

Societal expectations, public land values, and management culture in the United States: the role of risk management in addressing a wicked problem.


Dave Calkin Rocky Mountain Research Station, USDA Forest Service







Photo: Kari Greer





Associate Press

Camp Fire 2018: Paradise CA



Tubbs Fire, 2017: Santa Rosa CA

Getty Images




Washington Post

Mendocino Complex 2017: Mendocino, Lake, Colusa Counties CA




Chimney Tops 2, 2016 Gatlinburg Tenessee

Seeley Lake 2017 Wildfire Season Average 24-hour PM_{2.5} Concentrations*[†]




Rice Ridge Fire, 2018: Seeley Lake, MT

Recent US Wildfire Activity





Wildfire Insured Loss




Wicked Problems


- A social or cultural problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize.
- "The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy is bound to fail because of the nature of these problems... Policy problems cannot be definitively described...there is nothing like the indisputable public good; there is no objective definition of equity; policies that respond to <u>social</u> <u>problems</u> cannot be meaningfully correct or false; and it makes no sense to talk about "optimal solutions". (Rittel and Webber 1973)







WUI Development



Expectations of Response and the Role of the Media



Fireaviation.com

Public Perception: A complicated story




Alaska Public Media


Hero Culture



The Firefighting Trap and Political Influence


- A shortsighted cycle of problem-solving where you are trapped responding to emerging problems while failing to address the underlying cause
- Wildfire suppression has become a big business in US (~ \$5 billion US) with a number of large contractors and suppliers.
- Mitigation is typically small scale and timber revenue from many fuel reduction activities typically don't cover cost.





Budget Impacts

Figure 1: The Cost of Wildland Fire (Preparedness, Suppression, FLAME, and related programs) as a Percentage of the Forest Service's Annual Budget



Effect on other USFS programs (2000-2015)

Veg management	-22%	
Facilities	-67%	2
Roads	-46%	
Deferred maintenance	-95%	

21

Water and the Western US





Wildfire Effects – Spatial and Temporal Influences




Issues with Monetization


- Natural resource values, particularly non-use are notoriously difficult to value in monetary terms.
- Individuals' valuation vary greatly.
- Existing research in US has provided little guidance and occasionally contradictory evidence.
- Equity issues abound when considering use values or privately owned assets.

Changes to social and ecological systems necessary but insufficient

Need change in the fire management system as well



Organizational Culture



Great Burn of 1910

Paiute Forestry - Prescribed Fire Debate



What we know about how large fires are managed?

- Data limitations inhibit knowledge and understanding
- Human factors dominate strategies and associated cost vary considerably across regions and incident teams
- Production rate studies show considerable 'inefficiency' and even contradictory results
- Extensive experiential based requirements have limited participation and many IMTs are staffed by non-federal employees (particularly retirees)

Managerial Incentives and Decision Biases

- Decentralized decision making and a lack of control over suppression resource ordering on large fires creates a classic 'tragedy of the commons' where individual managers are incentivized to order resources beyond the level of marginal economic effectiveness increasing fire budget at the expense of funding for non-fire programs.
- A range of classic decision biases such as status quo bias, excessive discounting of future consequences, and loss aversion further promote excessive suppression resource use.

Suppression Effectiveness

- Finney et al. 2009 demonstrated quiescent period critical to fire containment
- Holmes and Calkin 2013 showed suppression resources approximately 15-30 percent efficient relative to reported production rates
- Katuwal et al. 2016 showed hand crews had a negative relationship on the production of final fire perimeter

Limits of Professional Intuition

Conditions for intuitive expertise:

"evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual's opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. **Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.**"

Competence in expert decision makers

Good Performance

- Static Stimuli
- Decisions About Things
- Experts Agree on Stimuli
- More Predictable Problems
- Feedback Available
- Objective Analysis Available
- Problem Decomposable

Adapted from Shanteau (1992)

Poor Performance

- Dynamic (Changeable) Stimuli
- Decisions About Behavior
- Experts Disagree on Stimuli
- Less Predictable Problems
- Feedback Largely Unavailable
- Reliance on Subjective

Analyses

• Problem Not Decomposable

Risk Management

- Risk (ISO 31000): "effect of uncertainty on objectives"
 - Given some objective, "distribution of outcomes"
 - Not just one outcome probability distribution
 - May include good and bad outcomes
- Risk governance should be inclusive, transparent, adaptable and reflexive in the future, particularly given the increasing prominence today of such multi-dimensional 'wicked' problems (Palmer 2011)

Levels of Risk Management

Enterprise

Strategic

Establishment of fundamentals: mission, objectives and their priorities, doctrine, governance, and culture.

Decision Maker: Organizational and government leadership. Analyses that inform strategies that best meet organizational objectives including probability, consequence and relative importance.

Decision Maker: Local senior manager.

Operational

Project level RM with time taken to discuss controls and form comparative options based on given objectives.


Decision Maker: Depends on task and level of risk.

Time-Critical

Real time decisions made in the conduct of operations. E.g. cut tree, order retardant, hike in or fly?

Decision maker: Individual operator, rarely time for additional level of approval


Structured Risk Mitigation Model




Wildfire risk and right tails

- Wildfire size has been shown to follow a power law.
- Extreme events dominate losses
- Mitigation are often designed for less than extreme conditions.

WUI DISASTER SEQUENCE





Community Exposure to Wildfire WA & OR




Figure 4. Sources of housing-unit exposure to wildfire across Washington and Oregon and exposed communities across the two states. The fifty most exposed communities in each state are shown in dark red, the remaining communities in gray. Dark blue areas of the map tend to produce greater annual housing-unit exposure.








Figure 2. Exposure of Washington communities to wildfire. The 50 most-exposed communities (by cumulative annual housing-unit exposure) are shown as larger gray dots. The top 15 are labeled with the rank and community name. See Table 1 for the names of the remaining top-50 communities. Smaller gray dots represent communities not among the 50 most exposed. Only the 382 communities with a mean burn probability greater than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000) are shown; 245 communities with a lower mean burn probability are not shown. Axes are shown on a common-log scale (base 10).







Wildfire Suppression Models



Suppression Difficulty




Potential Control Locations




PODS

Wildfire Risk Assessment



Strategic Response

- Maintain = risk metrics +
 - manage fire for resource benefit
- Restore = risk metrics +/-
 - resource benefits could exist, but values at risk are such that managing fires are difficult under some conditions
- Protect = risk metrics -
 - values at risk make it difficult to manage fires under most conditions. Fuels mitigation work needed
- Exclude = Sonoran desert
- High Complexity = difficult to mitigate risk, and mix of costs/benefits




Infusing Analytics into Fire Planning









Photo credit: Mike Caggiano




O'Connor, C.D., Calkin, D.E. and Thompson, M.P., 2017. An empirical machine learning method for predicting potential fire control locations for pre-fire planning and operational fire management. *International journal of wildland fire*, *26*(7), pp.587-597.







Example from the 2017 Pinal Fire (Tonto NF)




Wei, Y., Thompson, M.P., Haas, J.R., Dillon, G.K. and O'Connor, C.D., 2018. Spatial optimization of operationally relevant large fire confine and point protection strategies: model development and test cases. *Canadian Journal of Forest Research*, *48*(5), pp.480-493.







Planning \rightarrow Implementing \rightarrow Monitoring \rightarrow Review



Fire Line Effectiveness Analysis



Thompson, M., Lauer, C., Calkin, D., Rieck, J., Stonesifer, C. and Hand, M., 2018. Wildfire Response Performance Measurement: Current and Future Directions. *Fire*, 1(2), p.21.



Harvard Business Review

IDEA WATCH

Good Data Won't Guarantee Good Decisions

APRIL 2012 REPRINT F1204A

Most companies have too few analyticssavvy workers. Here's how to develop them. by Shvetank Shah, Andrew Horne, and Jaime Capellá

"To overcome the insight deficit, Big Data – no matter how comprehensive or well analyzed – needs to be complemented by Big Judgement" "Investments in analytics can be useless, even harmful, unless employees can incorporate that data into complex decision making"

Develop informed skeptics:

- the employees best equipped to make good decisions
- effectively balance judgement and analysis
- possess strong analytic skills

US Experience

- Over 100 years of attempting to remove wildfire from many western forest have created increased fuel loading and wildfire hazard.
- Large diversity of human communities and ecological conditions (some highly impacted others relatively intact).
- Climate change increases the likelihood of high severity fire weather conditions.

US Experience

- Human development has greatly expanded into high hazard areas.
- Broad management strategy has not sufficiently evolved to address these issues.
- Government ability to control new development and require homeowner action is limited, private actions (insurance, power companies) will likely have an increasing impact.

Concluding Thoughts

- Societal and political recognition of the unwinnable war on fire.
- The complexity of the wildfire environment and increasing loss requires a more integrated approach using the best available science to inform mitigation, planning, response, and post-fire evaluation and learning.

Concluding Thoughts

- Mitigation and planning must consider the extreme conditions under which loss occurs.
- Active and passive management that increases landscape resilience is required at scales we are currently not organized to address.
- Solutions will need to be designed that recognize the diversity of ecological and human community conditions.
- Social issues will be more challenging than technical issues.