Authors: Doris Wydra, Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies (SCEUS) and Helga Pülzl
Who holds the power in EU decision-making – and in forest policy specifically? Many would point to the European Commission. As “Guardian of the Treaties”, it not only enforces common rules - sometimes against the declared preferences of its 27 Member States - but also holds the sole right of legislative initiative (i.e. the power to propose a new law). This gives the Commission substantial influence over policy agendas, including the framing of forest-related measures and policies.
Yet, “holding power” is more than formal competences: it can be understood as the capacity of actors to shape outcomes by controlling decision-making areas, resources, and discourses (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Scholars have debated how the 2007 Lisbon Treaty reshaped the institutional balance of power in the EU, particularly by making the European Parliament an equal co-legislator with the Council under the “ordinary legislative procedure” (Kreppel 2018). More recent legal scholarship argues that a focus on rules and procedures falls short in understanding institutional authority and has to be complemented by a study of practices and political context (van den Brink 2024). Against this background, the following analysis examines how control over agendas, outcomes, and (financial) resources is distributed in EU forest governance.
Agenda-setting as a strategic power
In agenda-setting, the European Commission suggests itself as the obvious starting point. Despite reforms in the EU’s legislative process, it retains the exclusive right of initiative. This monopoly, combined with its autonomous policy influence and informational advantage, allows the Commission to translate declared priorities into legislative outcomes, even when other EU institutions may not share these priorities (Oztas and Kreppel 2022). Recent research highlights marked differences among the Commission’s DGs in their “quality of legislative anticipation”, or ability to anticipate which policy options are politically viable before proposing them. DG AGRI often sees its drafts pass largely intact, while DG CLIMA struggles to achieve similar success. These disparities reflect not only policy complexity and interest heterogeneity in the Council, but also unequal administrative capacities (Rauh 2021).
But agenda-setting is not the Commission’s domain alone. The European Council which includes the heads of states of the 27 Member States and which is formally limited to setting “the general political direction and priorities”, has, despite lacking a formal legislative role, frequently steered the legislative agenda in practice, producing a relationship of “competitive co-operation” (Bocquillon and Dobbels 2014). The Council’s agenda leadership is further complemented by the European Court of Justice, which engages in “procedural agenda-setting” by framing and developing EU law through its decisions, and by the European Parliament, which exercises “discursive agenda-setting” by shaping debates and mobilising support (Deters and Falkner 2021) – for example in its 2020 recommendations for an EU framework to halt and reverse global deforestation.
Beyond the institutions themselves, interest groups and NGOs – such as forest owner associations (e.g. CEPF, EUSTAFOR), environmental organisations (e.g. WWF, FERN), and industry associations (e.g. CEPI, CEI-BOIS) – also shape the agenda, framing debates through lobbying, media campaigns, and expertise-based advocacy in consultations and expert groups.
Veto power and negotiation leverage
Veto power denotes the capacity of an actor to block or substantially delay political decisions, institutional processes, or collective courses of action by withholding consent. Beyond its blocking function, it also constitutes a form of leverage, enabling actors to extract concessions and advance their own preferences. It matters chiefly where the Council of the European Union decides by unanimity, now confined to a handful of sensitive policy areas (e.g. EU membership, EU finances, foreign policy). In forest-related domains such as climate, agriculture and environment, legislation is instead adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure with qualified majority voting (55% of states representing 65% of the EU population [1]).
Nevertheless, negotiation leverage matters even under majority voting. Contrary to the common belief that large states like Germany dominate outcomes, evidence shows that France, Italy and Germany fare worse in securing their preferences than smaller states, including Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria and the Nordic countries (Golub 2012). Several factors contribute to bargaining success, including effective issue trading, holding centrist Commission-aligned preferences (Lundgren et al. 2019) and the capacity to mobilise structured coordination mechanisms. Cases like the land use, land-use change and forestry Regulation (LULUCF) (2018/841) or the Nature Restoration Law (2024) demonstrate how smaller states can shape outcomes in EU climate and environmental policy by leveraging niche expertise or occupying pivotal positions in qualified voting majority (QMV).
Financial power and control over resources
In EU forest governance, financial power—defined as the capacity to shape outcomes by controlling the flow of resources—operates through several channels. DG AGRI exerts indirect policy influence via the Common Agricultural Policy’s Rural Development pillar (EAFRD) by setting the regulatory framework and approving national strategic plans that govern forest-related subsidies. The actual allocation, however, lies with the Member States. Comparative analyses show that subsidy programmes are tailored primarily to domestic needs rather than to common EU forest policy goals. This results in considerable variation, highlighting the extent of member state control over spending EU financial resources (Haeler et al. 2023).
Beyond public funding, private-sector actors in timber production, bioenergy, and construction exert influence by deploying capital and providing jobs, thereby having a stake in the debate (Deuffic et al. 2018).
Policy instruments increasingly rely on market incentives, such as payments for ecosystem services, to pursue the multiple objectives of forest policy. In this way, the Commission seeks not only to position European forestry as a contributor to sustainability, climate, and biodiversity goals, but also to harness market power to stimulate innovation and broader economic growth. Market incentives can reconfigure governance by shifting the weight of decision-making power from hierarchical governance toward responsiveness to market signals.
Institutional interplay and contestation
The overview above illustrates the fragmented and multifaceted nature of power within the EU’s multilevel system. Decision-making depends less on a single dominant actor than on cooperation and coordination. The Commission may hold the right of legislative initiative, but it acts on the strategic priorities of the European Council and requires agreement from both the Council and the Parliament. Discursive power is likewise dispersed: the Parliament frames debates, the Commission advances communications and strategies, and NGOs and interest groups shape opinion through lobbying and advocacy. Finally, national governments exert influence not only in Council negotiations but also in implementing legislation and controlling financial resources.
Power in the EU is negotiated through compromise, informal influence, and shifting alliances. Because forest policy involves multiple actors – including several General Directorates (DGs) within the Commission, its priorities are contested, and trade-offs are common. This complexity generates both opportunities and constraints; advancing one’s position successfully hinges on coalition-building, effective coordination, and strategic timing.
[1] Voting calculator for the decisions in the Council of the European Union: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/voting-calculator/
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