




The storms of 1999 and 2009 in the Landes de Gascogne

Forest of Landes de Gascogne


→ Context of the two major storms

- Winter storms are usual phenomena on the atlantic coast.
- Memory of damaging events in 1996 (1,5 Mm³) or 1976 (144 Km/h ; 1 Mm³).
- Last major storm :1915. Memory lost and complete different context.
- Risk culture exists but major risk is **fire**.
- In 1999, no experience.
- In 2009, most of forest decision makers with experience of 1999. At a local level at least.
- No contingency plan at state level.




- 1,1 million ha of acid sandy soils (podzosoils)
- 800 000 ha of maritime pine forest (native specie)
- Average annual fellings (without storm) : 8 million m3
- More than 90% private forest and 30000 workers


TWO DEVASTATING CLIMATIC EVENTS



MARTIN 1999
Area affected: 204 000 ha
V damage : 32,8 Mm³
including 28,2 Mm³ of Maritime Pine



KLAUS 2009
Area affected: 494 000 ha
 202 000 ha damaged > 40 %
V damages : 37,1 Mm³ (Mpine)
5 years' harvest
30 000 ha killed by bark beetles
2 000 M€



Inter-professional proposal

- Setting of a “storm committee”
- Development of a strategy (1-2 months)

TARGETS :

- To limit economical losses for foresters

**compensation
of forest owners**

- To provide supply for Maritime Pine industry

Windthrown
harvesting

Forecast : 35 Mm³ / 4 yr

**Setting a regu-
lation storage**

Forecast : 10 Mm³ / 3 yr

- To reconstruct forest

National measures

- No compensation for forest owners...
- ... but a set of measures for promoting « Valorisation by harvesting »
- 6 months

Loans for storage

Subsidies for
transloading

Loans for
harvesting

Loans for buying
damaged wood

Subsidies for
transportation

Subsidies for
storage sites
setting

Loans for sawing
storage

Storage sites

Process abroad

Local process

What goal do we want to reach ? Expertise needed !

Newspapers, TV, radio, people : we had to answer three main questions

- Was it relevant to keep woodland on the whole damaged area ?
- What were the preconditions before reforestation ?
- Do we need to consider adapting or changing silvicultures ? Can we do it ?

POST-STORM REFORESTATION was soon considered to be an OBVIOUS CHOICE AND A NECESSITY

- But foresters had to face many critics (monoculture, plantations, intensive management)
- After 2 major storms in less than 10 years, forest owners motivation was (and still is) a critical factor.

Thinking hard : After-storm silvicultural schemes

*(collective reflection upon research results)
Internal and External expertise, from France (GIP Ecofor)
and EFI network*

Success stories, hardships and bottlenecks

- Total harvesting 2009/2010 : 30 Mm³
- Reopening of 31 000 km of forest tracks
- Logging operations by national firms monitored by the DRAAF
- On the whole... 8 Mm³ stored in 44 stockage areas
- Long distance transportation and export :


✓ ship : ≈ 900 000 t in 2009

✓ train : ≈ 700 000 t in 2009

→ Reforestation plan :
536 M€

→ Reforestation operations
monitored by steering committee

→ Dynamic mapping platform



Success stories, hardships and bottlenecks

→ Difficult Timing

- Complexity of mechanism
- Wood deterioration
- Increase of risks
- Deterioration of sale conditions
- Lack of roundwood storage

⇒ **Incompatibility between administrative time and crisis time**

→ Inefficiency of loans mechanism and target price

- Role of State guarantee, administrative hardships
- Access to bank loans difficult in crisis time
- Huge losses, no prices

→ Side effects of carriage subsidy ?



Thank you for your attention
to this « war time chronicle »

