECD and CEE countries from 1987 to 1998.

Among the variety of existing approaches, there is as yet no uniform model for strategic environmental planning. Nevertheless, some general characteristics can be distinguished. In this paper we will analyse the following types of long-term strategy: 1) general environmental policy plans (Netherlands, South Korea, Austria, Japan, Portugal, Canada, France); 2) national strategies for sustainable development (UK, Ireland, Finland, New Zealand, Australia) (in both cases, insofar as they include an explicit mechanism for implementation); and 3) formalised policy statements with – at least in the medium-term – significant environmental targets, where these are linked to a mechanism for regular environmental reporting (Sweden, Norway), and 4) strong sectoral and regional plans within a general national environmental framework (Denmark, Switzerland).

2. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AS STRATEGIC AND COOPERATIVE PLANNING: COUNTRY EXPERIENCES

A descriptive perspective on some existing green plans can illustrate the broad variety of national approaches to environmental planning.

The most prominent example of green planning is the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP). The first environmental policy plan of 1989 – which had been discussed over a broad political and societal base – included a detailed statistical description of the environmental situation and its foreseeable development. It is unique

in its wide range of binding goals and objectives with clear time frames as well as in the extent of societal mobilisation which accompanied its development. Its preliminary results were evaluated in the second environmental policy plan (NEPP 2, 1993) and its goals were partly revised. In 1997, the third NEPP was finalised. It proposes inter alia a package of new green taxes.

The Dutch approach to environmental planning – which has had a legal basis since 1993 – contains an institutionalised mechanism for evaluation and revision. Another important feature of the Dutch environmental policy plan is the underlying system of decentralised planning at local and provincial level, but also at the level of industrial target groups through negotiated agreements (covenants). In particular, the covenants with industry represent a highly developed form of social technology and are one of the central innovations of the new planning approach. In this respect, the Netherlands have clearly been setting the pace in global environmental policy learning (cf. Jänicke and Weidner 1997b). The existing system of negotiated agreements with industry is impressive, even if (as recent evaluations show) the quality of the different agreements varies widely (Tweede Kamer 1995).

The Danish government passed an Action Plan for Environment and Development as early as in 1988. In spite of the growing importance of the comprehensive Environmental Protection Report (1995) for integrated environmental planning, the strengths of Danish planning lie at the sectoral level. Most important is the "Energy 2000" plan, which was introduced in 1990 and revised in 1996 ("Energy 21"). The plan includes targets of a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions (1988-2005), a 15% decrease in energy consumption by 2030, an increase in the use of renewable energy, to constitute one third of total energy supply by 2030. A broad network of organisations and institutions is responsible for the evaluation of energy savings. Other important sectoral plans include the Environment and Traffic Action Plan, the Aquatic Environment Plan, and especially a system of national land and regional planning which has a strong emphasis on environmental protection and conservation of natural resources. Even the Danish Ministry of Defence has its own environmental action plan (Christiansen and Lundqvist 1996: 343).

The Swedish planning approach consists of regular parliamentary target-setting combined with periodic reporting. Particularly relevant is the "Enviro '93" strategy, which was prepared by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. It includes programs for significant target sectors such as Industry, Energy, Traffic, and Agriculture. More than 100 concrete targets with different time frames have been formulated, for instance phasing out the use of chlorinated solvents (by 1995), of mercury (by 2000), and of lead (no deadline). Eighteen new objectives have been added recently, including a 20% reduction of CO2 emissions by the year 2020. Regular reports are published on the implementation of the targets. As in Denmark and the Netherlands, the planning approach is closely connected with a comprehensive green tax reform (1991). At present, the Swedish government is drawing up a more radical strategy for sustainable development which will be presented to Parliament in 1998. The government's Eco-Cycle Commission has recently proposed a strategy for cutting resource use to one tenth of today's levels within the next 25 to 50 years. Following a government initiative, all of the 288 Swedish local authorities have started work on a local Agenda 21.

In Canada, a Green Plan for a Healthy Environment was decided upon in 1990. Its centrepiece was the integration of environmental goals into other policy fields and the wide participation of citizens and organisations in the process of goal-setting; more than 10,000 people participated in the (admittedly somewhat hurried) consultation process. The plan provided for six main fields of action, ranging from traditional air pollution control and species protection to promotion of the use of renewable resources. It covered a period of five (later six) years with a total budget of 3 mill. CAD. After a change in government in 1993, the Green Plan lost much of its importance and was de facto abandoned until 1996. However, Canada is trying to maintain a strategic approach to environmental policy: in 1995 the Canadian government published the Guide to Green Government, which introduces the drafting of sustainable development strategies – including regular reports – by all federal departments. Furthermore, Environment Canada recently published an Environment Action Plan for the period from 1996/97 to 1999/2000, which sets out general priorities and objectives for government activities.

The Austrian National Environmental Plan (NUP) of 1995 is of interest because of its differentiated description of problems, targets and the measures to be taken. Although a number of societal actors participated in its drafting, public awareness of the NUP has been very slight. The groundwork for the plan had been laid in 1992, the year of the UNCED Conference in Rio de Janeiro. Its core elements are – largely qualitative – long-term environmental goals as well as plans for reducing the use of non-renewable resources and for the minimisation of material flows. A 20% reduction of CO_2 emissions by the year 2005 (relative to 1988 levels) is among the most ambitious targets of the plan. In 1997, two years after its publication, the NUP was presented to and adopted by parliament in an effort to give a boost to the somewhat moribund plan.

In 1995, the Japanese government passed its Basic Environment Plan. Following Agenda 21, a broad range of rather vague targets has been formulated and tasks are assigned to all relevant organisations and institutions. The plan represents a policy monitoring tool in that it refers in detail to already existing environmental policy targets and measures. Implementation of the Basic Plan will take place mainly at local and company level. By the end of 1995, there were 46 local environmental and climate protection plans. A special Action Plan for Greening Government Operations has been formulated on the basis of the Basic Environment Plan, and includes 37 targets, 11 of which are quantitative. With this action plan, the Japanese government intends to set a good example to other sectors of society.

South Korea may be one of the most interesting cases. The country has a long tradition of economic planning. This has led to enormous industrial growth, but also to equally significant environmental damage. In the course of South Korea's transition to democracy after 1987, planning was extended to include environmental protection. Since 1987 Korea, has had long-term (10 years) and medium-term (5 years) environmental plans. The first medium-term plan of 1991 ran out in 1996. The goals in this plan included doubling the proportion of effluent water treated, a radical increase in the amount of waste treated, a clear improvement in the air quality in Seoul and an increase to 10% in the proportion of protected areas. During the first two years, costs for the plan were estimated at more than one percent of GNP. The importance of participation is broadly stressed, but does not, in reality, play an important role in the

Korean planning process. However, the plan must be agreed by the relevant administrative authorities and the heads of towns and provinces.

The Basic Environmental Policy Act of 1990 formulates clear criteria for the Comprehensive Long-term Plan for the Preservation of the Environment. The present long-term plan – "Green Vision 21" – contains precise goals for different areas, its costs are budgeted. The slogan "From a model country of economic growth to a model country of environmental preservation" describes an ambitious government strategy.

3. EMPIRICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GREEN PLANS

As the description of some of the existing green plans has illustrated, there is no uniform model for environmental planning. National responses to the demand for comprehensive and consensual long-term strategies vary considerably and display a wide range of different characteristics (see also OECD 1995; Dalal-Clayton 1996a). Frequently, they represent merely a first step towards a coherent strategy for sustainable development and are limited to the description of problems and options, with general statements of intent.

In order to distinguish between and systematise green plans, this paper proposes three categories for analysis: 1) the accuracy and relevance of environmental goals; 2) the degree of participation in and integration of the planning process; and 3) the extent of institutionalisation of the plan. Recent research at the Environmental Policy Research Unit suggests that these features are important if green plans are to have the positive effects outlined above (Jänicke 1996: 27-28; Jörgens 1996: 105-108). Tables 1 and 2 give a preliminary overview of green plans in OECD countries according to these categories.

With respect to the first category, the following significant questions present themselves: Does the plan include concrete quantitative targets, or do they rather remain unspecified and vague? Are the designated goals contextually relevant, or does the plan ignore important national environmental problems? Are the goals realistic, i.e. are they scientifically based and does the plan take into account the political system's and the target groups' capacity to achieve these goals, or does it formulate goals without regard to existing political and societal capacities for environmental protection?

The majority of green plans in industrialised countries set a wide variety of somewhat general goals, and few concrete quantitative targets. The British White Paper "This Common Inheritance" of 1990, for example, contained some 350 mostly vague commitments. Wilkinson (1997: 91) criticises the White Paper in that "(t)here were few quantitative targets, deadlines, firm commitments or new initiatives – apart from institutional ones. Instead the White Paper was littered with promises to 'review', 'consider', 'examine' and 'study further'. Most of the 350 commitments it contained re-iterated existing policy". The green plans of Japan, Finland, or Austria follow a similar pattern. Quantitative targets combined with accurate time frames and a detailed description of the measures to be taken are rare in these plans. If they occur, they usually refer to existing national or international obligations. This is the case, for example, in the 20% reduction of CO_2 emissions foreseen in the Austrian plan – a

Table 1. National approaches to environmental policy planning.

Accuracy and relevance of goals (Contents) / Type of plan / Quality of targets	Degree of participation and integration (Process) / Leading authority / Interpolicy coordination / Participation	Extent of institutionalisation (Stabilisation) / Legal / legislative basis / Special planning institutions / Reports and evaluations / Financing / Current status
Netherlands • environmental policy plan • 50 strategic objectives and over 200 specific quantitative goals and time frames arranged in 8 themes and directed at 9 defined target groups	• Ministry of Environment, Prime Minister • direct integration of ministries of industry, transport and agriculture; consultation with other ministries • high levels of public attention before and during preparation of NEPP; about 600 participants (science, government, target groups, NGOs) during NEPP 2	• parliamentary decision (1990); legal basis (1993) • yearly reports; operational plans every four years; annual rolling programmes • concrete budgeting • active
Denmark • strong sectoral and regional plans within national framework • concrete overall goals; sectoral and regional plans, often with quantitative	• Ministry of the Environment, Government • consultation and negotiation with all relevant ministries and agencies • mostly internal government process without significant participation goals	• parliamentary decision • regular reports • active
Finland • national strategy for sustainable development • mainly qualitative targets	• Commission on Environment and Development; Government • partly coordinated • 300 written statements e.g. by local governments	• Planning institution: Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development (1993), chaired by the Prime Minister
UK • national strategy for sustainable development • 350 mostly general commitments;	• Department of Environment, government • Consultation with all government departments in 2 Ministerial Committees, signed by most	• Ministerial Committee on the Env. (EDE, 1992); Government's Panel on SD (1994); UK Round Table on SD; Citizen's Env. Initiative

few quantitative targets and time-frames; institutional commitments	• departments; "Green Ministers" • consultation of NGOs in the 1994 strategy; only informal consultation of NGOs in 1990 White Paper	• yearly reports, adding new goals; environmental section in annual departmental reports • active
Canada • environmental policy plan • about 120, mostly qualitative initiatives divided in 8 thematic sections	• Environment Canada • Priorities and Planning Cabinet Committee including all relevant departments; "green" reporting in other departments • NGOs, industry, other interested social actors through public hearings after presentation of full draft GP	• two reports • $ 3 billion additional funding over 5 (subsequently 6) years • status: gradually abandoned
France • environmental policy plan • some quantitative targets, mostly institutional and legislative targets	• Ministry of Environment • broad, often negative coordination with other ministries • mostly internal process, few public meetings, some written NGO comments	• parliamentary decision (1990), without binding character • general assignment of environmental costs • status: completed
South Korea • long- and medium-term environmental policy plan	• over 30 quantitative targets • Government; Ministry of Environment • consultation of departments and cities • weak participation	• legal basis (1990) • planning bureau of the Ministry of Environment reporting with a basis in law • detailed budgeting • active
New Zealand • law; national strategy for sustainable development • qualitative targets, divided in 11 thematic sections	• Ministry of the Environment, Government • only with Ministry of Finance • participation of NGOs, economic interest groups, Maori	• RMA constitutes basis in law (1991) • no planning institutions • Environment 2010: reviews and revisions every 4 years • no financing • active

Table 1 continued. National approaches to environmental policy planning.

Accuracy and relevance of goals (Contents) / Type of plan / Quality of targets	Degree of participation and integration (Process) / Leading authority / Interpolicy coordination / Participation	Extent of institutionalisation (Stabilisation) / Legal / legislative basis / Special planning institutions / Reports and evaluations / Financing / Current status
Australia • national strategy for sustainable development • quantitative and qualitative goals divided into 8 sectors and 22 themes	• Council of Australian Governments, Dept. of Environment • Prime Minister, premier ministers and chief ministers, intergovernmental ESD Steering Committee • 9 pluralistic working groups; about 200 draft strategy statements	• planning institution: Steering Committee on Ecologically Sustainable Development • reports: every 2 years, coordinated by ESD Steering Committee • active, but gradually losing public support
Sweden • formalised policy statement • numerous goals, often quantitative and with clear time-frames	• Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) • other government agencies, experts from municipalities and counties • mainly internal government process; general written comments before preparation'	• parliamentary decision • reports: intended, but without concrete time-frames • active
Austria • environmental policy plan • 472 mainly qualitative goals	• Ministry of Environment; NUP Committee • all relevant ministries • labour and industrial associations (neo-corporatist actors), later NGOs	• parliamentary decision (1997) • NUP Committee • every 4 years • active, but little public interest
Japan • environmental policy plan • mainly qualitative; references to previous quantitative goals and deadlines	• Government; Central Environmental Council; Environment Agency • consultation of ministries and agencies • active participation	• legal basis in Basic Environment Law (1993) • monitoring and reporting every year by Central Environment Council; revision within 5 years • financing: vague • active

Portugal		
• environmental policy plan • qualitative and quantitative goals with time-frames	• Ministry of Environment; National Environmental Agency; Government • consultation of Economic and Social Council • public debate with NGOs, industrial associations, other societal actors, towns and districts, but few alterations to the plan	• legal basis (1987) in Basic Environmental Act • reports: revision after two years was initially intended • general assignment of financial needs to actors (EU, central and local administration, other sectors, industry) • status: losing importance
Switzerland		
• national strategy for sustainable development • some qualitative goals are intended	• interdepartmental commission (IDARio); Government • 20 federal authorities represented in IDARio, including relevant ministries	• IDARio, Council for Sustainable Development • no reports • status: relatively weak
Ireland		
• national strategy for sustainable development • large number of (mainly quantitative) environmental and institutional goals	• Department of Environment, Government • "green" reporting by task managers in other ministries • public consultations; submissions of over 50 organisations and individuals	• National Sustainable Development Council planned • reporting and revision of the strategy are planned; environmental indicators to be developed by 1998 • active
Norway		
• formalised policy statements • qualitative and quantitative goals	• Ministry of Environment, Government • "green" reporting by all ministries • some written contributions	• parliamentary basis • yearly reporting • active

Table 2. Green Plans in OECD Countries.

Country	Green Plan (official name)	Year
Netherlands	National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP); NEPP plus; NEPP 2, NEPP 3	1989/90/ 93/97
Denmark	Action Plan for Environment and Development; Nature and Environment Policy; sectoral action plans, e.g. Energy 2000 (1990, 1996)	1988 1995
Finland	Sustainable Development and Finland Finnish Action for Sustainable Development	1989/90 1995
UK	This Common Inheritance: Britain's Environmental Strategy; Sustainable Development: The UK Strategy	1990 1994
Canada	Canada's Green Plan for a Healthy Environment Environment Action Plan 1996/97-1999/2000	1990 1996
France	National Plan for the Environment/Green Plan (Plan Vert)	1990
South Korea	Master Plan (1991); Korea's Green Vision 21	1991/95
New Zealand	Resource Management Act (1991); Environment 2010 Strategy	1995
Australia	National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development	1992
Sweden	Enviro '93; Towards Sustainable Development in Sweden	1993/1994
Austria	National Environmental Plan (Nationaler Umweltplan - NUP)	1995
Japan	The Basic Environment Plan; Action Plan for Greening Government Operations	1995
Portugal	National Environmental Policy Plan (Plano Nacional da Política de Ambiente)	1995
Switzerland	Strategy for Sustainable Development in Switzerland (Strategie Nachhaltiger Entwicklung in der Schweiz)	1997
Ireland	Sustainable Development - A Strategy for Ireland	1997
Norway	Environmental Policy for a Sustainable Development (Report to the Storting)	1997
Germany	Sustainable Development in Germany	planned for 1998
Luxembourg	National Plan for Sustainable Development (Plan National pour un Developpement Durable)	planned for 1998

target that had already been announced in the previous Austrian government energy reports of 1990 and 1993 (Österreichische Bundesregierung 1995: 20). Similarly, the concrete and quantified targets included in the Japanese plan are all taken from existing national or international laws and agreements. The genuinely new goals introduced by this plan, however, remain largely vague as to the nature of a problem, its causes and the concrete measures to be taken.

There are, however, examples of green plans' setting specific and relevant targets and of designing concrete measures for implementation. Here, the Dutch National

Table 3. Environmental trends in the Netherlands 1985-1990, 1990-1995, and NEPP targets for 1995.

Theme/Substance	Trend 1985-1990	Trend 1990-95	NEPP 1995 Target
Climate Change/CO_2:	+13 %	+6,8 %	0 %
Acidification:			
• SO_2	-20 %	-29 %	-15 %
• NO_x	0 %	-10 %	-27 %
• NH_3	-16 %	-28 %	-18 %
Eutrophication:			
• Nitrogen	-3%	-26%	-50%
• Phosphorus	-24%	-65%	-50%
Diffusion surface waters:			
• Copper	+7%	-13%	-50%
• Lead	-19%	-47%	-70%
• Zinc	-3%	-21%	-50%
• Cadmium	-33%	-90%	-70%
• Chromium	-3%	-77%	-50%
Diffusion air:			
• Copper	+7%	-3%	-50%
• Cadmium	-25%	-25%	-33%
• Chromium	0%	-18%	-50%
• Fluorides	+12%	-18%	-50%
• Lead	-75%	-89%	-70%

Sources: Kampen, 1997; RIVM, 1994.

Environmental Policy Plan, with over 200 quantitative targets and corresponding measures, such as covenants with the principal polluting industries, is the most prominent example (see Weale 1992; Bennett 1997; Bressers and Plettenburg 1997; Kampen 1997). But with regard to the clarity of its goals and the concrete nature of the scheduled actions, the South Korean Master Plan for the Preservation of the Environment does not lie too far behind (Nam 1997). Some of the main targets of the Dutch and Korean plans are shown in Tables 3 and 4. The Swedish approach to comprehensive environmental goal-setting is another example of relevant, quantitative goals with clear time frames – without, however, a central planning document, relying more on parliamentary target-setting within a broad framework.

Canada might be placed somewhere between these two groups of countries. The Green Plan of 1990 offered a mix of quantitative and qualitative goals. It included some significant targets, such as a 50% reduction in Canada's generation of waste by the year 2000, a 50% reduction in SO2 emissions in Eastern Canada by 1994, phasing out CFCs by 1997 and other ozone depleting substances by the year 2000, as well as eliminating the discharge of persistent toxic substances into the environment (Gale 1997). However, critics have pointed out that most of the proposed measures have only an indirect influence on behaviour and more than half of the initiatives refer to the relatively vague instrument of "information development" (Gale 1997: 107-108; Hoberg and Harrison

Table 4. Targets and Budget of the Korean Master Plan.

Program	1991	Target 1996	Achievement 1995[1]
Improving the quality of drinking water resources • Proportion of 1st-rate drawing posts for drinking water (to total drawing posts)	34%	70%	53.4%
Recovery of water quality in rivers • treatment rate of sewage	33%	65%	45%
Sanitary treatment of solid wastes • proportion of sanitary treatment of wastes from everyday life (to total treatment)	27%[2]	90%	66%
Maintenance of clean air • concentration of SO_2 (Seoul City)	0.043 ppm	0.033 ppm[3]	0.017 ppm
Enlargement of green areas for rest and recreation • proportion of natural park area (to total land area)	7.5%	10%	7.5%
• area of parks in the cities	680 km²	800 km²	885,8 km²

Budget of the Master Plan (Unit: Trillion Won)

Year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
GNP	226.4	256.7	288.4	320.9	357.1
Budget of Master Plan	2.38	2.79	2.82	2.62	1.58
Proportion to GNP	(1.05%)	(1.08%)	(1.00%)	(0.82%)	(0.44%)

Source: Ministry of Environment, 1994
1) Actual goal attainment in 1995
2) Later revised to 19,9%
3) Later revised to 0,018 ppm

1994). The Environment Action Plan, successor to the Green Plan, leaves still more room for interpretation of its targets and there is reason to doubt the seriousness of its intents.

A special type of target which figures prominently in especially the British and French strategies concerns the creation of new institutions for environmental planning and sustainable development. In the course of implementing the French Green Plan, for example, the environmental administration was thoroughly restructured (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 1996). In the United Kingdom, various new government bodies were established, including the UK Round Table on Sustainable Development as well as a Government Panel on Sustainable Development. Similarly, the Irish strategy of 1997 schedules the creation of a National Sustainable Development Council. These institutional targets are an important element of environmental planning, as they improve the political system's capacity for further strategic environmental policy (Jänicke 1997).

The second category proposed in this article concerns the degree of integration of and participation in the planning process. In the first place, this refers to the degree to which environmental concerns are incorporated into other sectoral policies (interpolicy coordination). An indicator for the extent of interpolicy coordination can be found in the level and relevance of consultation and cooperation between the relevant sectoral ministries, especially during the drafting stage. In almost all the countries analysed, the leading authority in the planning process has been the ministry of environment. Usually, this ministry produced a draft plan which then was discussed with other government departments, and often changed in accordance with the interest constellations within the cabinet. In some cases, however, the relevant ministries were directly and constructively involved in the development of the plan. To some extent, this has been the case in Switzerland, where an interdepartmental commission (IDARio) has taken a leading role in the drafting of the green plan. The most intense cooperation between government departments has taken place in the Netherlands, where four ministries (environment, industry, transport, and agriculture) worked together on the preparation of the NEPP for a period of almost three years (Kampen 1997: 7-11). In the UK, the White Paper "This Common Inheritance" was developed by the Department of Environment in very close cooperation with two interministerial committees, one of which was headed by the prime minister. The final plan was signed by eleven ministers, including those for trade and industry, energy, transport and agriculture. The second British plan, the UK Sustainability Strategy of 1994, carried the signature of 16 different ministers (Wilkinson 1997).

Furthermore, a number of countries have, through their green plans, introduced some mechanism for "green" reporting by non-environmental ministries. Norway, for example, which explicitly locates responsibility for external environmental effects within the various sectoral ministries, plans to require sectoral environmental action plans combined with an annual progress report titled "Environmental Profile of The Government and the Environmental State of the Nation". In the United Kingdom so-called "green ministers" have been established inside all government departments, and all departments are required to dedicate a chapter of their yearly reports to environmental matters within their areas of competence.

This category also covers the extent of societal participation in the planning process. A claim of broad participation by societal actors can be found in almost all planning documents. However, in reality, participation is usually handled in a restrictive manner, if it is present at all. The Austrian plan, for example, has been criticised for having excluded environmental organisations during the initial drafting process, while including trades unions and employer's associations. In addition, media coverage has been very low-key, as the environmental administration showed little effort to publicise the ongoing process (Payer 1997). In South Korea, the general public has been virtually excluded from the drafting process, and even the Swedish planning process has been characterised as "an internal government process" (Dalal-Clayton 1996a: 41). In contrast, the drafting of green plans in Australia and Canada, the second Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP 2) and New Zealand's Resource Management Act were characterised by a higher level of consultation and participation (Johnson 1997; Dalal-Clayton 1996a).

The third category introduced in this paper concerns the extent of institutionalisation of the green plan. With regard to the long-term nature of the goal of sustainable development and respective targets and measures, this aspect may well constitute the most important condition for successful environmental planning. The OECD points out that the question of institutionalisation becomes important as the time frames for planning for sustainable development extend beyond terms of office and legislative periods (OECD 1995: 19). A strong institutionalisation could make the difference between programmatic declarations issued by one government only to be discarded by its successor, as has been the case with the Canadian or Portuguese green plans, and genuine long-term strategies. Institutionalisation plays an important role not least because of the cyclic nature of public attention to and mobilisation over political issues (Downs 1972).

Questions raised in this third category are: Does the plan have a legal or legislative basis, e.g. in a national environmental framework law or through a binding parliamentary decision, or is it merely a cabinet decision or a government statement of intent? Has a responsible (administrative) institution been established or designated to coordinate the planning process? Does the plan provide for regular, obligatory reports and evaluation of its progress? And, last but not least, does it include a finance scheme?

Table 2 shows that only five green plans have been established on the basis of a national environmental law. This is the case in the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Portugal. Within this context it may be interesting to note that, in the Netherlands, the legal institutionalisation of the planning process did not take place until four years after the publication of the first NEPP (Bennett 1997). The Danish and Austrian plans, as well as the Swedish and Norwegian approaches, have been given a legislative basis through a binding parliamentary decision. In a large group of countries, including Australia, Canada, Finland, and the UK, green plans lack such a legal or legislative basis and are thus more likely to stand and fall along with the particular government in office.

Provisions for regular reports on the progress of the planning process exist in most countries, but there are important differences in the quality of these reports. In the Netherlands, long-term environmental goals are "achieved through (...) specific measures that are formulated every four years in operational plans and implemented through annual rolling programmes" (Bennett 1997: 78). The process thus provides for strongly institutionalised periodic opportunities to evaluate results and to adapt targets and measures if necessary. A remarkable feature of the UK strategy is that it foresees yearly reports on its implementation. In 1997, the sixth annual report was published, reviewing in detail more than 600 targets and measures (Wilkinson 1997). Furthermore, the aforementioned inclusion of environmental sections in the annual reports of all government departments constitutes an important institutional mechanism. Similar mechanisms for "green" reporting by other ministries have been introduced in Canada, Norway and Ireland.

The British plan, with its strong emphasis on institutional innovation, is also among the few approaches that have established particular national authorities responsible for continuing strategic action. These administrative bodies are the Ministerial Committee on the Environment of 1992 and Government Panel on Sustainable Development of 1994.

4. EARLY EVALUATIONS OF GREEN PLANS

Although strategic and comprehensive planning at national level is a very recent approach in environmental policy, three plans have already been evaluated as to their implementation and goal-attainment. This section summarises and interprets the results of these evaluations.

The Netherlands: A recent evaluation of the achievements of the Dutch planning approach for 1995 shows that while no target was met precisely (which may be due not least to the "soft" instruments applied), many targets were exceeded (RIVM 1994; Kampen 1997). Among the targets that have not been reached, CO2 and NOx emissions (relating to the environmental themes of climate change and acidification respectively) stand out clearly. However, about half the targets set for 1995 have actually been realised, among them emissions of SO2 (acidification), phosphor (eutrophication), cadmium and chromium (surface water), and lead or dioxines (air). What seems to be still more important is that – compared to the pre-NEPP period from 1985 to 1990 – nearly all trends have improved and some have even been reversed between 1990 and 1995 (see Table 3).

South Korea: The evaluation of the first Korean medium-term plan for 1995 showed that some targets had been too ambitious (e.g. the treatment rates for sewage and solid wastes) while others – especially concentrations of SO2 in the city of Seoul – had already been met by 1996 (see Table 4). Although actual developments generally fall short of the targets formulated in the medium-term plan, South Korea (like the Netherlands) is experiencing remarkably positive trends in almost all areas of environmental protection.

Sweden: In 1996, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency presented a review of the 167 environmental objectives previously approved by the Riksdag. 100 of them were difficult to assess or have not been evaluated in detail. Nonetheless, of the 67 clearly formulated objectives, 46 have been achieved or will be achieved within the stated time-frame, while 21 targets will probably not be realised (SEPA press release, 4. 9. 1997). As in the Netherlands and South Korea, the SO_2 target was met earlier than planned, while the NOx target was only partially achieved. The 50 per cent reduction target for pesticide use was reached in 1990, but the additional reduction of 50 per cent could not be fully achieved in 1995. In September 1997, the SEPA proposed 18 new objectives. Some of the former targets (e. g. for CO_2 and NO_x emissions) have now have been more stringently formulated. The general impression given by the three countries might be formulated as follows:

- No target has been met precisely. But fine-tuning in public policy has scarcely ever been a realistic goal. Indicative environmental planning, therefore, should not be evaluated according to perfectionist criteria. On the one hand, there may be restrictions that have been ignored to date. On the other hand, dynamic processes may conceivably be stimulated by the policy's bringing unexpected success.
- In the Netherlands, where trends could be compared before and after the plan, a clear improvement or even reversal could be observed, even where the target itself was not met (as in the case of CO_2 emissions).

- In all three countries, failure was clearly reported and led (at least in Sweden and the Netherlands) to reformulation of policy, which usually included stricter measures.
- A precise evaluation of the immediate effects of environmental policy plans is difficult. In fact it is impossible in cases where "soft" implementation measures dominate, as in The Netherlands: there are no clearly identifiable chains of cause and effect. The role of information, networking, voluntary agreements etc. cannot easily be evaluated because they usually result in complex, dynamic communication processes. This also restricts the prognosis of future achievements in the planning process itself. Success may or may not be dependent on the plan. Only its failure (non-achievement) may be clearly evaluated. But even in this case, the long-term learning effect is an open question, and therefore, one should be content with plausibility in the evaluation of "Agenda 21" cooperative environmental policy plans.

5. SUMMARY: MAIN DEFICITS OF EXISTING GREEN PLANS

This section summarises the main deficits of existing green plans in industrialised countries. Most of the green plans could be characterised as pilot strategies, sporting a considerable number of deficits. The character of their goals is often inadequate. Targets are predominantly qualitative and frequently somewhat vague. Time-frames and operational measures for reaching targets are the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, in most cases, traditional environmental protection prevails. National resource or materials auditing hardly ever constitutes the starting point for the goal-setting process (exceptions are the Dutch and Austrian plans).

In many cases green plans remain rather non-committal, as they lack a strong basis in law, an institutionalised obligation of regular progress reports, or mechanisms of evaluation and reformulation of the proposed targets and measures. The first steps towards integration of environmental aspects into other policy fields have been taken, but early experience with existing plans proves the difficulty of maintaining some form of sectoral environmental responsibility over a longer period of time. This is especially the case with regard to highly polluting sectors like traffic and transport, energy, building or agriculture. Most of the plans can thus merely be considered a first step towards intersectoral communication. Furthermore, a number of plans are either suffering from an insufficient societal basis (France, South Korea) or rely too heavily on societal self-organisation (Canada, Japan), with the implicit danger of a more or less rapid "exhaustion". Almost all plans refrain from making a detailed analysis of restrictions, and thus fail to draw any conclusions from previous policy failures in environmental protection.

This last point is important, because the success of environmental plans depends so heavily on their realism. To make this clear, we would like to refer to a scheme for handling restrictions presented by Cohen and Kamieniecki (1991) that seems highly realistic in comparison to the great number of idealistic approaches in environmental policy. In a seven-step model for strategic regulatory planning, the authors propose to analyse systematically the involvement of actors as targets are formulated. The main question is: what are the motivations, goals, positions, and resources of each party to

either comply with, ignore, or resist the desired behavioural changes? The most appropriate devices for influencing the target group's behaviour should then be chosen on this basis (Cohen and Kamieniecki 1991: 31). Voluntary agreements are seen as the best solution, but coercion is not excluded as a last resort (or threat). The Dutch NEPP with its thorough and scientifically based target-group policy is the most remarkable empirical example of such an approach.

6. AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING

6.1 Main elements

Based on existing comparative studies of environmental long-term planning, some essential elements and characteristics of green plans can be identified (see RRI 1996; OECD 1995; Johnson 1997; Dalal-Clayton 1996a, 1996b):

- strong government leadership in the planning process
- clear and, where possible, quantitative targets and timetables
- partnership between government and industry
- intersectoral cooperation
- structured public participation
- close monitoring of performance capacity
- auxiliary government activities such as the introduction of a green tax reform

In the light of the empirical evidence presented in this article, the following characteristics of a good planning mechanism should be added:

- a basis in law, in order to solve the problem of perseverance
- a clear institutional framework for the planning process; the plan must have a well-known and strongly legitimated place in the institutional structure
- the provision of a significant and highly competent scientific and organisational capacity
- an analysis of the restrictions in previously unsolved problems
- setting priorities concerning the most urgent environmental problems of the country
- linking environmental planning to concepts of lean public management, management by objectives, or the separation of strategic and operative functions of government

6.2 Procedural steps

The planning process should start by recognising the dynamic character of national environmental planning – e.g. the importance of the process itself. This has been clearly stressed by the OECD: "Emphasis should be more on the process of working out a

strategy or a plan rather than a plan for its own sake. The process has its value in itself".
(OECD 1995: 13).

Preparation of the planning process should start with the integration of existing environmental policy plans (OECD 1995: 13) and voluntary agreements with and by decentral actors. In Austria, for example, there was an advantage in presenting 134 existing environmental plans and programmes of both government and societal organisations (Payer 1997). The planning process itself could develop as follows:

- Creating a knowledge base: Descriptions of the relevant environmental problems (structure and tendencies in land-use, soil and ground water pollution, climate change, loss of biodiversity, etc.); characterisation of the relevant target groups; description of necessary actions and available options, especially of win-win solutions, best practice in other countries, etc.
- Determining an initiator: An informal group of motivated and skilful initiators (Sabatier's "advocacy coalition" (1993)) should be created. The formal initiator should be a very high-ranking official/institution, if possible the prime minister together with the ministers of environment and of economic affairs (to underline the need and possibility of win-win solutions).
- Institutionalising the planning process: A formal institution consisting of representatives of the relevant ministries and administrative bodies, political parties, organised interest groups together with scientific experts should be established to coordinate the planning process and ensure interpolicy coordination. Likewise, the planning procedure should be given a legal or legislative basis.
- Creating an adequate infrastructure: An independent scientific infrastructure is needed, possibly a high-ranking research institute (or several institutes with different backgrounds). An infrastructure for organisational services (e. g. a broadly accepted planning bureau) is similarly important.
- Mobilising societal supporters, if possible the formation of strategic alliances in fields where there is strong resistance to change.
- Presenting a preliminary environmental policy plan which should contain special chapters on the different target groups (and "their" policies) – see above for its characteristics.
- Consensus talks, with the most relevant actors at every stage, starting with the energy sector, for example. A procedural regime should be established, containing binding participation rules (acknowledgement of the relevant environmental problems, of the general responsibilities of target groups, etc.). Consensus-seeking is directed towards problems, goals, priorities, and strategies. The resulting consensus should be published, not the discussion process.
- Public presentation of the environmental policy plan as a national orientation frame for decentral actors (branches/enterprises and regions/local communities).
- Establishing voluntary agreements with decentral actors to implement the plan. Decentral voluntary agreements should also be binding for individual members of organisations. In the Netherlands, for example, there are also agreements with individual firms.
- Creating institutional provisions for securing the planning cycle (monitoring, evaluation, revision).

7. ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AS MODERNISATION

According to some authors (Paehlke 1990; Jänicke 1993; Weidner 1996) the "ecological question" has been a strong engine of political modernisation, helping to increase participative and cooperative capacities in the political system as well as decentralisation or societal self-regulation. It has also contributed to new mechanisms for political legitimation beyond majority rule: legitimation by consensus among relevant actors and legitimation by scientific authority. The planning model of Agenda 21 may be viewed in this perspective of long-term political modernisation. It could be seen as a political innovation with potential for increasing political capacity simultaneously at national, local and global level. It is at any rate a significant step in the modernisation process of environmental policy. In the Netherlands and New Zealand, for example, it was connected with an increase in administrative efficiency.

A particularly interesting aspect is the association with innovative public management concepts. Strategic planning is generally spreading, as for example in the federal States of the USA. And the separation of the strategic and operative functions of public policy is essential in both environmental planning and modern public management.

The potential for economic modernisation, however, seems to us the most important aspect of this new comprehensive strategy (Wallace 1995). As mentioned above, environmental long-term planning could be – and in some advanced countries is already going to be – essentially a strategy of improving the cost-effectiveness of industrial production, to enter new markets of clean(er) production technology and products. In countries like Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, it is also seen as a contribution to innovative solutions for fiscal and labour market problems.

There are grounds enough for scepticism. In countries such as Germany, the euphoria over policy planning in the late 1960s ended in deep disappointment (partly as a result of too little attention being paid to systemic restrictions). In addition, the reality of existing national environmental plans may not provide too much reason for optimism, if the evaluation follows a short-term perspective. But modern political science teaches us that policy learning is a rather slow process which requires ten years or more to show some result. The early evaluations of three green plans provide some evidence that strategic planning may improve the conditions for environmental policy learning and innovation. A simple prognosis for the 21st century is that the growth in population, industry and pollution on a finite planet will steadily intensify pressure for environmental innovation, both in terms of technology and policy. With this perspective strategic environmental planning may be a step in the right direction.

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CAN INCENTIVE-ORIENTATED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES BE IMPLEMENTED? A PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

Using the public choice approach, this paper attempts to give an explanation of why in representative democracies, in which political entrepreneurs act according to selfish utility maximisation, an environmentally incentive-orientated policy has hardly a chance of being realised. In order to give an satisfactory explanation of this "execution" deficit, I differentiate between voters, politicians, interest groups and bureaucracies behaviour and show that there are conflicts with other policies and that public good effects may be the greatest obstacle to implementing most incentive-orientated environmental policies. In the final section, I provide five suggestions on how to overcome these difficulties.

Key words: Environmental Policies, Public Choice, Incentives, JEL-Classification D7, Q2 and Q3.

1. INTRODUCTION

Apart from traditional economic studies of the effects of environmentally oriented policies, it is also important to analyse the implementation of policies, such as taxes on fossil fuels or on harmful (CO_2) emissions, in representative democracies. Note that there are numerous studies for Austria and Germany on this topic which is not explored here (see e.g. DIW 1994; Schneider 1993, 1994a; Köppl et al. 1995; Schneider and Stiglbauer 1995). By using the Public Choice approach, I will make an attempt to analyse the possibilities of environmentally-oriented policy measures. Therefore, I will focus on the interaction between voters, politicians, interest groups and on the bureaucracy, in particular the individual (selfish) preferences of the various actors within the framework of environmentally-oriented economic policies.

From the Public Choice perspective it is not surprising, that particularly in representative democracies, numerous (from a purely traditional economic point of view) well-founded suggestions for the introduction of ecologising the tax system have been made, but hardly any incentive-oriented concepts have been realised as of yet. Additionally, most studies do not investigate the question of why important decision-makers have not adopted the measures that numerous economic studies propose to widen our social market economy that of an ecological social market. The environmental policy is shaped by omission and by inefficient use of instruments from the traditional economic perspective. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of this "execution deficit" within the framework of Public Choice theory, I differentiate between the behaviour of voters, politicians (or governments), interest groups and bureaucracies. With the help of this differentiation I will attempt to explain why very little is happening currently or can be accomplished towards ecologizing the economic (tax) system. According to the author's knowledge, a noteably smaller number of studies deal with Public Choice aspects of environmental policies (see e.g. Holzinger 1987; Frey 1992; Horbach 1992; Frey and Kirchgaessner 1994; Weck-Hannemann 1994; Gawel 1995a; Kurz and Volkert 1995, 1997).

In section 2, some basic interactions of the most important "players" with respect to incentive-orientated ecological policies are discussed. Section 3 examines voter's support for environmental economic policy. There are two lines of argument: first, the conflict between environmental and economic goals such as full and secondary employment, the public goods character and the possibilities of free-ride behaviour. Section 4 considers the chances of an environmentally-oriented policy being carried out from the perspective of re-election-oriented politicians. Sections 5 and 6 examine interest groups' and administration's influence on environmental policy. The paper ends with suggestions to overcome some of the major problems mentioned in Section 7.

2. THE INTERACTION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT "PLAYERS" WITH RESPECT TO INCENTIVE-ORIENTATED ECOLOGICAL POLICIES

As was discussed in the introduction, various actors (government, bureaucracies, voters, interest groups, etc.) are involved in the formulation of environmental-economic policies. Figure 1 shows the major interactions between the actors. The voters are influenced by the exogenous conditions from the environment and global economy, as well by the national economy/ecology and from the actions of the interest groups. Most likely, the voters will form their opinion of governmental performance on ecological and (short-term) economic conditions – especially if general elections are close. The survival of government is influenced by voters decisions at general elections. In order to get re-elected a government will pursue a policy which favours a majority of voters and will closely interact (and cooperate) with the administration and some interest groups. A close interaction also takes place between the administration and the interest groups, as both depend on the national economy/ecology as well as on the exogenous conditions from the environment and global economy. The interest groups will form coalitions with various types of administrations in order to reach their selfish goals, that

Figure 1. A politico-economic model of the interaction of incentive-orientated ecological policies.

is, they have a clear preference of "administrative-ecological rules" by means of the use of incentive-orientated instruments – a preference which is also in the interest of the various administrations. In the next sections, a detailed politico-economic analysis of the various actors is undertaken.

3. VOTERS: PLENTY OF SPECTATORS BUT NO ADVOCATES OF AN ECOLOGICALLY-ORIENTED ECONOMIC POLICY?

Due to an increased sensitivity of environmental issues by over 2/3 of the citizens the approval of a majority of voters in general elections is becoming increasingly realistic for sustainable economic policies. This can be seen in the results of several surveys made in the 1980s and 1990s for Germany and Austria, from which one can derive that

Austrian and German voters consider environmental problems increasingly important. They label these issues as most important after unemployment (see e.g. the survey results of the IMAS Institute (1995, 1996) published in regular intervals in Austria, in Linz and Dunlop (1994). With respect to the development in Germany, see Horbach (1992)). Based on this, one can propose the hypothesis that the likelihood of the realisation of environmental economic policies is rising.

However, it should be taken into account that ecological goals "compete" with other interests (e.g. pure economic goals) of the voters. In Germany, empirical evidence for such a trade-off between the reduction of unemployment and ecological goals was found: Horbach (1992) finds out that in regions with a high unemployment rate environmental parties receive less votes in elections than other parties. Furthermore, Horbach (1992) shows in an empirical study for Germany that the more important the chemical and steel industries are in a certain region, the worse the election chances are for environmental parties, whose ecological economic policy programs could weaken the position of these industries.

One reason for such a trade-off could lie in a lexicographic preference order of the voters. Citizens might attach a rather high priority to ecological goals – but only if full employment has been reached. In this situation, there are two ways to enforce ecological policies with regard to voters' preferences. Firstly, the major concern of unemployment would simply become irrelevant as soon as the employment goal is achieved. Secondly, even with persisting unemployment – the increasing importance of environmental issues might also change the preference order and favour ecological policies. Nevertheless, there are at least two prerequisites before noticeable and ecologically efficient pressure can be reached:

1. Considerable time-lags between changes in voters' ecological preferences, political actions and ecological improvements may occur.
2. Citizens have to be well-informed about the consequences of the ecological problems.

Ad 1: Such time-lags may cause inefficient results, for example when policy reactions against dangerous ecological developments occur too late to prevent ecological damage with serious long-term consequences.

Ad 2: Ecologically-oriented economic policies are characterised by high complexity, and it is difficult to calculate the present and future consequences of such policies. Therefore individual voters, who want to evaluate such a policy, need a relatively high level of education. Otherwise, they cannot calculate the current and future effects of the various ecological programs of the political parties. It is, therefore, not surprising that not only a good economic performance of a country but also a high educational level among voters has a positive influence on the election results of strongly ecologically-oriented parties (Schneider and Volkert 1997). Moreover, in addition to a well-educated body of voters a remarkable support of ecologically-oriented economic policy requires sufficient information about the ecological problems and the state of the environment as a whole. In contrast to these rather restrictive prerequisites of successful ecological policies, the effects of unemployment can be calculated quite easily by most voters.

Let us now suppose that a sustainable economy and healthy ecology is on top of the voters' lexicographic preference order. Even in this situation, only some of the necessary ecological measures will gain substantial support by a majority of the voters. Citizens will vote for ecological measures, which provide utility in the form of private (or at least in the form of club) goods; e.g. more restrictive ecological standards for producers in the neighbourhood (concerning stench or the reduction of noise). However, to reach other important ecological goals, from which a great number of people (throughout the world), or even the future generations will benefit, have the form of public goods. Sustainability in a global context with all its various world-wide implications is an example of such a public good. In this case, a voter who behaves in a utility-maximising manner, has little incentive for casting his/her vote for the approval of such an environmental economic policy. Instead, most voter's investment motive favours those political parties which most strongly represent his/her own selfish interests (for example job security). Therefore a large group of voters may act as free-riders, leaving the votes for the approval of the environmental policy up to others. This means that the goal of improving the environment must compete for votes with selfish economic goals, which have much less of a good public character. This implies, for example, that one's own employment situation will have a much higher priority than ecological economic policy, by nature beneficial for the general welfare of all voters!

In summary, the influence of economic indicators (e.g. unemployment, disposable income, etc.) on the election outcome shows that voters care more about economic short-term development than about the ecological situation (Schneider 1994b; Paldam 1991). Such behaviour can delay or even prevent the approval of ecologically-oriented policies by the majority of voters. Even if a citizen is to some extent altruistic, well-educated, and informed, it is not obvious that he/she as a (long-term oriented) "rational" voter will support ecologically-oriented economic policies at general elections. He/she may believe that his/her influence on the electoral outcome is so minimal, that he/she can't change the actual political situation with the help of his/ her vote.

It should thus be taken into consideration that the "consumption motive" is important for the participation of voters of general elections. This is valid particularly when the extreme small probability of one`s vote to have decisive influence the election outcome is considered. The consideration of the investment motive alone can, therefore, lead to a "paradox of not voting" . In contrast, the consumption motive of voting is independent of the single voters' influence of the election outcome, therefore, by introducing the consumption motive of voting, the "paradox of not-voting" might be of less importance (see Volkert 1996 and Schneider 1994b). The voting act itself often contributes to voters' utility, independent of the election outcome, for example, when the voter is acting in accordance with "civic duties". It is also possible that voting in general elections expresses the individual's satisfaction from participating in the political process (similar to the satisfaction which these voters get by participating in political discussions or by supporting certain politicians) (Brennan and Lomasky 1993). On the basis of the very weak individual influence on the outcome of the election, it must be taken into account that voters are generally poorly informed about the issues at general elections and will, therefore, prepare their voting decisions on easily available information. If the voter's information about environmental issues, such as sustainability, could be improved, then the election mechanism should serve as a

suitable instrument for revealing preferences for the environmental policy measures. One reason for this is the independence of the consumption motive from the voting act, as well as the extremely low influence of individually casted votes on the election outcome. Due to this fact, individual preferences can be revealed without "danger".[1] In this way it is possible for a voter, in accordance with his actual preferences, to vote for radical, costly ecological reform measures, as there will be no immediate consequences, such as higher individual tax-burdens, from his vote alone.

High publicity activities, such as those of the Club of Rome regarding the limits of growth, or the focus of certain technological environmental policy issues, such as automobiles with catalytic converters, or the global warming discussion, have been successful steps towards a lower information deficit. On the whole, Horbach (1992) shows empirically that this sort of activity has a positive effect on the sensitivity of voters to environmental problems and has a significant positive influence on the realisation of environmental policy measures in Germany.

To summarise, some remarks about voter behaviour: in many situations, a majority of voters will not vote in favour of an environmental program as long as they are not well-informed about it, or if the program provides benefits only in the form of public goods in the future times but with immediate cost (e.g. in form of a higher tax burden).

4. CAN POLITICIANS WIN ELECTIONS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS?

If we consider the selfish behaviour of utility-maximising politicians (e.g. politicians, who are, at least in certain time intervals, primarily interested in being re-elected), the chances of ecologically-oriented economic policy being implemented are poor. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that most environmental policies quite easily come into conflict with the preferences of re-election-securing politicians. These politicians favour economic policy measures which provide a majority of voters with immediate and noticeable utility gains, e.g. by increased transfer payments. Moreover, the costs of these measures are either not visible for the average voter (e. g. an increased state debt) or come into effect in the future (Volkert 1996; Schneider 1994b). On the other hand, the long-run effective utility gain of an ecological-oriented economic policy can hardly be used for winning a majority in a general election, as it is usually only future generations who will benefit from such policies. In addition, incentive-oriented environmental policy measures are burdening the current generation (voters/taxpayers) with quite extensive cost increases or even a rising unemployment in the short run; a fact which reduces the chances even further for realising ecological economic policy through the political process. It is very likely that potential losers from ecological policies will organise a voting campaign against these policies, as they are frustrated due to an increased (tax-) burden or other economic disadvantages, for example job losses or a consumption reduction. The threat of job losses is especially important in this context, as it is an issue which could be presented, for example, by a coalition

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[1] See Kirchgaessner (1996a, 1996b and 1996c), who argues that supporting the moral arguments of e.g. green parties is relatively „cheap" in an election and can therefore be expected as a special form of „ethical voting" (Mueller 1989)

between employers and employees in the affected production area. Such powerful coalitions will influence the behaviour of politicians and either they will hesitate to implement the necessary environmental measures, or they will even reject them.

One indicator of re-election-securing politicians' low level of interest in environmental issues and / or sustainable economic issues is the fact that one can discover only a few election cycles in environmental policy. These cycles are observable (Horbach 1992; Frey 1992), but also noticeably weaker than in other traditional economic policy fields, for example to increase government spending. In these fields, more votes can be won than with long-term ecologically-oriented economic policy programs. Furthermore, with respect to the use of economic instruments, it can be observed that selfish politicians prefer strongly "vote-maximising effective" instruments,[2] for example, tax rate reductions or an increase of transfer payments. The resulting benefits of such policies can be directly associated with the politician(s) in office. With respect to environmental incentive-oriented policies, this direct link is missing and, hence, we observe the tendency of politicians to choose instruments which are "inefficient" from the view of traditional economic. The reason for this is, that the re-election criteria of highly visible and immediately effective measures with postponed costs are more likely to be fulfilled by using regulations (for example standards) or, to a lesser extent, subsidies for environmental issues than by using the instrument of environmental taxes or tradable permits. These incentive-orientated instruments are inefficient for the politicians' re-election goals, as the utility gains from these instruments will only be effective in the future and thus only be partially attributed to the current government, whereas the government will be immediately held responsible for an increased taxes and for negative economic consequences (e.g. increasing unemployment) induced by those instruments.

As an ecologically-oriented economic policy is less attractive to re-election securing politicians, they will give low priority to this issue. This tendency is strengthened by the fact that the extension of state activity is limited, as these activities stretch the public budgets quickly to their financial limits. In this situation, it is natural that utility-maximising politicians reduce subsidies or restrict programs in environmental fields, as their re-election chances are least affected by such measures.

5. LOBBYING FOR AND AGAINST INCENTIVE-ORIENTED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

The great importance of well-organised and well-informed interest groups is derived from the fact that the environmental legislation requires a large volume of specialised information before passing a bill. This information is only obtainable with the assistance of interest groups. If this information from the various interest groups is equally reliable, the question as to which group will be able to achieve the strongest effect with their information, thereby having the strongest influence in the political arena, turns out

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[2] Instruments used for securing re-election by utility-maximizing politicians are discussed in detail in Pommerehne and Schneider (1983) and Schneider (1994b).

to be decisive for the behaviour of the interest groups. The answer to this question depends on the successful organisation of the group members' individual interests, as well as on the specific effectiveness of each interest group in carrying out its lobbying activities.

An important factor for the efficiency of (environmental) interest groups is the fact that a large number of people benefit from a successful environmental policy and that they quite often have many members. A well-known result of the theory of collective action (Mueller 1989; Schneider 1985; Olson 1965, 1985) is the difficulty to achieve an efficient organisation of very large interest groups: first, the members of environmental groups have very heterogeneous interests. Due to this, the organisational costs sharply increase with an increased number of members. Second, future generations, who are the major beneficiaries of ecological or sustainable policies, must be taken into account. However, they are unable to contribute to the actual group activities, e.g. the financing of the various lobbying activities. This "disadvantage" strongly increases the organisational and lobbying costs for the current members of interest groups favouring environmental policies. Third, at the beginning of their work, environmental interest groups often face the lack of a sufficient infrastructure, which can be used for efficient lobbying in the political arena.

The relatively high costs of "green" interest groups will only be accepted by their members, if these costs are clearly lower than the expected "profits" or "utility gains" which the group members try to achieve with their lobbying activities. From a Public Choice perspective, however, there are further difficulties: only those profits can be considered as "relevant" additional profits from environmental policies, if the group members benefit almost exclusively from them. This means that, even if the environmental interest group succeeds in obtaining a highly efficient lobby and, finally, an implementation of efficient environmental policies, all citizens will benefit from this policy. Because of this "public good effect" there is less incentive for individual group members to rigorously campaign for such an environmental policy and accept high costs, as the same positive effect can also be achieved by a free-rider. In summary, from the Public Choice perspective, environmental groups must take high organisational and lobbying costs into account when working towards the long-term goal of ecologically-oriented economic policies. These activities often do not yield the necessary high profits or utility gains until some time in the future, and moreover, for the individual, this achievement has the character of a public good.

If one considers the position of more traditional interest groups, e.g. the producers, not all of them are necessarily against environmental policies. They might benefit from environmental policies by means of additional business. Hence, it is obvious that the success of their lobbying is dependent on the extent to which changes along the lines of a sustainable development has already taken place among other factors. Horbach (1992) shows that the passing of extensive environmental protection legislation becomes possible when environmental protection industries make up a considerable share of economic production and employ a significant number of workers. An acceleration of environmental policy activities will be easier to obtain when these industries form an interest group and, thereby creating a counterbalance to those interest groups which oppose environmental policies.

Aside from the environmental protection industries, most other traditional industries oppose environmental policies. Most of these interest groups have the advantage that they are smaller than that of the initiators of environmental policy or its beneficiaries. Therefore, they face lower organisational and lobbying costs and, to a lesser extent, have the problem of free-ride behaviour. If these interest groups succeed in providing information, e.g. about subsidies for an environmentally compatible policy, or strategies for the reduction of cost burdens from environmental policies, used in the political arena to weaken environmental policies, the short-term benefits from these lobbying activities are much higher than the "pure consumption utility" for the individual group member. These benefits can be interpreted as a return on investment in the political arena, whose absolute value can be calculated by the value of the gained financial advantages.

There are four main reasons why the traditional interest groups opposing most environmental policies and representing both employer and employee interests, are not only better organised, but are also more able to achieve their selfish goals:

1. As opposed to environmental interest groups, the respective industry and business associations generally have sufficient financial backing, which is used for an efficient lobbying.
2. Industry and business associations often have considerable influence on public opinion by means of their own publications, as well as the influence they have on the media.[3]
3. The "market power" of these interest groups is a crucial factor for the achievement of their goals in the political arena. It is not only important in the goods and service market, but in the labour market as well, particularly in the form of the threat of transferring production abroad.
4. These associations quite often gain personal representation in legislative institutions (parliament and committees), making it possible for them to postpone, or even reject, environmental issues.

Above all, individual representatives of industrial and business interest groups are able to influence legislative proposals in their early stage by means of active lobbying in hearings and other parliamentary committees. For that purpose, they provide detailed information on environmental measures. This has the effect of linking together lobbyists and members of legislative bodies. As a result of this relationship, arrangements are made between the political administrative system and "private" interest groups of the economy. In Germany, such agreements have become common practice in more than fifty industrial sections and "voluntary self-obligations" (e.g. the obligation in the automobile industry to produce cars with a "3-litre engine"), as well as in several hundred committees for the definition of the "best available technology" (see Maier-Rigaud 1996; Helbig et al. 1997). Due to this successful lobbying, the efficiency of environmental policies is reduced, for instance the considering of compromises made in the form of modifications benefiting influential polluter interests in Germany. Only

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[3] However, one should note that environmental groups are sometimes better represented today in the media than their opponents because of spectacular actions (for example Greenpeace vs. Shell in Fall 1995).

these compromises are argued as being "economically tolerable". However, this catchword is quite often only a political "excuse" instead of an overall economically well-sounded argument.[4]

From the Public Choice perspective it is obvious that interest groups directly affected by environmental policy measures prefer the instrument of setting fixed standards to other environmental incentive-orientated instruments. A major reason for the preference of this instrument is that industries only have to pay attention to not reaching the limits of these emission standards. The outcome is, that all emissions remaining below the limit, are free of charge. Furthermore, defining these standards often provide affected industries considerable leeway for manipulating the environmental policy measures. Negotiations can, for example, be held regarding specific technical standards which can lead to exemptions (loopholes) for the affected firms. Since the information from affected companies on pollution-preventing technologies and costs is more detailed and more precise (but quite often one-sided), such agreements (compromises) are made mainly in the interest of the (private) producers. In comparison to other policy instruments (e.g. ecological taxes), exemptions are easier to carry out when standards are employed. In addition, in many cases a further tightening of standards would prove to be difficult and ineffective, as administrative controls are unable to monitor and sanction violations of these tightened standards. Therefore, the additional costs companies face for preventing pollution increase less, the control becomes more difficult the higher the level of current environmental protection measures. Furthermore, standards can lead to market entry barriers if potential competitors produce using different technologies, resulting in a large profit-seeking potential of old emitters. The preference of interest groups for administrative environmental regulations has also been found in surveys of the affected companies. According to Horbach (1992) two-thirds of the German companies favour standards, whereas only one-third favour levies or taxes. It is interesting that those companies, who argue in favour of standards, estimate that environmental standards are easier to fulfil and generate fewer conflicts and costs than environmental taxes. This statement can also be seen as an indicator of the significant leeway that is gained when environmental standards are used. Therefore, the interest groups' preferences for administrative environmental regulations are not surprising. It is not only the result that there is much less leeway with environmental taxes, but also the fact that the total amount of emission is subject to costs, which leads to the companies' rejection of environmental taxes. Producers opposition to the use of tradable permits can be explained similarly.[5] The difference between tradable permits and standards is that with tradable permits, additional costs for the purchase of the respective emission rights must be taken into account. In particular, former emitters must accept much higher costs with the transition from standards to tradable permits, as their previously cost-free production rights are replaced by tradable permits which have to be purchased for every pollution unit.[6]

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[4] Sandhövel (1994a) mentions the Bund der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) and the Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag (DIHT) as two especially influential producer interest groups.
[5] Strong resistance of interest groups to environmental taxes has also been observed in Switzerland. See Kirchgaessner (1996: 23)
[6] Vaubel's (1996) argument, that the opposition tot certificates could be overcome by the free distribution of licenses to old emitters, cannot be supported without restriction when, within the framework of sustainablility, at least in certain branches, it is necessary to gradually reduce the number of licenses.

6. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS' RESISTANCE TO INCENTIVE-ORIENTATED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

The political influence of producer and other interest groups is not only relevant in the legislative arena, but also on the administrative level of the political system. This is more important, as the influence of the public administration in Germany, for example, has continuously increased due to the transference of executive power. This is especially true in the course of the preparation and early realisation of environmental policy programs. Since most public administrations have a superior knowledge due to close contact with the affected interest groups and industries, bureaucracy has often played an important role as a generator of momentum and as a mediator for organised interest group preferences. The task of the legislation has been increasingly reduced to the mere legitimisation of those programs, whose content has already been (pre-) structured by the administration. Furthermore, lower levels of environmental administrations have been gaining in influence on the concrete structuring of complex environmental programs. In Germany, for example, the industrial inspection board (Gewerbeaufsichtsamt) and community environmental agencies (Umweltämter) have become more and more important in the realm of permission, control, sizing and sanctioning of environmental-politically relevant activities (Gawel 1995a; Horbach 1992).

Holzinger's (1987) empirical studies demonstrate that German environmental administrations are not completely bound to instructions and do not fully act according to the legislation fulfilling the legislator's environmental goals. Holzinger's studies reveal that bureaucrats follow their own interests, whereas goals such as "economic efficiency" and "overall economic cost optimisation" are of only minor importance for those working in German environmental administrations. Environmental authorities are particularly interested in environmental policy measures, which are labour- and resource-intensive. If they succeed in applying such policies, they can grow quickly. As a result, they are able to increase the number of employees, and they have a larger budget at their disposal every year. The result of this is that the environmental administrations will do everything they can to utilise those environmental policy measures requiring high administrative controls. Using the theories of bureaucracy from Niskanen (1971) and of Migué and Bélanger (1974), one can analyse the consequences of these goals of budget maximisation and/or of optimal discretionary budgets. According to Holzinger's (1987) study, approx. 76% of all employees surveyed working in environmental authorities in Germany demand an increase of their budgets in combination with additional responsibility.

According to Migué and Bélanger (1974), if the goal of budget maximisation in a given surrounding is difficult to achieve for the environmental administration, the administration will pursue the objective of expanding their discretionary budget. According to Gawel (1994, 1995a) 49% of surveyed employees in German environmental administrations want political authorities to regulate as little as possible, so that the environmental authorities have the greatest possible discretionary budget for their own decisions. Only 36% favoured a clear regulation of environmental procedures. Discretionary budgets are also necessary to meet the demands of those lobbies where the different environmental sections of German ministries have become even more important than the parliament.

In spite of these everyday co-operations, a number of conflicts can arise between the administrations and interest groups. According to almost 50% of surveyed enterprises in the iron and steel industry, for example, the intensive cost burden through planned environmental protection measures causes conflicts with the respective executive administrations. According to Sandhövel (1994b) and Ullmann (1982) the same sector, however, reaches most "compromises per firm" with environmental authorities. These compromises are reached in spite of the generally weak bargaining position of the administrations. There is little incentive from the perspective of the "environmental" bureaucracies to engage in lengthy, in formal and/or legal confrontations with affected companies and their interest groups, because in doing so, funding is tied up and can no longer be used in pursuing the goal of additional employees. Moreover, quite often environmental bureaucracies have poor labour resources – particularly in regions with a large share of ecologically harmful industries – which significantly reduces their chances for successful negotiations with well-organised producer interests.

The asymmetrical distribution of bargaining power between firms and environmental authorities results in compromises with respect to environmental standards and allowances concerning the best available technology. Further indicators of the rather weak bargaining position of environmental authorities in (potential) confrontations with producer interests are the comparatively low sanctions, as well as the relatively mild punishments. In Germany sanctions are only carried out against approx. 5% of firms requiring business permits as result of environmental regulations. According to the environmental administrations, this is in no way due to the widespread adherence to existing regulations, rather the difficulty of gathering proof, the high administration costs of investigations, the desire to avoid damaging the relationship to the addressee, and the insufficient infrastructure of the penal system. Considering the limited number of prosecuted violations the low number of the applied official sanctions is even more surprising, and can be explained by the weak position of the administration. In the German city of Kiel, for example, 714 prosecuted violations of environmental protection regulations were sentenced with only approx. $40,000 in fines – approx. $55 per case.[7]

Despite the weak bargaining position of bureaucracies, some measures can be carried out. The reason for this is that conflicts between potentially affected firms and the administration mainly occur with respect to the intensity of the environmental policy measures, less often with respect to the type of instruments to be used. The incentive structure of bureaucracies has many similarities to the incentive structure of business associations with respect to the preferences of certain policy instruments. Administrations prefer, for example, the use of environmental standards as well, which can only be supervised with labour- and resource-intensive execution efforts, allowing them to expand their budgets. Moreover, standards have relatively high discretionary regulatory requirements:

- a formulation of an exact definition of the given environmental goal and considering the best available technology,
- definition of sanction threats,

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[7] See Volkert (1996) with respect to the weak position of environmental authorities.

- determination of minimum requirements, and
- definition of control and observation rights.

These high discretionary regulatory requirements increase the influence of bureaucracies. The discretionary budget pursued by the employees of environmental authorities is extended even further by the setting of standards when negotiations are held with the affected industries or interest groups. Furthermore standards are characterised by a certain amount of rigidity, which is desirable from the bureaucratic point of view, as it lowers transaction costs. Lastly, further budget increases can be justified by the high demand for information often caused by the setting of environmental standards.

In addition to standards, subsidies are an instrument preferred by environmental administrations. They are attractive for those working in administrations and for the politicians, as they can often be used for vote-maximising strategies. The granting of subsidies, which are often (co-) determined by the environmental authorities, can reduce environmental damage through benefits instead of burdens, and costly confrontations with the affected industries can be avoided. One must take into consideration, however, that the use of the environmental subsidies can only be ecologically successful if enough financial means are taken from the budgets of other administrations or if additional revenues are available. As ecologically-oriented policies are relatively unattractive for re-election-securing politicians, however, these instruments will not play a dominant role compared with the instrument of environmental standards.

The evaluation of ecological taxes from environmental administrations' point of view is completely different. While standards and subsidies can only be justified with high labour costs and other expenditures, the use of taxes requires much less expenditure and manpower. Thus, a budget increase or increase in the importance of environmental authorities is less likely to occur than with the use of standards. Furthermore, the change from the currently used system of environmental standards to a system of taxes would require a high degree of flexibility of the environmental agencies. One should also note that establishing an ecological tax system requires vast information on producers' pollution prevention costs, which may not be easily available to the administrations. As opposed to the use of taxes, the information requirement, an environmental authority would face with the use of tradable permits, is notably smaller, as almost no information on companies' marginal pollution costs is required. Detailed information is only necessary for the tolerable total burden and the "correct" total emission amount derived from it. Information is also needed for the estimation of the economic effects of such tradable permits.

Using tradable permits would increase the efficiency of the executing administrations. This is no advantage for the administrations: on the one hand the obviously lower information requirements make it rather difficult to justify a large official budget. On the other hand, the gained discretionary budget is very low compared to the use of standards. It is also questionable if the additional revenues from tradable permits can be spent by the environmental administration. It should be noted, furthermore, that the instrument of tradable permits is the least known and least established instrument in German-speaking countries. This can explain the strong

resistance state administrations make to the use of tradable permits which are often, from an economic point of view, highly efficient environmental policy instruments. These considerations are supported by surveys in which bureaucrats gave the poorest evaluation of all environmental policy instruments to tradable permits (Holzinger 1987; Horbach 1992).

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Public Choice theory assumes that political entrepreneurs are selfish utility maximises and, consequently, an environmentally incentive-oriented policy has hardly a chance of being realised. It is, therefore, not surprising that a significant "execution" deficit can be observed. In this paper, various difficulties, which could hinder the establishment of ecologically-oriented policies, have been shown, e.g. the public goods character of environmental measures, the fact that the costs of environmental measures are felt immediately, the benefits much later, and widespread preferences for the use of standards. Perhaps they can be overcome with the help of the following suggestions, which solely represent initial ideas and need further elaboration.

1. The principle of subsidiarity should find more extensive use in environmental policy. The costs / utilities of many environmental measures could be more effectively "localised and accredited" to the affected parties if they were divided into small distinct units. This is necessary, as the environmental situation, the attitude of the affected parties towards the environment and the economic policy measures differ strongly in the various regions. Another aspect is that the subsidiarity principle is necessary in order to be able to design an environmental policy suited to voters preferences.

2. The individual voter/taxpayer in representative democracies has far too few possibilities to directly influence ecologically-oriented policy measures. This difficulty can be overcome by introducing direct voting, i. e. the use of a referendum. In the case that the environmental measure is accepted by the voters in a referendum, then politicians have a much more legitimate argument for the implementation of measures than without the voters' approval.

3. Another possibility to improve the chances for an incentive-orientated environmental policy is, under certain conditions, to compensate the additional burden of ecological taxes and tradable permits by means of general tax reductions. Measures which benefit future generations could also be financed through government borrowings. In this way, voters' resistance to ecological activities, which tend to increase their load immediately without raising utilities

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[8] Another reason to propose debt financing of long-term ecological measures can be the wish to preserve intergenerational justice. This is another line of arguments which critically depends on the (ir-)relevant question of the Ricardian equivalence theorem which is independent of the reasons which are the result of our Public Choice analysis.

in the near future, could be reduced. Replacing voters' additional tax burden by debt financing can be a way out of the problem. For politicians, an economically efficient environmental policy which increases voters' burden immediately in favour of long-term improvements is not at all attractive.[8]

Another political suggestion is the strengthening of the position of ecologically-sensitive producers. Therefore, one could give up the non-affectation-principle in the area of (future) environmental levies and taxes. As a result these additional revenues can directly be used to finance environmental policy projects. Examples for this are the SO_2-, NO_x-and CO_2-taxes, which are levied in France, the Netherlands and in Scandinavia (Cansier and Krumm 1997). The revenue from these taxes can be used in environmental projects or to subsidise companies which apply advanced pollution-preventing technologies.

Another means of strengthening environmental policy measures is to give each tax-payer the possibility to reserve a share of their paid taxes (e.g. 20%) for environmental measures, which is possible on all federal levels. The outcome of this measure would be the more trust invested in state institutions, as at least part of the tax revenue would be spent according to the preferences of citizens/ taxpayers.

If poorly informed voters/tax-payers hinder the implementation of an ecological-oriented policy, one could also propose the establishment of an independent federal agency. This institution would be comparable to an independent central bank, responsible for the provision of sustainable economic policies. In addition, it would be independent from group interests and does not have to consider short-term election campaigning measures. There is no doubt, however, that the establishment of such an independent institution might lead to some difficulties and may question about the responsibilities and the democratic legitimation. Crucial problems seem to be the efficiency of such an institution and it's ability to reach well-defined ecological targets. It has been argued, for example, that the definition of precise and simple goals for federal agency such as this would be impossible (Kurz and Volkert 1997; Volkert 1996; Vaubel 1996). Stable prices and other inflationary targets should be much more clear and simple for an independent central bank than the preservation of long-term high environmental quality. Apart from the question of whether monetary targets are actually simple,[9] criticism shows that an independent federal ecological agency should have to deal with clear cut tasks and responsibilities. The preservation of long-term high environmental quality is certainly not an adequate directive for such an institution. But what about clear political directives such as the precisely defined reduction of CO_2 in an officially fixed period? On the whole, if the other proposals should prove to be insufficient, the potential of such institutional innovation must not be ignored.

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[9] See Vaubel (1996). It should be mentioned that this criticism is based on very restrictive premises as far as the effects of monetary policy on the whole economy are concerned. Only if monetary policy does not influence real terms such as production and employment, an inflationary goal for an independent central bank can be clear and simple. Otherwise, if monetary policy is important for employment rates, stable prices as monetary goals have to be weighed against other (e.g. employment) effects of monetary policy, a process which is in no way simple. The discussions about the Geman monetary policy of the Bundesbank and the "adequate interpretation" of the price stability goal in times of unemployment underline the complexity of inflationary goals; see Volkert (1996).

It should be noted that suggestions might then help to overcome the above mentioned difficulties of implementing an incentive orientated notify in representative democracies. However, a detailed analysis of how these suggestions can be realised is not available and will be left for further research.

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MOVING FROM THE LIMITS AND PROBLEMS OF RATIONAL PLANNING TOWARD A COLLABORATIVE AND PARTICIPATORY PLANNING APPROACH

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ABSTRACT

Planning in the public sector is often governed by rules requiring the "rational-comprehensive" model of planning, whereby goals are given, and means are chosen based on a assessment of all available information. Never a reality, but nonetheless a strong normative model, rational-comprehensive planning dominated public and private natural resources planning for the last fifty years. Critiques of its weaknesses included: that marginal analysis and incrementalism better explained public planning; that goals and means could not be separated; and that deliberation was necessary to develop intelligence. This paper addresses five key problems with the traditional model of planning: what is the nature of the future, what creates "clearly defined goals," who creates and who uses knowledge, are citizens participants or clients, and does increasing the scale of planning lead to greater political hegemony? In addressing these questions, the paper both develops the critique of the traditional process and points toward new principles for a new planning process based on participation, deliberation, and collaboration. A role for science and scientists is especially important in terms of creating new, integrated strategies for sustainable development that protect ecological integrity and social resiliency. Planning is the link between knowledge and action, and so the context of action is critical to the scope of the planning agenda and outcomes.

Keywords: Rational-comprehensive Planning, Collaboration, Participation, Deliberation

1. INTRODUCTION

Planning is the connection between knowledge and action. For complex goals, like developing a national forest program, numerous actors must be coordinated to create and interpret information and develop an integrated course of action. The role of planning is to make this connection possible.

Traditionally, however, modern planning has focused on developing strategies to be implemented through bureaucratic organizations. In the public sector, goals and objectives were to be defined by legislatures, and planning was the process of interpreting these goals and organizing the people and resources to achieve them. Changes in goals were not to come from public agencies, but rather from the political process. Thus, the bureaucratic organizational structure was highly desirable, because its very "machine-like" structure greatly reduced the likelihood of responsive policy changes within government agencies and bureaus (Westley 1995).

The term "policy planning" refers to this process of implementing broad public goals through administrative agencies and program activities. Charles Lindblom in his seminal articles, "Policy Analysis" (1958) and "The Science of Muddling Through" (1959), outlined the rational-comprehensive approach to policy planning: define objectives, develop alternative strategies to achieve them, develop comprehensive information for analyzing their consequences, choose the best option. The decision criterion was "net public benefit" and usually based on some form of cost-benefit analysis. Lindblom argued that this model was unrealistic: complete information was impossible; objectives were interdependent with means; cost-benefit analysis could address only a narrow range of decision criteria; and experience was necessary to know if policies worked. His articles were widely read, but his warnings completely unheeded.

By the 1970s, planning rules for natural resource agencies were all modeled after the rational-comprehensive model. Complete information was assumed a reasonable goal, only sufficient funding was necessary to implement expert created plans. Objectives could be clearly and unambiguously defined – a premise leading in forestry to a preoccupation with harvest scheduling and allowable cut determinations to the exclusion of other objectives like wildlife habitat or scenic quality. Means could be defined and analyzed with decisions based upon unambiguous cost-benefit calculations, given the assumption that all relevant factors could be monetized directly or indirectly. All of the ambiguity Lindblom discussed disappeared.

This planning model fit well with bureaucratic organizations which had functional divisions and staffs based upon program objectives. Functional resource planning allowed goals for different resources to be independently defined and evaluated with little consideration of interactions among them or their cumulative effects on the landscape. The difficulty of changing goals and policies through planning in a bureaucracy was starkly illustrated in the 1990s by controversy over the US Forest Service's harvesting of the old growth federal forests in the Pacific Northwest. Only federal lawsuits, which stopped federal timber harvesting until there was an adequate conservation strategy for the late successional forests and dependent endangered species, succeeded in changing the goals, strategies and policies of the agency. The tight links between organizational structure, appropriated budgets, functional programs and staffs, and strong single resource constituencies controlled the scope of planning in order to legitimize current policy. Even thirty years of strong public demands for change and laws intended to force greater consideration of the environmental effects and costs of intensive timber management could not break through this powerful organizational structure (Caldwell et al. 1994). It is reasonable to assume that when policy planning is completely within the control of a single agency, it cannot be an instrument of open inquiry and change: it is simply captured by agency goals.

Clearly, creating "national forest programmes" (NFP) will require a fundamentally different kind of policy planning. Planning will need to be participatory with all interested parties and affected governments, agencies, groups, communities and individuals loosely linked in a network of collaborative relationships. It will need to be intersectoral and capable of considering multiple goals at multiple scales in space and time in the context of the capacities of governments, the private sector, and communities to carry out policies and actions. Most of all, planning will have to be open to new information, adaptive to experience and new conditions, and responsive to changing public values. The goals of NFPs are tied to the twin goals of sustainable development: ecological integrity and economic/social resilience. While these are powerful goals and inclusive of all interests, they are also ambiguous in terms of means to achieve them. It is this ambiguity of purpose and the uncertainty of outcomes that force the need for new fundamental principles upon which to design a new planning framework (Shannon 1997).

The purpose of this paper is to critique the current planning framework as a beginning for thinking about a new one. In order to undertake this critique, I will begin with a general discussion of the planning as social action. Then to focus the discussion, I will take up five key critiques of the current planning process and develop them in turn. In conclusion, I will return to the discussion of what kind of new planning framework is needed for developing NFPs.

2. WHY RATIONAL-COMPREHENSIVE POLICY PLANNING AND ANALYSIS?

The rational-comprehensive model of planning assumes that an unambiguous future can be created through technical analysis. The ability to "remove the politics" from public decisions was assumed to be a necessary and desirable goal of policy planning. The assumption was that experts could transform value choices into technical ones through analysis. For example, issues of whether to harvest timber on public forests in the US could be turned into technical analyses of the physical and economic suitability of the site for harvest, and the monetary benefits to society of the decision. Never was the goal questioned, the only choices were across marginally different means. Seldom were the environmental costs considered, for timber harvest was presumed to benefit the forest and not harvesting was simply a lost "opportunity cost." The standard planning models used "net public benefit" as their objective function, and then relied upon monetized resource values to make trade-offs among means.

Why would the rational-comprehensive model be adopted by all natural resource agencies? The best reason is the tight linkage between policy goals and organizational structure, budgets and staffing. The rational-comprehensive model of planning supported the existing distribution of power among functional staffs by legitimating their structure of goals and addressing only marginal changes in means. In addition, while Congress was rhetorically interested in achieving environmental protection goals, it was much more fundamentally concerned with delivering benefits to local constituencies – timber sales generate income for county schools and roads as well as jobs and infrastructure. Thus, Congress could control the outcome of planning by

allocating the budgets of the agency among line items for specific programs – timber got the lion's share of the money. While this discussion focuses on forestry, this same analysis would apply to the water resources planning in the Army Corp of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation; their goals were dam-building and irrigation construction respectively and their planning looked at alternative methods for these projects but never whether to do them.

Thus, since planning is the intervening variable between knowledge and action, we have to pay attention to the social and organizational context of action and especially how it shapes and limits inquiry by controlling what information is used, thereby rendering planning a functionary role to organizational goals (Benveniste 1989). This is the key problem with policy planning today. As long as the planning process remains within an organizational context, it can always be co-opted by the favored policy goals of the agency. The concept of NFPs is to bring planning into a multi-organizational, cross-sectoral context in order to hold goals against one another in the planning process and begin to chose among alternative combinations of goals, not just marginal means. The questions discussed in this critique of planning were chosen to illuminate aspects of this problem so as to provide windows of understanding for crafting a new planning approach.

A quick review of the key planning concepts so carefully analyzed by Peter Egestad in his paper "National Forest Programs in Clear Terms" (this volume) confirms the above analysis.

"PLANNING is the systematic process of examining the future and defining policies, strategies and actions to achieve goals.
STRATEGY is a broad course of action … to achieve clearly defined goals."
POLICY is a course of action adopted and pursued … according to desired economic and social objectives."

In each definition, the goal is assumed; it is established separately from the planning process. This was the fundamental critique of Charles Lindblom – choices among means are choices among goals. This remains the fundamental critique of policy planning – it pretends this is not so.

Before turning to the five critiques of planning, it is useful to place planning in a broader context of social action. In an excellent discussion of the emerging design principles for environmental governance, Frances Westley (1995) draws upon the analysis of the British sociologist, Anthony Giddens. Giddens argues that for social action to occur there must be three aspects of social structure which reinforce one another (Giddens 1984). "Structures of signification" are interpretive schemes that give meaning to our activities and our lives; like myths, paradigms and ideologies. "Structures of legitimation" are the norms and rules that organize our activities and govern the routines of life. "Structures of domination" are the allocation of resources and decision-making power that governs our ability to take effective action. Planning, Westley says, in all its forms, is a structure of signification (Westley 1995: 396). Planning serves primarily as organizational "sense-making."

Planning is not in itself a paradigm. But as a technology for sense-making and choice generation, its form is fundamentally determined by the myths or

paradigms that dominate a given organization, determining the perceptions of the environment and of the organization's role in that environment. Planning acts as an intervening variable between knowledge and action in large, complex systems. But under which circumstances is it a barrier and under which is it a bridge? (Westley 1995: 396)

Westley reinforces the basic critique of planning – organizational goals and perspectives capture it. But, can planning become an opportunity for cooperation and coordination among policy sectors and organizations as necessitated by the NFP process? Ideally, the planning process would reduce the equivocality of information so that choice is possible. Or, as Aaron Wildavsky put it in "Speaking Truth to Power" (1979: 18), "what combination of social interaction and intellectual cogitation, planning and politics, leads us to figure out what we should want to do and how to do it? For planning to have these deliberative qualities, it needs to be organized as an open, participatory process of inquiry among all responsible governments, NGOs and interested parties. As a social inquiry process, planning can facilitate the defining of issues and problems, and the working out new ideas and solutions. The following analysis illuminates some of the questions that must be addressed if planning is to become a useful technology for developing national forest programmes.

3. PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL PLANNING, QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

This section discusses five key problems with the traditional model of planning. These are "problems" in the sense that the rational-comprehensive planning model assumes them away, like economics "assumes away" the source of individual preferences in most analyses (Wildavsky 1987). Thus, these problems can also be thought of as the assumptions made by the planning model, assumptions that we must critique in order to build a new approach.

- The problem of "the" future(s) – is it already there or does our action bring it into existence?
- The problem of "clearly defined goals" – what are they and where do they come from?
- The problem of "knowledge" – who creates it and who uses it?
- The problem of "participation" – who is a participant and who is a client?
- The problem of "sense-making" in a multi-organizational context – is there domination or new super-organization?

3.1 The problem of "the" future(s)

Is it already there or does our action bring it into existence?
Planning analysis generally assumes that projections of current and proposed actions can be made over long time frames. The definition of planning is based on the

assumption that "the future" can be empirically assessed such that the conditions for achieving goals can be specified in advance and translated into policies and strategies. Think of most analyses of forest growth: the projected growth patterns of the forest are predicated upon current stand structure and estimates of growth. When dealing with easily predicted physical and biological processes, it is possible to imagine that the future is an unambiguous extension of the present. But is it?

The governing metaphors for understanding the world around us stem from the physical laws propounded by Sir Isaac Newton in the 17th century (Newton 1687). The laws of gravity and motion are universal qualities of the world, unchanged by any variation in conditions as the experiment with a feather and iron ball dropped from the Tower of Pisa demonstrated. From these physical laws a world-view based upon predictability, stability, and equilibrium emerged. This paradigm influenced the development of all the other sciences and common understanding as well. In this paradigm, the world naturally tends toward stability and equilibrium, and the role of prediction is to ensure that human control is exercised to avoid disequilibrium and reduce destabilizing forces. In forestry, for example, hundreds of research studies have investigated ways for controlling the conditions of tree growth and regeneration.

Ecology embraces a new metaphor based upon emergent processes, surprise and system transformation (Allen and Hoekstra 1992). This new metaphor draws from the "new physics" based on understanding elements like "quarks" that exist only at the moment of transformation and only in the relationship between other elements. What causes quarks to come into being are invisible fields of energy, which attract elements toward one another and at the moment of meeting entirely new elements emerge. Science now looks for those "invisible fields" and "strange attractors" in fields like organizational theory and leadership (Wheatley 1992). No longer is the future simply a product of the past, now it is an emergent process dependent upon the actions of the present to bring it into existence.

A purpose of metaphors is to create the future and prepare us for it. It matters whether one starts with the metaphor of a universe in equilibrium or one that is constantly emerging. Traditional planning clearly belongs with the metaphor of equilibrium and the role of management is to control the destabilizing activities of people. A planning process able to build cross-sectoral, integrated national forest programmes will need to start with a vision of the universe as constantly unfolding, and therefore brought into being through the relationships built through participation in the planning process (Regier 1993).

What has never a part of traditional "rational" planning was the notion of charismatic ideas. Charismatic ideas reshape our expectations and so also our future actions. One of the charismatic ideas that transformed forest policy in the Pacific Northwest was the concept of "connectivity." Scientific studies of endangered fish populations concluded that habitat changes were a key reason for their decline. These habitat features included the presence of large woody debris – large, dead trees – and favorable pool to riffle ratios. Longitudinal studies demonstrated conclusively that the intensive harvest of large trees and the extensive roads on steep slopes lead directly to the lack of woody debris and an overabundance of sediment filling up the pools and riffles (Nelson et al. 1991; Williams et al. 1992). These habitat changes were shown to be the proximate cause of fish population declines, over and above the toll on populations by the large

dams across the region. Thus, the aquatic system was "connected" to the timber management and became one of the driving forces for reducing the harvest of old growth forests. Today, strategies for the maintenance of healthy aquatic systems include road building and road closures, the importance of roadless areas, the management for large woody debris to be available when massive flood events occur, and an economic analysis of the feasibility of timber harvest methods that includes the "cost" to the aquatic system of sediment.

Charismatic ideas and metaphors shape our behavior, and thereby bring into existence the future. Planning which ignores the problem of the future cannot effectively create it. Indeed, a purpose of planning is to create the future (Friedman 1987).

3.2 The problem of "clearly defined goals"

What are they and where do they come from?
Again, recalling the definition of planning: the purpose of planning is to "define policies, strategies and actions to achieve goals." What processes create the goals? In the private sector, the overarching goal may be profit and survival, but in democracies the representatives of the people choose the goals. In forestry, there is usually some mix of public and private goals due to landownership.

- Assumption 1 – goals come from the public sector through legislative processes
- Assumption 2 – goals also come from the private sector, but those are short term goals

Studies of legislative processes tell us that goals are the product of interest group politics. Thus, the boundary between public and private becomes muddied, for the private sector works to shape public goals to its interests and benefit.

- Assumption 3 – goals come from pressure politics among single interest groups competing for policy control

All of these assumptions assume that goals are defined outside of the planning process. Yet, Lindblom suggests otherwise: choices among means naturally entail choices among goals. For example, in the case of the Northwest federal forests, the Forest Service chose intensive clearcutting and road building as the means to achieve the goal of "affordable lumber for American people to build houses." This choice of means entailed a choice to diminish the quality of habitat for numerous wildlife species and to disregard harm to streams. The justification of the choice was efficiency in meeting the single goal of cheap softwood lumber for building material.

As this example illustrates, choosing among means is choosing among goals. In the public sector, there are always numerous goals. Allowing the planning process to use technical analysis to mask the relationship between goals and means leads to plans which are ideological and difficult to legitimate in pluralist societies.

So, the kind of planning necessary for creating NFPs needs to be based on a very different assumption.

- Assumption 4 – goals can be developed within planning

This assumption can then guide the development of a planning process that explicitly analyzes goal-means combinations in order to understand their joint implications. This is what is meant by cross-sectoral planning and coordinated policy development.

3.3 The problem of "knowledge"

Who creates it and who uses it?

- Assumption: scientists and experts create knowledge, planners and policy makers use it.

Is planning merely an implementation process or is it also a creative process? In the public sector this is a crucial, and much contested, question. The traditional theory of public administration held that agencies did not make policy, they simply implemented the will of the legislature. By selecting agency staff based upon expertise rather than political party, wealth or family influence, agencies could apply neutral expertise rather than personal preference in achieving goals. Thus, the agencies would be a "neutral conduit" for legislative mandates (Reich 1985).

How should planning develop and assess potential policies and strategies? The traditional answer is through expert analysis of current information. The problems arise with the choice of what information is relevant to the analysis. This problem takes us back to the powerful linkage between organizational structure and ideology and commitments to certain policies and strategies. The choice of information in the planning process is never neutral and is always guided by what kind of information will support policy outcome desired by the agency. Given that agency staff are trained to identify with core organizational and professional beliefs, this is less a conscious choice of exclusion than an unconscious selection based on learned beliefs and values. Thus, the most important choice in the planning process – what information to use – is completely invisible and obscured by seeing it as exercise of "common sense and rationality."

Herein lies the dilemma. In the traditional planning process, scientists and experts create knowledge – it is an "input" to the planning process, as selected by the planners and managers. The separation of the processes of creating knowledge and transforming it into planning information means that scientists play no role in the critical examination of key assumptions or selections of relevant information. Paradoxically, when scientific knowledge is given a superior position to experience-based knowledge or community knowledge, it is more easily excluded from the planning process, thereby greatly reducing its power of critique. Examinations of recent policy conflicts shows that while scientific studies eventually changed resource policies, their critical effects were diminished for many years by keeping the process of generating knowledge separate from planning. Despite numerous studies and tall piles of scientific analyses, it took federal lawsuits to finally break the insuperable barrier of planning, ideology and powerful constituencies in the Pacific Northwest federal forests.

What kind of information should planning use? Recalling Frances Westley's definition of planning as the intervening variable between knowledge and action, it would seem that planning should create information that links what we know with what we will do. This seems a simple proposition. However, "what we know" is never organized around the choices necessary to decide "what we will do." This is the first challenge of planning: synthesizing existing information into useful analyses of goals and means. Who should do this?

If planners within an organization undertake this effort, the information is necessarily viewed as biased based on the organizational perspective. Scientists and outside experts need to undertake the organization of information relevant to planning with enough distance to retain their independence of perspective and openness to contrary positions, but with enough involvement to use the questions driving the planning process to synthesize and analyze the base of scientific knowledge. This calls for a new approach to planning that includes a partly external assessment process, but one tailored to the needs of the planning process. It also suggests an external review of the planning decisions based upon the science assessment to ensure that the information was understood, used appropriately and not applied selectively.

This kind of assessment process solves a significant weakness in planning – information gaps. Since comprehensive analysis is a fantasy, choices of information always imply something left out. Since what is left out tends to systematically correlate with agency beliefs and programs, these information gaps can shore up policy choices for a while, but eventually become the Achilles heel of the decisions when they are challenged.

Again paradoxically, by providing linkages between scientific knowledge and the planning process, other knowledge systems gain power. Public goals are always ambiguous about what it will take to achieve them – take sustainable development and NFPs, for example. When scientific knowledge is a part of the planning discussion, not just a functionary to ideological positions, then knowledge based on experience, observation, community history and other indigenous ecological knowledge can also contribute to defining the goals, means and questions to be addressed in making these choices. This is a crucial point for it links to the ability of a planning process to rest on participatory principles. Participation is not just influencing the decision-maker's choice; it is defining the questions and the goals, creating and applying the information, undertaking analysis, and participating in making choices. By including science in an appropriate role as independent in content but focused on key issues, other knowledge systems can also find an appropriate place in the process.

This leads to an important further conclusion. In traditional planning, scientists had no role. In a new participatory planning processes scientists have the important role of becoming integrators across knowledge systems (Shannon et al. 1996). This means that scientists first have to work across disciplinary boundaries when addressing real-world issues and problems. But second, it means that other knowledge systems must become intelligible to one another. Achieving this requires translation processes, like for example using maps and GIS techniques to show where community forest responsibilities are located or patterns of indigenous resource use control mechanisms, like hunting and gathering areas are delineated by families or clans. Translating experience, observation and indigenous knowledge into terms understood across

knowledge systems further enhances the open and critical qualities of planning as an inquiry process (Shannon and Antypas 1996).

3.4 The problem of "participation"

Who is a participant and who is a client?
In the public sector, the separation of goals (legislative role) and means (agency implementation) also separates the public from the process. While there are generally some kinds of formal public review processes where agencies must publicize their anticipated decisions and receive public comments, the role of the public is passive and influence often based on personal relationships (as occurs in clubs and service organizations). This passive role stems from the assumption that the agency or organization has the autonomous authority to act. In the US, this authority can be challenged only on grounds of "arbitrary or capricious decisions." Generally, the mandates given to agencies are broad and the interpretations of their mandate is considered "committed to agency discretion" by the courts. Thus, for participation to change an institutionalized policy, it must demonstrate that the agency choice was an arbitrary exercise of power and unjustified by any kind of rational analysis. The traditional planning model makes this challenge nearly impossible to win.

This passive, "outside the process role" raises the question of whether the public is a "participant" or a "client." A participant would shape and mold the decisions and help carry them out. A client is the reason for the program and its beneficiary. The traditional planning model assumes that the appropriate role for the public is "client." Participation is limited to a review and comment role on the proposed decision and accompanying comparison of alternatives based upon expert analysis and comprehensive information. A client in a democratic society can demand a good product and reliable service, but can determine neither the nature of the product nor the form of the service. It is assumed that clients will select across programs for the "products" and "services" that serve their interests. In the public sector, this means that the public searches the shelves of government policies and programs to find ones that serve their needs and interests (Landy and Plotkin 1982). However, turning citizens into clients and consumers of government programs, robs them of the essential meaning of citizenship – having a say in what programs and what services are available.

When citizens become merely clients, their knowledge of how choices will affect them is not necessary to the analysis of how to design and implement policies. The core principle of democracy is that people should participate in making decisions that affect them. By defining citizens as clients to be served, they are divested of this right.

When citizens and experts are placed in separate spheres, the knowledge of each is rendered less useful to the planning process. Societies are always engaged in processes of civic inquiry as they learn from experience and evolve over time. When this learning process is not part of the planning process, as in the traditional model, planning becomes a technocratic exercise in maintaining authority and autonomy. By keeping both scientists and citizens outside of the planning process, agencies and organizations attempt to immunize themselves from critical assessment of their favored policies and strategies.

A new planning process for creating NFPs will need to remember that participatory action creates community and public deliberation creates knowledge (Shannon 1998). These ideas are drawn from the new metaphor of the emergent universe. Community is the quality of relationships among a group of people, a quality based upon trust, face-to-face interaction, and mutual engagement through deliberating important public questions. A participatory process can create community through participation – for participation means the forging of new relationships and deliberation of important public problems. When multiple communities interact with each other, as is necessarily the case in cross-sectoral policy processes, new collaborative organizational arrangements emerge. The product of these new organizations is new knowledge as new relationships are built.

A planning process that is participatory creates collaborative organizations. Collaboration is the joining of parts of organizations into a virtual organization, meaning that it exists through the maintenance of on-going relationships rather than formal structures or shared office space. Developing NFPs requires that collaborative organizations emerge through the participatory processes and that planning is the mechanism for creating these organizations. Cross-sectoral policy processes will become the mechanism for maintaining them over time as well as providing the adaptive capacity for their evolution and growth.

When citizens participate in planning processes aimed at creating collaborative organizations so that cross-sectoral, integrated goals and policies are developed, they not only realize their citizenship more fully, but they also serve their own "client" needs in that they help develop policies that fit their needs and the needs of the society. Thus, reintegrating the roles of citizen and client in public policy planning is necessary to taking a participatory approach in planning.

3.5 The problem of "sense-making" in a multi-organizational context

Is there one "winner" or new super-organization?
The technocratic approach of rational-comprehensive planning immediately raises fears that cross-sectoral planning processes may create a "super-organization." The reason is that since goals are established outside of the planning process, cross-sectoral coordination would mean the creation of "super-goals" that a "super-organization" would implement. Based on the analysis above, the linkage between organizational ideology and programs and preferred means would lead to even greater hegemonic policy control. Not a future imagined by proponents of sustainable development or NFPs.

The other option under traditional planning is that through a political selection process, one organization or agency would "win" and their goals would be the dominate goals of the planning process. Again, this degeneration of pluralist politics is not consistent with the idea of NFPs.

NFPs assume that a multi-organizational framework is created by a participatory planning process. Such a collaborative organization, as described in the section above, links many agencies, organizations, communities, scientists and citizens. What animates and holds this organization together is commitment to important public purpose. In the

case of the NFPs, a commitment to sustainable development, sustainable forests and international principles of cooperation attract participants to common purpose. What overcomes hegemony is the necessity of negotiating definitions of the problem across policy sectors, among organizations, and with scientists and citizens. In this way, deliberating about "desired future conditions" (goals) along with the means (policies and strategies across sectors and organizations) to achieve them can lead to cooperation and coordination among diverse actors.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Policy planning for NFPs needs to encompass all three parts of social action – signification, legitimation and domination – into one process.

Signification: Planning in a multi-organizational context must create new meaning by drawing on powerful metaphors and charismatic ideas to reshape perceptions and create new possibilities. Defining what "the problem is" in a collaborative organization takes "organizational sense-making" to a new level. As an open, participatory process all interested parties share in creating through deliberation the meaning for their actions – goals.

Legitimation: Legitimation was assumed by the old planning model; it came from the separation of legislative and administrative roles and the autonomous authority of agencies to make decisions and carry them out. In the new planning process, legitimation is an outcome of a participatory approach. Legitimation can no longer be simply assumed; it must be continually created and reinforced through participation in joint decisions and coordination of cross-sectoral policies. Nations will vary significantly in the ease or difficulty of creating legitimation. In some, the consultative processes already in place can evolve quite naturally to a stronger relationship through more intensive and expanded participation in joint planning. In others, separation between the public and private spheres is less sharp and private actors can work closely with public agencies to reach mutual goals.

Domination: The ability to commit resources and carry out decisions is the most difficult step in social action. The real measure of success in NFP planning processes is achieving results. Leadership and strong symbols of common purpose will be necessary to provide the will for decision makers to commit resources, time and staff to both the planning process and the implementation of new policies and programs.

This is not the old planning process, which often assumed that if you "plan it they will come." Meaning that a good plan would get funded by the legislature; an expectation nearly always dashed in the end. Now, a good planning process will create the capacity for implementation (Hjern and Porter 1981). This is why the new planning process is an organizational process. Organizations are the means by which societies act. Thus, NFPs can only lead to action if they develop the organizational capacity to act.

It is evident that planning needs to become a knowledge producing process with learning so that action can be responsive to results and able to change as necessary. This adaptive approach will necessitate a new form of participation that results in creating implementation capacity.

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POLICY PLANNING WITHOUT A LEGALLY-BINDING FRAME-WORK? – THE CASE OF NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES

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ABSTRACT

National Forest Programmes, as outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, intersect and rely upon numerous legally binding legal regimes and instruments. The actors operating under these regimes and instruments tend not to be sufficiently coordinated so as to provide an effective framework for the design, execution and implementation of NFPs. Given their complexity and ambition, an integrated legally binding framework supportive of NFPs can greatly enhance the success of NFPs. The paper describes one proposal to create such a framework using Forest Partnership Agreements, which would bring together the relevant actors at national and international levels. The possible elements of National and International Forest Partnership Agreements are identified, as is a financial mechanism.

Keywords: Forest Partnership Agreements, International Law, Legal Frameworks, National Legislation

1. INTRODUCTION

It is evident that sound law should follow sound policy. Indeed, an important technique of legal interpretation is to make reference to the policy behind the law. However, it is also true that sound policy-making can benefit from an appropriate framework to support and guide it. Such frameworks can be the result of legally-binding instruments. Indeed, it is rare that policy-making occurs in a complete vacuum; there is almost always a pre-existing set of norms, backed up by legally-binding instruments, that the policy maker must build upon.

The focus of this paper is on appropriate legally-binding frameworks for the policy development and planning which occurs under National Forest Programmes.

2. LEGAL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES

With the adoption of the IPF Proposals for Action (UN Commission... 1997), it is now clear what the fundamentals of NFPs are. A conceptual step backward now ought to be taken so as to determine the possible legal frameworks most appropriate to NFPs. To do so, it is necessary to inquire what are the legal aspects of NFPs. According to IPF Proposal for Action 17(a), NFPs should:

- be consistent with national, sub-national and local policies
- be consistent with international agreements
- use partnerships and participatory mechanisms
- recognise and respect customary and traditional rights
- secure land tenure agreements
- be holistic
- be inter-sectoral and iterative
- adopt ecosystem approaches to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use
- adequately provide and valuate forest goods and services

IPF Proposal for Action 17(b) and (h) call for improved coordination mechanisms and strategies.

IPF Proposal for Action 17(f) calls for the elaboration of systems, including for private and community management systems, for all NFP phases which identify and involve forest dwellers, forest owners and local communities in decision-making regarding management of state forest lands

National Instruments

All this suggests the relevance of several existing legal regimes at the national level, including:

- Forest practices law. Forest laws traditionally address how forests, especially those on public lands, are to be conserved and used. They may stipulate the manner in which exploitation is to take place, as well as providing for use entitlements, penalties and the creation of administrative bodies.
- Environmental law. Since forests are affected by numerous forces and actions, laws regulating pollution, nature conservation, water quality etc will be relevant. In addition, general instruments relating to environmental impact assessment, as well as the creation of institutions may also affect forests.
- Land law. Land law governs the actions permitted on land (e.g. agricultural uses, urban development), as well as property entitlements and tenure.
- Tax law. These rules would provide for significant incentives and disincentives to forest conservation, management and development, especially on private lands.
- Administrative law. These rules provide, inter alia, for public entitlements to participate in administrative decision-making, as well as to challenge such decisions.

- Human rights law. Human rights law is relevant in particular to the rights of traditional and local communities, but can also establish relevant entitlements such as a human right to a clean environment

The norm is for these disparate national regimes to be administered by different governmental actors, with poor coordination as amongst themselves.[1]

International Instruments

In addition, however, several international legal regimes also impact on National Forest Programmes. Some of the more important ones include:

- Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD is inherently relevant to forests, as between 50-80% of terrestrial biodiversity resides in forests. This treaty aims to establish a comprehensive regime for the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of biological resources, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of access to genetic resources (Article 1). The treaty operates on the genetic, species and ecosystem levels, with an emphasis on the latter. It sets forth obligations in relation to in situ conservation, relating to protected areas, conservation and sustainable use, promotion of ecosystems, rehabilitation and restoration of ecosystems, alien species, endangered species, and harmful process and activities (Article 8). The CBD provides for sustainable use (Article 10), national biodiversity strategies and plans (Article 6), incentive measures (Article 11), and environmental impact assessment (Article 14). Provision is also made for a regime of access to genetic resources (Article 15), transfer of technology (Article 16), and of financial resources (Article 20).

- United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (Desertification Convention). The Desertification Convention is applicable to large amounts of the world, and aims to take an integrated approach to combating desertification (Article 4 [2]). As such, to the extent that forests carry out relevant ecological functions, the Convention sets forth rules and procedures that apply to it. The Convention itself is a framework of general obligations, such as the development of national and regional actions programmes on desertification (Articles 10 and 11), but more specific provisions relating to forests are found in certain regional annexes (see Annexes for Africa and for Latin America and the Caribbean).

- UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol. The Climate Change Convention sets forth a general requirement to conserve and sustainably use forests in their capacities as carbon sinks (Article 4[1][d]). The

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[1] E.g. typically, forest matters fall under the Ministry of Agriculture or of Natural Resources, environmental under Ministry of the Environment, taxation under the Ministry of Finance, administrative law by the particular tribunal in question as well as the judiciary, and human rights by specialist bodies.

recently adopted Kyoto Protocol contains several provisions of relevance to forests. Developed Country Parties, which are required to reduce their net carbon emissions, may do so by enhancing their carbon sinks through a set of specific forest activities (Article 3). In addition, the Protocol allows for "joint implementation", whereby a developed country Party can get credit in relation to its targets through investment in projects which reduce emissions in another country (see Article 6 for JI as between developed country Parties and Article 12 for JI in relation to non-developed country Parties)

- International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA). The ITTA, which is mainly a commodity trade agreement, also contains references to sustainable forest management. The non-binding target of sustainable management by the year 2000 is affirmed in the Preamble. The Convention also creates the Bali Partnership Fund that aims to build national capacity to implementation a strategy for achieving exports from sustainably managed sources by the year 2000 (Article 21). The ITTA also creates the International Tropical Timber Organisation, which has adopted several guidelines relating to sustainable forest management.[2]

- Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). CITES, which seeks to regulate international trade in endangered species, has listed a number of timber or woody species. It operates by requiring the issuance of permits before trade is to take place in listed species, specifying the conditions under which the permits are to be granted. The result is that for species listed in Appendix I, commercial international trade is prohibited, while for those under Appendices II and III, regulated trade takes place. Currently the issue of listing timber species is on the agenda of the CITES, with the Parties recently establishing rules on the modalities of such listings (CITES Resolution 10.13.).

- ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. ILO Convention No. 169 is applicable to indigenous peoples living in or around forest areas. The Convention requires the safeguarding of their environment (Article 4[1]), and establishes entitlements of indigenous peoples to decide their own priorities for development (see, e.g. Article 7). It also provides for the recognition of indigenous ownership and possessive rights over lands that they occupy (Article 14).

Other treaties, such as the Convention for the Protection of the World's Cultural and Natural Heritage and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially Waterfowl Habitat, contain requirements for the protection and conservation of designated sites.

In addition to actions resulting from international legal agreements, the existence of numerous forest-related programmes and activities of international organisations (e.g.

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[2] The ITTO has adopted Criteria for the Measurement of Sustainable Tropical Management, Guidelines for Sustainable Management of Natural Tropical Forests and Guidelines on the Conservation of Biological Diversity in Tropical Production Forests.

the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, World Bank, etc.) render the international arena even more complex, as well as those of bilateral donors. These activities are often underpinned by legally binding agreements between the agencies involved.

To date no effective international coordination mechanism exists as between international instruments or actions. As such, there is little harmonisation of implementation at the national level.

Therefore, it can be concluded that application of the NFP concept triggers numerous legally binding frameworks. The lack of coordination and harmonisation amongst these frameworks places a considerable burden upon the NFP to effectively integrate the implementation of these instruments.

3. NEED FOR A LEGALLY-BINDING FRAMEWORK FOR NFPS

Although NFPs are processes which should lead to more coherent and effective law and policy making, the concept begs the question as to whether the process itself requires any framework within which to operate. A poorly thought out or disorganised NFP risk leading to results that are counterproductive at best. Given that NFPs are inherently complex programmes and dependant on considerable political will, law, as the highest expression of political will, can play a useful catalytic role in ensuring that the NFP functions well. Additional advantages of legally binding frameworks to support NFPs include their ability to clearly define rational institutional roles and responsibilities, as well as rules and procedures for meaningful public participation and conflict resolution, and to order power-relations in order to achieve an effective rules-based system. It can be argued that the Tropical Forest Action Plan may have stood a better chance of success if it had been grounded in an overall legally binding framework.

The remainder of this paper focuses on such a framework currently being developed and tested by some organisations and countries, Forest Partnership Agreements.

4. FOREST PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

The Forest Adviser's Group originally conceived of the Forest Partnership Agreement (FPA) concept in the early 1990s as a means for supporting the development and implementation of NFPs in developing countries. They help provide the foundation for creating a legal and policy framework for the design and implementation of NFPs. FPAs are legally binding agreements that seek to promote:

• partnership and coordination among relevant actors,
• participation of stakeholders, and
• harmonisation of policy frameworks.

FPAs are based on bottom-up and country-led approaches. They are to be developed in relation to one single developing country; as such, they are not meant to be a substitute

for a possible global legal framework for forests, which is currently under discussion. The objectives are to be achieved through developing FPAs so as to be flexible, iterative, transparent, participating, by defining roles and responsibilities, and by containing a democratic financing mechanism. Accordingly, important lessons may be learnt from experience with the Global Environmental Facility, national environment funds, and framework cooperation agreements in support of sustainable development, such as those concluded between the Netherlands and Costa Rica and Bhutan, respectively.

The FPA concept was further refined to take account of the results of the IPF intersessional meetings at Feldafing (Report of Expert...1996) and the Swedish-Uganda Initiative (Kamugisha et al. 1996), as well as the IPF itself. Indeed it was endorsed by the IPF as a possible instrument in support of NFPs. Although the concept is in the process of being tested in some developing countries, it is still preliminary and evolving.

As the thinking about the concept progressed, it became apparent that it was neither feasible nor legally desirable to develop a single instrument to achieve the objectives of an FPA. Rather, it makes more sense to design two FPAs, one national and the other international, with connections between the two.

National FPAs

National level FPAs aim to define the roles and responsibilities of national actors in relation to each step of the NFP process. It should be recalled that these steps include:

- National Forestry Statement
- Forest Sector Review
- Identification of key issues and priorities (based on the Forest Sector Review)
- Forest Policy Formulation
- Strategy Development
- Action Plan for a planning cycle
- investment programme for public sector

To be successful, each of these steps require commitment and ownership by all major entities whose actions relate to forests. As such, the process of agreeing a national FPA should, ideally, bring on board government, NGOs, industry, and local and traditional communities. However, given these entities, which may not be organized so as to have designated any legal representative of each, it is difficult to conceive of a legally binding contract in the traditional sense being concluded as between them. Nonetheless, what may be possible is to have appropriate representatives of these different groupings conclude a declaratory agreement between them, which might then be endorsed or affirmed by a parliamentary procedure so as to give it legal status.

International FPAs

International FPAs would be concluded between donor agencies and the government concerned. Given that Memoranda of Understanding are regularly concluded, as

between individual donors and recipient governments, it would not be difficult from the technical point of view to craft a multiparty commitment in relation to a recipient country. Indeed, some donor-coordination mechanisms exist which may be seen as useful precedents (e.g. G-7 Brazilian Rainforest Pilot Programme, World Bank sector investment programme). Elements of an International FPA might include:

- Commitment by all parties to sustainable forest management in accordance with international standards
- Commitment by all parties to observe all international obligations relating to NFPs
- Commitments by international partners to respect national planning instruments and cycles
- Outline of instruments national government will use for NFP formulation
- Regulation of procedures used by international partners for activities of relevance to NFPs
- Mechanisms to pool financial resources in support of nationally led programme

As indicated above, it is technically possible to elaborate a legally-binding agreement containing these elements. The challenge mostly is at the political level, in that the entities involved will to some extent surrender their decision-making powers to a multilateral process.

Forest Partnership Facilities

The third element of the FPA concept involves the creation of a financing mechanism known as a Forest Partnership Facility (FPF). This component is especially important, as to some extent, it will be the concretisation of FPAs. It is envisaged that the FPF will help finance the execution of the NFP, as well as its results. Although some guidance can be drawn from experience with national environmental funds, designing FPFs will entail broaching several fundamental issues, such as:

- legal status
- governance structure
- financing

It remains to be seen whether it makes sense for the Forest Partnership Facility to be made part of the national or international FPA, or indeed be created by a separate instrument anticipated by either FPA. This sort of issue must be examined in particular national contexts.

5. FINAL REMARKS: TOWARDS A MORE INTEGRATED LEGAL FRAMEWORK

This paper has demonstrated the importance of considering the legal framework in the design of NFPs. A central point is that there will always be a complex set of legal rules

which will impact on the design or outcomes of the NFPs, but that these rules tend not be organised in the most appropriate or supportive manner in relation to NFPs. Forest Partnership Agreements may assist some countries in developing a useful framework that brings the relevant actors together both normatively and functionally in relation to the NFP process.

Ultimately, however, the legal framework for planning for forests should not be an isolated one. Although forests are important in their own right, and indeed merit a discreet approach for planning, they are, as noted above, the major component of terrestrial biological diversity. As such, the legal framework for forests should form an integral – and not separate — part of a country's implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity.

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III

SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES - A REQUEST FOR INTER-SECTORAL AND MULTI-LEVEL COORDINATION SOME ACTOR-FOCUSED CONSIDERATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Among many other research topics, the formulation and implementation of National Forest Programmes (NFPs) raise questions about inter-sectoral and multi-level co-ordination. This article applies some theoretical concepts of political science, namely about policy networks, multi-level governance and interest intermediation, to examine potential obstacles and incentives concerning these two dimensions of co-ordination. The main argument is that the demand for both inter-sectoral and multi-level coordination requires 'policy change' and that the reluctance to change crucially depends on the type of the existing forest policy network. However, since the main cross-sectoral conflicts affect policy core beliefs, the line-up against competing interests tends to be stable. Moreover, there are some serious obstacles regarding the co-ordination of NFPs at the European level. On the other hand, the collaboration in supranational networks offers certain incentives to interest group representatives and public actors. The theoretical arguments are briefly illustrated by the example of the forest policy subsystem in Austria and in the European Union.

Keywords: National Forest Programmes, EU policy-making, forest policy networks, Advocacy Coalitions.

1. INTRODUCTION

National Forest Programmes (NFP) are proposed in numerous documents of international processes on forest policy to promote sustainable forest management. Today it is not clear whether the strong focus on NFPs is only due to its characteristics as a vague concept offering a wide range of possibilities for consensus or whether it indicates agreement on common interests. Let me begin with the assumption that the expression is more than a trendy buzzword or an unintended side effect of international

negotiations. A basis for this assumption is the fact that the objectives and elements of NFPs have been defined and changed several times in the IPF-process (for details see Egstad 1999). If they were designed to be a mere political symbol, actors would have been satisfied without any further development of the concept since considerable conflict is rooted within the elements defined. In addition, some further assumptions are necessary to discuss the concept of NFPs. They are based on the documents of the IPF-process.

- The goal of NFPs is to achieve sustainable forest management (SFM), that is to ensure the conservation and the sustainable development of forest resources.
- The concept of NFPs comprises both decision-making and measures to achieve the goals.
- Although the NFP framework focuses on the forest sector, it emphasises inter-sectoral dependencies.
- The NFP concept is a decentralised and participatory approach which pursues to integrate all levels from the international to the operational level. International co-ordination is considered necessary for responding to the regional and global dimensions of SFM.

Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) is the principal goal of NFPs and has become a catchword in recent forest policy discourse, but it has often been criticised because of its vagueness; e.g. the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) avoids using the term 'sustainable-managed forests' because of its ambiguity as well as the controversy about it (Humphreys 1996: 246). According to Bäckstrand et al. (1996: 227), who discuss 'sustainable development', I suppose that the vagueness has contributed to its pervasive force, since it allows various interpretations. Different organisations were able to concentrate on what they regarded as central to their interests and ignore what would challenge them. In order to overcome divergent interpretations of SFM, the approach of NFPs is different from traditional administrative problem solving mechanisms. The attempt to introduce the principles of non-hierarchical, participatory, multi-level and inter-sectoral co-ordination meets strong resistance. The prevalence of governmentalism, standard operating procedures and the tendency towards the fragmentation of complex policy issues create obstacles for the formulation and implementation of holistic NFPs.

The assumptions from above are central aspects of the framework in which NFPs should be formulated and implemented. The goals are ambitious: On the one hand, NFPs are supposed to integrate all levels, from the global to the local level. Basically, supranational co-ordination is possible at the EU level, in the course of the Pan-European Process, as well as at the level of the United Nations. On the other hand, NFPs should go beyond the boundaries of forest politics, i.e. actors of other policy domains who are not part of the 'traditional forest policy community' have to get involved in the process of policy formulation and implementation.

This concept raises questions which are discussed from different theoretical perspectives in political science, namely in research on interest intermediation, policy change and multi-level governance. Taking the EU member Austria as an example, I will try to provide insight into the concept of NFPs with the help of these approaches.

The analysis aims at finding theoretical indications which help to clarify two questions from the viewpoint of the actors of forest policy networks:

- What are the advantages and disadvantages with regard to the inter-sectoral co-ordination of NFPs at the national level?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages with regard to the supranational co-ordination of NFPs?

2. THE NATIONAL FOREST POLICY DOMAIN – PRECONDITIONS FOR NFPS

The idea of NFPs focuses on forest policy, a domain of well-developed structures and actor relations. The dominant Austrian forest policy network is 'firmly rooted in nationally specific legal, political and administrative institutions, which have been outcomes of long-term historical processes and which have shown great persistence over time' (cf. van Waarden 1992, quoted in Schuhmann 1993: 421).[1] Some interest groups have succeeded in establishing themselves as the natural expression and representative of forestry in the eyes of the administrative agency. Consequently, they constitute the reference point for the activity of the administrative agency ('clientelism'). Since forestry is organised in only a few closely co-operating associations, they are monopolists of resources and expertise on which the agency depends. Furthermore, continuing close co-operation promotes close social relations. Bureaucrats are sensitive to the needs, the problems and the worldview of forestry interest groups. In addition, clientelism is favoured because of the socialisation of forest owners, forest managers, interest group representatives, forest consultants, journalists, civil servants and forest scientists in the 'community of forest professionals' (community of all involved in forestry except forest workers).[2] The relation is even closer because privileged interest groups are involved in policy implementation ('sectoral corporatism'). The implementation of public financial programmes is a central competence of the Chambers of Agriculture. They are self-governing corporate bodies in public law at the state level with compulsory membership of forest owners (the federal umbrella association of the Chambers of Agriculture is the 'Presidents` Conference of Chambers of Agriculture').

The dominant Austrian forest policy network could be characterised as a 'policy community' (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 186). Its characteristics are: a limited number of participants; some groups are deliberately excluded (e.g. environmentalists); dominant

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[1] According to Rhodes and Marsh (1992: 182) the term 'policy network' is used a s a meso-level concept of interest group intermediation. Networks are clusters of actors connected to each other by resource dependencies. A policy network is defined as a predominantly informal (but also formal) interaction among actors, usually organisations or individuals with different, but mutually interdependent interests, which deal with common issues at non-centralised, non-hierarchical levels. It is a sectoral system of interest intermediation between governmental and non-governmental bodies (see also Héritier 1993: 432).

[2] In the process of 'socialisation' a groups model of behaviour and its norms are transferred to an individual (Wössner, J. 1976: 225). Individual values and norms are adjusted to group standards (Forgas 1994: 250-270). For the definition of the 'community of forest professionals' see Glück (1987: 48) and Pleschberger (1981: 34). According to Glück (1983: 292) the community of forest professionals is characterised by voluntary subordination of different interests under the common cause 'forestry'.

economic and professional interests; frequent interaction between the members on all matters related to forestry; consistency in values, membership and outcomes in the long term; consensus with the ideology, values and broad policy preferences shared by all participants; exchange relationship among all members having some relevant resources and bargaining with resources; there is a balance of power which does not mean that all members equally benefit, but all members see themselves involved in a positive-sum-game.

Forestry interest groups enjoy privileged access to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. In return, the bureaucracy can rely on their support. Therefore, the main actors of the Austrian forest policy community will endeavour to keep the network closed and will generally refuse any attempt to shift competence to supranational levels. This was often confirmed in the past.

3. THE CHALLENGE OF INTER-SECTORAL CO-ORDINATION

Given the national preconditions of the Austrian forest policy domain, both the demand for inter-sectoral as well as multi-level co-ordination require 'policy change'. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a theoretical concept to explain policy change. It emphasises the importance of ideas, values and convictions and asks about the conditions for their development and change. This is also reflected by analytical concepts like 'policy style', 'policy profile' and 'policy networks' but the ACF focuses more on it. In the following I will discuss some hypotheses drawn from the ACF regarding policy change in the Austrian forest policy subsystem (cf. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1993a; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994; Sabatier 1998).

Policy subsystems are sets of actors active in a specific policy domain and/or working on a specific issue. For analytical reasons, actors are aggregated to a number of groups, namely to advocacy coalitions. 'The ACF assumes that actors can be aggregated into a number of Advocacy Coalitions composed of people from various governmental and private organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert' (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994: 180). The alliances force them to formulate common positions which stabilise in the course of time. This suggests the assumption that there will be more fragmented belief systems within 'young coalitions' (e.g. in 'new' policy domains of the European Union) than in coalitions which were established a long time ago (e.g. CAP).

Coalitions try to translate their belief systems into public policies which, in turn, reflect the orientations of dominant coalitions. In fragmented systems however, different advocacy coalitions 'dominate' different administrative units. Moreover, one of the fundamental strategies of advocacy coalitions is to influence the distribution of competences in order to shift them to those administrative agencies which they 'control' most (e.g. environmental NGOs prefer Ministries of Environment and DG XI, forest owner associations prefer Ministries of Agriculture and DG VI).

Belief systems of AC members are hierarchically conceptualised: The 'deep core' of the belief system includes basic ontological and normative beliefs which operate across all policy domains (e.g. individual freedom vs. social equality), 'policy core beliefs'

represent basic normative commitments and causal perceptions related to the policy subsystem (e.g. priority of economical or ecological objectives in forestry, governmental regulation vs. market instruments in forest policy), and finally, 'secondary aspects' which comprise a set of narrower beliefs and causal perceptions within a policy domain (e.g. which measures are most effective to ensure biodiversity?). However, the glue holding a coalition together is principal agreement on policy core beliefs and/or policy preferences involving a long standing, intense conflict affecting most members of the subsystem (Sabatier 1998: 117).

The analytical advantage of this conception refers to the analysis of 'policy learning in subsystems'. It is assumed that the reluctance to change decreases from the deep core to the secondary aspects. Whereas the deep core is very reluctant to change some aspects of the policy core (especially those based on the accumulation of evidence), are more variable in the long run. Beliefs in secondary aspects are most readily adjusted in the light of new data, experiences or strategic considerations (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994: 182). Therefore, policy-oriented learning often alters secondary aspects, but changes in the core aspects of governmental programmes are usually the results of disturbances external to the subsystem.

Advocacy coalitions respective their members are the subject of learning. The objects of learning are, above all, secondary aspects.[3] Policy oriented learning is an ongoing process of search and adaptation to achieve policy core beliefs. Regardless of the importance of political power, those who are able to argue on a logically consistent and empirically sound basis earn credibility. Those who cannot, have to compensate for the disadvantage by employing power resources. In a world of scarce resources, those who do not learn are disadvantaged in the long term. Actors usually try to limit the changes to secondary aspects and react in a way which is consistent to their deep core and policy core beliefs. Changes in core beliefs are usually the result of shocks from outside the subsystem.

Exogenous variables affect the constraints and opportunities of subsystem actors (Figure 1). Relatively stable exogenous parameters restrict the scope of alternatives and influence the resources and orientations of actors. Basic constitutional structures (rules), for example, are very stable in most subsystems and determine the scope and probability of policy learning.

Closed and centralised subsystems are rather resistant to change and hamper policy oriented learning whereas open subsystems are more conducive to policy change. Therefore, the model predicts that the Austrian forest policy subsystem is very reluctant to policy change, i.e. the policy community will remain closed as long as there are no external challenges which are strong enough to force changes. However, the forest policy subsystem is only partly autonomous. The relative autonomy may depend on the importance and/or on the political power of the respective sectors within the national economy. Therefore, 'forest policy communities' which can rely upon their political power in national systems (e.g. Finland) are expected to take an active role in attempting to shape their political environment, whereas less influential forestry communities are likely to behave more defensively.

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[3] It should be noted that other authors developed different conceptions of 'policy learning' and 'policy change'. For an overview and comparative analysis of concepts see Bennett and Howlett 1992.

Figure 1. The Advocacy Coalition Framework. Source: Sabatier P.A. 1998: 102.

Decisions and impacts from other subsystems are the driving force towards policy learning and policy change. Challenges from other policy domains (e.g. agricultural and environmental policy) have been the most important issue of forest policy in recent years. Undoubtedly, these challenges do have the potential to invoke policy change in the long term.

The major controversy about NFPs, under the condition that they have to be formulated in a participatory and cross-sectoral process, is likely to be about the definition of criteria and indicators of SFM which, unavoidably, affects the policy core beliefs of the dominant advocacy coalition. Members of that coalition reject every attempt which challenges private property rights ('private property rights coalition'); e.g. the guiding principle followed by the Confederation of European Forest Owners (CEPF) is 'to maintain and strengthen the diverse functions of forest ownership' (emphasis by the author; CEPF 1997: 3), the aims of the Austrian Federation of Forest Owner Associations 'cover primarily the maintenance and further development of private property and entrepreneurial freedom, healthy forests and fertile soil with the simultaneous production of raw materials and services' (emphasis by the author; ibid.: 9). On the other hand, the competing coalition pursues environmental objectives ('environmental coalition').

This designation ('private property rights coalition') refers rather to deep core beliefs than to policy core beliefs. To some extent, it contradicts Sabatiers' statement that the glue holding a coalition together is an agreement on policy core beliefs. Other definitions to consider would refer to the tenets of the primacy of sustainable timber

production ('timber production coalition') and the primacy of professional expertise ('forestry profession coalition') (for the tenets of forestry see Glück 1987: 45-51). These definitions clearly alter the range of comprised actors. The 'timber production coalition' is additionally comprised of interest groups of the wood products industries. In fact, looking at the issue of SFM-certification forest owner associations and interest groups of wood products, industries have so far acted in concert. However, one could assume that the stability of this coalition is not primarily the result of stable beliefs, but of stable economic interests ('policy core preferences'), i.e. the coalition will exist as long as both sides are economically dependent on timber production and trade. Recent studies indicate that the number of forest owners willing to set aside timber production in favour of conservation significantly increases if losses are compensated, but the number increases insignificantly if 'compensation' exceeds losses and adds additional income (Pregernig 1998). This is another hint that the most important discrepancy about NFPs between forestry and environmentalists is about property rights. Furthermore, the empirical differentiation of beliefs and economic or organisational interests raises thorny methodological issues because 'belief systems are normally highly correlated with self-interest and the causation is reciprocal' (Sabatier 1993b: 28).

The beliefs at stake belong to the deep core or at least to the policy core. Therefore, the line-up of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable. The most renowned actors for the private property rights coalition at the federal level are the Presidents' Conference of Chambers of Agriculture, the Federation of Forest Owner Associations and – to a certain extent – the forestry division of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Others are journalists of forest magazines as well as forest scientists. Most of those within the 'circle' are members of the Austrian Forest Association. Members of the environmental coalition are E-NGOs like WWF, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, some representatives of the Ministry of Environment as well as scientists and journalists. Even if diverging beliefs are 'overcome' by public incentives, private conservation contracts etc., the ACF predicts that policy change triggered by policy learning across the belief systems is unlikely to happen. The policy core of governmental programmes will not significantly change as long as the dominant coalition remains in power, except when the change is imposed by superior jurisdiction (e.g. supranational jurisdiction).

Furthermore, the ACF predicts that policy oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is an intermediate level of informed conflict (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993: 50). This requires that every one has the technical resource to engage in a debate and that the conflict is between the secondary aspects of one belief system and the core elements of the other, or, alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems involved. In this case, the level of conflict is high enough to utilise analytical efforts but does not involve direct normative beliefs. This may be the case when more technical or organisational issues are concerned. But the most important questions concerning the concept of NFPs (operational definition of SFM; public participation; cross-sectoral and multi-level coordination) refer to core beliefs and/or policy core beliefs.

Moreover, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993: 53) assume that problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are more conducive to policy oriented learning across belief systems than those in which data and theory are generally

qualitative, subjective, or unavailable. Therefore, problems involving natural systems (like forests) are usually more conducive to policy oriented learning across belief systems than those involving mere social or political systems (ibid.: 52). Anyway, I assume that the operational definition of SFM is not just a scientific-technical issue but most of all a political one because it directly affects private property rights concerning the use of natural resources. However, if we consider this hypotheses in spite of the dominant political dimension of SFM, we can say that there are lots of data about Austrian forestry, but there is a lack of data on ecological aspects (e.g. biodiversity).

Conflicting strategies of AC's are often mediated by another type of actor termed 'policy broker' (Sabatier 1993b: 27). The policy broker's role is to find reasonable compromises to reduce conflicts. However, this does not mean that this actor does not pursue particular self-interests and objectives but takes a more moderate position compared to the competing advocacy coalitions. Policy brokers are often officials of public agencies and federal ministries as well as scientists. Sabatier stresses (1993b: 27) that advocacy coalitions primarily seek to influence 'policy brokers' who do not share their belief system. Therefore, by definition, advocacy coalitions are not policy networks in themselves. The point is that several advocacy coalitions as well as other 'aggregates' of actors (e.g. epistemic communities) often compete for influence within policy networks (cf. Peterson 1995: 79).

However, the labels 'advocate' and 'broker' are ideal types which mark two extremes. In this sense, Austrian civil servants of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry are, in general, more or less on the advocate end of the scale. Forest scientists are often either advocates or providers of information but no brokers. Generally speaking, there are currently no prestigious brokers who coalitions trust within the national forest policy subsystem.

As already mentioned, other factors which force the policy community to open itself are 'shocks' from outside the subsystem. But policy change requires both external influences (e.g. policy outputs from other subsystems) and taking advantage of opportunities by the minority coalition. Usually, the formerly dominant coalition seeks to prevent them from doing so, for example, by calling for further research, confining changes to small experimental projects or diverting attention to unrelated issues. In fact, there have been lots of significant external disturbances to the national forest policy system in recent years; e.g. UNCED 1992 and its follow-up processes, increasing pressure on environmental and social grounds from business markets like the printing and publishing sector, the Austrian act of 1992 calling for restricted imports of tropical timber and its revision calling for SFM labelling in 1993, and, last but not least, international developments regarding timber certification. Most of these developments originate from increasing environmental and social awareness. E-NGOs have become influential actors. The 'property rights coalition' had to acknowledge that the environmental coalition has been able to increase its capacity to deal with forest issues and even to take a lead in current discussions (e.g. the WWF-Austria employed a considerable number of forest academics in recent years). However, up to now there have been no signs of policy change from within the Austrian forest policy subsystem.

Finally, another hypothesis derived from the ACF states that policy learning across belief systems is more likely when a forum which is prestigious enough to force

professionals from different coalitions to participate exists and when it is dominated by professional norms (ibid.: 54). However, as far as I can say, a forum like this does not exist in Austria today.

4. THE CHALLENGE OF SUPRANATIONAL CO-ORDINATION

4.1 Policy networks in EU policy making

EU policy networks

Forest affairs are under national authority. Nevertheless, SFM has been subject to many international processes in recent years, most of them have been inter-governmental (e.g. the IPF-process and the Pan-European Ministerial Conference; for an overview see Glück et al. 1997 and Humphreys 1996). NFPs will probably be developed within the framework of the results of these processes. In fact, Finland's National Forest Programme of 1998 is announced to be based on the agreements of Rio in 1992, of the Helsinki- and the IPF-processes (Hakkarainen 1998). Without denying the importance of these inter-governmental processes, I want to focus on multi-level governance in the European Union. This focus is justified with at least four reasons: Firstly, the EU is one possible intermediate level of governance able to develop a co-ordinated NFP framework. Secondly, although the Treaty of Maastricht does not provide a legal basis for a 'Common Forest Policy', the EU achieved strong influence in forest affairs, both in national and international arenas.[4] Thirdly, the EU typifies multi-level governance, i.e. the additional layer of government creates a framework for supranational co-ordination which is different from 'simple' inter-governmental processes and international regimes. The framework of EU decision making involves new actors and provides additional instruments to promote NFPs. Last, but not least, the supranational institutions of the European Union – i.e. the Commission – are very active in international forest politics, at the pan-European as well as at the global level. This is not a repetition of the second argument since it emphasises the organisational self-interests of EU institutions.

Talking about the supranational coordination of NFPs, both decision making about 'how' and 'on which level' need to be considered. Thus, we have to consider the orientations of national actors towards further integration (versus subsidiarity) as well as vested interests of supranational actors. If national actors consider to engage in the process of multi-level interest intermediation and decision making they have to face the advantages and disadvantages which depend, most of all, on their position in the national subsystem.

EU policy networks are primarily networks of policy formulation, but the stability of policy networks arises essentially from long term interactions in the course of implementation. However, this is in general a national responsibility. Compared to

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[4] There are already many EU regulations and programmes on forests which have to be linked to goals pursued by other policies, namely the CAP (Art. 43), competition policy (Art. 92), harmonisation (Art. 100), trade policy (Art. 113), environmental policy (Art. 130R and 130S) and Article 235, which allows to take the necessary measures to implement the Common Market if the Treaty does not provide for a legal basis elsewhere.

national networks, EU policy networks are characterised by less stability, many different actors, high fluctuation in actors, little institutionalisation and no common but numerous beliefs and problem definitions. Therefore, many conflicts arise not only about measures but already about problem definitions (cf. Héritier 1993: 435). EU policy networks are often 'issue networks', i.e. ad hoc networks which are built up around a pending issue. They are 'relatively ad hoc policy making structure[s] in which a large, and to an extent unpredictable, number of conflicting interests participate' (Jordan and Schubert 1992: 13). Therefore, 'epistemic communities' which are 'network[s] of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain' (Haas 1992: 3) are more important at the European level than comparable national expert committees. They can often prevail over other members of committees and working groups because of expertise and lack of time.

The activities of EU interest group federations, among other things, could stabilise supranational policy networks. However, this requires Euro-associations which are able to act like corporate actors.[5] In general, their importance compared to national interest groups essentially depends on the degree of integration of the policy domain involved. A high degree of integration favours them (e.g. CAP), a low degree of integration weakens their position vis-à-vis their national members (Kohler-Koch 1992: 109). Euro-associations of forest and wood products industry groups are fora ('associations of associations', Tiedemann 1994: 138) of national interest groups, but not corporate actors. Their task is to observe developments at the EU level and to ensure early information. Normally, their resources are small compared to member associations and they can hardly take a leading position in the course of internal decision making (Kohler-Koch 1992: 97). They provide a platform where diverging interests of members can be reconciled. This, by definition, is in contradiction to extensive autonomous competence of the representatives of Euro-associations (ibid.: 109).

Other characteristics of European policy networks are the relative centrality of one actor, namely the Commission, and that they are distinctly competitive (Héritier 1993: 436f). The centrality of the Commission is primarily based on the almost exclusive right to legislative initiatives. If the Commission once decides that a formal proposal is to be submitted to the Council and the EP, the probability of substantial changes in the following stages of EU policy making is quite small in general (Donelly 1993: 83). Because of this key position, the Commission is a broker of interests and a bourse for exchange of policy ideas. Thus, policy networks at the EU level will almost always be centred around the Commission (Richardson 1994: 141). The member states compete to transfer their own style of regulation, their own legislative tradition and existing national policies onto the supranational level. This regulatory competition has a double effect: On the one hand, member states get into the wake of regulations of others. On the other hand, they are driven towards regulatory innovations at the national level to be 'ahead of the crowd' and to be able to influence the contents and the form of future EU regulations with a view to minimise national adjustment costs (Héritier 1993: 444).

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[5] Corporate actors are formal organisations of individuals authorised to act. They have centralised resources to act at their disposal which do not belong to individual members. Decisions are taken by hierarchy (e.g. enterprises and public authorities) or by majorities (political parties and interest groups). The most important organisational resources are the ability of collective decision-making and the ability to effectively control the behaviour of members. It depends on these resources whether actions have to be assigned to organisations or to individual members (cf. Mayntz and Scharpf 1995: 49-50).

From this point of view, the development of a national certification system and a national forest programme (e.g. in Finland) could be seen as an attempt to achieve comparative advantages in European competition.

Furthermore, distinct fragmentation and functional differentiation are characteristics of the EU policy making system. All actors at the supranational level, except the European Court of Justice, show the corresponding structural features. Regarding the Council of Ministers, it is reflected in the domain specific composition of the Council itself, as well as in the systems of working groups and committees ('comitology') and finds its analogy in the DGs of the Commission and the committees of the EP (Schumann 1996: 127). Supranational forest policy networks tend to be more pluralistic whereas national networks more or less present patterns of corporatism (for a general discussion see Streeck and Schmitter 1992: 216-227).

Domestic policy networks in the context of EU negotiations
As a matter of course, national actors are alert to any shifts in the distribution of power between existing levels of government. Sensible interest groups are bound to attempt to influence policy making at the national and at the EU level where they find a multiplicity of access points; they have to 'shoot where the ducks are' (Mazey and Richardson 1996: 200).

The integration of national actors in the multi-arena, multi-level EU decision making system raises questions about the influence of the characteristics of domestic policy networks in the context of European policy making. As Josselin (1996: 298-301) conclusively argues, the structures of national networks constrain the ways in which national interests are promoted in negotiations at the EU level, i.e. 'certain forms of network organisation may prove more effective in this context' (ibid.: 298).

National mobilisation in EU policy making can be conceptualised as a three-stage process, comprising (i) the activation of resources in information, expertise and influence; (ii) the attempt to aggregate societal and state preferences to build a national position; and (iii) the representation of domestic interests (ibid.). This conceptualisation points to a number of 'organisational' conditions for effective mobilisations.

As information, expertise and influence can be widely disseminated and the best time to lobby is when 'legislation is little more than a gleam in an official's eye' (Hull 1993: 87), activation must be extensive and rapid. Highly routinised ties between domestic actors are therefore noticeable assets. In this respect, policy networks can be defined as 'mechanisms of political resource mobilisation in situations where the capacity for decision making, program formulation and implementation is widely distributed or dispersed among private and public actors' (Kenis and Schneider 1991: 41). According to Josselin (1996: 299), networks composed of a limited set of autonomous actors with mutually contingent interests can be strong vectors of negotiation and coordination, i.e. one can argue that a tight network, comprising homogenous organisations interacting frequently and sharing policy core beliefs, constitutes an asset from the point of view of national representatives, public and private. Firstly, because the institutionalisation of inter-organisational linkages reduces transaction costs and adds significantly to the rapidity and efficiency of resource mobilisation. Secondly, because it guarantees the active participation of sectoral actors. And thirdly, as a consequence, it facilitates the drafting of a common national position.

So far, the Austrian forest policy community seems to be especially suitable to a rapid mobilisation of sectoral interests. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether policy communities are advantageous regarding the third aspect of national mobilisation. From the few detailed comparative studies of national variations in policy networks and their effect on Euro-lobbying one cannot simply infer whether a cohesive network best encourages the emergence of proactive actors, capable of establishing transnational links to promote domestic policy preferences. On the contrary, Josselin, comparing British and French policy networks in the financial service sector concluded that policy networks 'in which private actors retain a relative autonomy fuelled in part by distrust and the need for information, appeared to be better suited to the pursuit of multiple targets' (Josselin 1996: 314). Undoubtedly, a certain degree of stability and routinisation is necessary, but sectoral actors less tied to strict domestic policy structures seem to be more able to exploit the multi-access lobbying system of the EU. In this respect, the distribution of power within the networks is likely the most crucial factor, because it will determine whether private actors primarily pursue national strategies, or whether they follow supranational strategies as regards information collection, interest articulation and lobbying (ibid.: 315). If uncertainty is a typical attribute of EU policy making, one may conclude that it would be rational for national actors wishing to influence the European policy process to avoid being locked into any one set of relationship, into advocacy coalitions or policy communities (cf. Mazey and Richardson 1996: 213).

However, the empirical basis regarding national sectoral policy networks in the context of European policy making is still poor. If, as some authors suggest (cf. Mazey and Richardson 1996: 213, Streeck and Schmitter 1992: 223-227), we assume that interest intermediation in the EU is likely to remain pluralistic, those actors who can reformulate their preferences rapidly consistent with their long term goals, who are able to mobilise ideas and knowledge in order to influence the 'framing' of public policies, will be favoured.

4.2 Perspectives of actors

Indeed, the development of international forest politics has had an effect on the actors of the Austrian forest policy community. Most evident is that the Department of International Forest Politics has become the largest one within the forestry division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and that private interest groups dedicated more resources to international issues in recent years. They intensified efforts to observe and influence international processes. Given the findings about the national forest policy community and policy networks at the EU level, the key question is: What could lead the dominant actors of the national community to engage in the supranational coordination of NFPs, and what could discourage them to do so?

Interest groups
The development of a multi-level system of joint decision making brings about substantial changes in the logic of influence (Grande 1996: 321). The 'target structure' (Almond 1958: 278) of actors changes fundamentally, i.e. the number of important points of access increases considerably. The impact depends on various factors, among

them maybe most important, on the actors' position at the national level. In general, it is 'unrealistic to assume that they can manage to influence European policies in the same way and to the same extent as they did policy making at the national level in previous decades. Symbiotic relations between public bodies and interest groups are rare exceptions in European politics, as are cases of agency capture' (Grande 1996: 322). From the point of view of influential national actors, the supranational strategy increases uncertainty about the output of the policy making process (cf. Maurer 1996: 249). Moreover, the European arena usually differs from national ones because of its great variety regarding problem definitions, problem solving approaches, strategies and interests (see above).

Therefore, influential interest groups of national policy domains characterised by clientelism or meso-corporatism prefer national strategies of interest intermediation. They consider that the dominance of national governments in EU forest politics is of major importance. The supranational strategy is preferred only if the chance to influence the national administration seems to be small or if interest groups doubt the governments' ability to enforce national preferences at the EU level (Kohler-Koch 1992: 99). In fact, the national strategy dominates. Public actors have to consult the umbrella associations of Austrian interest groups. In the run-up to the referendum on the EU accession, the political parties of the Austrian government signed an agreement which guaranteed all members of the 'social partnership' (e.g. the Presidents' Conference of the Chambers of Agriculture) participation and information in EU affairs. In addition, the right to immediate information and the right to comment was laid down in corresponding acts (cf. Reiterer 1997: 194). In practice, interest groups are invited to join national debates and to participate officially in committees of the European Union. Offices of the umbrella associations are located at the Austrian Mission at Brussels. This gives them the opportunity to participate in meetings of COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives). However, the main point of access is still at the ministry level. According to interest group representatives, the procedure is most satisfying with ministries which have traditionally close ties to them (Tálos and Karlhofer 1997: 72). The forestry division of the Ministry regularly invites the representatives of forest owner interest groups to co-ordination meetings on all matters concerning international and European forest politics.

However, the priority of national strategies is reflected in the emphasis on subsidiarity, which is a basic principle of the European Parliament's 'Resolution on the European Union's Forestry Strategy' (EP 1997). The EP requests the Commission to submit appropriate legislative proposals by January 1999.[6] The initiative opposes former proposals of the EP which called for the establishment of a common policy on forests. However, it does not define an exact framework for the Commission's proposal but lists measures to be taken at the EU level to complement national forest policies. In the wake of the EP resolution, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) adopted an 'own-initiative opinion on the situation and problems of forestry in the EU and the potential for development of forestry policies' (ESC 1997). In the preamble, it is

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[6] The request of the EP is legally based on Article 138b of the Maastricht Treaty which awards a new power in terms of legislative initiatives to the EP. It allows the Parliament to request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters for which it considers that a Community Act is required for implementing the Treaty.

stipulated clearly: 'The present opinion gives priority to necessary measures in this area in compliance with the subsidiarity principle. This is why no measure concerning the condition and development of national forest policies appear here.'

In spite of the priority of national strategies, forest interest groups welcome financial support to their members. In 1995, about eleven percent of total subsidies to forestry were financed by the European Union (BMLF 1996: 33). The 1996 agricultural budget included ECU 2.7 million and the 1997 budget included ECU 8.4 million EU subsidies based on the Council Regulation 2080/92. Although the Presidents' Conference of the Chambers of Agriculture strictly rejects any attempt towards a Common Forest Policy, they are considering 'separating' measures on forestry from the CAP and developing an independent programme to support rural development. In fact, negotiations about a proposal on a Council Regulation to support the development of rural areas are currently underway.

Activities of national actors on the EU level affect national policy networks. The national position of those who are integrated in supranational networks is strengthened. The dominance of top representatives of interest groups with an 'atomised' membership increases because only full time officials are able to observe the developments at the EU level and to intervene at short notice. The national level of sectoral interest groups gains importance compared to the subnational level (Kohler-Koch 1992: 87, Eising and Kohler-Koch 1994: 189). The integration of national actors in the sectorised system of EU policy making promotes the existing trend towards sectorisation (Karlhofer 1997: 77). At the same time, the need for intensified coordination, as well as scarce resources to represent sectoral interests purposefully at the EU level, may result in the cooperation of interest groups representing related industrial sectors (cf. Eising and Kohler-Koch 1994: 189). A first empirical indication for this development are recent efforts of the federal umbrella associations of the Austrian sawmill industry and the Austrian woodworking industry to elaborate a concept to strengthen co-operation and even to unify the organisations in the medium term.

Furthermore, the involvement in European policy networks changes the definitions of interests as well as preferences for specific solutions because the new field of action comprises new actors (addressees, coalition partners as well as competitors), the widened awareness of sectoral problems results in considering the situation in other member states and evaluations regarding the political compatibility and objectivity of policy proposals are changing. As a consequence, the evaluation of the chance to successfully introduce national preferences changes as well (Kohler-Koch 1992: 87). This may lead to the adaptation of demands or to increasing resistance towards further integration.

If we consider inter-sectoral co-ordination at the EU level of, for example, a framework of NFPs, national actors have to acknowledge another effect. The more it is attempted to co-ordinate forestry matters with other sectors, such as regional, agricultural, environmental and industrial policy, the more the process of policy formulation will shift from a narrow set of actors to a more extended network, just as is the case at the national level (see Richardson 1994: 142). This means that even if forestry interest groups can rely on their administrative counterparts at the Council of Ministers, they have to consider that other Councils of Ministers (e.g. of Environment) could have to deal with the issue as well. But, forestry interest groups clearly want to

keep forest affairs in the responsibility of the ministries of forestry. They fear the expansion of responsibilities of environmental agencies.

Governmental actors

The transfer of competences to the EU level can allow the national administration to free itself from the corporatistic relationship to private interest groups to some degree (Kohler-Koch 1992: 99). In general, national ministries of forestry have a new scope of action to pursue policies due to legitimation by European regulations in spite of the resistance of powerful national actors, no matter if they are other ministries, interest groups or bureaucracies (Eichener 1996: 271). This may present opportunities to overcome deadlock caused by a 'crystallised' balance of power. As Eichener (ibid.: 277f) has shown with the example of work safety and environmental regulations, national actors are mostly surprised. Especially those who are offered additional opportunities by the European integration are rarely able to take advantage of them.

One cannot simply assume that public actors intend to loosen their relation with forestry interest groups, since, firstly, they benefit enormously from the status quo and, secondly, because of the close social ties to their clients. However, if the administration attempted to take the 'chance', it would undoubtedly have to expect intense conflicts. Assuming that the Ministry of Forestry, like every other institution, is interested to increase its room for manoeuvre, the key question is which mechanisms lead to additional opportunities.

In the preceding paragraphs I emphasised the complexity of EU decision making and the uncertainty of its outcomes. The main causal factors discussed so far are the large number of actors, the diversity of interests and the fragmentation of EU institutions. Undoubtedly, these are important aspects, but they are only part of the explanation. The fact that European policy making is performed in an 'integrated system of multi-level bargaining' is equally important (Grande 1996: 324f). This highlights two aspects: Firstly, the EU is a multi-level system which comprises intergovernmental and supranational arenas. Secondly, the EU system incorporates national and supranational actors, creating an institutional setting in which decisions on important matters have to be made by consensus.

According to Grande (1996: 325), the main problem of interest groups is not to find access to relevant decision makers; their problem is that such a central decision making body does not exist because the state's power is distributed among a large number of public actors. The crucial question is how this system of joint multi-level decision making affects the power and influence of public actors vis-à-vis private interest groups. Applying the logic of two level games, Grande (ibid.) identifies three patterns of state-group relations. The most obvious possibility is that interest groups reduce the autonomy of public actors by binding them to their special issue position, thus making the win-set for joint decision making smaller. In doing so, they can prevent any agreement or benefit from the public actors' need to national consensus. Secondly, joint decision making can reduce the demands of private interest groups because they have to consider the political constraints of the public actors involved in arenas on other levels. Radical preferences are often outside the win-set of joint negotiations, they have no chance of being recognised. Thirdly, joint decision making may change the balance of power in favour of public actors. Public actors may tend to 'purposefully use the

'internal' ties and commitments produced by joint decision making to strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis 'external' (private) actors and interest groups' ('paradox of weakness', ibid.: 328). The loss of autonomy because of integration in the supranational system can be compensated by gains in autonomy at the national level.

There are at least two systematic reasons why joint decision making may cause changes in the logic of influence: First, it changes the bargaining position between private and public actors, and, second, it changes the conditions of access to public policy making. The dependence on preferences and resources (e.g. voting power) of other actors in the EU arena can be used by public actors to restrain the demands raised by interest groups. They can use their commitments and obligations to strengthen their bargaining power. Regarding the change of access conditions, Grande (ibid.: 330) highlights the temporary closure of the EU decision making process. Although the EU system offers many access points to the policy making process, there are stages in which the process is not directly accessible to private interest groups. According to Grande (ibid.), the temporary closure seems to be an important mechanism to prevent deadlock in joint decision making. He distinguishes three phases of negotiation: In the first phase, the process is open to interest groups. The Commission searches for expertise and is interested in contacting all the major actors concerned. The Commission's interest is to look for preferences and support on a broad basis. Because of its agenda setting role, the Commission's services are the main target of interest groups which try to influence policy making during the initial drafting of regulations (Pollack 1997: 579). But, when it comes to Council meetings and/or meetings of Council work groups, negotiations are dominated by public actors. This stage is not directly accessible for private interest groups. Their position is in the hands of the minister and/or the civil servants. After agreement among public actors has been reached, the policy process is again open for private consultations. The potential influence, however, is now usually limited to fine tuning. Substantial changes are almost impossible at this stage, since consensus among the governmental actors of the member states is a scarce resource in EU decision making (ibid. 331).

To sum up, it can be said that the institutional setting of multi-level decision making creates certain possibilities for public actors to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis forestry interest groups. However, if public actors attempt to take this risk, they have to expect serious conflicts at the national level. Speculating about future developments, I expect the ministry to act very carefully, just incrementally exploring the opportunities offered within the EU system without exposing itself to intense national conflicts.

Supranational actors

Recent developments seem to meet a favourable climate within the European Union. Firstly, the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria has considerably increased the economic importance of matters concerning forestry and forest industries. Secondly, the present consideration of forests coincides with the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which has led to the search for alternatives for agricultural production. Thirdly, the internationalisation of forest politics intensified pressures on member states and European institutions to develop common strategies.

Above all, the Commission and the European Parliament have always been interested in expanding their scope of activity and competence. The Commission issued its first

initiative for a community forest policy in 1978. It failed because of resistance of the member states in the Council. In 1986, the Commission issued a new proposal to common activities, but again it was not accepted, neither by the Council nor by the EP. In 1989, a revised proposal, the 'forestry action programme', was adopted. The action programme focused on financial incentives as supporting measures to the CAP. In the course of the programme, the 'Standing Committee on Forests' was established (Council Regulation 367/89). Since then its main function is to cooperate closely with the member states and the Commission. Its creation and history illustrate both the enormous political difficulties in developing a common strategy on forests and the wish of the member states to develop coordinated positions in international dialogues on forests. In this respect, EU agenda setting has become easier in recent years because of international agreements which call for coordinated actions (e.g. UNCED Statement of Forest Principles, Convention on Biodiversity, Resolutions of the Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe).

Additionally, the call for a common framework of NFPs could be explained by the interest of the Commission in economic integration. Facing numerous environmental regulations in the member states, the Commission strives to prevent trade barriers and disadvantages for states with high-level regulations (Héritier et al. 1994: 18). This corresponds to a growing awareness of governments in high-regulation countries, how stringent national standards could affect international competitiveness. This consideration may be joined by forestry and wood product industries who ask for a 'level playing field' (cf. Scharpf 1997: 529). Therefore, we could expect forest owners and industries from high-regulation countries which are exposed to international competition to ask for an international agreement on standards for sustainable forest management as well as for a coordinated framework of NFPs. They would gain more advantage if European standards were equivalent to theirs and higher than those of their competitors. Unfortunately, or fortunately, however, as the elaboration of 'Pan-European Operational Level Guidelines for SFM' has shown, this will not necessarily happen. In fact, many international negotiations as well as environmental regulations at the European level either failed or succeeded only at the level of the smallest common denominator. Accordingly, negotiations on 'Pan-European Operational Level Guidelines for Sustainable Forest Management' lead to very general statements on which everyone could easily agree on and failed with regard to the question whether or not participation of the general public concerning forest management planning should be considered (cf. Holz-Kurier 12/1998: 6).

Governments defending cost advantages and less mobile national business are likely to oppose demanding agreements. Then, side payments to those countries may be the only possibility to agree on common rules, although uniform implementation remains uncertain. Regarding the accuracy of implementation, Eichener (1997: 606) even argues that often 'the Commission achieved wide acceptance for high-level regulation by allowing weak implementation.' Another strategy to achieve agreement is to restrain EU decision making to rather vague regulations ('guiding principles').

The enforcement of supranational interests strongly depends, among other things, on existing similar regulations at the national level which add legitimation to EU regulations (Héritier 1994: 19). Therefore, the Commission welcomes national initiatives. The Commission itself has very limited resources and gladly shares

experiences with member states (ibid.: 18), especially if they comply with its intentions. In case of lacking competence, the Commission seeks to develop EU policy networks. The goal is that these networks function as a transfer-mechanism to those actors of the sector which the Commission wants to convince for extended responsibilities of the Community by means of incentive programmes (Kohler-Koch 1996: 203). Very often, those actors who are involved are, to a minor extent, those who push for cooperation in European decision making. Usually, it is the Commission that organises participation systematically by using various forms of co-optation and cooperation at first (Tömmel 1994: 278). Consequently, whether these networks can become structures of European governance depends essentially on whether they are in competition to existing structures and organisations at the national level. The more national forest politics is dominated by closed communities of private and public actors, the smaller the chance is of the Commission to create its own supranational clientele which lobbies for further integration (cf. Kohler-Koch 1996: 214).

Furthermore, the Commission is not just a 'competence-maximiser' and a 'policy entrepreneur', but also a 'multi-organisation' composed of twenty-four Directorates General (DGs), which provides many access points (Pollack 1997: 580). This is especially important for interest groups which lack influence at the national level. For example, DG XI is often depicted as 'a green colony' (ibid.) which has close relations to the European Environmental Bureau and groups such as Friends of the Earth Europe and Greenpeace. Responsibilities in forest affairs are scattered among many DGs; the most important ones are DG VI (Agriculture) DG III (Industry) and DG XI (Environment), but relevant matters are also dealt with at DG I (External Relations), DG VIII (Development) and DG XII (Research). On the one hand, this manifold environment of policy making is not easy to comprehend and is a main cause of uncertainty about policy outputs. On the other hand, the fragmentation of competence and the existence of institutional self-interest in the DGs may be a handicap to the Commission when it tries to increase supranational responsibility in forest affairs.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Beginning with the assumptions about the core elements of NFPs, I emphasised two central questions: Which incentives and/or disincentives will allow national actors to enter or not to enter inter-sectoral programme co-ordination? And, what are the potential advantages and disadvantages which national actors might have to face in the course of the co-ordination of NFPs at the EU level? Since the concept of NFP is still vague, conclusions are very speculative.

Looking at the Austrian forest policy subsystem, there are some indications which do not allow to expect that inter-sectoral co-ordination will be stimulated from within. The dominant policy community is a closed network of public and private actors which is very reluctant to perform a policy change. Since the main conflict would be about policy core beliefs, policy learning across belief systems is unlikely to happen and the line-up against competing interests tends to be stable. Moreover, there are no prestigious policy brokers within the Austrian forest policy subsystem who try to negotiate compromises

with the environmental coalition. Given this fact, the Advocacy Coalition Framework predicts that there will be no policy change other than it is imposed by superior jurisdiction or by developments outside the forest policy subsystem.

Moreover, there are some serious obstacles regarding the coordination of NFPs at the European level. The complexity of EU decision making involves uncertainty regarding its outcomes. Therefore, forestry interest groups favour national strategies of interest intermediation, although the structure of the Austrian forest policy community seems to be quite suitable to the rapid mobilisations of sectoral interests. However, it is by no means clear which kind of policy network best encourages proactive actors in the context of EU policy making. Anyway, the collaboration in supranational forest policy networks offers incentives to interest group representatives as it strengthens their national position. But, forest interest groups have to be aware that public actors may be able to compensate the loss of autonomy because of supranational decision making by gaining more autonomy at the national level. Public actors can use the need for consensus at the European level to restrain demands of interest groups. However, taking into account the close ties between private and public actors, the incentives to public actors seem to be too weak in the short term.

Furthermore, I assumed that supranational actors - especially the Commission - have a strong interest to coordinate an NFP framework at the European level. The Commission's interest meets favourable conditions which may allow to promote further integration (e.g. based on financial incentives and 'soft regulation'). These efforts will possibly coincide with economic interests of forest industries from high-regulation countries who ask for a 'level playing field' within the single market.

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POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL FORESTRY PLANNING – EXPERIENCES OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND LESSONS FOR NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES

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ABSTRACT

Based on the experiences of regional forestry planning in 11 Central European Countries, political factors are discussed which might also be important for the national forest programmes (NFP). Due to the resistance of powerful interests against any further restrictions, the goal setting and coordination by the NFPs are likely to become, for the most part, symbolic only. The restriction of the NFP mission to formulating demands in selected forestry goals and to the visualization of selected conflicts only offers a better chance to achieve an impact on politics. Another source for the NFP could be the modernization of the state forest enterprises. The NFP could support the state forest enterprises in the task of using public funds to finance their mission to provide non-wood products beyond markets and simultaneously win a strong ally in the state forest enterprises. To overcome the inevitable conflicts in the implementation, the NFP might try to play the role of a mediator between all interests in forest use and forest protection. Mediation and participation require a distance from lobbying for wood production and from the interests of private forest owners. The process also requires new social skills for group management. Besides such internal problems, mediation by forestry planning results in tough competition since other state agencies are also aware of the chance to gain competence by being the central mediator. Due to the high risk, forestry planning has not seriously tried participation in practice until now. Therefore, it is a big challenge for the NFP to increase participation. Finally, the NFP could be an instrument for the innovation of new forest products that can be created by the specific strengths of planning, which are high rationality and public legitimization. Two examples are discussed in the paper the "Forestry Ecological Database" and the "Forestry Ecological Compensation".

Keywords: Forestry planning, Public Participation, Forest Authority, Non-wood Products.

1. RATIONAL PLANNING IN A WORLD OF INTERESTS AND POWER

Planning has a very demanding mission. The natural resource of forests, their multiple-use and their protection, should be analyzed statewide in a scientific sound way. Based on the analysis, goals have to be coordinated and defined and the most effective means should be designed. Beyond this high standard of rationality, planning is aimed at two even more demanding goals (Jänicke and Jörgens 1996): planning promises to develop a democratic procedure for decisions and integrating all user groups and stake holders. Nobody with an interest in the forests should be excluded and the decisions have to be developed and accepted through participation. If conflicts arise, or if the rational analysis shows serious new problems, the third goal of planning is required: innovation. The planning process should create an enlarged informational basis and an open discussion that promotes new ideas for optimizing forest use and protection.

The mission of rationality, democracy and innovation is a tough challenge for day-to-day forestry where the management, by the inertia of the practice as in all businesses, is based on a very restricted analysis, hierarchical decisions, and the daily routine. To overcome these obstacles, a strong leadership must exist within a single forest enterprise. However, planning on a level beyond the single enterprise can not count on such a dominant leader. By emerging out of the clear decision structure of an enterprise into the political world, regional forestry planning has to cope with many stake holders, conflicting interests, and a large amount of political instruments which influence the multiple-use and protection of the forests. Major players, as well as state agencies,

Figure 1. Forestry planning in the political process.

interest groups, forest owners, media and citizens, are already there making use of the forest and defending their own interests. Forest policy is organizing a process for policy formulation which results in legally binding programs. Their implementation intervenes directly with user conflicts. In this world of interests and power, the challenge for regional forestry planning is both to keep track of its demanding goals and to get things politically done.

The political dynamics of regional forestry planning might become more apparent if it is understood where stake holders and user groups, interested in the natural resource of forests, receive their ability to influence the planning process and its results. Following the framework of the policy analysis, politically hot spots for regional forestry planning can be identified in the goal setting, in the cooperation of private forest owners, in the participation of stake holders and user groups, and in the implementation of the plans by the state forest service (See Figure 1). Finally, the innovative push by planning touch policy in a specific demanding manner.

Regional forestry planning as it is practiced in the different countries in central Europe is experienced in dealing with the political dynamics mentioned above. Such experiences, and some recent, new concepts for regional forestry planning, were discussed at the 7th European Forum on Administrative Policy-Making in Forestry in September 1997 in Switzerland. Some key results of the countries Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Slowakia, Slowenia, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic are the empirical basis for this paper (Krott and Bloetzer 1998).

2. GOAL SETTING BETWEEN SYMBOLIC SUCCESS AND CRITICAL DEMANDS

Goal setting is a key element of rational planning. Goals enable the planner to identify problems and to choose optimum measures. Despite the importance of goals, the planning process only has a weak ability to formulate them. Most of the regional plans just formulate, instead of clear goals for the protection and use of the forest, very general or even contradictory goals (Krott and Bloetzer 1998). Judged by the standard of such goals, a broad variety of the forestry related regional development fits similarly well. As a consequence, the plans lose much of their ability to provide a meaningful orientation for land use.

A political reason for weak goal setting is the well-known and simple fact that powerful users of forest lands are strongly opposed to binding decisions in public plans, because they can fulfill their user interests best without additional regulations. Land users, as well as private wood producers, farmers, public departments for construction and road building, etc., do not need any public coordinated planning to improve the profitability of their projects. The formal and mainly informal political opposition causes an exhausting planning process for the forestry planner, requiring huge inputs of time and other sources. Finally, in most of the European countries the acceptance of the regional forestry plans is made possible mostly by renouncing binding, coordination, and specified goals.

Such sober results of goal setting in regional forestry plans have lead the way for mainly two political strategies of planning: the symbolic success and the public

demand. Despite the meager results, the planning process and the plans themselves communicate the message of responsibility and competence. Experts supported by G(eographical) I(nformation) S(ystems) deal seriously with all problems of the forest. The complicated and in public visible procedure ends up with thick reports and colorful maps. The procedure and the maps themselves become a symbol of success (Glück and Krott 1990). In their symbolic effect, the regional forestry plans do not produce regulations but mark the hope that the analysis and the search for solutions for the problems of the forests are well under way. The strong symbolic effect of regional forestry planning is just a variance of the general wide spread symbolic treatment of problems by politics (Edelman 1976).

It is important for all participants in a planning process to keep the symbolic potential of regional forestry planning in mind. Some of the promoters of the process may use the symbolic potential of planning to run activities which will never lead to any substantial results. The most important side-effect is that as long as a problem is tackled by the planning process no other more substantial regulation will take part. Such symbolic planning is producing "non-decisions" despite huge activities. Depending on the specific interests of the participants, a non-decision may be an aspired result, e.g. the forest owners have more freedom as long as there are non-decisions on nature conservation in the forests.

Another option is to use the plans of public demands for specific interests. Such a strategy gives up the goal of coordination and only includes the demands from different points of view in the plan. For instance, forestry could use such plans to stress forestry goals in public again. In many European countries, forestry institutions frequently use the existing regional planning to advocate in public for selected forestry goals. The same can be observed by the institutions for nature conservation (Abel 1998). Comparing these two the only politically important difference is that the nature conservation plans show much more demands and conflicts with other land user interests, whereas the forestry plans uncover only very few selected demands and conflicts avoiding to draw the public attention to forestry problems.

3. COPING WITH POLITICAL PRESSURE BY PLANNING

Private enterprises manage their forests within a network of legal and social restrictions, which are developed by a political process in which the private owners traditionally take part in by means of strong lobbying. Any attempt of regional forestry planning to deal with the forests inflames the fear of the private landowners that more restrictions are threatening. Being seen as restriction, regional forestry planning will not gain acceptance.

The image of restrictions by planning only fits as long as the restrictions caused by the political surrounding of the enterprise are stable. If increasing pressure is threatening the enterprise, planning could offer a procedure for actively dealing with the new pressure. Planning as an instrument for coping with political threats from the outside has something interesting to offer to the forest enterprises and, therefore, will find much more acceptance.

In the older European democracies, political restrictions for private forest enterprises are increasing in many cases. Legitimized by public interest, additional legal restrictions, in principle only legally guaranteeing private ownership are formulated, e.g. new nature conservation laws try to define some standards for sustainable forestry. Besides, the law, implementation causes restrictions for private enterprises. In urban areas, the pressure of recreation and nature conservation groups to use the forest for their specific demands is stronger than the freedom of the enterprises, in practice. Despite the fundamental production right of any private enterprise, even cutting old trees against political protest can become difficult in such areas. In such cases, the offer to deal with conflicts by regional forestry planning may be seen with relief by private enterprises.

In the younger democracies, increasing pressure from the outside is felt as the shelter from the old monopoly of the state forest enterprise is melting away due to the transition into a more pluralistic political and social system. In the centrally planned economy, the whole forestry task was concentrated within the state forest enterprise. The internal planning of the enterprises and of the sector was identical with the regional forestry planning. Today, other institutions and groups have the opportunity to bring forward their demands on the forest in the political process. By offering a procedure to cope with this new pressure, regional forestry planning could gain support by forest interests.

The ability of regional forestry planning to handle political pressure and demands on the forest gave way to two strategies to strengthen the acceptance of planning. First, by focusing on the specific demands from the outside, which today cause conflicts with the forest enterprises and are seen by them as threats, planning could increase acceptance as an active counterstrategy. Secondly, planning could go even one step further by actively selecting topics for the use and protection of the forest and by trying to cooperate in this topic with other political procedures in order to start political mobilization from the outside as a presupposition for planning. Following the second strategy planning will gain some influence but lose much trust and acceptance of forest enterprises.

4. IMPLEMENTATION BY STATE FOREST ENTERPRISES

Regional forestry planning formulates tasks which go beyond the forest products, especially wood, that can be sold on markets. Therefore, traditionally public forests are engaged to a higher degree in implementing the goals of the plans. Fulfilling the public duties by state forest enterprises offers multiple advantages. A big share of the production costs of the public goods in the forests can be financed by profits of the wood production in state forest enterprises. Thus, the public budgets financing the production of public goods in the state forests are much smaller than the budgets for a state service without any income from the markets. Furthermore, the costs for public goods in the state forests are covered within the whole production process. On the one hand, this is an economic disadvantage, but, on the other hand, political stake holders prefer covered costs, because they make it much easier to supply the public with desired goods without telling them the costs.

The well developed model of multiple-use in state forests with special emphasize on public goods, such as nature conservation, recreation or water, is under pressure only if the income from wood production decreases and contributes shrinking shares to the financing of the whole multiple-use of the state forest enterprise. This economic crisis is just beginning in the state forest enterprises in many older democracies as well as in the younger democracies. Increasing labor costs make a similar development probable in the near future.

Two different strategies have been developed to reform the state forest enterprises with opposite consequences for the implementation of regional forestry planning. The first strategy is aimed at creating a state forest enterprise which is like a private-owned enterprise, just oriented towards making profits on the markets. Such a new state forest enterprise will focus on forest products which can be profitably sold on the market. The fulfillment of the planning goals for public goods without markets will be diminished in order to minimize the costs, e.g. in the older democracies, the new state forest enterprise of Austria will follow this model. In the younger democracies, the state forest enterprises are forced more by practice than by programs to follow this model, because the only source of income which works is selling wood on markets, as the subsidies from the state are shrinking (Krott and Bloetzer 1998). As a consequence, implementation of regional forestry planning becomes much harder.

The second strategy designs a state forest enterprise which should produce profitable wood and, additionally, public goods in the forests. The public goods should be financed by additional public budgets. In this model, which is especially supported by Germany, the traditionally multiple-use forestry has to be split into different production lines with respectively separated cost and profit calculations. The production of the public goods should be guided to a high degree by regional forestry planning and financed by separate public budgets. Due to the combination with wood production, high efficiency is expected.

The multiple-use model is based on a public budget which is able and willing to pay additional money for the multiple-use of the state forests. Therefore, the recent restrictive budgeting policy in the European states is a serious obstacle to develop the model any further. Another obstacle is the competition between the different state agencies. A wide spread multiple-use production in the state forests also covers the tasks of other state agencies. By enlarging the activities, the state forest enterprise gets into conflict with the competition and the budget claims of other state agencies, e.g. activities in nature conservation in the forests have an impact on the competence and the budget of the nature conservation service, which solely wants to be active in the forest. The state forest enterprise can in small steps avoid the danger of the nature conservation service claiming the task of nature conservation in the state forests and, additionally, taking resources away from the forest enterprise (Ripken 1998). The regional forestry plan can support the activities of the state forest enterprise by formulating multiple-use goals, comprising nature conservation and simultaneously getting a strong ally for implementation.

5. INFLUENCE BY MEDIATION

The new concept of regional forestry planning in Switzerland is a far reaching model for the strategy of gaining influence by mediation (Bachmann 1998; Dürrstein 1998). Forestry planning tries to become a mediator between all interests in use and protection of the forest. The forestry planning is open for all interests. It organizes an exchange of information with all groups that want to deal with the forest, comprised of forest owners, public agencies, nature conservation groups, citizens and media. By providing an instrument for comprehensive exchange of sound information, forestry planning becomes recognized by different political groups (Krott 1990).

A presupposition for the success as a mediator is a forestry planner who is open and neutral and does not advocate for specific (forestry) interests. The planner has especially to explain to the forest owners that they have to bring forth their interests by themselves like any other group. A forestry planner, e.g. a state forest service, who advocates primarily for the interests of the forest owners is not able to receive the trust from all other groups interested in the forest and to lead a fair bargaining for well balanced solutions. The neutral role required of a mediator is not usual for the forestry planner who is accustomed to being an advocate for forestry interests.

The participation of all groups interested in the forest follows the currently widely recognized goal of democracy in European countries and supports the acceptance of the regional forestry planning. However, besides the advantages, new risks are also caused by participation and mediation. Forestry planners in most European countries are very aware of the risks and cautious in increasing participation.

One serious problem is the difference between decision making by participation and decision making by implementing legal standards for a specific cause. The principles of a constitutional state require that every decision by public regional forestry plans has to be based, defined and, therefore, legitimized by legal standards. Within the framework of legal standards, the private forest owner is free to decide on the production and the plan does not allow the definition of compulsory measures, even if the majority of the participating groups prefers such a solution. Because the final decision must be defined by the legal standards, the planning process has to avoid any vote by the participants. Nevertheless, the planning has to find a way to take the participants seriously.

Another problem is caused by the difference in the knowledge of the forest of the participants. The forest experts have good knowledge on the potential of the ecosystem, whereas many participating citizens have wishes and fears which do not corespond with the dynamic of the ecosystem, e.g. it is very difficult, but absolutely necessary for decisions, to imagine how a forest will look like in 20 years. In the planning process, the foresters have to provide the factual information on the potential of the forest to all participants without dominating the decision making.

In addition to the difficulties of designing the information and decision processes, the participation and mediation takes place in a group of participants which differs from procedures which the foresters are accustomed to. Deeper knowledge and abilities than that what foresters get in their education in leading a group process are inevitable to handle participation successfully.

Mediation by forestry planning, has, besides the internal problems, external political competition on the role of the mediator. Other state agencies are also aware of the chance of gaining competence by being the central mediator. They require the task of mediation for themselves, e.g. the general regional planning or the nature conservation planning want to be the central planning process leaving for forestry planning just the role of one participant among many others. In most of the Central European countries, the laws support a central role for the general regional planning also in forestry issues. Nevertheless, the new forestry planning model of Switzerland demonstrates that forestry planning could become very active in participation. In the long run, the specific planner will be most influential and will play the central role by bringing in broad participation and, therefore, be winning the trust of the groups interested in forest use and protection. Forestry institutions could meet this political challenge only by actively offering participation, which they are currently not willing to do in most countries due to the high risks connected with the participation.

6. NEW NON-WOOD PRODUCTS BY PLANNING

The development of new non-wood products is an important strategy for forestry in the Central European countries. The key idea is to sell the new products on markets and to create additional income besides the wood production. Planning cannot help much in the marketing of non-wood products. But, the innovative strength of planning can be used to create new products which will be financed by public budgets.

One product can be named "Forestry-Ecological-Database". The demand on data describing the forest ecosystem is increasing in many European countries. Biologists, geologists, and scientists involved in landscape planning are more frequently choosing the forest as a subject for research. Further experts in public administration and private consulting firms for nature conservation, environmental protection and tourism develop an increasing number of forestry-related projects with a large need for data on the forest. Finally, the media and schools like to deal with many aspects of the forest if data on this subject is available. The examples indicate the increasing demand for data on the forest. Forestry planning could meet this demand by developing the product Forestry-Ecological-Database. The basis of data is already stored in huge amounts within the manifold of forestry data and inventory systems, but the readability for other groups besides foresters must be improved, e.g. the mixture of tree species is a common forestry data which can be redefined easily into an indicator for biodiversity which environmental groups are interested in. The innovation is just looking on the forestry data from the perspective of other groups and their specific information needs on the forest. The Forestry-Ecological-Database can be provided by planning and used in many ways for being partly sold on markets, public relations or assistance for public agencies.

Another innovative product would be "Forestry-Ecological-Compensation". The basic idea is to describe the ecological improvement of the forest by specific means and to recognize these means as an ecological compensation for damages done to the

environment by other projects (Abel 1998). The Forestry-Ecological-Compensation would add new measurements to the traditional compensation means as afforestation and biotop reconstruction. The central condition for recognition as compensation is the analysis and description of the ecological effects of the means in the forest on a sound scientific basis which is also approved by biologists. These analyses and monitorings could be done by forestry regional planning. The forestry planning could give information on the potential for compensation means in different forest areas. The offer for compensation means in the forest would be highly welcomed by technical projects like housing, roads or pipelines. Since technical projects are forced by law to make compensatory measurements for the environment, there is an increasing and financially strong demand for "Forestry-Ecological-Compensation" which is well defined by regional forestry plans and, therefore, legally recognized.

7. LESSONS FOR THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES

A national forest programme (NFP) is "the process used by a country to deal with forest issues, including the planning and implementation of forest and forest-related activities" (Intergovernmental Panel on Forests 1996). Such, mission is broader and even more demanding than the mission of the regional forest planning discussed above. Nevertheless, some of the political dynamics of the regional forest planning are of relevance for the NFP also. Due to the broader approach, the political dynamics counterbalance the goals of rational, democratic and innovative problem solving and might even be stronger. Therefore, the experiences with regional forest planning can draw the attention to political factors which might also be important for the NFP in practice.

The non-decision by symbolic coordination
The NFP promises to coordinate and formulate clear and comprehensive goals for the use and for the protection of the forests. The experience from the regional forest planning is that, in practice, planning very often fails in goal setting due to the fact that powerful forest-users do not accept any restrictions by planning. The most common strategy for plans to adapt to these informal pressures is just to formulate very general goals, leaving the problem solving open. In the political practice, such a plan signals in public that planning experts and central planning institutions are considering and coordinating all forestry issues, but under the cover of the merely a symbolic plan, the conflicts and the powerful forest users remain untouched. The pressure just to develop into a symbolic activity increases with the broadness of the goals and the aim of full coordination. Therefore, the NFP is even more exposed to the symbolic coordination than regional forestry planning. It should be mentioned that symbolic coordination is common in politics and can strategically be used by forestry, too. If forestry wants to avoid a decision in a specific conflict, it helps to bring this conflict into the planning process. The result will be, after an exhausting planning procedure, a general statement with very little binding potential.

The impact of selected demands and visualized conflicts
One alternative to symbolic coordination is to sacrifice the comprehensive coordination and to restrict oneself on selected goals and conflict visualization. Selected goals in a plan can remain contradictory to a certain degree and can receive more acceptance because they serve many powerful conflicting interests at the same time. Despite their low rationality, selected goals have political impacts because they formulate in public demands of different forestry groups supported by the authority of the plan, respective NFP. Bringing demands into the political process has always had an impact, especially on forestry, which receives only low political attention. An even more active strategy is to show in the NFP selected conflicts and unsolved problems. Bringing unsolved problems of the use and of the protection of the forest into the political process causes strong impacts. Therefore, the selection is crucial; accompanied by some courage and willingness to take risks, which is not common for the traditional political style of forestry.

The source of external conflicts
Forest users, especially private forest enterprises and forestry institutions, reject any additional planning such as what a NFP would be, because of the fear of additional restrictions caused by the plans. Such opposition can be diminished if the NFP process makes clear that the planning is a procedure to cope actively with demands and restrictions which arise from the political and social surroundings of forestry. Such pressure increases in countries which restrict with new laws, the private freedom for enterprises due to public interests, e.g. in nature conservation. Such pressure grows also in the younger democracies where the forest service is losing its monopoly because of growing pluralism. Pressure from the surroundings aimed at private and state forest enterprises helps to convince them that planning could be an active strategy to handle such threatening restrictions. To meet this potential, the NFP must carefully monitor the old and new restrictions from the surroundings and focus its planning activities on these topics.

The source of modernization of the state forest enterprise
In the implementation of regional forest plans, it is traditionally differentiated between the forest owners and heavily relies on the state forest enterprise. The strategy of focusing on a special role of public forest land might be important for the NFP also since the area of public forests has, in most countries, a reasonable share between one and two thirds of all forest land. By combining the NFP with the modernization of the state forest enterprise, the planning can strengthen the state forest enterprise and simultaneously win a very important ally in practice. In the European countries, there are two different concepts for reforming the state forest enterprise and also opening up different options for the implementation of an NFP: The traditional strategy of financing the multiple use in the state forests by using income from wood production loses its economic potential in many countries, because of decreasing profits. Such a type of only wood-based state forest enterprises tries, on the one hand, to focus on wood production, decreasing all other forest uses, and, on the other hand, to increase the efficiency of the production. The concentration on wood markets only leaves no freedom for implementing other goals of the NFP. An alternative is developing in some

countries. The goal is to create a multiple production in the state forests. Wood remains to beonly one part of the production and other parts, e.g. recreation or nature conservation, become just as important as wood. For these non-wood products which can be sold on markets to only a small degree, specific state budgets will be formulated. For the concept of state forest enterprises which have formulated multiple-use goals based partly on specified public budgets and partly on incomes from markets, the NFP could be supportive in legitimizing the demand for public funds. On the other hand, such state forest enterprises will also implement specific goals of the NFP which do not make profits on markets.

The competitive source of mediation
By implementation the NFP, respectively the agency responsible for it, inevitably gets into conflict with the private forest owners and with other state agencies with competence in land use. The NFP could maintain its political influence by playing the role of a mediator between all forest users. The strategy of mediation requires the NFP to avoid the traditionally strong lobbying for wood production and for the interests of private forest owners, and to build up an open exchange of information with all groups interested in the forest. The mediation requires social skills which are not common to foresters. Furthermore, the mediation gets into conflict with the procedure of the constitutional state which requires that the final decision must be defined by the legal standards. Therefore, the planning process has to avoid any vote by the participants. Mediation by forestry planning gets, besides the internal problems, into external political competition on the role of the mediator since other state agencies are also aware of the chance of gaining competence by being the central mediator. Due to these risks in most of the European countries, the forestry planner has currently not integrated active mediation or public participation into the planning. Nevertheless, some new models of participation, especially in Switzerland, show that forestry planners can gain competence beyond their legal role in planning and that mediation and participation would be an additional source the NFP could win in forestry.

The innovation by new NFP products
The mission of innovation can be enriched by the NFP with new forestry products which can be created by the special ability of planning. The basis of innovative products are the enlarged knowledge and the higher public legitimization that the NFP offers. As shown in the example of regional forestry planning, two products which can also be produced by the NFP just on a statewide level are the "Forestry-Ecological-Database" and the "Forestry-Ecological-Compensation". The foresters have a lot of data on the forest and there is a large demand for such ecological data. The problem is that the data described in forestry language cannot be read and understood adequately by other groups. Therefore, the NFP can provide a monitoring system producing "Forestry-Ecological-Data" that many user groups will pay for, just by describing the forestry data in generally understandable ecological terms. The other product requires from the forestry plans the definition and description of the specific forest areas where specific forestry measurements can be realized as improvements for the environment. Such forestry measurements, e.g. planting ecologically desired species, can be considered to be a "Forestry-Ecological Compensation" for damages done to the environment by

technical projects like housing, roads or pipelines. Since technical projects are forced by law to make compensatory measurements for the environment, there is an increasing and financially strong demand for "Forestry-Ecological-Compensation" which could be well defined by NFP and, therefore, legally recognized.

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PATTERNS OF NESTED "INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE" IN NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT – THE CASE OF CRITERIA AND INDICATORS OF SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

The paper considers the current debate on effective National Forest Programmes (NFPs) and long-term Sustainable Forestry Management (SFM) by means of a variety of standardization mechanisms. The objective of the paper is three-fold: (1) to emphasize the interdependence of international, national and site initiatives of SFM; (2) to introduce most current debates and concepts of new institutionalism into the analysis of SFM; and (3) to capture some of the practical devices from present implementation research to a cumulative and adaptive reform of current economic, political, and institutional arrangements for SFM. The study focuses on issues of Criteria and Indicators (C&I) and related certification schemes in forestry. Special emphasis is given to the analysis of nested 'institutional governance' arrangements in international forestry cooperation.

Keywords: Governance, Institutions, Multilevel, Criteria & Indicators (C&I), Sustainable Forest Management.

1. INTRODUCTION[1]

Tropical forests are declining rapidly in many countries. Commonly cited causes of deforestation range from logging to firewood collection and to land conversion for crops and grazing, as well as the multiple dimensions of poverty effects. Boreal and temperate forests, on the other hand, have remained relatively stable in area, but are increasingly threatened by transborder pollution, and old-growth stands are converted to less-diverse tree plantations. Whereas states have sovereign rights to exploit resources

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for economic growth, forests provide public goods to neighbouring countries through e.g. shared watersheds, and to the earth's biosphere as a whole, e.g. in their function as carbon sinks. Further, the international timber trade has come under serious criticism as harvesting and export of timber is not seldom in violation of national laws and often with significant impact on the customary rights of indigenous people. Collective action is thus required for sustainable forest management[2].

Integrated forest assessment and management requirements have gained influence in the implementation of national forest programmes (NFPs). The concept of NFPs is understood in more generic terms as a wide range of approaches to processes of planning, programming and implementation of forest activities at the national level[3]. Gradual shifts from aspects of 'governability' to concepts of 'governance' can be witnessed in forestry policy, ranging from the local to the global level of action. While the former management approach focused primarily on the subject and the content of control, the latter approach is increasingly concerned with the object and process of control. The role of actors and their positive or negative impact on policy outcomes moves into the foreground as different forms of multi-stakeholder models have emerged. Furthermore, implementation research becomes more prominent as not the planning or development of institutional governance, but the implementation of it represents the most critical phase (Brinkerhoff 1996).

SFM, in a broader sense, is defined as "a management system that maintains forests' critical ecological functions and biological diversity, and minimises the adverse impacts of human activity to ensure the availability of forest goods and services in perpetuity for the use of present as well as future generations" (AsDB 1995) (For a more general debate on the concept of 'sustainability' and the possibilities of its '(mis)management' in forestry, centering around arguments of sustainable-enough 'knowledge' on forestry, see McRae (1997)). There is a general consensus that the harmonization of concepts, terms and definitions concerned with SFM should be encouraged. A common understanding of SFM would facilitate the comparability of NFPs from individual countries and, at the same time, support regional and global synthesis reports. SFM can be achieved by means of the use of a number of policy tools, alone or in concert with others. The number of initiatives being undertaken world-wide to measure and identify sustainability in forests is increasing. Very specific instruments which are under lively discussion at present are criteria and indicators (C&I) and related certification schemes. C&I is a more generic category of SFM as compared to certification; "...while certification requires agreed C&I, C&I do not imply any formal certification system per se. Certification is certainly the more controversial of the two, and while some nations are energetically pursuing agreement on C&I, they remain active against certification..."(IISD 1996b).

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[2] Compare e.g., (Schlager 1995) confronting three different policy network frameworks analysing collective action: (1) the "advocacy coalition framework" of (Sabatier 1988) and (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993); (2) the "institutional analysis and development framework" of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, in Bloomington, Indiana University (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994); (3) the "theory of structural choice" of (Moe 1990a; Moe 1990b).

[3] The concept of NFPs, and the included issue of land-use, has been widely discussed during the past decade, in particular in the context of the formulation and implementation of National Forest Action Programmes (NFAPs, promoted by the FAO), Forstry Master Plans (promoted by AsDB) and Forest Sector Reviews (promoted by the World Bank) [cf. Feldafing Expert Consultation, 1996 #237:3]

2. GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVES OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND PATTERNS OF NESTED 'INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE' ARRANGEMENTS IN FORESTRY

The new institutionalism in the social sciences spans traditions in classic political economy in various ways. Above all, it is the driving transdisciplinary force - i.e., the general openness and theoretical access to the modes of institutional analysis in economics, sociology, anthropology, political science, as well as public management (For an overview on various institutionalisms, including issues of organization theory, see Finnemore (1996) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991). Whereas the issue of anthropogenic global environmental change became a major concern of international social science research,[4] the role of institutions is still not incorporated adequatedly in much of present research in forestry. This is due, among other things, to the fact that the institutional dimensions[5] of forestry change cover a wide spectrum of human/forest relations. New institutional theories and methodologies that are able to seize the complexity of interaction and decision-making in intermediary policy arenas such as institutions, are only slowly gaining foothold in forestry research. The knowledge of how institutions function in relation to humans and their use of forest resources is critical to the design and implementation of national forest programmes.

Institutions must be differenciated from formal organizations such as forestry ministries or the International Timber Trade Organization (ITTO). Institutions can be broadly understood as social practices and structuring influences on human activities that affect the condition of forests. They provide stimulating, enabling and restricting contexts for forest-related action. "The purpose of drawing this distinction is not to argue that institutions are more important than organizations or vice versa. On the contrary, the distinction opens up an important research program focusing on the roles organizations play in the formation of social institutions and the factors that determine whether and to what extent organizations are needed to administer institutions once they have been put in place" (Young and Underdal 1997). The International Timber Trade Agreement (ITTA), for example, is an institution. It constitutes the rules of the timber trade regime for a multitude of actors or players, including producer countries and enterprises. The ITTO as an administrative organization, of course, plays a significant role in the governance of this institution.

The abstract notion of successful structuring of action through institutions, was even a part of Adam Smith's conception of the invisible hand of the market. In the 1980s, however, the political economy's bad taste of having become an old-fashioned school of thought went hand in hand with a hermetically sealing of the disciplines of economics, political science and others. Subsequently, a multitude of increasingly complex forms of institutional governance and failures were, for example, categorized as either the 'state' or the 'market'. In addition, maxims such as "...economics is all about how people make choices; sociology is all about how they don't have any choices to make..." were enlivened (Duesenberry 1960: 233). Differentiated sets of institutional arrangements had been developed in each separate field.

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[4] Compare, the various dimensions and related concepts reflected in the research agendas of e.g. the International Human Dimensions Programme of Global Change, IHDP (htmlhttp://www.uni-bonn.de/IHDP) or national Human Dimensions Programmes of Germany (http://www.psychologie.uni-freiburg.de/umwelt-spp/umwelt-spp) or Great Britain (http://www.nerc.ac.uk/ukgeroff/welcome.htm).

[5] Compare the long-term international, collaborative research initiative "Institutional Dimensions of Global Change" (IDGC), currently developed under the auspices of the IHDP and chaired by Oran Young (International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP) 1998).

With the growing number and complexity of these more or less isolated concepts and policies, however, interconnections gained theoretical and practical importance again, most prominently, between the institutional arrangements of the market and those of the state. Finally, market-oriented organizations such as the World Bank started to rethink the state and its institutional capability in the changing world (World Bank 1997). Respective shifts in approaches are based on the assessment that over and above the manifold institutional prerequisites for functioning markets, fairly different institutional clusters e.g. of traditional local communities, decentralized administrations, democratic governments, profit-seeking state classes, strategic networks of multinational enterprises, transnational networks of civil society or heterogeneous international regimes need to be taken into account in their interdependence and mutual dynamics of development.

In the following, only three examples are briefly sketched to illustrate the empirical support for aiming at more complex and integrated institutional governance forms in forestry: Firstly, the dominant forms of social organization today are indeed market economies. Open, competitive market arrangements for producing private goods, however, play a far less central role as conceded in neoliberal or neoclassic economic theories. This applies particularily to forestry, where markets often do not perform effectively in relation to public goods where exclusion is difficult, as well as costly. Aside from market institutions, there is an immense number of other institutions for the governance of exchanges of forest products, such as forest communities, forest councils or forest administrations. Directly related to the question of institutional design is the development of property rights on forests. Translating single forms of property rights into categorical programmes of private property, open access, community involvement, or state control (Ostrom 1990) will not inevitably lead to sustainable forest management. On the contrary, "...all property systems incorporate some elements of what in a rough-grained analysis is called private, common, and state property rights" (Agrawal 1996: 10).

Secondly, the quality of the so-called primateship of policy is in a constant process of change. Forms of social engineering or any other unreflected planning optimism on the side of governments or international aid agencies are inappropriate. This argument goes right to the heart of the sustainable management and certification debate. Timber certification schemes for example, are often critisized for not meeting the needs of small forest owners, indigenous groups and potentially restricting trade. Certification obviously brings only little grist to the mill, when national forests are highly fragmented into small private owned plots, as larger public or privately owned forests are better suited for certification. In contrast to many developing countries and North America, European forests are highly fragmented due to the approx. 12 mill. forest owners. And while no national blueprint of certification or single ideal set of national C&I can be produced by any international initiative, lessons can be learned from studying regional and national experiences on timber certification[6]. International institutions can provide some guidance on best practice in relation to sustainable management of forests with the required variety in national and site arrangements.

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[6] Compare the series of 'test reports on criteria and indicators for the sustainable management of forests' in Germany, Indonesia, Côte d'Ivoire and Brazil of the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR).

Thirdly, the state is now as before the most powerful single actor in international relations. Realist models of states as unitary actors of international politics, however, are disintegrating by means of processes of domestication and transnationalization. Any efforts, for example, by the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests, to pursue consensus and coordinated proposals on international issues such as trade-related matters or whether to begin negotiations on a global forest convention, can not solely rely on a policy dialogue among states. "In order to increase the effectiveness of international support to NFPs, it was proposed that a new "Forum for International Consultation on Forests" should be established based on the experience of IPF...Such a forum would promote international support for the NFP process. It should be a consultative body, whose work is supported by technical and scientific advice. It should establish collaborative leadership in the forest sector, yet not seek to coordinate national processes. It should ensure that all actors, including NGOs and the private sector, are integrated into the consultation process" (Feldafing Expert Consultation 1996:11). As a matter of fact, the present organizational environment of the IFF, consists of overlapping networks that can be linked to the particular types of actors cited above, e.g. (a) networks of bi- and multilateral technical experts, such as the Forstry Advisers Group (FAG) or the Inter-Agency Task Force on Forests at the UNDPCSD, (b) scientific networks, such as the International Union of Forestry Research Organizations (IUFRO), the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), and the European Forest Institute (EFI), (c) NGO-networks as the Global Forest Policy Project which jointly represents the National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth (U.S.), or last but not least networks of the private sector, such as represented by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)[7].

Market, hierarchy and community and their commonly discussed variants are the basic structures referred to in governance research. Pluralistic and integrated models of institutional governance beyond these categorial structures, however, are gaining importance. A central theme of Elinor Ostrom and colleagues "...is that if complexity is the nature of systems we have an interest in governing (regulating), it is essential to think seriously about the complexity in the governance systems as proposed. Without a deep concern for creating complex, nested systems of governance, the very processes of trying to regulate behavior so as to preserve biodiversity will produce the tragic and unintended consequences of destroying the complexity we are trying to enhance" (Ostrom 1995: 34).

A set of connecting analytical components of the new institutionalism can be referenced to such approaches as of transaction-costs, property-rights, principle-agent, or public choice. They represent highly differentiated, yet institution-related approaches that help to overcome a merely descriptive and narrative status of institutional theorizing (cf. Kenis and Schneider 1996). The new institutionalist approaches are able to provide guidelines for theory development, e.g. the applicability to a relatively large number of potentially forest-related cases, as well as policy advice[8] to improve the

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[7] On the roles and responsibilities of forest industries in SFM, see (International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 1996)

[8] A persistent discussion on the methodological requirements to be met in global environmental research can be found in (Bernauer and Mitchell 1997) and (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

sustainable management and the formulation of national forest programmes. The new political economy, in this respect, shares a set of transdisciplinary characteristics with present-day institutionalism (compare e.g. the 'political economy of institutions' of Alt and Shepsle 1990) or the 'institutional economics' of North 1990)):

- the recognition of endogeneous and exogeneous forces of forest institutions;
- the common concern for explaining the emergence and continuous evolution of forest institutions over time (Atkinson 1996); and
- the increasing interest in forms of institutional interplay across different levels and dimensions of forestry cooperation (King 1997; Moltke 1997).

The following section represents by no means an effort to falsify any dominant, traditional governance arrangements in the forest sector, but a general test of the applicability of present-day 'institutional governance' research to the issue.

3. DISCRETE PATTERNS OF 'INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE' IN C&I AND RELATED CERTIFICATION SCHEMES OF FORESTRY

In international forestry cooperation, a lack of international policy dialogue and clear leadership on forest issues is often noted in international analyses. Others caution that a convention may be a placebo rather than a panacea for the problems facing forests (cf. IISD 1996). The fourth and final session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) in New York, February 1997, had to negotiate action proposals and conclusions under 12 programme elements dealing with the management, conservation and sustainable development of all forests. Among others, the issue (III.2) of "criteria and indicators" had been addressed. Nitin Desai, Under-Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, highlighted the IPF's progress on this issue. The IPF definitely contributed to the internationalization and vitalization of the discussion of C&I. "Still, divergent views surround SFM as well. There is no consensus yet on what SFM means in concrete terms nor how to balance commodity and economic values of forests with ecological and sociocultural values" (IISD 1997). And certified wood is likely to cost more than unncertified. Thus, consumers will have to pay for the privilege of C&I. But, if it costs more and no consensus can be reached on what sort of forestry is environmentally sound, how can the actors be motivated to cooperate on C&I? There is no clear leadership and markets do not perform effectively here. What is the logic of cooperation behind all the tabula rasa on C&I?

In forest scholarship different spatial and functional facets of institutional governance and cooperation are addressed, including research, e.g. at the level of local communities with regard to property systems (Agrawal 1996; McKean and Ostrom 1995), at the national level regarding legal reforms (Schmithüsen and Siegel 1997), regional timber politics (Dauvergne 1997), or at the level of international forestry regimes focusing on issues of trade (Hönerbach 1996; Humphreys 1996) or public management aspects with regard to international secretariats (Obser 1998). Furthermore, there are a number of studies showing a quantitative focus on the issue of C&I. This literature provides

important comparative information on the number of criteria, indicators, actors involved and the general orientation in scope (FAO 1995), but provide no answers to questions of institutional governance and embeddedness. C&I frameworks are institutions that are, in general, rather broad in their functional and spatial orientation. In the tradition of holistic management instruments they often transgress common spatial and functional categories, e.g. global or local aspects in national frameworks.

In addition, government resources and capacities are usually limited. Often responsibilities have to be delegated to the private sector, NGOs and forest-dependent communities. Several years ago, however, joint activities of government agencies, NGOs, research organizations, and the private sector would have been impossible[9]. "Environmentalists, who like hugging trees, and forest firms, who like chopping them down, rarely get on well together. But a number of big Swedish firms, including AssiDoman and Stora are now working in co-operation with green groups to develop timber certification schemes. Are these companies going soft, or just being clever?" (The Economist 1996: 62). This inevitably has implications on tenureship and ownership of what is currently classified as public property. Governments will need to devise tenure policies and instruments and timber pricing regimes that offer incentives for the long-term sustainable management of forests, and will have to introduce supportive legislation, long-term planning, responsive research and enforcement mechanisms, as well as strengthen local institutions and impact assessment systems (AsDB 1995).

A particular model to address the problem of embedded institutional arrangements in forestry can be referenced to the current development and testing of Forest Partnership Agreements (FPAs). "[FPAs]...should be understood as instruments designed to coordinate and guide the activities of international and national actors, within the context of national forest policy frameworks for the achievement of sustainable forest management (i.e. National Forest Programmes, NFP)" (Skala-Kuhmann 1997). Although, integrative limits are related to the legal options for FPAs. It is pointed out, that "...a distinction has to be drawn between national and international FPAs, since both instruments have different parties and participants and vary in their objectives." Such a differentiation, however, misses the significant dynamics between international and national layers of institutional governance if not conceptualizing the interstices and coherence among them. It is important to understand how C&I institutions are constructed by actors and how they use them. The problem of institutional interplay needs to be addressed as actions at one layer increasingly affect incentives of actors at other layers. This applies particularly to the case of forestry were modalities of discrete institutional governance gain in importance due to a burgeoning number of cooperative arrangements beyond the limits of efficient markets and hierachies, and across the traditional divide of international and national layers of institutional governance.

The international level of C&I institutional arrangements includes (1) the Year 2000 Objective of ITTO, (2) the IPF Process, (3) the Tarapoto Proposal, (4) the Montreal Process, (5) the Helsinki Process, and (6) the UNEP/FAO Dry-Zone Africa Initiative. In addition, there are two major international initiatives to formulate certification

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[9] (Murphy and Bendell 1997); Several NGOs (other NGOs not), for example, withdrew from the voting at the FSC Founding Assembly following the decision of the assembly to allow private sector representatives to vote on issues to be decided at the Founding Assembly in Toronto, in 1993. Concern of 'institutionalising a conflict of interest' had been articulated (cf. Statement from Environmental and Indigenous NGOs at the FSC Founding Assembly).

programs, i.e. (7) the ISO-14001 Standards and (8) the FSC's Principles and Criteria. On the national level of institutional arrangements for C&I or related certification arrangements, a rapidly increasing number of institutions is developing and takeing shape. Similar to the level of local or management-unit initiatives, only individual arrangements of the national and local levels will be referred to. Although the impression might arise at some point, it is definitely not the intention here to develop a full-scale institutional governance arrangement that covers the entire spectrum from local to global forestry action. Varying forms of institutional interplay and integration, however, are identified and proposed for a detailed analysis yet to be undertaken.

The international C&I frameworks are usually intended to provide a common understanding of what is meant by SFM. They also aim at providing a reference for national policymakers in the formulation of NFPs. In contrast to many national C&I frameworks, the internationally agreed-on C&Is provide no direct references for the forest management unit level. C&Is – international and national alike can also help to clarify or hamper ongoing debates on certification of products from sustainably managed forests. The following paragraphs rely on background information and facts drawn from a range of reports that will not be quoted seperately on every piece of information cited[10].

3.2 International institutions and their multi-actor and multi-dimensional characteristics

The (1) International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) issued the first internationally adopted guidelines for SFM. Concerns have been voiced frequently that timber trade interests prevail in ITTO (Colchester 1990). In 1991, the International Tropical Timber Council (ITTC) adopted the Year 2000 Objective which committed ITTC members to trade in tropical timber from sustainably managed forests by the year 2000. The C&I were kept intentionally simple as a sort of checklist and oriented to SFM practices. The legally binding International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) was renegotiated in 1994 and was closed at the UN Conference on Tropical Timber under the auspices of UNCTAD in Geneva. The Agreement included the non-binding promise that forest products should come from sustainably managed forests by the year 2000.

The (2) Intergovernmental Panel on Forest (IPF) process has been considering several interrelated issue categories of which "Scientific research, forest assessment and development of criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management" is one of five. The third Session of the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) considered the issue of C&I for SFM as one of the priority areas of work of the IPF. The IPF process, however, could not generate an alternative or consensual approach by the end of IPF-4 last year. As a result, a more general international position on C&I and certification was formulated. The IPF efforts will continue in the new Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF).

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[10] The reports primarily used are (Intergovernmental Seminar on Criteria and Indicators for Sustainable Forest Management (ISCI) 1996);   ADDIN ENRef ´ (UBC-UPM Conference on the Ecological 1996); (International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 1996b).

In the (3) Tarapoto proposal of the signatory countries of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty (ACT) i.e. Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela, C&Is were identified and agreed on in 1995, to measure Amazon forest sustainability. This proposal is considered to be the most comprehensive set of C&I for tropical forests. In particular, it addresses socio-economic issues and is also unique in its emphasis on the issue of the global services provided by tropical forests, i.e. the Amazon countries' need of compensation for global services is also addressed in this proposal. International NGOs were consulted during the process.

The (4) Montreal Process was initiated in September 1993. The Santiago Agreement of the Montreal Process established C&Is for the Conservation and Sustainable Management of Temperate and Boreal Forests, in 1995. It is seen as the most comprehensive set of C&I's for these types of forest. From the Americas, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Mexico, the United States, and Uruquay agreed to the C&Is. Policy and technical experts as well as NGOs had been involved in the process. Aside from having a national focus, the Montreal Process is also referred to as an ecosystem-oriented approach.

The (5) Helsinki Process resembles the Montreal Process, but focuses on European forests. It is said to be strong on ecological aspects, but weaker on socio-economic considerations. The process is still in development. It was initiated in 1993, in a follow-up to the Forest Principles agreed at UNCED in Rio, and explicitly addressed by the IPF process. Particular emphasis is on threats of acid rain and global warming. Expert-level follow-up meetings led to agreement on a number of criteria and quantitative indicators, in 1994 and further qualitative indicators in 1995. The third major ministerial meeting on European forest protection is scheduled for 1998. Some international NGOs concerned with forestry (e.g. WWF, Geenpeace, Friends of the Earth, IUCN, IUFRO, WRI and the Global Forest Policy Project) were invited as observers to the initial and/or follow-up meetings (FAO 1995: 7).

The (6) UNEP/FAO Dry-Zone Africa initiative included the organization of an expert meeting which proposed a set of C&I to be used at the national level in Sub-Sahara Africa. The C&I were endorsed by the African Wildlife and Forestry Commission and are supposed to be further discussed and improved in the countries concerned. FAO and UNEP plan similar meetings for the Mediterranean climate in North African and Near East countries, and for Central America, in collaboration with other international organizations concerned in late 1996.

Timber trade came under criticism from concerned consumers demanding timber from sustainably managed forests. In response, an increasing number of international initiatives, governments, enterprises and NGOs started to develop their own certification programs with no or little harmonization among them. These initiatives, further contributed to the confusing proliferation of SFM frameworks, in addition to the C&I programs sketched out before.

The (7) Forest Stewarship Council (FSC) is by far the most significant nongovernmental process to formulate a certification scheme. The certification initiative developed out of pressures in Europe and North America to prohibit imports of timber which is produced in ways that do not meet certain ecological and social criteria. The Council is composed of scientific experts, indigenous peoples, business and NGOs. The FSC's Principles and Criteria (P&C) apply to all tropical, temperate and boreal forests (FSC 1994).

The (8) International Standards Organisation (ISO) promotes the use of the ISO-14001 standard, published in 1996 and written over five years in consultation with international industrial experts, NGOs and regulators (Sheldon 1997). A forestry organization that wishes to be certified under the ISO-14001 system must demonstrate that it abides by laws and regulations, continuously improves its environmental management, and provides training for staff involved in activities that might negatively affect the environment.

3.2 Forms of Institutional Interplay and Integrative Measures

The dialogue of the Montreal Process has been extended to define SFM for non-European temperate and boreal forests as well. Intergovernmental consultations included Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the USA. Both the Tarapoto Proposal and the Montreal Process are linked to the renegotiated ITTA of 1994 and the Central American nations' Regional Convention for the Conservation of Forest Natural Ecosystems and the Development of Forestry Plantations, adopted during the 1993 Summit of Central American Presidents (including Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama).

Another integrating mechanism of the Tarapoto Proposal and the Montreal Process emerged from the Summit of the Americas in Miami (in 1994)[11] and a forest-focused follow-up workshop held in Washington, D.C., in June 1996. Representatives from governments, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector participated in the exercise that was jointly sponsored by the World Bank and the Organization of American States. Among others, a semi-annual Inter-American Dialogue on SFM over the course of the next decade, was proposed. It is building on existing fora such as FAO's Forest Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Central American Commission on Forestry and Protected Areas. The integrating mechanisms include setting up the Inter-American Network on SFM with forest experts whose technical secretariat (housed in the OAS) is supposed to complement the Forest Dialogue[12].

The 1995 meeting of the Helsinki Process took draft documents of the Montreal Process into consideration. Russia also participated in both the Montreal and the Helsinki process. Furthermore, "...as result of mutual interest between these two on-going processes, some exchange and 'cross-fertilisation' of ideas have led to broadly similar sets of criteria, the major difference being the inclusion by the Montreal process of a seperate criterion on the legal, policy and institutional framework needed for sustainable forest management" (FAO 1995: 10).

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[11] The Miami Summit called for partnerships throughout the Americas to enhance the establishment of democracy and free trade, to eliminate poverty and discrimmination, and to guarantee sustainable development and the conservation of the natural environment for futre generations [cf. Summit Conference on Sustainable Development, 1996 #235:3].

[12] Furthermore, a database and directories of forest agencies, neworks, sources of information, and a list-server and a World Wide Web site on the Internet would be established, including hyperlinks to other relevant forest-initiatives represented on the Internet."...The Network is a particularly attractive alternative in a time of shrinking foreign asssistance, since it has the ability to maximize the transfer of knowledge and training at minimum cost."(Summit Conference on Sustainable Development 1996: 6)

The Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) is an independent, yet internationally-funded research unit within the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CIGAR) network. CIFOR is the first international organization to undertake broad testing of a range of proposed C&Is for SFM. Among others, specific genetic C&I were proposed which are expected to be part of a more general set of biological, economic, and social C&I[13].

The open-ended Intergovernmental Seminar on Criteria and Indicators for Sustainable Forest Management (ISCI) was held in Finland in 1996. It was organized in collaboration with the FAO and other intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, among others, in support of the IPF. The seminar was attended by experts from developed and developing countries and from intergovernmental, international and non-governmental organizations representing governments, forest owners, forest industry, environmental and development organisations, indigenous people and research (ISCI 1996: 2). The ongoing international and regional initiatives such as the ITTO, Helsinki Process, Montreal Process, and Tarapoto Proposal and UNEP/FAO Dry-Zone Africa initiative reported on the development of national-level C&Is for SFM for their specific regional, economic, ecological, social and cultural conditions. Finally, "...a trend can be detected in the growing emphasis on both performance standards and management processes, suggesting a possible convergence of FSC- and ISO-style approaches" (IISD 1996b).

3.3 National Institutions and their Multi-Actor and Multi-Dimensional Characteristics

It is essential that countries initiate themselves domestic processes to develop a national consensus on C&Is that are closely linked to national policy frameworks or NFPs. As part of this domestic process, however, the need for and the way of making use of internationally agreed-to C&Is became part of most national exercises. Government officials, individual national enterprises and national NGOs participate in the international processes. Further, some governments inform international fora on their progress on a more or less frequent and detailed basis.

Canada's Model Forest, for example, became as sort of a smashing export hit of management-related technology transfer. The Canadian Standards Association's SFM System Standards are consistent with ISO's 14001, yet go beyond it by requiring significant public input throughout the process, adherence to the Canadian Council of Forest Minister's six criteria for SFM, development of local SFM values, goals, and performance indicators, and independent audits that verify performance in the field (CSA 1996).

National certification systems have been launched or are in preparation in Finland, the United Kingdom (i.e. 'UK Forest Standard') and the Netherlands. The Dutch government has defined minimum requirements relating to C&I. These C&I

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[13] "These proposals are intended for use in guiding tropical forest management but the indicators and verifiers described are not in the form of simple prescriptions where a single measurement can be recommended for a single causal effect. Since genetic dynamics operate at different times and spatial scale than the events that can be observed at the level of forest stand effects, a single forest stand event can have effects on several genetic processes. In addition, the pattern of genetic diversity that has already evolved is due to a balance of several evolutionary forces that operate at different spatial and temporal scales. Forest practices would therefore be expected to affect several genetic factors." (Namkoong et al. 1997)

requirements, however, have a rather strong extra-territorial effect, as more than 90% of the timber used in the country is imported. These programs are usually developed by working groups including, aside from government officials, representatives of forest owners, industry and environmental groups as well.

It is expected that the international C&I from the Montreal process will serve as the foundation for a domestic set of C&I in the USA[14]. "Indonesia's recent proposal to establish a government-led national certification program is a tribute to FSC's impact. The government of Indonesia is consulting closely with FSC on this process and has indicated interest in seeking future FSC accreditation. Participation in the certification program will be mandatory for all concessionaires by the year 2000 as a move to meet the ITTO Year 2000 Objective" (Sizer 1995: 8).

National initiatives should effectively integrate the role of actors at management unit level into the exercises. Strategic partnerships with NGOs, indigenous peoples, local communities, and, in particular, other key sectors of civil society are proposed. National management unit level C&I receive a growing mutual emphasis in national and international frameworks alike, though possessing different degrees of site-specificity. Systems of certification or marks of origin, for example, are being implemented or foreseen in Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, and in the Scandinavian countries.

3.4 Forms of Institutional Interplay and Integrative Measures

To summarise, a number of countries and organisations shared their experiences in adapting the internationally and regionally developed C&Is for SFM in their NFPs or other relevant policy frameworks (ISCI 1996: 2). There were many activities in producer countries to disseminate ITTO's C&I, in some cases, a pilot-scale demonstration of SFM. The ITTA of 1994, included the counterpart commitment by the consumer members of ITTO to achieve SFM of their boreal, temperate and non-tropical forests. An expert panel met in Yokohama in 1995 and recommended that the C&Is be revised and updated, to reflect the many national and regional initiatives (ITTC 1995). Furthermore, the IPF process has generated a number of governmental and supra-governmental meetings on C&I such as the joint initiative by Germany and Indonesia or the Intergovernmental Working Group on Forests (IWGF), sponsored by Malaysia and Canada[15].

Exporters and some producer countries showed interest in a certification system of FSC. Within the FSC's framework, each country defined its own performance standards. To date, the European countries only Sweden will soon reach anagreement on what the countries' performance standards should be. Yet, single blocks of public forests have solely been certified under the FSC system in Poland and Belgium. In Europe, the ISO-14001 standard is already being applied in the forest sector in Sweden, and a national workgroup has been established to implement the standard in France. The C&I-related research program undertaken by CIFOR and the open-ended Seminar

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[14] "Highly sophisticated forest plans, such as those in the United States, have also failed to achieve the kind of public involvement called for in the Montreal Process and the Tarapoto Proposal. While information may be technically available to the public, it may be interpretable only to a limited number of experts." (Summit Conference on Sustainable Development 1996)

[15] The IWGF involved more than 30 countries, three IOs and four NGOs and led to consensus of a series of action.

ISCI explicitly aim at promoting national implementation of C&I, studying the feasability of their further development and examining their comparability and international compatability.

Basically, there is a need for identifying a core set of C&I at the global level. The procedure to this end, however, is controversial and the debate has cristalized around arguments for "striving for a value added to C&I, by identifying a small number of key indicators at the global level", while others felt that "it would be premature to develop global indicators as many countries are just about to apply their C&I and hence being able to contribute to the global process, ...It was recognised that the various existing international C&I processes have been put in place in different contexts and respond to different needs, and that a common set of C&I at the global level would be in addition to these processes and not as a substitute for them. As an alternative to a common or core set of indicators, the importance of fostering mutual recognition among existing sets of C&I as tools for assessing trends in SFM and conditions at the national level was recognized" (ISCI 1996: 12).

4. CONCLUSIONS

Since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, countries throughout the world have participated in a multi-level and embedded groups of new or renegotiated forest forums, panels, initiatives, consensus-seeking exercises, agreements, treaties, and accords under an odd assortment of acronyms designed to enhance the sustainability of forest resources. Making coordination in forest management work better is a central piece of the C&I puzzle. We were interested in how C&I institutions are constructed by organizations and other actors and how they use them. The actual implementation of international and regionally agreed-on C&Is may take quite a while.

Coordination has increased, as information is shared within and among the various C&I institutions. The increasing embeddedness of C&I processes has fostered collaboration between countries. Progress in individual institutions resulted from various actors' active paticipation in the other frameworks. The political, social, economic and ecological front-lines of sustainable forest management has become indistinct. The great divide between international and domestic politics is steadily narrowing[16]. Achievements within individual institutions even reinforced cross-sectoral understanding and cooperation outside the forest sector. The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change recognize the role of forests in the maintenance of global ecosystems.

"Despite their differences, an element of globalism and convergence seems to be creeping in as socio-economic and ecological variables receive increased attention, and national management unit level C&I receive growing mutual emphasis. A recent

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[16] See contributions in Keohane and Ostrom (1995), among others, with the objective of comparing (and, in the long-term, integrating) the insights from institutional research on different levels, e.g. local common pool regimes and international environmental regimes. Other integrative calls are formulated in Caporaso (1997) with regard to research on comparative and international politics or in Healy (1998) aiming at building bridges between comparative and international public administration.

meeting in Helsinki, for example, concluded that the international community should pursue the further development and harmonization of C&I on the international, national and management unit levels as a tool for defining and improving [SFM]" (IISD 1996b). We are interested in how C&I institutions are constructed by organizations and other actors and how they use them. It seems inevitable that some sort of institutional governance at the international level will be required to ensure that national and management-unit level arrangements are mutually supportive and do not conflict with each other. At the same time, local and management-unit level concerns need to be considered in international institutions. For this problem of embedded institutional governance arrangements, however, no blueprint that would be able to perfectly integrate top down and bottom up inputs into forestry decision making will be at hand.

The latter paragraphs underlined that individual C&I programs and related certification schemes cannot be isolatedly implemented, as they are coexisting institutional arrangements with a variety of links. One possibility to explain nested institutional arrangements at many levels is the analysis of how actions at one level change the incentives of actors at another level (cf. Ostrom 1995: 41). Cross-scale and multi-level dynamics of C&I processes are still treated as a black-box in most literature.

Public choice frameworks emphasize related issues of institutional rules and incentives. These approaches are primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with the structural and functional aspects of institutional arrangements. Emphasis is put on how forestry institutions effectively allocate resources, responsibilities, status and ideas among the various actors constituting the institutional arrangements under consideration. In these concepts the institutional rules are relatively stable[17], assumed to determine forestry related behavior in specific arrangements. The different forms and processes of allocation provided in these approaches, aim at institutionally adequate forestry actions and cooperation of the actors involved.

Another approach that takes its pattern from public choice frameworks, also seizing on political-economic reasoning, is reflected in concepts referring to actor-centered institutionalism[18]. In deviating from the preceeding approach, it is assumed that each rule in institutional arrangements of forestry might be impaired by utility calculations and strategic actions undertaken by individual members of the game, at any time. Thereby, the rules themselves represent additional windows of opportunity for effective governance and collective action in complex forestry institutions. Aspects of self-dynamic or self-regulation of institutions, as well as actors' and organizations' self-interest in arrangements of institutional governance are taken into account. The identification of the range of strategic actions available to actors is decisive for this approach. Effective institutional governance, then depends on motivating critical actors for collective action by means of, for example, processes of negotiation[19] and exchange (e.g., Marin 1990). Most governance research starts with identifying the basic cluster of structural ideal types and related principles or logics of action in the policy field of concern. Consequently, 'discrete alternative structures' are identified herein as well.

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[17] Assumptions about actors' orientation along 'taken-for-granted rules' and 'bounded rationality' are predominant.

[18] This concept refers to a broader scholarship directly or indirectly linked to the Max-Planck-Institute in Cologne, and other German institutes, e.g. in Speyer and Konstanz. An excellent overview on this research is given in Kenis and Schneider (1996). Particular work, commonly cited in this regard, include e.g. Scharpf (1994), Mayntz (1996), Benz (1992) or Héritier (1997).

[19] Compare e.g. Mayntz (1993) or Scharpf (1994:27). For an examination of the applicability of models of 'positive' and 'negative' integration to the analysis of international environmental cooperation, see Zürn (1997).

The objective of this paper was to counter traditional governance models in the forest sector by a general test of the applicability of present-day 'institutional governance' research to the issue. It should open important research questions that contribute to theory development within the institutional dimensions of global change in forestry and provide advice relevant to policy. Such research is seen as an important contribution to further narrowing the gap between knowledge of domestic and of international institutions and their role in integrated NFP processes.

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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN OF AUSTRIA - A LESSON TO LEARN IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY?

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ABSTRACT

In March 1997, the Austrian Parliament adopted the Austrian National Environmental Plan, which formulated a new strategy for the entire Austrian policy. According to its own perception, the new plan describes the "fundamental" or "structural change" in the national environment and in society necessary for sustainable development. It has often been surmised that the plan actually does not present any new information, themes or requirements concerning environmental policy; it merely summarises the existing ones. While formulating the national plan, state actors openly co-operated with representatives of those industries that contribute most to environmental pollution. This selective cooperation, common practice within the Austrian political system, is not in accordance with the new concept calling for the efficient regulation of environmental pollution requiring broad, large-scale cooperation of all political and societal actors. The new environmental plan is a compromise which the industries and the state representatives can accept as a common environmental policy. With a weak and pragmatic definition, sustainability now claims an official role on the current national environmental agenda. The new strategy is influenced and limited by the interests of its few leading actors and is yet another example of the symbolic acts taking place in the field of environmental policy.

Keywords: Austrian National Environmental Plan, Policy Learning, Programme Formulation, Symbolic Policy in Environment

1. INTRODUCTION

After the long process of programme formulation (1992-1995) and considerable delays in the political legitimisation process, the Austrian Parliament accepted the National Environmental Plan in March 1997. The plan (Federal Government of Austria 1995) is a voluminous document describing a new strategy for the Austrian environmental

policy. As for terminology, the new plan is alternatively referred to as "plan" and "strategy", but also as "frame of reference", "path", "starting point" or "programme". It remains unclear whether these terms should be regarded as synonyms or if they refer to other phenomena. The varying terminology is an example of the political jargon used to make the plan more attractive and give the impression that it is a "new" comprehensive management approach for regulating the environment. This was done to accommodate the often heard conservative and liberal voices, which criticise the traditional environmental policy for its inefficiency to tackle environmental problems.

2. TWO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT MODELS

In general terms, we can identify two different models for managing the environment. In the traditional management model of environmental policy, the ministry is the central actor in charge of environmental protection. Based on the best available data and scientific research, the ministry can put legislation into effect concerning environmental policy.

In the new paradigm of planning, the state is no longer considered the central actor. Instead, it relies on the idea that the state is managed by society with the co-operation of important societal actors who can steer economy and society towards a better environment. This process requires strong governmental leadership, as it must intervene on occasion and act as guardian of public interests. It is the only party with the resources and authority to facilitate national dialogues.

Another basic element is the long-term view of the planning process. In the long run, the goal is to have environmental issues addressed consistently and efficiently. This is in sharp contrast with the often moderate "muddling through" management of the past which emphasized the positive effects of short-term efforts and limited state regulation which were imposed by law.

Another basic element of the new strategy is its far-reaching concept of sustainable development.

Thus the new management model would replace the "traditional" environmental policy and gain the official status of a new strategy.

The new environmental policy planning is a "big system" in which there are many elements with relatively flexible ties. For example, the answer to the question of the relative importance of one element (objective, measure) in regard to another element (objective, measure) is left open for debate. The following characteristics describe some additional elements of the environmental policy planning strategy:

- Environmental impact is considered on the sectoral and inter-sectoral level and no longer from the one-point-source
- Environmental protection is also an inter-sectoral policy issue; therefore coordination and integration of the different levels of state or policy realms are required for adequate institutional response.
- The policy objectives are described in qualitative terms as having clearly defined, long-term quantitative targets complete with timetables for achieving them, as well as a mechanism to measure its progress toward those goals

- The short-term effects of concrete policy measures will be evaluated systematically and serve as progress indicators.
- The planning process can be modified if necessary in one or more of its elements.
- In particular, the economic costs and the efficiency of the policy measures are an essential part of the decision-making process to guarantee a comprehensive view of the environmental and economic aspects of environmental protection measures.
- All actors, including polluters, should be guided voluntarily in the "right" direction, preferably without force. The state will contribute by offering discussion forums and consultation to promote this new style of cooperation.

At the core of the planning approach is the active cooperation between all actors related to environment issues, including industry and other business actors, which often are the polluters. For a long time, studies claimed that the state's programme formulating activities had selectively favoured organized economic interest groups, thus hindering the realisation of the ‚pure' democratic environmental policy principle of cooperation (e.g. Weidner 1989: 23). Some authors now consider the issue of active cooperation with polluters the most important element of the new environmental policy planning strategy (Jänicke and Weidner 1997: 17). Others describe it as part of a new "regulatory regime" in environmental policy (Leveque 1996: 16-19). In corporatist systems (such as Austria), co-operation with organised representatives of industry and other business sectors is practised daily. What is new is not the readiness of state actors to cooperate with them actively, but the selective and public regulation of environmental problems within the broadly argued "stakeholder consultation", which includes individual actors and civilian groups (ibid: 18). Here we see the plea for a new partnership between government and business actors. Under the new strategy, the government is still responsible for setting standards and long-term goals, yet industry is given more freedom to develop the technical or institutional changes and policy designs needed to reach environmental goals and to improve the rather problematic efficiency of the environmental policy which is now in operation.

To reach this goal, it is not only necessary to dismantle any existing roadblocks in environmental policy-making, but also to be prepared to cooperate on a level much higher than the usual trade-off of interests, as seen in cooperative political systems.

3. SOME THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ABOUT POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY LEARNING

The main question studied in this article is why phases of normalcy, in which everybody seems relatively content with the effects of the existing regulations, are succeeded by phases of change. Prominent policy approaches generally treat policy processes in relation to phases or cycles, simplifying the complexity of the policy-making process by breaking the process into a limited number of main stages or sub-stages. On the other hand, these theories argue in sharp contrast with traditional theory that policy making is a problem-solving process rather than an actor-centered process of conflict resolution and consensus-building among many competing actors.

Surprisingly, even as many new theoretical models have been developed, they have been insufficiently adapted in the empirical research. Or, as Bennett and Howlett (1992) stated somewhat sarcastically: "… the concept has been overtheorized and underapplied" (288). Another weakness is that it can be misinterpreted as an assumption that the policy process is a rational process of systematic and subsequent phases of problem-solving.

In Anglo-American policy research, the concept of policy-learning has become common to analyse the conditions for policy changes in public policy (see e.g. Bennett 1991; Bennett and Howlett 1992; Howlett and Ramesh 1995: 175-201). The concept "policy learning" is not a broadly accepted one, and there are at least two different definitions of what it means from the governmental perspective and why policy changes occur. On the sources of policy change, Howlett and Ramesh commented, "whether policy-learning is a process imposed upon policy-makers from outside the policy process, or whether it originates within the process as a policy-maker attempt to refine and adapt their policies in the light of their past actions" (Howlett and Ramesh 1995: 176-177). Aside from the exogenous and endogenous types of learning, there is the rational interest of policy actors to adopt environmental changes if their policies are to succeed (ibid: 175). The second type of learning is more fundamental and is related to the goals of a policy and the underlying problem-perception, whereas the first type includes the alteration of means and techniques adopted by policy makers to achieve their goals (ibid: 176). The crucial question of both types of learning is the ability of policy makers to increase their capacity to absorb new information about the environment as a whole in order to work with a new policy. Learning in both cases depends again on different ways of learning. Endogenous learning takes place in focused, specialized policy networks which is in contrast to exogenous learning involving the participation of entire communities, ideally the country's entire population. Which subjects are allowed to participate in the policy learning process depends on many things, such as the history of a policy, its nature and the type of the state. If the state plays a dominant role, endogenous learning with a set of „exclusive" actors might be expected.

If policy-learning takes place successfully, some policy change will occur. But what is the basic description of this dependent variable? Policy change is a process of alternating an existing policy, which leads to a new policy situation differing from the past. Again following Howlett and Ramesh, it seems useful to differentiate two types of learning. As they put it, one is "a process of normal change in which the settings and instruments used to pursue policy goals change incrementally within an overall, well-established style", whereas the other is "a process of paradigmatic change in which there is a rapid transformation in policy outcomes and styles" (ibid: 200). Which type of policy change really exists is a matter of empirical case studies of policy activities covering different policy realms.

Policy learning, within this rough outline of the dominating theoretical thinking, allows actors to move ahead towards problem-solving, so that analysis of policy change must take into consideration the interests of the actors who neither implicitly nor explicitly influence the policy learning process. Nor do they decide which actions are possible or out of reach. It is not only the complex policy issue itself which may be a constraint, but which actors are involved in the policy formulation, how they interact,

what they decide to do or not to do in the formulation process. To answer this question, some interesting structural models have been developed in the conceptual research. Among these contributions, the advocacy-coalition approach and others have become quite prominent and useful (for overviews see ibid: 124-131; Minitrom and Vergari 1996: 420-425).

In modern democracies, public policies often are forcefully communicated as new, despite the evidence that they only fill "new wine in old bottles". Upon close examination, there is often strong continuity among the policy-making actors who monopolize problem-definition and goal-setting procedures of long-term policy making. This could mean that policy changes will only occur when the monopoly of well-established members of policy communities have broken away from new and competing members of other communities.

4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following part of this paper focuses empirically on the relevance and influence of "actors" in the "policy formulation" of the Austrian National Environmental Plan, which at a first glance seems an important innovation of the established environmental policy. Five questions are researched in more detail:

- Which actors dominated the formulation of the plan?
- Who controlled the recruitment of experts to develop the information basis of the policy planning?
- What kind of specific expertise was mobilised and what was the information basis resulting from the different expert groups managed by the dominating actors?
- How was the materially-related objective of "sustainable development" interpreted?
- Finally, to what extent is the plan a compromise among the dominating actors and/ or a "step forward in learning"?

But before answering these questions, the environmental plan's policy context will be described for a better understanding of the formulation process leading to the new plan. The understanding of the policy context of the new plan already allows some insight into the feature of policy learning.

5. THE NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL POLICY CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN

After many ineffective attempts in the 1970s, there was a staggering increase in the amount of state environmental regulatory acts (laws and others) in Austria in the 1980s, which lead to the so-called "Verrechtlichung" (Habermas) of the environment. Simultaneously, awareness of the operational problems of newly introduced regulatory

environmental law, which was once seen by many researchers as merely symbolic and without any consequences, is gaining more importance. Even governmental documents have confirmed the difficulty in implementing regulative environmental law and this has recently been recognised as a problem in current national environmental policy.

Much more actively than in the past, representatives of Austrian environmental policy of the early 1990s government have propagated the principles of a market economy. In their view, new eco-taxes and duties imposed on the market forces should become the main tools for environmental policy instead of relying on the many regulatory laws and acts. The proclaimed market-based environmental policy will lead to a decrease in the traditional claim the state has had on steering environmental protection. The scientific basis of this paradigm shift is the recent boom of relevant concepts of environmental economics, which propagate duties and taxes and – though clearly more restrictively – quantitative solutions as alternative (or complementary) environmental policy instruments. All in all, however, a bigger difference could not exist between the permanent announcement of market tools in the Austrian environmental policy and their actual implementation. One reason for the difference between theory and practice is the resistance of target groups within the regulated markets. The highly organized Austrian economic interest associations have consistently been refusing the introduction of new taxes for years. Since Austria joined the EU, the following argument is heard more often: Austria's economic ability to compete in the European economy will be weakened if new market-oriented instruments are introduced only on a strictly national level.

The developments and agreements of global environmental policy, combined with the supranational environmental policy of the European Union (EU) form a second range of influence on the national environmental policy. These new concepts and goals were taken over as objective guidelines for environmental policy within Austria.

In 1992, sustainability began to take the lead in the conception of the global environmental policy field due to the conclusions reached at the Earth Summit Conference in Rio. In fact, it has already been a catch-all phrase for a new global development strategy since the 1980s. The Earth Summit finally made the concept a centrally accepted worldwide theme, though its contours remained general and blurred. According to the original sources, sustainability is a "confession of faith", whose details are yet to be specified in policy and research. The dimensions of the possible interpretation of sustainability could be pictured as a ladder, "ranging from those associated with the promotion of a weak form of sustainable development to those aimed at a stronger, or ideal model" (Baker 1997a: 381, extensively Baker et al. 1997: 8-18). Within this range of ethical and practical interpretations, relevant political initiatives can change, and, depending on their selected point of view, they can differ radically.

The often-cited Agenda 21 of the Earth Summit delegates the responsibility for environmental planning to the individual nations: "Governments should adopt a national strategy for sustainable development... Its goals should be to ensure socially responsible economic development while protecting the resource base and the environment for the benefit of future generations" (Chapter 8).

The EU has also influenced the Rio process and the worldwide orientation towards sustainability. By signing the Rio declaration, the EU has committed itself to putting the concept into practice – just as its member states which ratified the numerous

conventions, declarations, etc. It is my thesis that the EU adapted the new concept using a very specific terminology. The Maastricht Treaty (Art. 2) stresses firstly – among other goals – sustainability as a fixed policy goal of the EU-constitution, and speaks of "sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment". In the same light, sustainability is put in the context of economic growth or social welfare in other documents. The EU-terminology gives sustainability a weak, pragmatic meaning (Welch 1997: 17; Baker 1997a). Economy, with its close proximity to the traditional criterion of growth moves to the foreground, while other related criteria of sustainability slip to the background. The range of possible political, social and also ecological reforms is pared down, especially where ecological reforms could very easily hinder growth processes. The restrictive terminology allows the implementation of changes in the frame of the established socio-economic development strategy (Baker 1997a: 383-387; Welch 1997: 17-19). The normative contrast would be a definition of sustainability stating that physical living conditions and natural resources should at no point in time go under a critical level, or that economic developments – local or national, as well as intergenerational – are "tied" to the equal distribution of resources.

The Fifth Environmental Action Programme titled "Towards Sustainability: A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development (1992-2000)" was finalised following the Rio-meeting. The new action programme differs from past programmes in some respects:

- It focuses on the processes which damage resources and environment rather than dealing with the consequences as in the earlier programmes.
- It demands a shift in behaviour and especially in the consumption patterns of a given society
- And it broadens the range of policy instruments.

The programme places the weak, pragmatic meaning of sustainability in the centre of the EU's daily-environmental policy. It is also the programme's intention to modernise the procedures and instruments of environmental policy to make them clear. The idea is to fill in or replace regulative instruments, namely directives and regulatory acts, with market-based economic instruments and a wide range of sectoral voluntary agreements, as well as to invite all population groups to participate in the entire environmental process. Here lies the most interesting turning point: its transformation from the pronounced centrally-regulated EU environmental policy (Leveque 1996) of the past (since the early 1970s) to an open policy style with bottom-up elements (e.g. Baker 1997a: 387; European Commission 1997: 15). One important critique should be stressed in this matter: after two decades of development in Western countries, environmental policy is still a policy of the management of negative environmental impacts which is meant to stabilize the quality of an environment to a "tolerable" level for the economy. This policy cannot simply be "programmed" as a long-term oriented policy of sustainability in light of the new policy imperatives. This "old" policy is still in place today. Only a new vision has added to it, and its policy implications are in opposition to the current policy.

It should be emphazised that the new Austrian plan has not been designed as a policy option to overcome a new dramatic problem situation in the national environment

(explicitly Federal Government of Austria 1995: 12), as is the case in the Netherlands. In the cross-country view, the Austrian plan is clearly distinguished from its Dutch counterpart. The Netherlands became pioneers by publishing the first National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) late in the 1980s (1989). An important initial phase of the NEPP was the publication of an official study (1988) which presented a very serious situation regarding environmental conditions that seemed officially tolerable. Yet other documents had already reported on the critical condition of the country's environment in previous years, and they did not fundamentally differ from the statements made in the new study (van der Straaten and Ugelow 1994).

In the supranational or global view, the Austrian plan is the imitation and adoption of "higher" environmental related policy developments. Old and new documents of the global and European environmental policy are repeatedly mentioned as reference sources in the national plan. In addition, the target sectors selected as areas for policy involvement are drawn from the fifth Environmental Action Programme of the EU. This shows that the new Austrian environmental policy places itself demonstratively within the context of supranational and global environmental policy which serves as the legitimizing source for the national policy efforts.

6. COLLABORATING WITH THE ORGANIZED POLLUTERS' INTERESTS – THE TWO SIDES OF THE COIN

The national plan is a contradiction in itself. It is often described as an elaboration of the bottom-up policy necessary for the sustainability doctrine's "concept of joint social affection" (Federal Government of Austria 1995: 26) of environmental protection which also stresses "responsibility" (ibid: 11) and cooperation of the government, federal and local authorities, non-governmental organisations, producers, consumers and individuals as private entities in environmental protection.

But empirically, the plan is the result of the new, highly selective "dialogue culture". By inviting "proponents of single economic sectors" (ibid: 315) and "relevant institutions" (ibid.) to participate in the formulating process, the intent was to benefit from their experience and to gain their acceptance for putting the numerous measures into practice.

The actual putting into practice of the "joint involvement" during the process of programme formulation uses the following table, which proves the clearly selective cooperation between state representatives and representatives of the organized interests – also by delegating experts (see below) – which in effect depicts precisely the factual "normalcy" in Austria's "old" environmental policy and many other policy realms.

In the initial phase, seven working groups were assembled to draw up the plan. Their leaders, all highly qualified experts, were selected consensually by the state administration and the interest groups which were represented in the national planning committee. Each chairman of a working group had the option of nominating their "own" experts, but this actually remained an exception. Only in the selection of the members of subgroups of experts did the chairmen show slightly stronger authority. These subgroups had the task of actually drafting the reports of the working groups.

Table 1. Participating actors during the drawing up of the NUP (working groups).

	WG 1	WG 2	WG 3	WG 4	WG 5	WG 6	WG 7
Federal administration	23	20	18	13	15	20	12
Country administration	4	3	6	12	2	9	2
Scientists and experts	11	6	9	9	3	8	6
Economic associations	4	8	10	5	4	7	5
Labour unions and consumer associations	1	1	1	-	-	1	2
Environmental organizations	2	4	5	1	-	2	3
Enterprises	-	2	4	-	1	1	-
Engineering und Consulting	1	2	1	-	1	1	-
Banks	1	-	-	1		-	-
Total participants	47	46	54	41	26	49	30

WG = Working group; WG1=Trade & Industry; WG2=Energy; WG3=Traffic & Transport; WG4=Agriculture, Forest & Water; WG5=Tourism & Leisure Industry; WG6=Resource Management; WG7=End users & Consumers (Source: Payer 1997).

The majority of experts came from federal administration, city and state administrations, as well as from economic interest groups. Experts from environmental organisations, on the other hand, were hardly represented at all. Yet because of the current high professionalization of environmental organizations, they included the usual qualification standards of environmental experts.

It must be considered that the interests of the main economic associations are strengthened by "captured" ministries ("polluter reports"). Only in this instance is the real weight of the polluters' interests during the formulation of the programme described.

When viewed on an international scale, the document significantly deviates from the development procedures of other countries, as it was drawn up without the participation of broader circles.

7. MOBILIZED KNOWLEDGE

The question here is, what specific type of knowledge was mobilized for the formulation of the plan?

Put simply, the formulation of the plan was primarily based on scientific-technical knowledge with economic "expertise" playing a lesser role, as is to be expected with accepted practices regarding environmental policy (cfr. Jasanoff 1990; typologically Pleschberger 1995: 94-95). Furthermore, in light of sociology, it can be assumed that perceptions of environmental problems will vary depending on the experts' institutional affiliation, despite their common framework. According to American studies, experts coming from the government or from institutions with close ties to the government tend to be more open to taking environmental risks than experts coming from the ranks of

industry or economy (Lynn 1986). Experts coming from universities are "somewhere in between". Yet the differences are gradual, not fundamental. Therefore, air pollution could be considered more of an environmental or health risk by one group of experts, while another group would rather consider it an economic question. Both views lead to different political solutions from governmental sides.

The kind of expert knowledge used for plan formulation is a goal-oriented "report research" (Ronge 1989). In order to guarantee the orientation of decisions, the scientific competence must represent the current state of knowledge, and proposals must aim at relatively precise definitions of a problem. It must also be possible to transform these decisions into political-administrative actions or legitimisation strategies without communication barriers.

8. INTEREST-ORIENTED MANAGEMENT OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE

The actual work of the working groups on developing the programme's contents was done in subgroups of independent individual experts and in institutionalised expert circles.

The material elaborated in the subgroups was discussed and fine-tuned with members of the working groups. "Knowledge conflicts", if any, were dealt with within the framework of the hierarchical organisation structure of the national plan. This succeeded in removing controversial debates among the working groups during the presentation of parts of the reports, as well as allowing bilateral-informal clearing of differences between participants (Payer 1997: 130). A settlement of discussion topics on a higher level in the national plan committee has not been observed. The national committee was simply the place where various reports were finally approved before they were presented publicly as official documents.

The arisal of few tuning problems among the actors during the formulation of the national plan is a clear indicator that relatively small expert groups which work out of sight from the public can operate as a fully-functioning, hierarchically absorbed, self-regulating group. The original materials for drawing up the plan originate from the activities of these expert groups.

9. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-LEARNING IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERESTS – SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT TWO DIMENSIONS OF SYMBOLIC POLICY IN THE ENVIRONMENT

The theory of policy-learning assumes that in order to reach a better solution, policy-oriented innovations on the actors' side require changes to established positions of the actors' interests while considering existing societal problems. One mechanism for getting interest-based actors into a learning process is cooperation.

In light of the Austrian planning formulation strategy, which favours a very selective cooperation of appropriate corporatist actors, we see no evidence of policy learning

since the actors were neither forced to nor ready to overcome their existing interest positioning.

The learning of participating actors during the formulation of the plan involved the successful "search" for a new environmental policy option that would be acceptable to both the representatives of the economic interest organisations and to the state representatives. Within the established national corporatist framework of policy making the involved actors primarily received some symbolic gains from participating in the planning procedure over years. Their learning of a common position refers to symbolic policy development in environment.

As a critical concept, symbolic environmental policy can be viewed differently. One view is the adoption of new terminologies in a policy field to symbolically demonstrate its "modernization" capabilities. The second view is the explicit unwillingness of concerned politicians and administrative officials or of economic actors to really do something such as put a new plan into practice. We find proof of all dimensions of symbolic policy.

To begin with the first dimension, a general thesis can be formulated: owing to the Austrian national environmental plan, state actors reached an agreement with important representatives of the polluter interests involving a programmatic revaluation of the national environmental strategy to find a way out of the accumulated policy deficits of the past. State actors came to an agreement with representatives of the polluters within a joint framing of the "important" environmental problems and the "necessary" solutions in order to communicate a new acceptable policy competence more clearly to the public.

As we know, the environmental agenda of the past was part of the entire "obscurity" of society (Habermas). The environmental policy of the past was only able to manage environmental problems to a very limited extent using the traditional regulatory approach. This way, the state environmental policy could protect itself against political "subversion" (Gray 1997: 297).

With the new plan, a different attainable policy option has been created in order to stabilize their public image by suggesting that the state's policy-makers have a "modern" solution strategy for environmental problems at hand (just as the economy commits itself normatively).

One important part of the new strategy is the acceptance of the sustainability guideline. Firstly, both groups of actors have had – till now – pressure coming from several sources. The overwhelming global sustainability discourse is of a great influence, which has more than merely diffuse power. By now, the discourse has gathered such a symbolic force that it cannot be ignored if state or economic activities are to be legitimised with the future in mind. Thus, it makes sense to adopt at least the new terminology. The new objectives are penetratingly and opportunistically repeated in many parts of the plan document. By the way, this also shows the way states, which are not particularly known as "trend-setters" (ibid), are reforming. The critical thesis is, that the governmental officials and the polluters interests reached an agreement to use a weak definition of the sustainability-concept for the environmental policy, thereby rounding the edges of its original utopian elements in the policy agenda. By means of this agreement they made a successful effort to limit the sleeping conflict potentials of the sustainability guideline.

According to the second dimension of symbolic policy it is very revealing to see that the implementation challenge, which is necessary for the realization of the plan, was not in the least a subject for discussion from the start. The traditional implementers of the state policy took the necessary subjective, financial and organisational resources required for the new task for granted.

Only seemingly contradictionary, we observe the paradoxical expansion of the existing, often critizised "environmental state" in the plan itself. In all, 472 measures (357 without repetitions etc.) are listed in the plan document. The majority of the measures are directly addressed to the state itself, which would expand its intervention agenda enormously. Ironically, the new opulent measures agenda was formulated together with actors who normally take action against the growth of the state, having organized economic interests.

Without resources (money, personnel, laws, institutions, co-ordination etc.), the agenda cannot even begin to be put into practice. Although there are many indications that the environmental state administration operates inefficiently, the theoretical "free" potential is not yet large enough to put the new measures into practice. The measures – only if they are taken seriously – require massive reinforcement and expansion of the state's environmental policy, paralleling the increasing prominence of neo-liberal deregulation strategies or pragmatic strategies of the modernization of the state.

Finally, all considered, the plan is at least extensive, yet the concepts are vague. Its priorities and concrete time schedules for single measures remain unclear, so that the implementation of each element of the "big system" would be a new micropolitical management process in itself.

As of yet, we have not found any valuable proof that at least the government has undertaken some steps in initiating the implementation of one of the numerous measures of the national plan.

For the moment, however, the environmental policy, with the help of a new plan and a new strategy, does demonstrate leadership which all concerned – the public – can rely on for future developments. The marketing of the plan should be the vehicle for communicating the new certainty. Already an element of the basic document, the plan was to be exposed to a broad "political public". If interpreted as a product, the plan is a notable marketing performance with many boxed examples, pictures, tables and other images in many colours.

In the meantime, the plan is being communicated by means of a public relations track (including a special internet homepage) which was developed by a commercial advertising agency.

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EVALUATING NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES: LESSONS FROM BIODIVERSITY POLICIES IN CANADA

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ABSTRACT

National Forest Programmes (NFPs) represent a choice of institutions and instruments amongst the many available. To demonstrate the superiority of this choice requires that an NFP be subjected to comprehensive evaluation. NFPs often include provision for internal evaluation in terms of meeting their own objectives according to recognized criteria. Comprehensive evaluation requires that the NFP itself be measured against alternatives and against the wider objectives of the forest policy community. This paper explores some of the conceptual and methodological problems of such comprehensive evaluation in the context of the biodiversity conservation commitments in Canada's National Forest Strategy which ran from 1992-1997.

Keywords: Forest Policy, Biodiversity, Evaluation; Canada – National Forest Strategy

1. INTRODUCTION

Biodiversity conservation is one of the most important but also one of the most vague and ambiguous concepts in contemporary forest management. To some extent, precision can be introduced by being clear about the spatial and temporal scales at which biodiversity conservation is being attempted. But the concept itself retains an essential and perhaps irreducible ambiguity that arises from the multiple social and political contexts in which it is found. The very usefulness of the concept of biodiversity conservation would be diminished or even destroyed if, in attempting to arrive at a precise operational definition, the concept was narrowed in such a way as to exclude the usages found in some contexts and so to exclude the various interests that operate there. Even before arriving at a consensus about management strategies to conserve the biodiversity of native forests, forest policy must thus engage in a delicate balancing act. "Biodiversity" must be defined in a way that is inclusive enough to maintain a broad

consensus in the forest policy community that biodiversity conservation is worth pursuing as a central goal of forest management. On the other hand, "biodiversity" must be defined carefully enough to function as a meaningful and measurable objective of forest management on the ground (Bunnell 1994; Bunnell and Kremsater 1994).

Given the salience of biodiversity conservation, it is thus unlikely that a National Forest Programme (NFP) could be devised that ignored the idea. Indeed, an NFP may seem an ideal way to promote a standardized approach to biodiversity, one which incorporates the concerns of different interests while responding to the lessons learned by forest managers on the ground. However, whether NFPs contribute to the development of successful biodiversity policies is an open question, one that raises the much broader issue of how to evaluate NFPs. From the political scientist's point of view, that means treating the NFP as a new kind of institutional arrangement. NFPs are intended to create new structures of rules and principles that will constrain self-interested actors in the forest policy arena. As Bernauer (1995: 351) puts it, "institutions are choice variables" and it thus becomes important to know whether we have chosen wisely and how our choice can be improved upon in future. This in turn, requires evaluation of the impact of the NFP: what have been its effects and are they the desired ones?

These may seem fairly trivial questions, to be answered by pointing out that a properly constituted NFP will include a set of objectives together with the criteria and indicators that will allow evaluation of progress towards each objective. This answer, however, begs two important questions. First, even if the indicators suggest that progress is being made in the desired direction, it is not necessarily the NFP that is responsible for the change. The change may have happened in its absence. Indeed, for all we know, the change may be happening in spite of the NFP, which is acting as an impediment to a secular process of change quite unconnected with its own existence. Second, even if we can succeed in showing causal connections between the existence of a NFP and progress towards meeting the Programme's objectives, this does not necessarily mean that the objectives themselves have been well-chosen. After all, the overall goal of a NFP is to make a difference in the world, not merely to meet its own objectives. We cannot assume that meeting self-defined goals is a criterion of success. At the very least, there may be unforeseen and unintended consequences of a NFP. At worst, the achievement of internal or endogenous goals in the plan may, in the light of new information or changing public values, be harmful.

In fact, most NFPs are already designed in ways that, potentially at least, address the problem of how to evaluate the Programme against exogenous as well as endogenous goals. That is, they include provisions for partnership and participation by all affected interests. Often, the participatory requirement is seen in a rather crudely instrumental way as a means of providing legitimacy to the programme: by involving different interests we can ensure that they "buy in" to the final product. While participation can perform this useful function, participation is also a vital safeguard that the programme actually addresses real problems of forest policy and forest management as perceived by members of the forest policy community and, perhaps, the wider attentive public. In an ideal world, the participation and partnership mechanisms would allow NFPs to be real exercises in problem-solving. In reality, of course, some interests are more easily able to impose their own problem definitions than others, a fact which will be reflected in the

NFP and will provide good reasons for not taking the Programme's own goals and objectives as the ultimate standard for evaluation. However, participatory exercises will also provide a record of alternative problem definitions: those not included or only partly acknowledged in the final Programme will at least be available to the researcher. The record of participation can provide that larger evaluatory framework which, while enabling NFPs to be conceptualized as exercises in problem solving, does not restrict evaluation to the problem set that actually found its way into the objectives in the Programme.

The question of how to formulate counterfactual hypotheses in order to determine whether change would have occurred independently of a NFP is more difficult. This fairly general problem in the social sciences is usually addressed by comparative analysis, though it is sometimes extremely difficult to find appropriate comparative examples. Comparing one country with another will often be unsatisfactory, varying the wrong conditions for the purposes of the analysis. The short study that follows takes advantage of the Canadian situation, where provincial jurisdiction over forestry provides counterfactual examples of an issue that is addressed by one province prior to the implementation of a NFP and measured against the performance of the other provinces within the Programme.

2. THE NATIONAL FOREST STRATEGY, 1992-97

A preliminary illustration of this approach to evaluating NFPs as broadly-defined exercises in problem solving is provided by the inclusion of several objectives relating to biodiversity in the most recent Canadian National Forest Strategy (NFS). Canada's NFS is constrained by a number of features of the Canadian political system. Most significantly, Canada has a federal system of government and constitutional responsibility for forest resources lies firmly in the hands of the provinces through their jurisdiction over Crown (public) lands. Though the federal government has some constitutional leverage by virtue of its responsibility for international trade and its ability to enter into international agreements, provincial jurisdiction over forestry issues is jealously guarded. For many provinces, forestry on Crown lands is a significant source of revenue, both directly through licenses and stumpage, and indirectly through taxation of the forest industry and its employees (Howlett and Rayner 1994).

Although the federal government has often tried to assume a coordinating role in forest policy, lacking regulatory powers its most effective policy instrument has been financial incentives in the form of federal-provincial cost-sharing agreements. In recent years, even this form of federal involvement has been dramatically reduced, the victim of federal deficit-cutting and the general hostility of the provinces towards federal spending in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Thus, attention has shifted to the possibility of using other policy instruments that might provide some coordination of forest policy without offending provincial sensibilities. The Canadian Forestry Service (CFS) has long played an important role in research and education but, beginning in 1981, an effort was made to provide some overall guidance or strategic direction with the publication by the CFS of "A Forest Sector Strategy for Canada." The idea was

expanded upon by the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers (CCFM), a federal-provincial inter-ministerial forum with a small secretariat of permanent public servants, which sponsored the next Strategy in 1987. The immediate policy context of both initiatives was a series of projections that Canada would be unable to maintain its position as a major forest-products exporting nation in the face of a looming domestic timber supply shortage. The policy problem to which the Strategies were supposed to be coordinating a solution was largely defined as under-investment in silviculture and the Strategies helped legitimize federal-provincial cost sharing agreements that provided money for backlog reforestation.

The policy context had changed dramatically when the third strategy was formulated in 1992. Several years of intense conflict between provincial governments and environmentalists over forest practices and demands for new protected areas had culminated in a successful consumer boycott campaign against Canadian forest products in European and American markets. This time around, the policy problem had less to do with sustaining and improving fibre yield and more with aligning the public face of Canadian forestry as quickly as possible with the global movement for sustainable development. The overall objective of the new strategy, which was developed through a series of public forums held in 1991, was "to maintain and enhance the long-term health of our forest ecosystems, for the benefit of all living things, both nationally and globally, while providing environmental, economic, social and cultural opportunities for the benefit of present and future generations (Canada... 1992) Clearly, this kind of "motherhood" statement of principle offers very little help in evaluating the impact of the strategy, encompassing goals that manage to be both vaguely defined and potentially in conflict with one another, but it does provide evidence of the general policy problem to which it is a response.

Since, in the antagonistic Canadian constitutional context of the 1990s, the NFS could not rely on substantive instruments to reach its objectives, the Strategy turned to procedural instruments (Howlett 1999) to promote opportunities for cooperation between jurisdictions and organizations that might otherwise be engaged in destructive competition. Chief amongst these procedural instruments is the idea of public comparative evaluation. The signatories to the Accord that launched the NFS publicly affirmed their acceptance of the commitments that make up the Strategy and there is thus a weak negative incentive not to be perceived as obstructive or slow to fulfil the commitments. More positively, the NFS was designed to facilitate the comparison of approaches among the different jurisdictions through mid-term and final evaluations carried out by an independent panel created by and reporting to the CCFM and is thus a modest effort in intentional policy learning, at least in the form of policy transfer (Howlett 1998).

Unfortunately, the Final Evaluation of the NFS, though a gigantic task, offers very limited information about the success or failure of the NFS as an institutional choice. The evaluators worked with the objectives and criteria found in the Strategy and commented only on the extent to which the principal signatories, the provinces and territories, had fulfilled their commitments. That is, they took the objectives at face value, they did not question what impact success or failure in meeting commitments has had on the forest itself, and they did not ask whether the signatories might have achieved more or less in the absence of a NFS or with a differently designed one. By

looking at just one part of the Strategy, its commitments on biodiversity conservation, it is possible to sketch how a more comprehensive approach to the evaluation of NFPs could contribute to improved institutional design.

Biodiversity

A significant part of the strategy was a response to the growing interest in biodiversity conservation as a forest management goal. The first of nine "Strategic Directions" encompassed "Forest Stewardship" and proposed to "conserve the natural diversity of our forests, maintain and enhance their productive capacity, and provide for their continued renewal" (National Forest Strategy Coalition 1997). This was eventually operationalized as eleven commitments, five covering forest ecosystems and six on biodiversity. Something of the state of the policy debate about biodiversity conservation in 1992 can be gauged from the fact that the first of these commitments (1.6) was to agree upon a definition of biodiversity! The others were to "work towards" the completion of representative network of protected areas by the year 2000 (1.8), to create a working definition of "old-growth forests" (1.9), and to develop forest management guidelines to protect genetic, species and habitat diversity, as well as to incorporate specific measures to maintain biodiversity in management plans (1.10 and 1.11). Finally, the CCFM committed itself to establish national reporting system on the state of forest biodiversity by 1995 (1.7).

The Final Evaluation noted very uneven progress with biodiversity commitments, both at the level of individual jurisdictions and in the aggregate. The Final Evaluation ranked commitments as "fulfilled" (13%), "substantial progress" (38%), "some progress" (38%) and "little progress" (8%), where the numbers in parentheses refer to the percentage of all commitments in the Strategy found in that particular category. While the evaluators felt that substantial progress had been made on one commitment, the development of guidelines, some progress had been made in defining biodiversity, completing the protected area networks and protecting old-growth, little progress had been made on including specific measures to protect biodiversity in management plans or in reporting on the state of biodiversity in the nation's forests. No commitments had been fulfilled. Thus, the signatories record on biodiversity was rather poor; in fact, it was significantly worse than their performance on the Strategy as a whole. In each case the evaluation found the biodiversity commitments to be of continuing relevance and, presumably, as candidates for inclusion in future strategies.

Probing a little more deeply, it is clear that there remains considerable conflict about the meaning of biodiversity and the precise role that biodiversity conservation should play in forest management. The Final Evaluation (1997: 1-14) includes a perfectly candid statement of the two exogenous objectives that are actually motivating the emphasis on biodiversity conservation: "National-level information on species and habitats enables a preventive approach to conserving and managing biodiversity, *protecting market access for Canada's forest products.* Providing an ecological knowledge infrastructure could be the single most important step towards *sustainable forest management.*" In other words, there is an instrumental view, common in the forest products industry, that sees a biodiversity strategy as the price that has to paid to

maintain market access in the face of the consumer boycott threat. On the other hand, there is an evolving view that the scientific basis of sustainable forest management must shift from one based on a relatively simple and static conception of respecting the carrying capacity of a resource to one that understands natural systems as inherently complex and wishes to see reductions in the rate of harvest to preserve a large margin for error in the face of such complexity. (Worster 1994)) The difficulty of reconciling these two objectives in practices makes it unlikely that the biodiversity commitments can be kept. At the same time, it gives greater urgency to the role of the NFS in promoting policy transfer from jurisdictions where some working compromise has been achieved to those where progress is less advanced. What is the evidence that policy transfer has taken place and, equally important, what is the evidence that the NFS is responsible?

Some evidence of how a biodiversity strategy might work in the absence of the NFS is provided by events in British Columbia (BC). There biodiversity conservation arrived early on the policy agenda through the conflict between the industry and environmentalists over logging in the coastal temperate rainforest. By 1989, guidelines had been developed in connection with two of the most controversial forest management licences on the west coast of Vancouver Island. The affected licensees themselves pressured the government to create a level playing field by extending the guideline's scope and a technical committee was struck with representation from both industry and the environmental movement to devise biodiversity guidelines for the entire coast. Intensification of the conflict, with civil disobedience and consumer boycotts, resulted in the draft guidelines produced by the technical committee being rolled into the more comprehensive Forest Practices Code in the form of a Biodiversity Guidebook. The Guidebook's approach is to offer prescriptions that would maintain the distribution of seral stages in a forest within the range of the relevant Natural Disturbance Type. Alternative prescriptions are ranked in terms of risk to natural biodiversity and form the basis of different "biodiversity emphasis options" used in land use planning.

The result has been that, while the Final Evaluation of the NFS shows BC as one of the few provinces to have made substantial progress on all biodiversity-related commitments, it has done so outside the framework of the NFS. In addition, developments in BC do not seem to have been passed on in the form of policy transfer to other jurisdictions. BC has its own working definition of biodiversity, while the other provinces have picked up definitions from a variety of sources, including the Canadian Biodiversity Strategy (3), the Biological Diversity Convention (1), the CCFM working definition of biodiversity (1) and the UN (1). In this instance, the NFS has provided little impetus for standardizing on a working definition, a fact that is hampering the development of national reporting on the state of forest biodiversity. Without such reporting, it is impossible to determine whether policies are actually improving matters on the ground or not.

A similar story could be told with respect to progress on the development of a representative network of protected areas and their use as "ecological benchmarks" to track biodiversity conservation in surrounding areas. While the provinces and territories have made varying efforts to develop protected areas, there has been very little standardization of reporting representativeness according to eco-region classification,

making comparison and national reporting difficult. Further analysis would undoubtedly show that these variations could be explained by local circumstances which outweighed the standardizing impetus of the NFS. Very little work has been done on the use of protected areas as benchmarks. As the Final Evaluation Report notes, in many cases (with the exception of Parks Canada [a federal agency] and BC) inventory and wildlife monitoring often cease when an area is designated as protected. Despite the fact that developing a consistent ecological classification of forest lands and developing a *representative* system of protected areas were both highlighted in the mid-term evaluation as issues in need of particular attention, little progress had been made by 1997, except at the level of individual provinces and territories.

4. CONCLUSION

This brief analysis of progress on biodiversity conservation in Canada is not intended as a general criticism of NFPs. Many of the problems and disappointments of Canada's NFS can be traced to special features of the Canadian institutional landscape and to the continuing controversy surrounding the concept of biodiversity itself. Nonetheless there are lessons to be learned. First, although the NFS is the closest thing to a NFP, this Canadian variant shares some features of an international regime, since the Strategy relies very heavily on voluntary cooperation between governments which are, to all intents and purposes, sovereign bodies in this particular policy sector. The specific conclusion that might be drawn from the Canadian experience is that, in these circumstances, procedural instruments are too weak to achieve objectives and a NFS needs to be backed up by substantive policy instruments in critical areas, most likely in the form of incentives. Where the fiscal or institutional climate makes this impossible, the NFP is likely to fall short of expectations.

The second and more general conclusion that I wish to draw, however, concerns the importance of taking comprehensive evaluation seriously. The chief drawback of rational choice approaches to planning and forest management is a tendency to confuse the plan or programme itself with the implementation of the plan or programme. That is, because the programme is devised in such a way as to make it rational for actors to engage in the various goal-directed or problem-solving ways that the plan is trying to promote, it is assumed that they will then do so. As Gordon Baskerville remarked some years ago in the context of forest management plans, a plan achieves nothing. Implementing the plan may or may not achieve the plan's objectives. Furthermore, as I have suggested, even achieving the internal objectives of the plan may not satisfy the various constituencies who matter in the forest policy community and whose support is essential. The wrong problem-definitions may have been adopted in a plan, and it is important that evaluation be able to point this out by appealing to the wider policy context in which a NFP is set.

Finally, we must take evaluation seriously because NFPs are not without competition. To return to Bernauer's remark, they are a choice amongst alternatives. At least two serious competitors have emerged. One is the eco-certification movement, essentially a non-institutional market-driven response to the consumer-boycott threat. The other, as

the fate of Canada's NFS illustrates, is a focus on sub-national initiatives. In both cases, as Peter Glück has observed (1996), the result is a confusion of standards, criteria and indicators that makes the development of a fair international forest regime more difficult. But, as the Canadian example illustrates once again, many NFPs will be, in the first instance, a response to the domestic forest policy agenda. They will have to demonstrate that they are the best institutional choice for the job if they are to survive and prosper. If they cannot do so, they will be remembered only as another passing policy fashion.

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NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES – SUBSTANTIAL OR SYMBOLIC CO-ORDINATION?

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to discuss whether the significance of *National Forest Programmes* (NFPs), as discussed in the follow-up processes of UNCED, is of substance or if it is mainly based on symbolic co-ordination within its context of international deliberations. After a short introduction possible reasons which led to NFPs being of such central importance in international deliberations are discussed. Especially due to the strong expert-based inputs and the reflection of developments in modern political science, theories in the processes are understood as an indication that NFPs are of substantial significance in international deliberations. The second part of the paper than focuses on whether NFPs are also of substantial significance for national forest policies in Europe. It is argued that the significance of NFPs at the country level depends very much on how the aspects of policy planning and of policy co-ordination inherent with NFPs can be brought into concordance. It is argued that institutional arrangements as the third inherent aspect of NFPs can enable such concordance and hence seem to not only have a key role in the successful formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe.

Keywords: National Forest Programmes, Policy Planning, Policy Co-ordination, Institutional Arrangements

1. INTRODUCTION

The call to introduce *National Forest Programmes* has been a recurring theme in international negotiations on moving towards the sustainable management, conservation and sustainable development of forests for over five years. For the first time since the

demise of Agenda 21 from the 1992 UNCED Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the demands for the formulation of *National Forest Programmes* have been internationally set down. Corresponding sections are contained in all four programme areas in Chapter 11 "Combating Deforestation" (UNCED 1992).

As of its second sitting, the formulation and implementation of NFPs has become a central focus in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), in charge of further implementing the Rio Agreements. The NFP retained this central importance in the IPF's further sittings and was expressed in their final report to the Commission of Sustainable Development:

> *"The Panel: (a) Encouraged countries, in accordance with their national sovereignty, specific country conditions and national legislation, to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate national forest programmes, which include a wide range of approaches for sustainable forest management, taking into consideration the following: consistency with appropriate - international agreements; partnership and participatory mechanisms to involve interested parties; recognition and respect for customary and traditional rights of, inter alia, indigenous people and local communities; secure land tenure arrangements; holistic, intersectoral and iterative approaches; ecosystem approaches that integrate the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of biological resources; and adequate provision and valuation of forest goods and services; ..." (UN-CSD-IPF 1996: para. 17)*

As is well known, only a few of the actions proposed by the IPF and submitted to the UN General Assembly in June 1997 by the Commission for Sustainable Development were actually taken up. One of these was the urgent need for "...countries to develop national forest programmes in accordance with their respective national conditions, objectives and priorities" (UN-Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 1997: annex, para. 39).

The formulation and implementation of NFPs can be expected to retain this central importance for the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF), responsible for continuing the work of the IPF process and for developing recommendations for a legally binding International Convention on Forests (UN-ESC-IFF 1997).

Despite the proven importance of NFPs in international discussion, it is still not possible to draw any conclusions as to their significance for structure and co-ordination within the national forestry sectors. These will not become apparent until their practical integration into the forestry sectors. Inference as to the real significance of NFPs can be made by examining the reasons which led to them being of such central importance in international discussions. Secondly, certain conclusions can be drawn from forest policy discourses on the national level about the pros and cons of NFPs. At this level, the analysis of the significance for national forest policies is restricted to the European view, as there is relatively little experience with *National Forest Programmes*. Furthermore, the call for formulation and implementation of NFPs is new in Europe, and this very newness is a barrier for the decades-old, and in some cases centuries-old, traditions and institutions in the respective forestry sectors.

2. SIGNIFICANCE OF NFPS IN INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS

The ultimate goals of NFPs are ordinarily regarded as being "...the conservation, management and sustainable development of all types of forests" (UN-FAO 1997) and, in most general terms "...the achievement of sustainable forest management" (UN-CSD-IPF 1997, para. 8; Egestad 1999). A basic consensus about the necessity of conservation in forests and forestry does exist among all the parties involved. However, due to the widely differing situations, conditions and requirements world-wide, the measures and programmes given priority by each country are equally divergent. While in some regions the conservation of forests is seen as the goal of sustainable forest management, others regard it as the prerequisite for higher, further-reaching goals, such as the preservation of the manifold aspects of forests as well as safeguarding forestry output. Similarly, the perception of the best-suited ways and means to ensure sustainable forest management varies greatly. For this reason, it is impossible to speak of a unified definition of the problem common to all parties involved in international discussions.

When despite these problems a certain consensus is reached, and, as in the case of NFPs, is defined as being of central importance to the outcome of the discussions, then two interpretations are possible – that the achieved agreement is seen as a policy capsule with nothing but symbolic meaning, or, it is seen as a system-rational approach to the problem. It is assumed here that inter-governmental power, such as the appointment of countries to certain positions by others exercising their power potential, is of lesser importance within the framework of the IPF/IFF process, and that the countries involved, or their representatives, act from within their national sovereignty. This assumption seems to be justified, in so far as the development of discussions – at least so far – in no way reflect the usual inter-governmental power structures, e.g. between North and South, and that the IPF and IFF are basically only pre-decision making committees.

NFPs as symbolic co-ordination

A first interpretation is that the regularity with which the call for formulation and implementation of NFPs recurs in international discussions on forests, and its central place in these discussions, could be due to the fluffy and rather hollow nature of NFPs. This interpretation is supported by the, at times, vague formulations and imprecise definitions and elements ascribed to NFPs, which leave sufficient latitude for the various interests and interpretations of the countries involved. Whether this symbolic co-ordination is a strategy consciously chosen by certain parties, or simply the result of lacking consensus on content due to the different interests and viewpoints of the participant countries, is of lesser importance. In both cases, the ambiguous and imprecise wording allows participants of most widely differing standpoints to agree with them, since any binding elements can be easily watered down through the freedom of interpretation.

If one accepts this interpretation, NFPs would fall into the category of co-ordination through a symbolic "policy capsule". This brings about an integration of ideas based on mutual communication during the international discussions, but, because of their

ambiguity, they would have no immediate significance for the countries involved or their respective forestry sectors (Elder and Cobb 1983: 119f).

It must be remembered here that even symbolic co-ordination can have significant effects on matters, due to their symbolic function. Not least of all, the symbolic power can lead to the "policy capsule" being converted from the symbolic charter into a real treatise with immediate, significant consequences. This possibility is especially likely, as in tropical and sub-tropical countries specific experience with the Tropical Forest Action Plans, Master Plans and National Forest Programmes exists, which could lead to concrete meaning being integrated into the NFPs as discussed at the international level.

It is also this specific experience of NFPs in various countries, seen in the context of the latest international discussions, that makes the second interpretation concerning the importance of NFPs as concepts in international negotiations more likely than that of NFPs being merely a symbolic "policy capsule".

NFPs as a substantial approach

The second possible interpretation about the recurrence of NFPs in international discussions as a rational approach of real substance can be supported by two lines of argumentation: one taking up the amount of expert-based input and the modern understanding of policy planning in the IPF-/IFF-processes and the second looking at general reflections of recent political science insights in the discussions.

a) Expert-based input and policy planning
The first line of argumentation is based on an extension of Principle-Agent theories, and holds that the course of the international discussions as well as their results are more influenced by the positions and opinions of the individual representatives (agents) than those of the participating countries (principles).

Due to the fact that the position of each country is not normally fixed, each representative enjoys some degree of freedom/flexibility, so while representing their countries, they are not under direct control of their patron nation (Puntnam 1988). As a result, the cultural and, especially, professional backgrounds of the individual participants have a considerable influence on the outcome of the proceedings. Every time the participating experts fulfil the criteria of professional objectivity, a context-based, rational problem solving approach has the best chance of success (Mayntz 1993: 53).

The IPF process and, as a result, the NFPs reveal a high degree of expert input. The influence of, among other things, the international workshop "Expert Consultation on Implementing the Forest Principles – Promotion of National Forest and Land Use Programmes" in Feldafing, Germany, June 1996 (German Foundation for International Development 1996) and of the work of the Forestry Adviser Group (e.g. Forestry Advisers' Group 1995; for a literature overview confer also Liss 1999) are apparent. The central position of the NFPs in international discussions could therefore be seen as the result of the largely professional identity of the delegates working objectively towards a rational-judicious form of problem solving, initially only basically influenced by the expectations and partiality of their patron countries. This explanation is supported by the fact that however vague the principles and elements of the NFP-

concept at the international level may be, they are essentially based on the theoretical characteristics of policy planning and policy co-ordination, though not on the erroneous expectations and developments of policy planning of the mid-1960s and 1970s.

The basic intention of policy planning in the mid-60's and 70's was to improve the quality and effectiveness of policy making, by increasing the rationality, and ensuring the long-term orientation of policy decisions, and, thirdly, by better co-ordinating the decisions of the separate actors (Scharpf 1979: 22). This original intention failed inasmuch as the paradoxes contained in policy planning drove the basic premise of "objective rationality" *ad absurdum*, and naturally failed in practice (Scharpf 1979: 23).

Furthermore, what was notably missing from the original concept of policy planning was the knowledge that policy formulation is not a one-way process from state to society, but rather a complex interaction between various sectors of society. In a democratic society, the state can only be seen as an abstract body whose representatives are merely part of local, regional and national network structures. This, in turn, leads to a diminished view of the state as "ruler", as well as an increased demand for consensus-building activities (Mayntz 1993: 41). The political system is interwoven with the functionally differentiated society, which is why all policy co-ordination must of necessity be "reflexive, co-operative, concordant, corporate or decentralised" (Druwe and Görlitz 1992: 148). So, it is clear that the potentiality and limits of policy planning and policy co-ordination are above all dependent on how successfully effective policy consensus and negotiation processes can be achieved (Scharpf 1979: 27).

Modern theory in policy planning and policy co-ordination is for this reason no longer concerned with setting and achieving apparently "objective" goals, rather with pragmatic co-ordination which, like the original intentions of policy planning, aims to effect policy with a view to solutions and long term orientation , but based on procedural rationality, and dependent on given implementation structures (See Table 1).

The fact that the stipulations about "specific elements" and "principles and key elements" in the conceptual discussions about NFPs in the IPF-/IFF-processes affirm the new concept of policy planning, and policy co-ordination is not the only reason supporting the interpretation that they can be seen as having meaningful content. More importantly, these elements, agreed upon within the IPF process, reflect the cornerstones and development of contemporary political science theories.

Table 1. Changes in concepts of policy planning (adapted after Glück 1997). Policy planning and co-ordination based on the following assumptions:

old understanding as: "active" politics	modern understanding as: control and co-ordination
• hierarchical relationship between state and society	• governance processes in policy networks or bargaining systems
• 'public interest' can be measured participation	• 'public interest' enhanced through
• scientifically based forecasts ensuring long-term orientation	• adaptive and iterative process, social learning
• state with implementation power, no consensus necessary	• consensus building processes as a basic necessity

b) Reflecting political science development

How well the proposals of the IPF reflect current political theory discussion in the areas of policy planning and co-ordination can be seen, for example, in the central elements of the report about its fourth session (UN-CSD-IPF 1997, para. 9):

"The Panel emphasised a number of specific elements that need to be considered during the development and implementation of national forest programmes, in particular the need for *appropriate participatory mechanisms* to involve all interested parties; *decentralisation*, where applicable, and empowerment of regional and local government structures; consistent with the constitutional and legal frameworks of each country, recognition and respect for customary and traditional rights of, inter alia, indigenous people, local communities, forest dwellers and forest owners; secure land tenure arrangements; and the establishment of *effective co-ordination mechanisms* and *conflict-resolution schemes*." [emphasis by the author]

"Regardless of the approach adopted by individual countries, national forest programmes, as *long-term iterative processes*, should recognise the following as key elements: national sovereignty and country leadership; consistency with national policies and international commitments; integration with the country's sustainable development strategies; *partnership and participation*; and *holistic and intersectoral approaches*." [emphasis by the author]

Thus, the call for NFPs to be set up as a "*long-term iterative process*" takes the uncertainty of the future as a constitutional condition of policy into account by highlighting the procedural rationality of the process as a central foundation, and by emphasising the necessity of flexible and iterative processes, as they appear in the foundations of recent "social learning" or "policy learning" theories. Important implications for the formulation of learning processes in the institutional sector – depending on the respective societal and natural conditions – can be drawn from theoretical analyses of learning subjects, learning context and learning successes in society.

Due to the tension between formulation and implementation, policy planning processes are often related with conflicts. The question of the formulation of "*conflict-resolution schemes*" is fundamental in determining the success or failure of policies (Lee 1993: 113). The role of the state or the political system also plays a major role, as does the interplay between centralised and decentralised power. Here, modern policy network theories and theories on negotiation systems can make a major contribution to mutual understanding and concrete formulation, by making, for example, policy networks more tangible (cf. e.g. Mayntz 1993), or by highlighting the importance of interaction in various arenas of negotiations (cf. e.g. Benz 1992). Of course, networks and negotiation systems do not stop at the borders of policy sectors, which is why "*holistic and intersectoral*" approaches can be assumed indispensable prerequisites for policy planning, even if this was overlooked in the past, or they are difficult to realise in practice.

The fruitfulness of network and negotiation approaches can be applied to the call for "*partnership*" and "*participatory mechanisms*". The idea behind participation may first of all be to capture the procedural rationality thereby ensuring that the direction taken by the policy makers is the one desired by society, through the involvement of many contributors (Stankey 1996: 106). However, newer theories suggest that the involvement of as many contributors as possible is much more a prerequisite for all

kinds of policy planning as a kind of self-regulation – to be understood as "co-ordination by a co-ordinated co-ordinator" (Hejl 1992: 125).

Along with participation, questions of the society and suitable "*co-ordination mechanisms*" come up as it seems as only already focused interests have the necessary connections to the political system which form the basis for being heard in political decision making processes (Münch 1992: 83). An agreed necessity is that sufficient capacity for formulation and implementation exists in the society in the first place. "*Capacity building*" aims to strengthen the institutional and organisational structures, so that they are independent of external support. Studies in national environmental planning thereby show that the informational and communicational capacity of a society are more important than the traditional culture (Jänicke 1997: 12).

3. SIGNIFICANCE OF NFPS FOR NATIONAL FORESTRY SECTORS IN EUROPE

The significance for national forestry sectors in Europe of international agreements to ensure the conservation, sustainable management and sustainable development of forests is primarily dependent on the content and the level of abstraction and obligation laid out in the agreements. It is still not clear whether there will be an agreement on a binding international convention on forests in the near future or not. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that even today, without any legal obligations in effect, a high degree of pressure to justify all actions and processes is on all countries, and their governments, involved in the ongoing international deliberations. This pressure is increased by the fact that not only agreements from the IPF and IFF processes have effects on forests. These are only two of many international charters on the environment such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, also covering the management, conservation and sustainable development of forests, thereby also affecting national forestry sectors.

If one accepts the second interpretation that the consistent and agreed relevance of NFPs in the IPF-/IFF-process is not only due to their symbolic effect, but rather to their substantial content, then it is clear that changes will need to occur in the decades-old institutions and organisational structures within European forestry sectors if they are to be implemented on national levels. Only few European countries possess the necessary participatory structures to allow all involved parties access to forest policy planning processes of the type called for by the NFPs. Rather, it has been the case that in order to protect certain interests, and to prevent outside interference, any attempts to introduce these kinds of measures have been vehemently opposed. Even the establishment of appropriate co-ordination mechanisms and conflict resolution schemes in Europe is restricted to hierarchical co-ordination by the state forestry authority and the conflict-alleviating buffer effect of the state forest areas and its particular form of forest management. Since only very few of Europe's national forestry sectors have an organisational and institutional structure reflecting the *key elements* or *specific principles* of NFPs, the strategy used by some countries of re-naming their traditional existing regulation and co-ordination mechanisms National Forest Programmes can therefore be seen as tactical and thus short-lived.

NFP		
Procedural Aspect	**Processual Aspect**	**Programmatic Aspect**
Planning procedure:	Planning process:	Planning content:
• Situation analysis	• Identification of actors	• Content and bindingness
• Strategy development	• Co-ordination mechanisms	• Objections
• Choice of strategy	• Communication strategies	• Instruments
	• Institutionalisation: Markets - Hierarchies - Networks	
"*Policy planning*"	"*Institutional Arrangements*"	"*Policy co-ordination*"
Formulation		
	Implementation	

Table 2. Inherent aspects of NFPs and their concordance/reflexivity by their formulation and implementation.

Therefore, it seems obvious that the formulation and implementation of NFPs in most European countries will be met with resistance and conflict. Particularly those countries with federalist structures and powerful interest groups in the forestry sector pose the danger of allowing the NFPs a purely symbolic significance (Glück and Krott 1990). The successful establishment of the NFPs will depend on how well consensus and negotiation can be achieved, not by working against the ever present power and interest structures, but rather by using these. In order to grasp the different power and interest structure which might occur in relation to NFPs, it seems helpful to take a deeper look at the different aspects inherent in NFPs. In theory, three ideal types of aspects inherent to NFPs can be identified (cf. Table 2).

The reduction of NFPs to symbolic co-ordination is most likely if procedural and programmatic aspects do not go together or, in other words, if formulation makes implementation impossible (see Table 2). If one accepts this ideal type, distinction of aspects inherent to NFPs, it becomes obvious that the design of institutional arrangements is of major importance in the success or failure of NFPs due to its critical position between policy planning and policy co-ordination. The central importance of the institutional arrangements is not at least acknowledged by the fact that almost all *"key elements"* and *"basic principles"*, as agreed upon in international discussions (Egestad 1998), apply almost exclusively to the institutional arrangements of the planning process.

Institutional arrangements as a central focus

The area of institutional arrangements seems to be the most appropriate starting point for the successful establishment of NFPs aiming at substantial co-ordination in Europe.

The countries most affected by the development and strengthening of their forest sectors by NFPs will be those which are currently, after decades of central governmental control, in the transition towards democratic and market economy structures. Besides strengthening the forestry sector within its national economic and political context, it can be assumed that for the majority of European countries, the potential of the NFPs lies more in the strategic improvement of existing, or in the evolution of new, institutions and their adaptation to the continually changing conditions of modern society.

The social developments in most European countries over recent years have brought major changes to all forms of industry, not only to forestry. The long-held view of the market and of hierarchy as the appropriate instruments of co-ordination for society and the individual has become increasingly questioned as society challenges traditional relationships and practices.

This has lead to the loss of classical orientations and established certainties. As a reaction to these changes, new network-style institutional arrangements such as cooperation and strategic alliances are gaining in importance. Only a few years ago, in the context of the classic dichotomy between state and market, these arrangements would have been unthinkable. Although such processes often involve higher transaction costs, these are outweighed by the advantages: reduction of uncertainty, greater access to information, trustworthiness, flexibility and responsiveness, to name the most important ones (Powell 1996).

It is becoming apparent in European forestry sectors, that after a long period of relatively stable orientation, the social and economic changes are leading to increasing orientation difficulties and social conflict. According to Hellström and Reunala, in their comparative study, one major cause of the conflict in Europe is the failure by the traditional forestry authorities and institutions to recognise the social changes and thus to create new, appropriate strategies (Hellström and Reunala 1995). Many of the modern demands made on forestry, e.g. the globalisation of markets for forest products or the changes in relation to transition processes in former socialist countries, exceed the co-ordination abilities of the existing institutional structures and require co-ordination and development at a national level. A recent example of this is the problems experienced by central European forestry when faced with international certification initiatives, which are heavily influenced by environmental protection groups. This illustrates the need for appropriate institutional structures to be installed in many European countries to address the problem of strategic realignment in the forestry sector.

The apprehension of the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe is that more specific content would lead to a restriction of the freedom enjoyed to now. It can be expected that, at least for some actors, the formulation and implementation of NFPs would lead to a rise in transaction costs. At the same time, however, certain advantages in the strategic area through institutional reorganisation would balance this out. That is why, if the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe is to go beyond a purely symbolic form, formulation and implementation must focus on the design of institutional arrangements. Where the content is concerned, this should remain less specific, similar to the national forestry laws. As fitting to the modern view of policy planning, the rationality should centre on the planning process and not on the plan itself.

Therefore, a unified definition of sustainable forest management is by no means a prerequisite for NFPs. On the contrary, various views and understandings of the term by the actors involved in the planning process are the prerequisite for rationality of policy planning in the process of formulation and implementation of NFPs. Neither can the results of the planning procedure decided on for the NFP imply a unified understanding of sustainable forest management. Rather, it is to be understood as a strategy which is considered by the responsible actors, in a given situation, at a given time to be the most appropriate. Policy co-ordination in connection with NFPs should be limited to ensuring that suitable institutional structures are created, which give credence to all interpretations of sustainable forest management as they relate to social context within the planning process. Secondly, the planning process should be ongoing and iterative.

Appropriate institutional arrangements

The appropriateness of the institutional arrangements is highly dependent on the situation and context, which makes generalisations very difficult, if not impossible to make. Network arrangements seem to be a very promising approach to the re-orientation of the institutional structures of national forestry sectors. Essential elements contained in and promoted by network structures are knowledge, the need for quickness (flexibility, responsiveness) and trust (Powell 1996). The key elements and basic principles ascribed to NFPs such as "capacity building", "conflict resolution patterns" and "co-ordination mechanisms" are aimed directly at these features. Nevertheless, general predications about the concrete design of appropriate institutional arrangements seem impossible. Clues can be taken indirectly from the way in which institutions in dynamic societies deal with the paradoxes of policy co-ordination.

According to Münch, there are four basic paradoxes of policy co-ordination in dynamic societies: the paradox of rationalism, the paradox of instrumental activism, the paradox of individualism and the paradox of universalism (Münch 1992: 100/101). In connection to the formulation and implementation of NFPs, this means that their success relates directly to how well the institutional arrangements can cope with the paradoxes of policy co-ordination resulting from the stipulated content.

Paradox of Rationalism
The paradox of rationalism is based on the recognition that every attempt to control society makes the social circumstances more unpredictable and thus less rationally comprehensible. Therefore, institutional arrangements must be organised so the necessarily varied forms of rationality present in society are made explicit. An example of how this applies to the formulation and implementation of NFPs is that the various equally valid and mutually exclusive interpretations of sustainable forest management must be acknowledged (Schanz 1996). Every institutional planning process which is able to enforce *a "right"* definition of sustainable forest management will inevitably lead to the failure of the NFP. At the same time, it is possible to actively promote the *"appropriateness" of different* interpretations of sustainable forest maintenance , which is a prerequisite for the long term success of a NFP.

Paradox of Instrumental Activism

The Paradox of Instrumental Activism is a result of the complexity and interdependence of society, where every action intended to solve a problem causes a multitude of new problems. Institutional arrangements can, admittedly, not eliminate this problem, but they can increase the problem-solving ability, and put relevant issues onto the problem solving agenda. The greatest danger is that for fear of resulting problems, or in an attempt to prevent them, policy planning becomes neglected or gets lost in qualitative wording. If NFPs are to go beyond symbolic meaning, then the institutional creation of the planning process must concentrate on developing quantitative goals, but not particular content goals.

Paradox of Individualism

The Paradox of Individualism can be shown by the fact that every law designed to protect the freedom of the individual then restricts the perception of these rights to exactly the form of that law. Allowing individual participation in planning processes and emphasising interactive forms such as trust and cooperation, rather than those of market and hierarchy, is an attempt to avoid this problem. The rights of the individual are then not restricted to their perceptions of those rights, but rather safeguarded and increased. The less individual actors are given the opportunity to participate in policy formulation in general, the more likely it is that the NFP will fail in the middle or long term. it is inevitable that individuals must first be put in a position to be able to participate.

Paradox of Universalism

The Paradox of Universalism is based on the fact that every attempt for equality for all members of society in turn creates new inequality. The competition to take advantage of chances becomes so strong that the weaker members are pushed even further to the side. As with the Paradox of Individualism, it is important to place emphasis on the qualities of trust and cooperation. For a NFP, this means that institutional structures must be created which shun the usual pressures between actors, usually resulting in inequality and often covered over with false harmony (Glück and Pleschberger 1982), and instead deal with conflict directly and explicitly.

4. CONCLUSION

The prospect of developing the national forestry sector through the formulation and implementation of NFPs is probably of minor importance to most European countries. The development of transsectoral relations and the subsequent strengthened perception of the forestry sector would bring with it certain advantages. The deciding chance for Europe through the NFPs would above all lie in the strategic renewal of existing institutional structures and their adaptation to new conditions. The creation of institutional planning processes must be a major aspect of the formulation and implementation.

Due to the concordance and reflexivity between institutional arrangements and policy co-ordination, central importance for the implementation of NFPs goes to the design of the planning process, which, at the same time, reduces the opposition to the NFPs and increases their chances of success. After all, the significance of the institutional arrangements arises from their bridging function between formulation and implementation. The creation of the planning process becomes, then, a connecting link between strategic and operational planning.

The ever-changing social environment will require, in general, quick access to information, flexibility and responsiveness from all involved actors if the sustainable management and conservation of forests are to be ensured. The main orientation of institutional arrangements for conservation and ensuring sustainable forest management can no longer only be those of market forces and hierarchies, but rather knowledge, the need for rapid adaptability and trust. The acceptance of policy co-ordination is primarily dependent on the effects the fundamentally related paradoxes have on the actors involved. It seems, therefore, prudent to judge the appropriateness of the institutional arrangements by their ability to deal with the paradoxes of policy co-ordination.

It is obvious that the key points to the success or failure of NFPs, not only in Europe, will be the potential and limitations in the creation and design of institutional structures, as well as their co-ordination capacity and adaptability.

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PART II

DOCUMENTATION OF THE WORKSHOP SESSIONS

CONCEPTUALISING NATIONAL FOREST PROGRAMMES FROM A THEORETICAL POINT OF VIEW

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1. INTRODUCTION

The following report documents the workshop sessions during the international seminar on formulation and implementation of national forest programmes (NFP) which was held from 18-20 May, 1998 in Freiburg, Germany. The report's aim is to present exclusively the main lines of argumentation and results of the work groups. By no means does it contain a complete representation of all single contributions to the discussions or an interpretation of the results.

It is important to remember that the primary point of issue for the entire seminar was the understanding of NFPs similar to the IPF-/IFF-process as "...countryled, broad intersectoral, iterative and holistic approaches for the achievement of sustainable management, conservation, and sustainable development of forests. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests, the term NFP is to be understood as the process used by a country to deal with forest issues, including the planning and implementation of forest and forest-related activities". Planning, in the context of the seminar, was thus under no circumstance to be understood as "... forest-management planning which aims to identify and choose among alternative production and use combinations at the forest management unit level," but as continuous programming and planning of alternative ways of conserving and using forests at the national and subnational level in the medium and long term range.

In order to ensure a common starting point for the linguistic understanding and contentwise background of the seminar participants, two studies on history, terminology, and definitions of NFPs had been prepared in advance of the seminar (Liss 1999; Egestad 1999). Furthermore, country reports had been prepared prior to the seminar by the participating European scientists on the approaches, structures, and procedures concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in different European countries (cf. Volume II of the seminar proceedings). Additionally, supplementary papers submitted in advance had been distributed to all participants for preparation.

The seminar was structured according to the principal aims of the seminar. The first day of the seminar was devoted to the orientation and theoretical foundation within the topic of National Forest Programmes, thereby drawing on experiences with national environmental planning. The second day of the seminar was for analysing the current situation and experiences of approaches, structures, and procedures concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in different European countries. Finally, the third day was for focusing on further research needs of national forest programmes, thereby taking the latest developments in social scientific theories into consideration.

The seminar thereby followed the same procedure on all three days. Introductory and impetus presentations were held in the morning sessions. The topic of the morning sessions was then elaborated on in several workshops in the afternoons. The workshop findings were subsequently presented and discussed in a plenary session at the end of each seminar day.

In order to create a stimulating and fruitful atmosphere necessary for a detailed discussion of the seminar's topic, the group of participants was split into four work groups during all workshop sessions. Participants were assigned to work groups during the first two days. Criteria for assigning participants to work groups had been a balanced representation of the different European regions and an equal representation of experts from the South in all work groups. On the third day, their participation in the different work groups had been left open to the participants according to personal interests.

Each work group was assigned a special task every day, whereby at least two work groups were working parallel on the same assignment. An overview on the daily assignments is given in the following chapters (Chapters 2.1, 3.1, 4.1). In the following the individual work group summaries are documented by those in each case responsible facilitators. Although all work groups were given similar assignments, the individual group summaries reflect very distinctly varying approaches and results. This might seem surprising at first. It is, however, these differences and contrasts, in addition to the remarkable correspondence in the group results, that best reflect the character of the current and highly political concept of NFPs.

2. WORKSHOP 1: WHAT ARE NFPS FROM A SCIENTIFIC POINT OF VIEW?

2.1 Background and Work Group Assignments

The first day was intended to analyse the theoretical foundations of National Forest Programmes and to characterise its effects and meanings from a scientific point of view. The idea was not to provide a new definition for National Forest Programmes, but to analyse the concept of NFPs as stated in the IPF-process from a theoretical/epistemological point of view and to locate it on the scientist's conceptual map. Therefore, this analysis was to take place independently from the prepared country reports on as abstract a level as possible in order to derive an analysis framework for the view of the actual approaches, structures, and procedures concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in different European countries on the second day of the seminar.

In order to focus discussions during the workshops, the seminar organizers provided with the background of the European situation a condensed list out of the *specific elements* and *principles* or *key elements* as mentioned in the IPF report to the Commission for Sustainable Development:

List of elements and principles of NFPs as stated in the IPF reports (cf. Egestad 1999)

Specific elements:

1. Appropriate participatory mechanisms to involve all interested parties;
2. decentralization, where applicable, and
3. empowerment of regional and local government structures consistent with
   the constitutional and legal frameworks of each country;
4. recognition and respect for customary and traditional rights of inter alia,
   indigenous people, local communities, forest dwellers and forest owners;
5. secure land tenure arrangements, and
6. the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms and conflict-resolution schemes.

Principles and key elements:

1. National sovereignty and country leadership;
2. consistency with national policies and international commitments;
3. integration with the country's sustainable development strategies;
4. partnership and participation, and
5. holistic and intersectoral approaches.

Condensed list of elements of NFPs as provided for discussions by the seminar organizers

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1. "Appropriate participatory mechanisms"
2. "National sovereignty and consistency with international commitments"
3. "Respect for customary and traditional rights of local communities and forest owners"
4. "Decentralization"
5. "Holistic and intersectoral approaches"
6. "Empowerment of regional and local government structures" / "Capacity building"
7. "Effective coordination mechanism and conflict-resolution schemes"
8. "legal framework"

The impetus for the workshop session on the first day was created by presentations on "NFPs – Significance of a forest policy framework" (Glück 1999), "NFPs in a global context" (Humphreys 1999), "Limits and problems of policy planning" (Shannon 1999), and the experiences with National Environmental Policy Plans (Jänicke and Jörgens 1999). For workshop session 1 *"What are NFPs from a scientific point of view?"* participants were split into four work groups which were assigned the following topics:

Work groups 1 + 2: "Locating NFPs on the scientist's conceptual map": Critical examination of *purposes and functions* of NFPs as implicitly or explicitly stated in the IPF-process from a scientific point of view

Work groups 3 + 4: "When can something be called a NFP?": Critical examination of *principles and elements* of NFPs as explicitly stated in the IPF-process from a scientific point of view

2.2 Findings of Workshop 1

2.2.1 Work Group 1 (documented by Boon, T.; Lueckge, F.J. & Statz, J.)

Introduction
Discussing the purpose of NFPs inevitably led to semantic discussions on the meaning of words and general considerations:

It was noted, that the purpose of NFPs varies according to whether we focus on the national or international level, and whether we relate it to planning, implementation or evaluation.

It was recognised that norms vary from national to international level and, naturally, between nations. For instance, sustainable forest management could be understood as "meeting the needs of society", but what is society and whose needs are thought of varies according to the level at focus.

When defining the purposes of a National Forest Programme, it is crucial what meaning we put into the words "forest" and "forestry". Is the purpose of a NFP to comprise forest related activities in the broadest sense or should it only relate to forestry in the narrow sense of timber production?

This was discussed in the context of national experiences and related to the discussion as to what degree NFPs should be intersectoral or not.

Purposes of NFPs on an international level
Internationally, NFPs could form the basis for international checking as to whether given procedural standards are fulfilled or not.

Looking at the historical background, Tropical Forestry Action Plans were, at least partly, donor driven processes, adopted by developing countries in order to get assistance from Northern countries.

NFPs cannot substitute international conventions, neither can a cook book for doing a NFP be provided on an international level. NFPs can contribute to, but not be part of, an international regime.

Purposes of NFPs on a national level
At the national level, the main purpose/objective of a NFP is "to enhance forest policy planning including transformative aspects". It was discussed whether it was the tool or just another tool in a series of instruments. Another purpose of a NFP is to bring stakeholders together and compare attitudes. Also, the purpose of a NFP could be/is to be a tool to achieve political commitment.

2.2.2 Work Group 2 (documented by Böswald, K.; Egestad, P. & Schraml, U.)

Introduction

The purpose of the workshop was to provide a critical scientifically based examination of the purposes and functions of the concept NFP as defined by the IPF process. The heading "Locating NFPs on the scientist's conceptual map" was used to frame this intent.

After a short introduction stating the task of the day, the work group members were asked to introduce themselves and to write one card each, stating an initial characterisation/perception of the concept NFP as described in the IPF process. The two characterisations presented by Prof. Glück in the morning session "A substantial new policy framework" and "an empty policy concept" were used as examples. The list of suggestions contained:

What is an NFP to you as a scientist - and why?

- Substantial new policy framework
- Empty policy concept
- Comprehensive policy instrument (2 people)
- Object of research
- Organisational tool of forestry to sustainable development
- Organising framework
- National framework for sustainable forest management (2 people)
- Global framework for planning and action
- Strategy for the role of forestry in sustainable development
- NFP should be part of a more comprehensive/general programme

The intention after this initial warm-up exercise was for each participant to write up three arguments stating *why* they described/characterised an NFP as in the above list. A few examples were initially given. This method turned out to be unsuitable and it was, therefore, subsequently decided by the group to discuss the concept more generally.

Discussion outcome

An element that kept appearing in the discussion was that an NFP arises from Agenda 21 and is based on *sustainable development*. It involves implications in relation to equity, poverty alleviation, democratic process and consultation with all interested parties.

Another central element in the discussion was that NFPs should be principle driven and the principles should be articulated following international negotiations. The principles should help avoid conflict in forest management.

In regards to locating NFP on a conceptual map, the following elements/statements were mentioned in the discussion:

- NFP is not a plan or a product, but a process.
- Preparing NFPs is a participatory process with repeated consultation.
- A participatory process that should create the will to act and ensure commitments at all levels, including the highest.
- NFPs should mobilise political support and facilitate international collaboration.
- An NFP process is iterative and continually evolving. It is a living process.
- An NFP process should not have a narrow focus, but rather span across sectoral boundaries.

Furthermore, the group discussed if the level of detail in the IPF process elements is adequate and how NFPs should be co-ordinated with other initiatives following Agenda 21. It was stated, that NFPs were to be part of a larger development pattern towards sustainable development as outlined in the Agenda 21. An argument in favour of the present level of detail was that conditions vary largely between countries. Despite country variations, should the principles of an NFP be agreed upon by all? As such the principles were seen to be a smallest common denominator.

At the end of the group discussion it was argued that NFPs should be seen as processes that need to evolve and that they, at the present, can be seen as tentative models that provide a useful starting point.

As it appears from the above, the discussion has focused more on what an NFP should be, rather than on why it should be like that. The IPF definition was generally accepted and used. More theoretically based arguments dealing with NFP as a (policy) concept were not brought forward.

2.2.3 Work Group 3 (documented by Hanewinkel, M. & Pregernig, M.)

Introduction

The initial question asked the members of the work group was: „What does NFP as discussed in the IPF process mean to you?" First, it was explained that the IPF is an intergovernmental forum that met for two years and that generated various proposals and recommendations for action. The follow up of the implementation of these proposals will take place in the IFF, which will report to the CSD in 2000. In the following discussion a wide range of different understandings of NFPs were brought forward. NFP are seen as:

- a plan (document) which is national in that it is inclusive of all people in a country.
- a plan for all forest and forest-related issues.
- an integrated operational plan for action, conceptually similar to NEPs.
- an open process for future activities.
- just another (new) name for forest policy.

In principle, the discussion came down to the question of whether NFP is a new policy tool, a plan (in the sense of a document) or a planning process. In this context, the example of Tropical Forestry Action Plans (TFAP) was stated. TFAPs are characterised by a number of typical features. A TFAPs is

1. a strategy to save the forest.
2. a document.
3. an evolving process.
4. the application of a plan (TFAP) at the national level.

At the end of the discussion concerning the meaning of NFP, two different – partly conflicting - views were pointed out:

- Proceeding on the assumption that in order to guarantee flexibility and openness to change, planning must be seen as a process. In this sense, NFPs have to be regarded as planning processes as well.
- From a scientific point of view, it is impossible to pass judgement on what NFPs definitely are (or could be). The prevailing definition as given by the IPF is all-embracing and, at the same time, highly contradictory. From a scientific point of view, it is not possible for a definition to have contradicting elements in it (for practical purposes, contradictions, skillfully hidden, of course, can sometimes even be useful).

Elements of NFPs as stated in the IPF process

In the following, the 8 main elements of an NFP as stated in the IPF process are discussed. These elements have to be regarded as a predominantly *political* definition of a NFP. The members of the discussion group were asked which of the given elements they would judge to be the most important ones.

The following table shows the different elements and their importance, according to the members of the work group (each member had 3 points to place on the different elements):

Element	Number of points	Ranking
• Appropriate participatory mechanisms	8	1
• National sovereignity and consistency with international commitments	4	4
• Respect for customary and traditional rights of local communities and forest owners	4	4
• Decentralization	4	4
• Holistic and intersectoral approaches	5	3
• Empowerment of regional and local government structures / capacity building	4	4
• Effective coordination mechanisms and conflict		
• resolution schemes	7	2
• Legal framework	2	8

As a result of the discussion within the group, an additional principle, namely „Rational problem solving", was added to the list.

The suggestion (brought forward by the facilitators) to discuss the reasons why certain elements could be more important than the others was rejected by the group, because this type of evaluation was not regarded as a scientific question. Instead of that, the group decided to look at these elements and principles from two different angles:

1. How do these elements and principles look like? („*meaning*")
2. What is supposed to happen if these elements and principles are to be implemented? („*consequences*")

Meanings of the elements of NFPs

While in the political process the elements and principles characterising NFPs as well as the concept of NFPs as a whole, are still rather vague, a scientific approach would call for a rigorous usage of terminology and the clear and unequivocal demarcation of the constituent elements of NFPs. For each of the elements and principles stipulated, the members of the group tried to give examples on how these elements could look like (supplementary explanations in *italics*):

1. Appropriate participatory mechanisms:
- Rather a bottom up than a top down approach - (*however, successful participation calls for a balance between a bottom up and a top down approach*).
- Responsibility by *all* stakeholders
- Exchange of information
- Opportunity to influence outcomes
- Action in implementation

2. National sovereignty and consistency with international commitments
- International commitments, by definition, restrict national sovereignty (*thus, there is a tension between these two aspects*). But,
- non-legally binding international instruments may not be contradictory to national sovereignty (*nevertheless, conflict is a likely outcome*).
- Competing claims to ownership

3. Respect for customary and traditional rights
- Rights are ceded by a community and, in exchange, there is an obligation to the community.
- If the right is withdrawn a compensation must be paid.

Open questions:
- Does respect for customary rights only refer to existing rights (i. e. the status quo) or does it comprise non-written, ancestral rights as well?
- How to recognise traditional rights? What is their moral basis? What is their basis in law?
- Should traditional rights encompass basic needs?
- Should recognition of these rights carry with it an obligation?

4. Decentralization (Related to subsidiarity and empowerment of local structures; see 6.)

Two possible meanings:
- (1) A decision must be made at the lowest level possible (*This is often the case, if decentralization becomes a value by itself*).
- (2) A decision must be made at the appropriate level (*which is not necessarily the lowest level; the concept of „subsidiarity", in most cases, is geared towards this interpretation of dencentralization*).

There should be a distinction between:
- (a) Decentralization of policy formulation and
- (b) Decentralization of implementation.

5. Holistic and intersectoral approach
- Carries with it effective participation (*i. e. all actors have to be involved*)

6. Empowerment of local and regional government structures/capacity building (Related to participation [see 1], respect for traditional rights [see 3] and decentralization see 4]).

- Empowerment means to give all actors the capacity to be involved and to negotiate.
- In order to build power, it is necessary (1) to raise people's ability for long term strategic thinking and (2) to mobilise resources (from outside).
- Empowerment requires both empowerment of people and empowerment of institutions (*these two are closely linked*).
- *Capacity building* implies both the capacity to plan and the capacity to implement (*related to the intersectoral dimension*).

7. Coordination and conflict resolution
- Coordination is one aspect of rational problem solving (see 9).
- Coordination is the political aspect of capacity building.
- Successful coordination and conflict resolution assure the ability for decision making.

8. Legal framework
- A difference between the national and the international legal framework has to be made.
- It is obvious that any plan must fit into the *(national)* legal framework. But,
- A strong legal framework is not enough (to implement an NFP). Additional instruments are necessary.
- If the legal framework does not permit effective forest conservation, it may be necessary to change the law (*contested*).
- It makes a difference whether a plan itself has a legal status (i.e. has been passed through the legislature and been made law) or not.
- To have a national legal status, a plan only needs the support of the national political elite. But,
- To be effective, a plan must have widespread support from all sectors of society. Besides legal acceptance, societal acceptance is also of great importance.

9. Rational problem solving. Rational problem solving requires at least the following elements:
- Goal setting (*e.g. decentralisation can generate new ideas*)
- Flexibility to innovation (*Innovation as a means to sustainability. Counter-argument: Innovation itself is not necessarily good*).
- Implementation
- Evaluation: Criteria and indicators - processes as a way of measuring sustainable forest management.

Consequences of (the implementation) the principles of NFPs

1. Participation

Two possible outcomes:
- (1) Participation is a never ending process. Or:
- (2) Someone has to be excluded.

But: Who has the right to exclude?
- The individuals/groups to be included or excluded are determined by the NFP process.
- All stakeholders are included.
- etc.

Further annotations:
- Participation also means the sharing of knowledge.
- Participation is maximised when all actors have their own resources and are not dependent on other actors for resources.

2. National sovereignty *(Unlike for the discussion of meanings, the two principles*
   "national sovereignty" and "international commitment" were discussed separately.)
• Sovereignty is a legal fiction.
• The principle of national sovereignty is permanently redefined.
• Power is a zero-sum game.

3. International commitment
• The South being prepared to consent to any legally binding commitments
  will require further financial aid by the North („conservation for subsidies").

4. Respect for traditional rights ...
• There will be winners and losers (*e.g.: If local people and communities win,*
  timber companies lose). Thus, conflicts of interests are inevitable.
• The outcome of any planning activity strongly depends upon whether compensation
  is paid when rights are withdrawn.
• If traditional rights are broadly respected, planning might become conservative
  (i.e. remain at the status quo).

5. Decentralisation
• Loss of power (functions) to the state.
• Increased need for coordination at national level or among the localties.
• Thus, the state may lose a planning and implementation function and
  may gain a coordination function.
• More capacity and increased motivation at the local level (*which could lead*
  to a conflict with the central political power).

6. Holistic and intersectoral approach
• A need for more sophisticated *(e.g. economic)* modelling.
• A need for more networking strategies.

7. Empowerment of local/regional government structures *(Unlike for the*
   discussion of meanings, the two principles "empowerment" and "capacity building"
   were discussed separately.)
• New (types of) institutions
• Not *(exclusively)* based on the economic sector but integrating a multisectoral approach

8. Capacity building
• Coalition building - both temporary and permanent - as new actors seek allies
  with similar values, preferences and policy priorities.
• New allies for forestry
• New resources

9. Coordination and conflict resolution
• New conflict resolution mechanisms
• Increased trust
• Competition to existing instruments (styles)

10. Legal framework
• More restrictions could lead to a conflict between "winners" and "losers"
  (especially those who have profited from forest exploitation will lose).
• The ordinary political legitimation process has to be passed through.
• Market incentives

11. Rational problem solving. It requires:
- New type of planning experts
- More research (both in science and social science)

2.2.4 Work Group 4 (documented by Hogl, K. & Schanz, H.)

Introduction
The task of the working group was to elaborate on the meanings of NFPs (*"When can something be called a NFP?"*) from a scientific point of view, thereby departing from a *critical examination of principles and elements of NFPs as explicitly stated in the IPF process*. In order to provide a common basis for discussions it was pointed out by the facilitators at the beginning of the workshop session, that the reference basis for eximantions and discussions during the workshop is the characterization of NFPs through principles and elements as implicitly or explicitly stated in the IPF process. It was made explicit that the task of the work group was therefore not to provide a new definition/characterization of NFPs, but to locate NFP's on a conceptual map.

NFPs according to personal impressions
As a starter and warm-up round, members of the work group were asked to give their personal opinion on what NFPs are from a conceptual point of view ("*In my opinion an NFP is a.."*).

Whereas there was a general agreement between all members that the common goal of NFPs as stated in the IPF process is *to move towards Sustainable Development* in general and *Sustainable Forest Management* in particular, distinct opinions concerning the conceptual meaning of NFPs arose (no special ranking). The results to the question state that in the participant's opinion, an NFP is:

- box of tools
- sector plan
- structuring concept
- joint commitment
- coordinating instrument
- instrument
- policy instrument
- strategic framework and process
- intersectoral framework
- intersectoral tool to adress forestry
- element of development policy
- process with additional symbolic functions
- intersectoral process
- process
- participatory process

Elements and principles?!
In order to come to a more detailed understanding of the conceptual background of NFPs,

the group was supposed to start with a critical examination of principles and elements as explicitely stated in the IPF process from a scientific point of view. First of all, it was pointed out by the facilitators that there is no clear distinction in the IPF terminology, when something is called a 'principle' or an 'element'. Therefore, it was suggested that for the work group discussions no distinction between principles and elements should be made, and that both should be referred to as characteristic elements of NFPs.

After a short repetition of elements and principles of NFPs as stated in the IPF process the group agreed that the condensed list of characteristic elements provided by the seminar organizers (cf. Chapter 2.1) could serve as a valuable working basis for the subsequent discussions.

Importance of elements

In the next step, the group members where asked to weigh the given elements according to their personal opinion about the importance of the formulation and implementation of National Forest Programmes in Europe. Each group member had three points to giveand was asked to provide the reasons for his decision ("*Which of the following elements seem to be the most important ones concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe? Why?*"). The following weights and reasons were given (list of characteristic elements as presented to the working group):

ElementImportance (Weight out of 33 in total) Given reasons

- Participatory mechanisms; 9
  Participation needed for legitimazation of policies; ensuring rationality/public interest through involvement of stakeholders; in order to resolve potential conflicts in advance; because of central importance/requirement for implementation of policies; in order to ensure the flexibility of policy formulation.

- National sovereignty/consistency with intern. commitments; 2
  Topics discussed at international level need commitment of countries; pressure from international initiatives for changes/implementation.

- Rights of local communities and forest owners; 0

- Decentralization; 1
  In order to make the experience and knowledge which exist at the lower/local level accessible.

- Holistic and intersectoral approaches; 8
  Forests and forestry must be seen as being an inevitable part of society; existence of conflicting interests of different sectors about forests; existence of multi-responsibility distribution for forest issues in society; as a precondition for any problem-solving approach.

- Empowerment of regional and local government structures/capacity building; 1
  Capacity building as a central precondition for any policy implementation.

- Effective coordination and conflict-resolution schemes; 10
  Joint commitment of actors as the most important prerequisite for successful policy implementation; to achieve agreement on norms and values/guiding principles which form the basis for all activities and processes; central element including all other elements.

- Legal framework; 2
  In order to secure enforcement of policies; this element was very controversial, as some pointed out that it is highly self-evident within the existing legal frameworks for forestry in Europe.

Important elements in detail

In the subsequent discussion, the work group was asked to examine and elaborate in more detail on the three elements which seemed to be the most important ones, according to them ("*The 'Why, Who, How-Question':With the given reasons (see above) in regards to what can be said about the elements from a scientific point of view. Focus on possible intention (why?), level (who/where?) and the details of its structure/design (how?)*").

   The group thereby decided to discuss the the elements *'Effective coordination and conflict-resolution schemes'* and *'participatory mechanisms'* together, as it was assumed by the majority of the members that they are closely related and should not be examined seperatly.

Coordination/conflict-resolution schemes and participatory mechanisms

- *"Why?":* There was widespread agreement between members of the work group about the intention of these elements. Main arguments in addition to the above given reasons were: to achieve holistic and intersectoral approaches, to include diverse stakeholders, to coordinate responsibilities, and to ensure the flexibility of policies.
- *"Who?":* After discussing a long list of possible interested and affected participants, it was concluded that no exclusive criteria for participation could be found. Furthermore, there was a general agreement that there is also no exclusive criteria for the different levels. All levels from local, regional and national mechanismhave to be taken into account.
- *"How?":* It was very obvious to all participants that the design of coordination/ conflict-resolution schemes and participatory mechanisms should lead to feasible, and not only symbolic, commitments. Additionally, a certain agreement could be reached, that, from a theoretical point of view, aspects concerning the legal basis, the distribution and availability of information, the financial support, the institutional arrangements, and the procedure have to be addressed when talking about these elements. Nevertheless, it was concluded that generalized scientific statements cannot be made, as the subsidiarity principle and the issue-dependency are the most decisive factors concerning an appropriate structure or design of these two elements.

Holistic and intersectoral approaches

- *"Why?":* There was widespread agreement between members of the work group about the intention of these elements. Main arguments in supplement to the above given reasons had been: in order to consider and to ensure a continous supply with all goods and services provided by forests and forestry for society; in order to handle and coordinate the influences of other sectors.

- *"Who?/How?":* The aspects of who and how were discussed together. It was agreed that all sectors that influence, ore are influenced by the forest sector have to be taken into account. Still there was a widespread agreement that the question of how this should be done is very issue- and country-specific and, therefore, not very suitable for general scientific statements.

Discussion and conclusion

At the end of the workshop session, the work group concluded that NFPs, from a scientific point of view, have to be characterized as processes, which – by providing an impetus or request for rethinking - aim to stimulate or initiate changes or improvements in existing structures, approaches, and procedures in the respective national forest sectors by ensuring social benefits and the public interest. It was agreed that a major conceptual aspect of NFPs is thereby to better coordinate already existing instruments. From a conceptual point of view, the advantage of a NFP lays in a commitment of major stakeholders through its processual character, thereby enabling better coordination of the respective national forest sectors in general.

It was left open to discussion, whether NFPs as processes have to be expressed in written form or not. Another open question of major interest has been how to coordinate or ensure the direction of such processes towards SFM.

3. WORKSHOP 2: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND DEFICIENCIES IN EUROPEAN NATIONAL FOREST SECTORS CONCERNING THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NFPS

3.1 Background and Work Group Assignments

The subject of the second day was the analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies in European national forest sectors concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs. Based on a comparision of existing approaches, structures, and procedures concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in European countries, general assertions for the different types of development should be derived at. A further intention was to determine the possible potentials of NFPs in Europe. The main advantages and constraints concerning their formulation and implementation should thereby be considered from a scientific point of view.

An impetus for the workshop session on the second day was provided by the presentation of four country reports, which reflected different situations in approaches, structures, and procedures concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe. The selected country reports were from Slovenia (Iztok and Sinko 1999), Italy (Corrado and Merlo 1999), Sweden (Lönnstedt 1999), and The Netherlands (Wiersum and vanVliet 1999). A further impetus came from discussions with a panel of experts from the South, which were held during the morning session and dealt with the manifold of, and sometimes long-ranging experiences with, NFPs and forest policy planning in southern countries.

The workshop session during the second day was explicitly based on the European

country reports prepared by the participants prior to the seminar. In order to make the comparision manageable within the short time frame of the workshop session, a compiled version of the different country reports submitted in advance was provided to all participants (cf. Annex 2).

During workshop session 2, all four work groups in the same participants composition worked parallel on the same assignment:

"Strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies in European national forest sectors concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs"

3.2 Findings of Workshop 2

3.2.1 Work Group 1 (documented by Boon, T.; Lueckge, F.J. & Statz, J.)

Identification of major gaps in the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe. In his presentation made on Monday morning, Prof. Dr. Glück enumerted key characteristics of NFPs. These characteristics were used as a starting point to identify the major gaps in the formulation and implementation of NFPs:

Key characteristics of NFPs...	... and the main deficits in this field

national sovereignty
  • national tradition
  • problems when financial assistance is needed

partnership/ participation
  • few effective mechanisms for articulation of interests
  • lack of "informed decisions"

decentralization
  • federalism (e.g. Canada) can be an obstacle
  • ... the same holds true for the quasi- federalism expected for Malaysia

consistency with international commitments
  • gaps in knowledge (at national level) about international guidelines (e.g. IPF)
  • European commitment: Helsinki process or EU-policy
  • low international commitment to solve the problems of developing countries
  • problems finding comparative indicators

integration in countries' sustainable development strategies
  • false assumption that a country already has SFM and therefore does not need a NFP
  • scepticism over "planned development"

effective coordination and conflict resolution
  • lack of coordinated planning
  • problems to coordinate different interests in one consistent "policy"
  • different scopes: mainly state forests vs. mixed forest ownership

intersectoral approach
  • in Europe, focus on forestry sector programs (because of stable land use patterns)
  • intersectoral approach needs a higher level of decision/ planning than just the forest sector
  • market orientation vs. state intervention

Identifiying the causes and explainations for deficits in planning/implementation of NFPs. Three key issues that were felt to be deficient have been selected and looked at more in detail:

1. formulation and implementation of NFPs as an intersectoral approach,
2. the role of decentralization, and
3. establishment of effective coordination and conflict resolution mechanisms

The examination of the most severe deficits was carried out under three perspectives:

1. Which extrasectoral factors could explain the deficits?
2. Which structures and contents of NFPs are responsible for the respective deficits?
3. Which means and instruments are lacking that could help to overcome the stated deficits?

Key deficits...   ... and related causes/ explainations

1. extra-sectoral causes / country settings	2. structure and contents of the NFPs	3. means and instruments
intersectoral approach		
strong conflicts between administrative institutions (ministries...)	difficulties of policy design and control across sectors	lacking incentives
intersectoral inputs lack to ensure social and environmental quality of forest resources (not forest area as such)	difficulties with policy design and control	deficits in interdisciplinary research (integrated concepts)
how are the sectoral goals formulated?	subnational governments (especially federal) fail to attain consent	lack of training in communication and cooperation for ministry staff
decentralization		
decentralization at various levels: decentralization at the level of implementation vs. decentralization leading to the devolution of decision making power	diversity of eco-systems	lack of incentives
different perception of "states" responsible for the forest sector	regional development vs. national development	

Key deficits...	... and related causes/ explainations	
1. extra-sectoral causes / country settings	2. structure and contents of the NFPs	3. means and instruments

effective coordination and conflict resolution

interest of privat owners	empowerment of single stakeholders	lacking incentives
strong conflicts between the various administrative institutions in a country (ministries)	difficulties of policy design and control vis-à-vis NGOs	
future problems cannot be fully prognosted	hierarchically organised buro-cracies canno,t and some-times do not, meet require-ments of participatory processes and coordinated efforts	
lack of coordination in the formulation of sectoral goals		

Comparison of countries in the North and the South. At this point the question arose, weather the identified gaps are common to the formulation and subsequent implementation of NFPs in countries of the North <u>and</u> the South. Or, do some of these difficulties need to be differentiated between the North and the South?

Deficits in the formulation of NFPs in the North and in the South....

patterns that are common to both...	... and conditions that vary
• capacity building	• land use structures
• empowerment of single stakeholders strongly related to development assistance and its conditionalities	• in tropical countries, NFPs are
• political administrative systems tropical countries are expected to follow IPF agreements, but donor countries do not follow development assistance obligations	• international commitments:
• strong extra-sectoral influences limiting factor in the North, but as a potential in the South	• decentralization perceived as a

How can these gaps be overcome? The participants named a number of possible approaches:

Approaches to bridge the identified gaps...

1. forest data bases
   - forest data bases should serve as a starting point

2. appropriate accounting of the forests' benefits
   - create incentives to promote social and environmental services of forests
   - budgetory accounts on environmental and social issues need to be established (and implemented in coordination with other tools)
   - forest benefit assessment tools

3. actual planning and implementation
   - decentralization of planning processes
   - communication and cooperation training
   - strategic and flexible planning approaches are to be introduced
   - differentiate the various planning and implementation levels; this differentiation can be normative, strategic or operational
   - appropriate mechanisms of vertical and horizontal coordination need to be designed

Establishing the link to science. Eventually, the link was established to the primarily scientific perspective of the conference. The last question approached by the participants of the work group this afternoon was: *"How can we approach the identified gaps scientificall; what needs to be done from a scientific point of view?"* The requirements as defined by the work group were:

Scientific approaches to bridge the gaps in the formulation and implementation of NFPs...

- make sure research is being carried out in an interdisciplinary manner
- *carry out comparative studies of actual NFP performance to date (à la* Jänicke*)*
- develop training units for instititional cooperation
- develop flexible planning approaches
- create new market opportunities for timber and non-timber products
- assess the proper mix of a) regulatory, b) market and c) negotiation tools to solve resource conflicts
- develop a data base system for effective planning
- carry out research on values of different stakeholders
- develop reliable forest benefits assessment tools
- make sure database informations are disseminated
- find model approaches to create optimum landscape/environment

Outlook. It was found that these first suggestions of scientific approaches need to be made more explicit. This task was to be tackled on the afternoon of the third day.

3.2.2 Work Group 2 (documented by Böswald, K.; Egestad, P. & Schraml, U.)

Introduction. The workshop on Tuesday afternoon dealt with the analysis of strengths, weaknesses and deficiencies of current structures and rules in different national forest sectors in Europe. With regard to their perception of National Forest Programmes, the participants were asked to identify gaps of NFPs in Europe. Finally, the participants tried to provide suggestions for bridging the gaps in order to foster NFPs.

Principles and Elements of NFPs in Europe - State of the Art? At the beginning of the session, the participants were asked to express their perception of the current state of National Forest Programmes in Europe. Therefore, they had to consider if different elements and principles of NFPs are implemented in national forestry strategies in Europe. Each of the participants had to point out if selected elements and principles are implemented (no gap) or have not yet been considered (gap). The table below comprises the results of the evaluation. It can be concluded that, according to the groups perception the principles, national sovereignty and decentralization are well developed. There seems to be a consistency with international commitments and a certain kind of partnership/participation in the countries. The participants agreed that an effective coordination/conflict resolution, an integration with the country´s sustainable development strategy and intersectoral approaches need to be improved in the forestry sector in Europe.

Principles and Elements of NFPs and their current consideration in the forest sector in Europe....

	no gap	+ -	gap	ranking
National Sovereignty	11	2	0	1
Decentralization	6	4	3	2
Consistency with International Commitments	4	3	5	3
Partnership/Participation	4	3	6	4
Integration with Country´s SD Strategies		6	7	5
Effective Coordination/Conflict Resolution		5	8	6
Intersectoral Approaches		4	9	7

The inputs of the southern countries and the European group members were distributed with colours. It was very interesting to find that there was no difference between the perception of the two groups. Hence, both the group members of the southern countries and the European group members indicated that there is a need for an integration of the forest sector policy with a country´s SD strategies, in order to have effective coordination and conflict resolution and intersectoral approaches.

Reasons for the gaps. The group concluded, that the gaps between the requirements and the current state of National Forest Programmes in Europe are mainly due to socio-economic, informational, and political structures.

The socio-economic reasons for the gaps are a result of sectoral thinking, a given value system, political culture and a lack of intersectoral collaboration. The increasing complexity, a lack of institutions, a lack of national plans and the traditional functions of governmental structures were seen as political reasons for the gaps mentioned above. The participants clearly stated, that NFPs are no means to do anything about the existing political structure. The lack of information, that results in gaps, is twofold. While increasing awareness and transparency were characterised as outgoing information, lack of (scientific) information, e.g. social science, has been characterised as an ingoing information. The information flow, availability of the right information, a raise of the understanding of sustainable development and participation and problem awareness were seen as ingoing and outgoing informational reasons.

Bridging the gaps. To bridge the gaps, the participants proposed several measures, which can be assigned to values, coordination and structure.

Hence, it is necessary to monitor and to consider given values and value systems in the process. Furthermore, there is urgent need for a flexible response to changing value systems. A National Forest Programme might serve to integrate stakeholders and interest groups with different values.

The experts of the different countries agreed, that due to a lack of coordination, an improvement of institutions for intersectoral coordination is necessary and that participation should be enhanced in order to facilitate intersectoral coordination. Networks could be a feasible means to fight against these constraints.

Furthermore, a change of organizational structure, an improvement of the information flow, the organizational capacity and the understanding of the parties involved, as well as transparency of decision making and communication, are necessary to bridge the current gaps in the implementation of NFPs elements and principles.

All of these possibilities could be promoted with a multi-disciplinary policy science.

3.2.3 Work Group 3 (documented by Hanewinkel, M. and Pregernig, M.)

Goals to be achieved. Using the discussion in workshop 1 as a background, the members of the group identified possible pitfalls contained in the guidelines for the second workshop as proposed by the organisers of the seminar. Since the group did not come to a common understanding of the concept of NFPs (from a scientific point of view) in the first workshop, there were no criteria available for assessing the status of formulation and implementation of NFPs or NFP-like instruments in different European countries. Thus, it would have been impossible to identify strengths, weaknesses and deficiencies in European national forest sectors concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs. Therefore, the group decided to modify the goal of the workshop and to reformulate the title as follows: *"Conditions for successful implementation of NFP principles and elements (on the basis of selected countries)"*.

Whereas, in the first workshop, the chances of having the different NFP principles and elements implemented were assessed on the basis of theoretical considerations (or ad-hoc explanations) (see workshop 1, work group 3: „consequences"), the second workshop should fall back on *empirical evidence*: A comparison between European

countries and countries of the Tropics and Subtropics as well as a comparison between different European countries should supply valuable clues as to which characteristics of a socio-political system promote the implementation of an NFP and which elements tend to hinder it.

Due to the unanswered question of „When can something be called an NFP?" (workshop 1) it was decided not to argue on the level of NFPs as a meta-concept but rather on the more operational level of possible principles and elements of NFPs (as elaborated in workshop 1).

With the different national backgrounds interpreted as independent or explanatory variables, it should be possible to identify *general patterns* which promote or rather prevent the formulation and implementation of NFPs. Ideally, such a pattern would look like this:

IF *in a certain country condition X is met*   **THEN** *this country is likely to have NFP-principle Y implemented*

The identification of these general patterns was carried out (1) by using the country reports prepared in the advance to the seminar as a background (and partly presented in the morning session) and (2) on the basis of the personal experiences brought in by the individual members of the work group.

Discussion. For each of the 11 main principles/elements of an NFP (worked out during the first workshop session) possible conditions for successful implementation were discussed and documented. The following list shows possible factors of influence as identified by the group whereby text given in *italics* corresponds to the items listed and

1. (Appropriate) participatory mechanisms
    • *(long-standing)* tradition of participation
    • absence of strong vested interests
    • expertise (*on the part of people or groups to be involved in the planning process and limited influence by people or institutions inputting professional expertise, esecially the forest administration*)
    • well defined processes *(and procedures)*
    • availability of resources *(money, personnel, etc.)*

2. National sovereignty
    • strong internal control *(by the state)*
    • exclusive when used by governments
    • should be respected *(by other countries)*

3. International commitment
    • positive incentives *(to be „traded" for restrictions in one's freedom of action; „win-win-solutions")*
    • open attitude towards international commitments

4. Respect for customary and traditional rights (of local communities and forest owners)
    • strong organisation of users
    • written rights *(national legal framework)*
    • international law

5. Decentralisation
    • strong local institutions *(regarding formal authority as well as resources)*
    • *(well-informed)* developed civil society *(grass-roots groups etc.)*
    • private forest ownership *(disputed within the group)*
    • well defined procedures

6. *Empowerment* (of regional and local government structures*)*
    • resource allocation from the centre

7. *Holistic and intersectoral* (approaches*)*
    • good data-basis
    • information sharing
    • horizontal co-ordination
    • paradigm shift *(other way of looking at a situation)*

8. Capacity-building
    • trained personnel *(especially at the local level*)
    • trusted institutions
    • availability of resources

9. *(Effective) co-ordination mechanisms and conflict-resolution* (schemes*)*
    • well defined processes *(and procedures*)*
    • effective co-ordination
    • intersectoral co-ordination

10. Legal framework
    • transparency of legal framework

11. Rational problem-solving
    • [not discussed due to lack of time]

text given in brackets is intended to give further explanations or to illustrate the discussion within the group.

3.2.4 Work Group 4 (documented by Hogl, K. & Schanz, H.)

Introduction. As a starter and an indirect approach to the working group's task on strengths, weaknesses, and deficiences in European national forest sectors concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs, the group was confronted with the following question: *"If you would have to report on the European situation concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs what would you state?"*

There was widespread agreement in the group that it is impossible to state something about Europe in general as the situation concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs is very diverse. It is exactly this diversity that constitutes Europe. It was concluded that this has to be seen in line with the characterization of NFPs as country-specific and principle (here synonymously understood as elements of NFPs) driven processes.

Analyses of the differences in European countries. As the principles/elements of NFPs are providing a more general frame, which has to be applied under the specific

conditions of the respective countries, it was suggested first to take a look at what makes a difference in the approaches, structures, and procedures concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in European countries, without characterising them already as strengths, weaknesses or deficiencies. The following differences with their respective reasons for differences were found:

What makes a difference in the approaches/structures and procedures concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs? (in no special order)

- *Who is defining the 'forestry sector'* discussed in the context of: which actors define what belongs to forestry and what not; boundary setting/openness vs. restrictiveness of sectors; questions of exclusivness/inclusivness

- *Type / location / diversity of forests* discussed in the context of: forest types (e.g. plantations, natural forest, protection forest) determine the type of users and thereby the societal demands; location (also fragmentation) of forests determine their relevance (e.g. edge effects); diversity of forest types determines the number and diversity of interest groups and responsibility structures (e.g. Scandinavian forests compared with Portugal)

- *Constitutional structure* discussed in the context of federal or unitary state; responsibility distribution for forest policy issues; relationship between provinces and the state (with special reference to the Italian country report as an example of weak relationship)

- *State-society-relations* discussed in the context of the degree and quality to which society and individuals of the society identify themselves with the state; furthermore, quality and quantity of interfaces between state and society

- *Democratic structures* discussed especially concerning participation procedures and traditions in decision making; tradition of democratic structures (e.g. countries in transition)

- *Degree of organisation in society* discussed in view of institution and capacity building

- *Property distrubition* discussed on the one hand concerning ownership structures (e.g. relation of public and private land), on the other concerning property rights (e.g. accessibility of the forest for the public)

- *Societal valuation of non-market benefits* discussed not only in relation to the economic importance of the forestry sector in terms of production but also in absolute terms concerning the recognition/awareness of society

- *Economic importance in terms of commercial values* discussed in the context of the strentgh of classical product chains and the degree of internationality of markets for national forest procucts/timber

- *Institutional capacities* discussed concerning the implementation of forest policies, mainly the structure of leading authorities/forest service (e.g. seperate enterprise for state forest management)

- *Institutional responsibilities* discussion mainly focused on the distribution of power and responsibilty among leading authorities/ministries in the sense of disperse or concentrated (e.g. Ministry for Environment and Ministry for Forestry as two sperate ministries or merged together)

- *Availability of financial resources* discussed concerning the possibilities and amounts to provide compensations/subsidies/grants for forest owners

- *Planning traditions* discussed in relation to existing planning frameworks: what other plans exist? Separate plans concerning forests or are they part of other plans?

Search for general explanation patterns. Based on the provided distinctive characteristics, the group was asked to elaborate on general explanation patterns for the differences in approaches, structures, and procedures concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe. On the basis of the provided overview on European country reports the work group agreed that these explanation patterns can only be formulated as *hypotheses* which need to be empirically tested. The actual pattern of characteristic elements of NFPs (see Chapter 2.1) are thereby to be seen as dependent variables, whereas the identified reasons that make the differences are to be understood as the independent or explanatory variables.

Due to time, the group was only able to formulate a few hypotheses. Nevertheless, the group members agreed that the identified reasons for differences do provide a valuable basis which could provide a source for the formulation of many more hypotheses. The formulated hypotheses concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe were:

Hypotheses about what promotes or rather prevents the formulation and implementation of NFPs...

1a. If the definition of the forest sector comes from outside the traditional actors, broad participation and inter-sectoral co-ordination is easier to achieve.

1b. A higher degree of organisation of interests makes participation easier to reconcile with co-ordination.

2. The more different types of forests; the greater the number of potentially conflicting uses; and the more different social organisations there are, the more complicated co-ordination gets.

3. The higher the awareness of the society about non-timber-benefits of forests, the more likely there will be holistic and inter-sectoral co-ordination and conflict-resolution schemes.

4. If a country has a federal distribution of powers in the forestry sector and the provinces have primary responsibility, this will hinder progress towards NFP (but: international commitment?).

5. Contested hypothesis: *More public forests make formulating an NFP easier.*

4. WORKSHOP 3: FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH NEEDS CONCERNING THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NFPS

4.1 Background and Work Group Assignments

Based on the discussions of the first two seminar days, the intention of the third workshop session was to identify further research needs concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs. An additional focus was to analyse the potential contribution

of the latest concepts of the social sciences in regards of the concept of NFPs and to elaborate on promising research directions in this light.

Impetus for the workshop session was therefore provided by a selective presentation of modern social scientific theoretical approaches. The intention of this presentation was to create an open and creative atmosphere for the workshop session 3. Invited speakers were therefore asked not to focus too much on NFPs, but to give a more general overview on the respective scientific approach, whereas taking reference to formulation and implementation of NFPs was left to the work group sessions. Subsequently, four work groups were setup to focus on the four presented scientific approaches, respectively:

- Work group 1 on *"Economic aspects"* with the presentation by F. Schneider on "Can incentive-oriented environmental policies in representative democracies be implemented – a public choice analysis" (cf. Schneider 1999) as a starting point for discussions;
- Work group 2 on *"Legal framework"* with the presentation by R. Tarasofsky on "Policy planning without a legally binding framework?" (cf. Tarasofsky 1999) as starting point for discussions;
- Work group 3 on *"Social learning"* with the presentation by M. Howlett on "Policy learning and policy change: reconciling knowledge and interests in the policy process" (cf. Howlett 1999) as a starting point for discussions;
- Work group 4 on *"Multi-level governance"* with the presentation by A. Benz on "Multi-level governance" (cf. Benz 1999) as a starting point for discussions.

In contrast to the previous days, the composition of the work groups was not fixed, but was left open to the participants according to their personal interests.

4.2 Findings of Workshop 3

4.2.1 Work Group 1: Economic Aspects (documented by Boon, T.; Lueckge, F.J. & Statz, J.)

Introduction. What hints do we find in Prof. Dr. Schneider´s presentation "Can Incentive-orientated Environmental Policies in Representative Democracies be implemented?" that help us to answer our question?

After collecting hints, there was a discussion on how the mentioned arguments can be organized. The work group agreed that "issues", "theories" and "instruments" would be appropriate headlines for clustering.

Possible contributions of economic theories. In a second step we changed the viewpoint and asked: *"What hints do we find in economic theories that help us to answer our question?"* With these hints the three separate clusters were completed.

It was found that there is a gap between economic and ecological theories.

Economic issues...	Examples of issues identified by the work group members...
diversity of goods and services/ Value systems	• need of tools to give more value to forests • some goods cannot be traded • low perceptual value of forests by society • part of NFP goals cannot be reached by marked mechanism • value of various types of forest • need of means to compare different market and nonmarket goods • lack of recognition of the various values of forests
temporal dimensions	• short term objectives (e.g. investment) versus long term objectives of forestry • time lag: decision making versus effects • voter´s short term perspective • gap partly perceptional?
conflicting market demands and trade-offs	• international interests affecting land-use • market demands affecting land-use • conflicting demands
decentralization	• vertical and horizontal inter-sectoral co-ordination
execution deficits	

Economic issues...	...and related/corresponding theories
diversity of goods and services/ Value systems	• valuation • theory of market failure • contingent valuation methods, travel cost method, hedonic pricing • resource rent taxs
temporal dimensions	• forestry economics • business economics • discounting • forest resource accounting
conflicting market demands and trade-offs	• market theory • international trade theory • comparative advantage theory
decentralization	• local public goods
execution deficits	• public choise theory • environmental science • environmental economics • ecological economics • ecological theories

The mentioned economic instruments were grouped into:

1. Financial instruments
2. Persuasive instruments
3. Institutional instruments
4. Regulatory instruments
5. Combinations of 1 - 4

4.2.2 Work Group 2: Legal Framework (documented by Böswald, K.; Egestad, P. & Schraml, U.)

Introduction

The original purpose of the workshop was to recognize further research needs concerning the formulation and implementation of NFP's and to discuss the contribution of different theoretical directions. Moreover, the members of the work group were asked to formulate questions for scientific work concerning the legal aspects of NFP's.

The short introduction to the objective was followed by a lively discussion regarding the question whether the participators of this work group (mainly experts, no scientists) would be able to handle the proposed formulation of the question. Finally, the proposal advanced by the facilitators was rejected. It was pointed out that the objective of the workshop should not be the formulation of research needs and the evaluation of different theoretical directions. Moreover, the legal aspects concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs should be discussed first, in order to deduce the task for scientific work connected to it. The members of the group agreed upon the following four questions:

1. What is a legal framework?
2. Do we need a legal framework?
3. What kind of a framework is needed?
4. How do we get a legal framework? (including the role of science)

Discussion outcome

What is a legal framework?

In order to achieve a common basis for the discussion, the members of the group agreed upon the definition *legal framework*. Main emphasis was placed on the different meanings on national and international levels of such a *framework*. At the national level, a legal framework may be described with terms such as *statute, regulation, administrational order or juridical decision,* whereas at the international level the definitions of *treaties* and *soft law assume* completely different basic conditions.

By the example of Forest Partnership Agreements (FPA) the differentiation had also been discussed. At the international level, FPAs agreements are to support the country's NFP between international actors and individual countries. At the national level, it's an agreement within a country that supports the development and implementation of the NFP.

It had been pointed out by several participators of the workshop that a legal framework can by no means automatically be considered equivalent to a forest consent, as many wording possibilities are likely.

Do we need a legal framework?

Despite a repeated discussion upon the different significances of a legal framework on the national and international levels, the meeting had been followed by both parties. Arguments for pros and cons have been collected and sorted out.

Most important arguments **for** the utility of a legal frame work:

- Stability within relations
- Predictability or anticipation of certain behaviours of the interested parties
- Creation of equitable power relations
- Identification of relevant actors
- Identification of objectives of the interested parties
- Legal framework legitimizes an NFP
- Harmonization of existing policies (the vast abundance of resolving-points to ameliorate the forest situation can be coordinated and harmonized)

Most important arguments **against** the utility of a legal frame work:

- Request of additional resources (financial, human, time)
- A legal framework can be threatening, as one of the parties could feel itself under pressure
- To agree upon a framework would be rather difficult; it would be threatened by a great number of arrangements with legal commitments, which are not easy to coordinate

A comparison of the various arguments at hand showed that there are far more advantages than disadavantages, which in the eyes of the group members proves the request for a legal framework.

What kind of a framework is needed?

During the discussion some problems turned up again, deriving from numerous uncoordinated rulings.

Examples like *the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)*, *the Convention on Climate Change*, *the Convention to Combat Desertification*, *the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA)* and existing FPAs have been mentioned. They all refer to the forest without providing for final treatment and coordination.

However, the formulation of a possible legal framework has not been completed. Nevertheless, two important points were gathered from the discussion:

1. the coordination between existing frameworks
2. the creation of an overarching framework

The main focus of the discussion was on the question of how to achieve a legal framework.

How do we get a legal framework?

Finally, the work group took a critical look at the possibilities to establish a legal framework to enhance the formulation and implementation of NFP's. The debate resulted on a very abstract level as national and international interests had to be discussed on a common scale.

First of all, different steps for a legal framework were outlined and then the part of science in this process was discussed. For the development of a framework, the following five steps have been identified:

1. Screening of existing frameworks. In a first step, gaps, overlaps and opportunities of existing frameworks have to be identified.
2. Identification of obstacles. In this step, the ascertained gaps, overlaps and opportunities are to be acknowledged in order to assess new elements, in case any obstacle would appear to harmonize with existing frameworks and/or contradictions and multiple regulations and to operationalise alternative proposals.
3. Formulation of proposals
4. Realization in practice
5. Evaluation of results

This ideal state of description has been completed, as steps three to five are regularly repeated and run through.

It was pointed out that the formulation of a legal framework is an iterative process too, which needs continous evaluation and adaption. Particular attention was given to the fact that the evaluation and adaption of the proposals have to occur at the national and international levels.

The role of science
There was no agreement within the group regarding the role of science. Some of the participants were of the opinion that the task of science should be concentrated on step 1, which is the screening of existing frameworks, whereas the rest also considered the scientist's roots in identifying obstacles. Even the formulation of proposals and the respective evaluation werediscussed as the task of science. A participation during all the described phases has not been excluded. Scientists, together with legal experts and practioners, should be involved in the whole process.

4.2.3 Work Group 3: Social Learning (documented by Hanewinkel, M. & Pregernig, M.)

Introduction
With the key issues of the second day's discussion in mind, and against the background of "gaps" in existing NFPs and how these gaps could be "bridged", research needs concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs should be identified. The contribution of the theoretical direction "Social learning" as stated in the morning session by M. Howlett should thereby especially be taken into account. It should be specified how this theoretical contribution could look like.

Discussion
Key questions of the theoretical contribution of the "Social learning" approach could be: "Who has learnt?" "To what purpose?" and "What has been learnt?" As general principles of the contribution of the "social learning" approach were fixed:

- the strength of an interdisciplinary approach
- the outcome of such a contribution should result in an increase in capacity building
- the learning for management processes should thereby be facilitated

Distinct differences were stated between the research needs in European countries and in countries of the South where there seems to be an increasing need in, for example, basic research concerning improved management techniques. Two main groups of aspects of development and research needs were identified and discussed:

- conceptual aspects: theoretical knowledge is yet to be generated.
- evaluative/empirical aspects: there is „enough" theoretical knowledge available so that theories can be tested by means of empirical studies.

The working group agreed that the conceptual problems of research should be solved with priority as a basis for further empirical (evaluative) research.

In the following, the main issues of the conceptual and the evaluative (empirical) aspects are listed together with examples for possible research projects (*in italics*) concerning these issues. For the general aspect of "interdisciplinarity" the *development of improved interdisciplinary research methods* as a possible research project was stated. The following table provides an overview of the main aspects of the discussion in the work group:

Conceptual aspects...	Evaluative (empirical) aspects...
- institutional learning theory · acquisition and transfer of knowledge · diffusion of knowledge · negotiation processes - cross institutional learning	- comparative politics - cross sectoral cooperation - paritcipation and conflict resolution - interaction professional /local knowledge - types of social organisation of forest management - prerequisites for implementation

Conceptual aspects

For the conceptual aspects of further research needs, two main issues were fixed:

- institutional learning theory and
- cross institutional learning.

Within the institutional learning theory one key issue was the

- *acquistion and transfer of knowledge*
- identification of triggers for learning in the forestry sector
- sectoral vs. subsectoral learning processes
- classifying learning types on an individual, an organisational and an inter-organisational level
- increasing learning potential by policy design
- influence of transfer of ideas.

- *diffusion of knowledge:*
- analysis of focus, processes and structures of hindrance to learning.

No detailed research projects were stated for <u>negotiation processes</u> within the institutional learning theory or the research focus of cross institutional learning theory.

Evaluative (empirical) aspects

- Comparative politics:
  - · *Comparative assessment of processes of social learning in* connection with the formulation and implementation of *NFPs* or NFP-like instruments
  - · Comparative study of forest and other resource policy making processes
  - · Extent of subsidiarities (institutions, methodologies).

- Cross sectoral cooperation:
  - · S*tudy of patterns of information/research distribution/dissemination and*
  - · methods of cross sectoral cooperation.

- Participation and conflict resolution:
  - · Assessment of the connection between p*articipation and private ownership of forest land.*
  - · *Assessment of balance in resource conflict solving through regulat*ory*, market* and/or *negotitation instruments.*
  - · Who should participate and who wants to?
  - · Forms of participation.

- Interaction between professional and local knowledge:
  - · *Traditional forest-related knowledge*. The difference was discussed between European countries („Is there traditional forest knowledge at all?") and the countries of the South where this seemed to be of particular importance.

- Types of social organisation of forest management:
  - · Community forest management experiences.

- Prerequisites of implementation:
  - · *State capacity.*

4.2.4 Work Group 4: Multi-Level Governance. (documented by Hogl, K. & Schanz, H.)

Introduction
The discussion was based on the preceding presentation of Prof. Arthur Benz on 'Multi-level Governance' in the plenary session. The objective of the work group was to identify research needs and to simultaneously explore potential contributions of the theoretical concept of multi-level governance concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe. The working title of the work group session was:

'Potential contributions of theories and hypotheses about multi-level governance concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs in Europe'

At the beginning Prof. Benz was asked to give a brief recapitulation of some theoretical aspects. It was emphasised that multi-level governance is not to be seen as a hierarchical governance structure comprised of multiple levels but as a setting of interdependent levels with the need for co-ordination and co-operation. In this sense multi-level governance is about multi-level co-ordination and decision making across interwoven arenas by means of hierarchy and bargaining which takes place in the context of a variety of institutional and legal settings (in the shadow of hierarchy).

In this context, a policy arena is characterised by a more or less institutionalised set of rules of negotiation and interaction ('policies are looking for their arena'). Arenas at different levels (e.g. on the international level, the EU-level, the national, the regional and the local level) can be interpreted as 'loosely' coupled games, i.e. decisions taken in one arena do not necessarily strictly bind the actors of other arenas but represent information and constraints to them (e.g. guiding principles set at a higher level). Furthermore, there is not just one arena which is comprised of all relevant actors. Some actors are 'players' in more than one arena, they can act as mediators between different arenas respective of different levels.

When applying the theoretical insights about multi-level governance to the concept of NFPs, some possible topics for further discussions were pointed out. These are questions concerning:

- the degree of centralisation, respectively decentralisation,
- participation,
- inter-sectoral co-ordination,
- and inter-level co-ordination.

Potential contributions of 'multi-level governance' to meet research needs

By discussing the presentation of Prof. Benz in the light of the formulation and implementation of NFPs, the group tried to identify research needs and promising scientific approaches.

Within a wider scope of governance aspects, some research topics were identified, but it was pointed out by several members of the group that this is only a provisional and therefore incomplete selection of potential and relevant research questions.

The following research topics were identified. It should be emphasised that most of them are closely related. For lack of time only some of them were discussed in more detail.

1. Which effects are to be expected because of different degrees of centralisation/ decentralisation?

The discussion started with questions concerning the degree of centralisation/ decentralisation which is an inevitable aspect of a NFP. It was mentioned that this might be a major field of potential contributions of the presentation of Prof. Benz.

Furthermore, aspects of participation, inter-sectoral as well as inter-level co-ordination are closely linked to it. However, the theory does not provide a general prescription to determine the 'appropriate' level of decentralisation, it rather indicates some trade-offs between advantages an disadvantages of these two oppositional strategies (e.g. centralisation facilitates inter-level co-ordination but impedes inter-sectoral co-ordination very often, especially if the programme is primarily dealt with within one public agency).

Furthermore, it was pointed out that, concerning the formulation and implementation of NFPs, many countries experience a direction which is rather opposite than the postulation of decentralization: responsibilities concerning the forestry issues are rather decentralized, whereas formulating an NFP would require a more centralized structure.

Two further questions related to aspects of decentralisation are: on which level to define policy-goals? Which policy-instruments are preferably imposed and at which level of governance ('policy mix')?

2. Does the process of the formulation and implementation of NFPs entail changes concerning existing hierarchies? If it does, which changes are to be expected? (How are existing hierarchies effected by the NFP-approach?)

It was stated that in case of federal systems the formulation and implementation of NFPs might entail centralisation to some extent. One important question is on which level co-ordination takes place. However, some group members pointed out that the introduction of new participatory elements and conflict-resolution schemes in forest policy making will certainly alter the distribution of political power and therefore induce some changes to actual hierarchical structures.

3. Regarding participation:

- What are the actual modes of participation in European forestry sectors on different levels?
- How to bring values into the process of participation?
- How to secure accountability in different models of participation?

This battery of questions is closely related to item (2). Another question discussed is how to include those who are not powerful and well organised into the bargaining/participatory process.

It was stressed that there is a need of studies concerning different modes of participation in European forestry sectors whereas a lot of empirical work has already been done in countries of the South and North America.

Another central question related to participation is how to organise accountability in a multi-level policy making system. A crucial point is the set-up of arenas for participation. On the one hand, there is a demand for institutionalised settings which are open to poorly organised and less endowed actors, even to individuals. It was pointed out that such settings might encourage potential participants to raise their capacities. On

the other hand, participatory mechanisms which are comprised of too many actors are less efficient. This might induce a shift towards participation based on informal groups and settings, which in turn raises the question of accountability. The 'organisation of accountability' in multi-level systems is still an open question of political science.

4. Are there different professional cultures on different levels (e.g. dominance of expert knowledge and bargaining oriented towards problem solving at the EU-level vs. dominance of group-interests at the national/regional level)?

There were some empirical indications that bargaining at the EU-level is influenced relatively strong by professional expertise and often oriented towards problem solving ('epistemic communities') whereas national/regional arenas are mostly characterised by conflicting interest groups (represented by conflicting advocacy coalitions or dominant policy communities) and therefore often oriented towards the 'smallest common denominator'. Interestingly, experts of the South stated that their experiences are converse to that, i.e. conflicting interest groups dominate bargaining at the higher (national) level, whereas actors at the operational level (regional, local) are often pragmatically focusing on problem solving to meet basic needs.

5. How to ensure the rationality of policy planning in the course of the NFP-process, the direction of the NFP-process in general towards SFM and the accordant specification of standards in multi-level bargaining processes?

Again, this question is closely related to other research needs (e.g. items 1-3). There was a debate about the contrariety of 'planning' and 'bargaining' in respect to the specification of programme goals and the possibilities to evaluate policy outcomes. However, it was agreed by most of the group members that NFPs are not just about planning but should be understood as broad processes which could comprise almost all kinds of policy instruments.

6. Regarding monitoring of policy outcomes and processes: What is the institutional basis? How can the policy outcome as well as the process of policy making be monitored?

One research topic mentioned is to find instruments to monitor the NFP-process. It was mentioned that the goal of NFPs, i.e. Sustainable Forest Management (SFM), has to be seen as a 'moving target' as it is not defined operationally yet, and will never completely be defined. On the other hand, it was emphasised that NFPs are an iterative process which should not be understood as a 'simple' planning process.

Whereas the monitoring of outcomes and processes was seen as a potential and important contribution of the scientific community, it was stressed that comprehensive monitoring is very expensive. Therefore, the institutional (financial) basis of monitoring is crucial to guarantee the independence of those who monitor and evaluate the process of policy formulation and implementation as well as the outcomes of NFPs.

7. Regarding inter-sectoral co-ordination: How do bargaining processes contribute to inter-sectoral co-ordination? What effects concerning the identity of a policy sector can be expected because of inter-sectoral co-ordination?

Concerning the contribution of bargaining processes to inter-sectoral co-ordination, it was pointed out that the level and the institutional setting in which bargaining takes place is of crucial importance (see items 1 und 3).

In respect to the identity of the forest sector it was discussed to which extent the need for inter-sectoral co-ordination challenges actual 'circles' of forest policy making and thereby the traditional identity of the sector and to which extent it may lead towards a new identity.

8. Which are potential modes of inter-level co-ordination?

This is closely related to questions concerning decentralisation (1), participation (2), challenges to existing hierarchies (3) and inter-sectoral co-ordination (7).

9. How important are aspects of 'regulatory competition' among European forestry sectors?

The term 'regulatory competition' was discussed in two senses: On the one hand, it was mentioned that decision-making on lower levels is embedded in a competitive system (e.g. funding depends on the 'quality' of programmes from the point of view of higher levels which set guiding standards or principles). There are possible patterns of a process which simultaneously leads to the 'Europeanisation' and 'regionalisation' of a policy domain, i.e. principles/standards are set at the EU-level but funding is based on regional programmes. This may impose changes concerning the strategies of national governments (e.g. towards the co-ordination of regional programmes at the national level and inter-governmental bargaining on guiding principles at the supra-national level).

Related to this there might be a shift in competence at the EU-level. As can be learned from other sectors this is often initiated by means of financial incentives. There was another remark that the wish to avoid disincentives (e.g. imposed by EU-environmental policies) may have the same effect as the search for benefits ('stick and carrot'strategy of policy making).

Concerning the question of who defines the 'criteria to measure the quality of programmes' in the context of multi-level governance, it was mentioned that standards/principles are typically set at the international (EU)level, bearing in mind that they have to be the result of intergovernmental decision making. The standards are to be seen as some kind of guidance for decentralised decision-making and implementation.

Keeping the political system of the European Union in mind, it was mentioned that it might be in the interest of the EU to endorse NFPs and thereby to enlarge its competence in forest policy (e.g. by means of financial incentive programmes which set guiding principles).

On the other hand, focusing on the empirical finding from other policy domains, regulatory competition was discussed in the sense that member states of the EU compete with each other in order to influence the content and form of European regulations with a view to minimise their own adjustment costs. One strategy to do so, is to formulate innovative policies at the national level - in general, to take innovative steps (e.g. Model Forests) - and to try to promote the adoption of the national regulation at the EU level.

Both mechanisms may serve to overcome deadlocks and to achieve results of joint policy making above the smallest common denominator. They make effective co-ordination towards innovative policies more likely to occur.

10. What is the importance of personal capacities and channels to influence policy making in the context of multi-level governance?

It was emphasised that politicians who are engaged in arenas on several levels ('double binded actors') play a central role as mediators between these levels/arenas. It seems clear that their personal capacities and channels to influence policy making are important explanatory variables. However, it was not discussed whether the focus on individuals is preferable to the analysis of corporate actors.

11. If the formulation and implementation of NFPs is embedded in a system of multi-level governance, what are the effects on the patterns of interest-intermediation on different levels?

It was discussed that the variety of channels to influence policy making in multi-level systems at different levels favours differentiated and well established organisations. Weakly organised and poorly endowed interest groups are disadvantaged (there is a need for a certain degree of organisation to be heard). On the other hand, it was stressed that the integration of forest policy in a system of multi-level governance might offer new possibilities to influence policy making to interest groups which have been excluded from national policy making so far (see above for 'changes in hierarchy'). This might even urge national policy networks to open themselves ('breaking up' of rather closed forest policy communities). As a result, this may lead to changes concerning the 'identity of the forestry sector' (see above).

12. How are hierarchies and bargaining systems effected by different democratic structures and traditions?

Clearly, existing settings of hierarchies and bargaining systems are closely related to the actual degree and modes of democracy. Therefore, different national structures will be affected differently in the course of the formulation and implementation of a NFP.

5. References

Note that all references in this summary of the workshops are to papers published in these proceedings.

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